Jocko Podcast 286: The Indirect Approach is The Best "Strategy" in All Cases.

2021-06-16T21:28:32Z

Underground Premium Content: https://www.jockounderground.com/subscribe Join the conversation on Twitter/Instagram: @jockowillink @echocharles @davidrberke 0:00:00 - Opening 0:01:00 - The Indirect Approach. Pt 2. Strategy, by B.H. Liddell Hart. 1:58:22 - How to stay on THE PATH JOCKO UNDERGROUND Exclusive Episodes: https://www.jockounderground.com/subscribe Jocko Store Apparel: https://www.jockostore.com Jocko Fuel: https://jockofuel.com Origin Jeans and Clothes: https://originmaine.com/durable-goods/ Origin Gis: https://originmaine.com/bjj-mma-fit/ 2:12:42 - Closing Gratitude

AI summary of episode

yeah talking about that guy um back to the book but in seeking to formulate the experience of the Napoleonic wars the emphasis he put on certain retrograde retrograde features helped to cause what might be termed a revolution in reverse back towards true drive-alarm fair Claus Witz theory of the military aim into finding the military aim Claus Witz was carried away by his passion for pure logic quote the and this this makes it really odd this starts to make it really obvious why this stuff doesn't mend with my normal way of thinking quote the aim of all action in war is to disarm the enemy and we shall now show that this inferior at least is indispensable if our opponent is to be made to comply with our will we must place him in a situation where which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice we demand but the disadvantages of this position must naturally not be of a transitory nature at least in appearance otherwise the enemy instead of yielding will hold out in the hope of a change for the better every change in this position which is produced by a continuation of war must therefore be a change for the worse worse the worst condition in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being completely disarmed if therefore the enemy is to be reduced to an into submission he must either be positively disarmed or placed in such a position that he is threatened with it from this follows that the complete disarming or overthrow of the enemy must always be the aim of warfare and quote this reminds me of the bath party in Iraq being completely disarmed how much did that help my freaking hurt right maybe some class witsy and people were saying yep got to disarm them completely completely good job the influence of of can't cont where's where's Darrell Cooper of Darrell Cooper's making jokes about like he's just bringing in deep the echo and I are looking at him like bro wrong crowd the influence of cont can be perceived in class wits dualism of thought he believed in a perfect military world of ideals while recognizing a temporal world in which these could only be imperfectly fulfilled so he's giving credit here's a little credit going back to to class wits like hey man he got it that you got these ideals but everything takes a different shape when we pass from abstractions to reality this object of war in the abstract the disarming of the enemy is rarely attained in practice and is not a condition necessary to peace so he wasn't even saying what he was saying he goes back and kind of backs off it a little bit cost wits his tendency to the extreme is shown again in his discussion of battle as a means to in to the end of war he opened with the startling assertion there is only one single means it is the fight he justified this by a long argument to show that in every form of military activity quote the idea of fighting must necessarily be at the foundation and quote having elaborately proved what most people would be ready to accept without argument cause would said the object of a combat is not always the destruction of enemy forces its object can often be attained as well without the combat taking place at all so there you go he's saying some of the stuff that that I do agree with more over class which recognized that quote the waste of our own military forces must set a risk parabas which means all things being equal always be greater the moral aim is directed upon the destruction of the enemy's power the danger lies in this that the greater efficacy which we which we seek recoils on ourselves and therefore has worse consequences in case we fail of success so he's got some he's got some quantifying statements about his about his thoughts and theories out of his own mouth class with here gave a prophetic verdict upon the consequences of following his own gospel in World War one and two for it was the ideal and not the practical aspect of his teachings on battle which survived he contributed to this distortion by arguing it was only to avoid the risks of battle that quote any other means are taken so it's like we're trying to avoid battle that's the only reason that we're going to do anything else because we're trying to avoid battle and he fixed the distortion in the minds of his pupils by hammering on the abstract ideal. I mean he covered it he did his best to cover it much of the harm might have been avoided but for that fatal cholera germ for there are significant indications that in the gradual evolution of his thought he had reached a point where he was about to drop his original concept of absolute war and revise his whole theory on more common sense lines when death intervened in consequence the way was left open to endless misconceptions far excessive his anticipation for the universal adoption of the theory of unlimited war has gone far to wreck civilization the teaching of classmates taken without understanding largely influenced both the causation and the character of world war one thereby it led on all two logically to world war two theory and flux next section after world war one the course and effects of the first world war provided ample cause to doubt the validity of cross with theory at least interpreted by his successors on land and numerical battles will fought without ever producing the decisive result expected of them but the responsible leaders were slow to adapt their aim to circumstances or develop new means to make the aim more possible and maybe that's why when he was going through the eight um items that we were talking about earlier on the earlier podcast his number one thing remember you're saying the number one thing was his number eight thing his number one thing was adjust your adjust your end to your means and here he's saying the responsible leaders were slow to adapt their aim to the circumstances or develop new means to make the aim more possible instead of facing the problem they pressed theory to a suicide-licks stream draining their own strength beyond the safety limit in pursuit of an ideal of complete victory by battle which was never fulfilled that one side ultimately collapsed that one side ultimately collapsed so the Germans ultimately collapsed do more to emptiness of stomach produced by economic pressure of sea power than the loss of blood although blood which was lost in the abortive German offensive of 1918 and the loss of spirit in consequence of their palpable failure to gain the victory hasten the collapse if this provided the opposition the opposing nations with the semblance of victory their efforts to win it cost them such a price in moral and physical exhaustion that they the seeming victors will left incapable of consolidating their position. it is the negation of statemanship and intelligent strategy which seeks to serve the ends of policy if war be a continuation of policy as clouds with its head elsewhere declared it it must necessarily be conducted with a view to post war benefit a state which expands its strength to the point of exhaustion bank rubs its own policy and by the way that's at all players in world war one cost with himself had qualified the principle of quote utmost force by the admission that quote the political object as the original motive of war should be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made still more significant was a reflective passage in which he remarked that to pursue the logical extreme and tailed that quote the means would lose all relation to the end and in most cases the aim at an extreme effort would be wrecked by the opposite weight of forces within itself what's the what's the return on investment you're going to get his classic work on war was the product of 12 years of intensive thought if it's author had lived to spend a longer time in thinking about war he might have reached a wiser and clearer conclusion as his thinking progressed he was being led toward a different view penetrating deeper unhappily the process was cut short by his death from cholera in 1830 it was only after his death that his writings on war were published by his widow they were found in a number of sealed packets bearing the significant and prophetic note so he wrote a note on his writings and it said should the work be interrupted by my death then what is found can only be called a massive conceptions not brought into form open to endless misconceptions but then he even get to finish his book he wrote free get three chapters and his old lady finished it up uh such a commandment gave reinforcement to the instinctive conservatism of soldiers in resisting the possibilities of a new form of superiority which mechanical invention increasingly offered it also gave powerful impulse to the universal extension and permanent establishment of the method of constricted conscription as a simple way of providing the greatest possible numbers so if you want a big army well if I want to be in charge of a bunch of people you know what I have to say look we need more people if we're gonna win cool start drafting people I want to be in charge more people cool draft more people this by its disregard for psychological suitability meant that armies became much more liable to panic and sudden collapse the earlier method however unsystematic had at least tended to ensure that the forces were composed of good fighting animals this is an interesting shot at classmates classmates contributed no new or strikingly progressive ideas to tactics or strategies he was a codifying thinker rather than a creative or dynamic one he had no such revolutionary effect on warfare as the theory of the divisional system produced in the 18th century or the theory of armored mobility in the 20th which by the way that's what kind of the delheart like is about right and then I was looking at what that was I was gonna write I was gonna write machine gun because for me where the tactics sort of solidified where you can say yep these things hold up it's you gotta have the machine gun that's where we start to get the modern machine gun where we can start to kill a lot of people and how concentration is like the war the worst thing and just right covered move becomes totally important and it's it's important in all areas but it really starts to solidify around there well you use the example of like on steroids of nuclear weapons you know it's on my dispersion you know versus concentration with nuclear weapons I thought of another one just as I was thinking of this is hold the line jacos is hold the line like cool got it If we've got a company and our company's object or our vision, our goal is to be the premier hardware producer for a product that every company the world needs for them to be successful and then I've got a sales team inside there and nobody's saying, well sales is like the most important thing we have, we got to sell this thing, it's the military version for this company and you're out there running the sales team and your objective is sell as many of these things as you can because that's obviously how we become the indispensable producer of this product that everybody's going to need and be the most reputable and reliable company in the world. Once I see now it's one of several different ways and when you made that comment about the military is existance like the ideal thing you would think for the military is I want this military to exist to deter any potential opponent from ever going to war with us in terms of like what would I want from my military? and and you can kind of see I mean what's there's another good saying it's something along the lines of like old men like to send young men to fight young men like to go fight like that's kind of a thing and I guess that's where we end up with these two kind of opposing theories of war and who wants to be called the wimp who wants to be called the weak right because that's what you could easily go back to be actually a heart and say like well he wants to run away he wants to you know attack people from the rear there's a time where attacking someone the rear shoot him in the back was like a horrible thing and I'm just using that one example of trying to be going from this book of like a great way of like I'm care like dude that that is not what he meant I know that's what it says on people If you want to hear some other topics that are adjacent to yet not fully embedded with Jockel podcast topics, but look, even though I think about leadership 20 hours a day, there's other things I think about like psychology, like sociology, like questions, do answering questions from people. So this is a, again, there's very few people that would think that the military mind should focus on hey, I might have to adjust what I'm trying to get to because it seems like the military is more, you know, like we're going to get this done. It's almost a means in and of itself as if the military exists for the military as opposed to this is a tool, one of many tools that actually accomplishes the political means which and to just kind of bring that back a little bit when he talked about the object being a greater piece or a better piece or whatever the term that you use and it's funny because I think I've evolved in my thinking when I hear objective I don't think bridge anymore, I don't think airfield anymore, I think goals I think outcome. I don't I don't get the advanced copy you don't like say Dave we're prepping this I get to hear this and I I'm thinking and I'm trying to analyzing I'm making connections and correlations and and I've kind of just been chuckling a little bit of like hard is just hammering clouds wits but he it's almost like I understand more now of why he's so brutal on the attack of him when he made that connection of he's the reason why we had generals and I think he used the word blunders which is about as nice as you can describe what those leaders did in order one Is it like, do you feel like it's maybe like, because it's like you say glorify, you know, never quit that, yeah, that never quit. The relevance of class was in the 21st century you know start talking about you know like nuclear power nuclear weapon stealth airplanes and things like hey do these maximums of these do these do they hold up to the scrutiny of the 21st century of warfare the modern warfare and a bunch of discussions on that. yeah is that what's going on your coward he's like hey bro I win wounded three times and gasped almost the death you fucking savages and you don't know what that was like you talk about how many times this has come up this the capacity for the dehumanization of our enemies and how there's a danger in there and there's there's a natural piece of that I've seen countless leaders think that they know the way and want to do something a certain way and waste time and effort and resources and most important waste leadership capital to get something done a certain way when my attitude is like, I don't care. But if you're out there selling this product and it hasn't been made yet because our operations team has been stood up or you're selling this and we don't have the support for the clients that are going to buy it to actually give them the tools that need or you're selling this and we don't have the software to update it and back it up, you can actually accomplish your objective by selling this product that doesn't help us achieve the object that doesn't actually help us be successful and I'm not defending cost-wits but there is the military is somebody's car I don't know that's all good. That's what I'm saying, where they oversimplify it, where they have all these cool things like, you know, if they fit first, you don't succeed, you know, try again or you know, all these things. You know, people seem to like and seem saying, I got to admit when I learned the master and I saw some people that had, you know, shirt locker shirts on totally represent extra level of connection.

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Episode transcript

[00:00:00] This is Jockel podcast number 286 with echo turtles and me.
[00:00:05] Jockel will like good evening.
[00:00:06] I go good evening and also joining us again.
[00:00:09] Dave Burke.
[00:00:10] Good evening Dave.
[00:00:12] Good evening.
[00:00:13] So if you haven't listened to 285, just go back and listen to 285 right now.
[00:00:20] We are exploring some of the works of BH LaDelle Hart.
[00:00:25] I explain who he is on 285.
[00:00:29] He's a British soldier, World War I, military theorist, military historian, wrote influenced.
[00:00:36] He's an influencer.
[00:00:37] He's kind of an OG influencer.
[00:00:40] And he legit was.
[00:00:42] He had a lot of influence inside the British military.
[00:00:46] He had influence in all kinds of different military organizations, including some enemy
[00:00:53] military organizations that actually listened to what he had to say.
[00:00:55] So if you haven't listened to 285 yet, go back, listen to 285 and we're going to jump right
[00:01:00] back in to his book, which is called strategy.
[00:01:04] It's a, the last one we covered was the strategy of the indirect approach.
[00:01:08] This, look, everything he does is tied into the strategy of indirect approach.
[00:01:13] And we're going to jump back into this, his other book, well, he's got many books.
[00:01:17] One of his other books called Simply Strategy.
[00:01:20] Basically, they'll, here we go, they have anything before I just jump right into this thing.
[00:01:25] No, let's do it.
[00:01:26] Okay, so we're going to get into a section here called basis of strategy.
[00:01:32] And I think it's very interesting how this one kicks off.
[00:01:35] A deeper truth to which fuck and other disciples of classwrites did not penetrate fully
[00:01:41] is that in war, every problem and every principle is a duality.
[00:01:48] Like a coin, it has two faces.
[00:01:51] So this may remind you of another book you might have heard of called the dichotomy
[00:01:55] a leadership.
[00:01:56] There you go.
[00:01:57] Again, I think I owe this guy some royalties.
[00:02:00] I didn't know.
[00:02:01] I mean, I could have called the book the duality of leadership, but I didn't.
[00:02:06] Right, called the dichotomy a leadership.
[00:02:09] Like a coin, it has two faces.
[00:02:10] Hence the need for well, a well calculated compromise as a new one.
[00:02:15] Well, calculated compromise as a means to reconciliation.
[00:02:20] What does that mean be balanced?
[00:02:22] Big shocker.
[00:02:24] This is the inevitable consequence of the fact that war is a two-party affair.
[00:02:28] So imposing the need that while hitting one must guard.
[00:02:34] This is just the, you got a balance that I caught in me some leadership.
[00:02:37] You can't just be on all.
[00:02:38] It's all offence, you got to have a guard up.
[00:02:40] You can't just be have your guard up, you got to go on offence, you got to be balanced.
[00:02:43] It's a corollary that in order to hit with effect the enemy must be taken off.
[00:02:47] His guard, effective concentration can only be obtained when the opposing forces are dispersed
[00:02:53] and usually in order to ensure this, once own forces must be widely distributed.
[00:03:00] Thus, by an outward paradox, true concentration is the product of dispersion.
[00:03:07] So isn't this interesting?
[00:03:09] We have to concentrate our forces, but we have to disperse our forces in order to dislocate and put the enemy off balance.
[00:03:17] So there's an economy.
[00:03:19] We have to be together so that we can act effectively, but we have to be spread out.
[00:03:24] So we can put the enemy off balance.
[00:03:26] What happens if we get too far spread out?
[00:03:28] Well, now we're, now we're weak.
[00:03:30] What happens if we're too concentrated?
[00:03:31] Well, now we can't disperse the, we can't dislocate the enemy.
[00:03:36] A further consequence of the two-party condition is that to ensure reaching an objective,
[00:03:41] one should have an alternative objective or alternative objectives.
[00:03:48] Plural.
[00:03:49] Here in lies, a vital contrast to the single-minded 19th-century doctrine of fuck and his fellows,
[00:03:58] a contrast of the practical to the theoretical.
[00:04:02] For if the enemy is certain as to your point of aim, he has the best possible chance of guarding himself,
[00:04:09] and blunting your weapon.
[00:04:11] This is why in Gigietsu, you have to do more than one move.
[00:04:13] You can't just grab the arm and think you're going to get the arm lock, it's not going to work.
[00:04:18] If, on the other hand, you take a line that threatens alternative objectives, you distract his mind and his forces.
[00:04:26] This, moreover, is the most economic method of distraction for it allows you to keep the largest proportion of your force available on your real line of operation,
[00:04:37] thus reconciling the greatest possible concentration with the necessity of dispersion.
[00:04:45] So, you have to have some different objectives.
[00:04:49] If you just grab the arm, that's not going to, if you just flank, if you're like, okay, hey, we're going to flank the enemy.
[00:04:55] Okay, the enemy goes, oh wait, looks like they're moving over there.
[00:04:57] Cool. Now we adjust our forces, now that flank becomes the front.
[00:05:01] So you have to have multiple objectives. Now, what if you go to flank and they think,
[00:05:04] oh, that's not, that's just a, that's just a fake move.
[00:05:07] So now they don't put their forces over, then you attack it.
[00:05:09] But if you only have one objective, and the enemy recognizes what that is, they're going to defend it heavily,
[00:05:16] and you're not going to be able to achieve victory.
[00:05:22] So the absence of an alternative is contrary to the very nature of war.
[00:05:28] It sins against the light, which Borzet shed in the 18th century by his most penetrating victim,
[00:05:37] that, quote, every plan of campaign ought to have several branches,
[00:05:43] and to have been so well fought out that one or the other of the said branches cannot fail of success.
[00:05:54] So get gotta have multiple branches, and they should be well enough fought out that one of them is going to work.
[00:06:03] One of, one of those branches, one of those lines of operation is going to work.
[00:06:09] This was the light that his military air, the young Napoleon Bonaparte, followed in seeking always, as he said, you guys want me to go French?
[00:06:20] Yeah, kind of.
[00:06:22] A fair, son, fame, and dur, facions.
[00:06:29] There you go. What does that mean?
[00:06:32] It means, make your theme in two ways.
[00:06:36] You've got to have two different approaches.
[00:06:40] And it's just, he calls it, it's a sin against the old victims, right?
[00:06:45] Which is a gun, you gotta have a focus, you gotta aim for that.
[00:06:48] Contintrate your forces in one spot.
[00:06:50] It's like, cool, what if the enemy defends that one spot?
[00:06:53] You're screwed in technical terms.
[00:06:59] Seven years later, Sherman was to relearn the lesson from experience by reflection and coin, his infamous maximum about, quote, putting the enemy on the horns of a dilemma.
[00:07:11] End quote.
[00:07:12] In any problem, we're an opposing force exists, and cannot be regulated, one must foresee and provide for alternative courses.
[00:07:19] Adaptability is the law which governs survival and war as in life.
[00:07:24] War being a concentrated, war being but a concentrated form of the human struggle against the environment.
[00:07:30] Thank you.
[00:07:32] Amplified, intensified, but nonetheless, a concentrated form of the human struggle.
[00:07:41] To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy's power to frustrate it.
[00:07:47] The best chance of overcoming such an obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily very to fit the circumstances met.
[00:07:57] I mean, I just was saying this today on a YF online.
[00:08:00] You gotta have a flexible plan.
[00:08:02] You gotta have a flexible plan.
[00:08:04] And you think that seems super obvious, but you know what?
[00:08:07] People want to control, and they want to eliminate the unknown.
[00:08:11] And how do you eliminate the unknown? You come up with a plan.
[00:08:14] Well, guess what? They're still unknown even when you have a plan.
[00:08:19] And the more rigid you make a plan, the less adaptable and flexible it becomes, which is bad.
[00:08:29] To keep such adaptability while keeping the initiative, the best way is to operate a long align, which offers alternative objectives.
[00:08:38] For thereby, you put your opponent on the horns of a dilemma, which goes far to assure the game.
[00:08:43] To assure the gaining of at least one objective, whichever is the least guarded, and may enable you to gain the other one afterwards.
[00:08:50] Boom.
[00:08:52] In the tactical field where the enemy's dispositions are likely to be based on the nature of the ground, it may be more difficult to find a choice of dilemma producing objectives than it is in the strategic field where the enemy will have obvious industrial and railway centers to cover.
[00:09:07] But you can gain a similar advantage by adapting your line of effort to the degree of resistance that is met and exploiting any weaknesses is found.
[00:09:15] A plan like a tree must have branches if it is to bear fruit. A plan with a single aim is apt to prove a barren pole.
[00:09:25] I'm just thinking of this idea of having multiple objectives, and then the dilemma that that causes, and even just in aviation terms like we go out on a mission and our objective is to destroy enemy or defenses.
[00:09:40] Sam sides or mobile sams or whatever it might be.
[00:09:44] But it's actually reliant on them to have those systems active and operating because how you find them, if they're shut down in the dormit, you actually can't find them.
[00:09:52] If they're mediating, they're not uncovered, you could fly around and not have them there.
[00:09:56] But if they don't have their Sam systems or air defense is objective, then the things that they're defending are vulnerable.
[00:10:03] So the secondary mission we'd have these, the thing called a TPL, a target priority list of these things aren't there?
[00:10:07] Cool, go to this. Those things aren't there? Cool, go to this. And sooner or later one will be exposed.
[00:10:12] And as you start to attack those defended positions, like bridges or roads or things that matter.
[00:10:19] And on those right now, there's turn on the radar. It's exactly right. And that idea that we would have multiple target priorities, which all eventually are designed to lead us back to the number one priority, which might not get on that mission.
[00:10:31] But we get in the next wave or the next wave.
[00:10:33] And sooner or later they're stuck in a place like, well, if we don't turn these things on, we're going to lose all of our critical infrastructure and there's nothing to defend and creating that dilemma by having multiple objectives on each flight.
[00:10:46] And in the business world, this whole concept is we hear debates or arguments against this, right? You got to have a clear objective.
[00:11:00] And that makes sense. I tell people that we got to make sure we understand what the objective is.
[00:11:06] That being said, we also don't want to have a single point of failure.
[00:11:10] Where hey, you know what, we're going to make one product. We're going to make one product. And if this product does, it's products is the one. We're going to put all of our money, all of our birds in this basket.
[00:11:22] Is that the one?
[00:11:23] Eggs.
[00:11:24] All our eggs that are going to go in this basket. Don't do that. Don't do that.
[00:11:29] Don't put all your eggs in one basket. That's there you go. Never mind.
[00:11:33] Be aged l'a d'elle hart, whichever farmer thought of that one after his kid dropped the basket full of eggs. Right?
[00:11:40] Is like hey kid, don't put all your eggs in one basket. Put them in two baskets. Same thing.
[00:11:47] It's the exact same thing.
[00:11:49] And yet, we can get focused on one objective.
[00:11:53] And as soon as you meet resistance, if you're not ready to switch to another one, like Dave Burke, flying up there and going,
[00:12:00] going home, there's nothing to let you shoot at. Cool. What's the next objective? Bridges.
[00:12:03] Let's go. Rock and roll. Okay. So now we're going to roll a new section called cutting
[00:12:11] communications in planning any stroke at the enemy's communications either by maneuver
[00:12:17] round his flank or by rapid penetration of a breach and his front. The question will
[00:12:22] arise as to the most effective point of aim whether it should be directly against the
[00:12:26] immediate rear or the opposing force or further back. When studying the question, so again,
[00:12:32] and I talked about this before on the last podcast is, every time it talks about communications,
[00:12:39] it's telling you, hey, you better, you better keep your communication open. We talk about attacking
[00:12:46] the enemy's communications and that's how we cause unbalanced and that's how we kind of crush
[00:12:50] them. Great. We're glad to know that. That's also a reminder to us as leaders that
[00:12:55] communication is so paramount to getting our job done. When he's got a whole section called
[00:13:01] cutting communication, guess what? That should mean to us from a red cell perspective. Don't let
[00:13:06] your communication get cut. And yet we work with companies all the time where the communication
[00:13:10] isn't open and it's not flowing and people on the front line don't know what's happening.
[00:13:14] And the people in the head shed don't get the feedback that they should be getting from the front
[00:13:18] lines. There's not communication happening. And yet there's a whole section here about cutting
[00:13:22] communication and you're allowing your communications to be cut when there's not even an enemy.
[00:13:26] It's not like your competitor got into your email system or got into your phone system and didn't
[00:13:31] let you call your front line leadership. That didn't happen. You failed to do it.
[00:13:39] So where do we cut the communication? When studying this question at the time that experimental
[00:13:44] mechanized forces were first created and their strategic use was under consideration. I saw
[00:13:48] guidance on it by analysis of cavalry raids carried out in the past especially in the more recent
[00:13:54] wars since railways came into use. While such cavalry raids had more limited potentials
[00:13:59] than a deep strategic penetration of mechanized forces seemed to me to promise
[00:14:05] that this difference emphasized rather than detracted from making the significant evidence
[00:14:10] which they provided, making the necessary adjustment the following deductions could be drawn.
[00:14:14] And I'm going to kind of burn through this section. The overall concept is that
[00:14:21] the nearer to the force that the cut is made the more immediate the effect.
[00:14:26] And the nearer to the base the greater the effect. This is common sense. Right? If you kill the
[00:14:31] the node at the headquarters, they can't communicate to anybody, but it's going to take a while
[00:14:36] for that impact to hit the front lines for them to actually not know what's going on.
[00:14:40] Whereas if you cut the front line node, that immediate node is kind of messed up. So that's the general
[00:14:47] consensus that he gets into there. He goes on to say these deductions were confirmed by the
[00:14:56] experience of the second war above all the catastrophic, the catastrophically paralyzing effect
[00:15:02] physically and psychologically that was produced when gradients, panzerforces, racing far ahead of the
[00:15:10] main German armies severed the Allied army's communications where these crossed the far back line
[00:15:17] of the song and this is where you run into problems. So catastrophically paralyzing when we start to
[00:15:23] cut off communications. So look, are you going to go into your competitors, you know, headquarters
[00:15:29] and destroy their their their internet and their email? No, you're not going to do that. But are you
[00:15:35] allowing that to happen just by just by human nature and laziness and not lack of prioritizing
[00:15:42] execute? Are you going to allow your communications to fall apart? There's a decent chance you are
[00:15:45] we work with companies all the time that aren't communicating. They might as well have had
[00:15:51] panzerforces going caught off their email between their front lines and them because there's no email
[00:15:56] happening. There's no conference calls happening. There's no text happening. We don't know what's
[00:16:00] going on. We've lost communications, not through enemy action, but through our own fault.
[00:16:07] Yeah, and one of the ways, one of the places we see that with business is that the communication
[00:16:13] is a one-way communication where I am dictating or or directing or communicating to you. I'm transmitting
[00:16:20] and there's no response to that transmission. There's no communication really isn't designed for me
[00:16:29] to hear what you have to say. It's for me to tell you what to do and how to do it and when to do it
[00:16:33] and where to do these things. Yeah, and I get that compliance, but I don't get that communication,
[00:16:38] which is a almost guaranteed that sooner or later when when they're as friction with that
[00:16:46] without that communication, is that plan is going to fail? Even when I was just talking about
[00:16:52] communication, I said, you're not getting the information in front lines and you're not getting
[00:16:57] the feedback you need, which is what you just said. It's like, hey, communication is supposed to go
[00:17:02] in two ways. That's what's supposed to be happening if we don't let it happen. We're going to have problems.
[00:17:06] We're going to have problems. And in making this relevant to these civilian world or the
[00:17:14] private sector, the needle, the bias needle of the communication, would be to be transmit is
[00:17:20] little as possible and receive as much as possible. When I have my team communicating to me,
[00:17:29] more than I'm communicating to them, here's what we're seeing, here's what we're doing, here's the
[00:17:33] problem, here's how we're doing, here's how we're doing, and so that's what you would want. That's how
[00:17:36] you would set up the bias. Yes, the bias is, if I see that I'm the, as the leader doing 90% of the
[00:17:41] communication, I'm, I'm, the needle is in the wrong direction. And so the ability for my people to
[00:17:47] communicate to me, for me to hear from them what they're doing, what they're seeing, where they are,
[00:17:53] and I'm doing less communicating to them than they are communicating up to me. That's where I want that needle.
[00:18:01] That falls into something I was talking about the other day on, on our online platform.
[00:18:06] I use this term in both, it's struck, I think both you and life, because you've never heard me say it
[00:18:12] before I started using the term traditional leadership. Yeah, and then like an archetypical leadership.
[00:18:18] What does that mean? Well, when we think of a leader, what do we think of? Like if you just say,
[00:18:22] oh, what does a leader do? Well, a leader gives orders, a leader talks, a leader tells everyone
[00:18:26] what's going on. They tell people what to do. That's traditional leadership.
[00:18:29] And actually in my mind, if I'm doing that sort of traditional leadership, I've made
[00:18:37] 47 mistakes to get to a point where I have to tell you what's going on. I have to give orders. I have to
[00:18:44] give you direction about where to go and what to do. I've made so many mistakes if I'm doing
[00:18:48] that traditional leadership role of like, all right, here's what we're doing. Does that happen
[00:18:54] sometimes? And that was when I was talking about the case does sometimes happen where we got a
[00:18:58] leadership vacuum known as what to do. There's some confusion. And sometimes we do have to take
[00:19:02] a role as traditional leader, step in, tell everyone what to do, is what we're doing in this
[00:19:05] direction we're having. And in a traditional leadership role, I'm in charge. I'm the one that's
[00:19:12] putting out the word. We want to flip the script on that to what to your point. Traditional leadership
[00:19:19] is not what my ideal is. Ideal leadership is Dave's actually giving me information and telling
[00:19:28] me what's going on. And I have to give very little communication back because he already understands
[00:19:33] the community's intent and what his roles were ready. By the way, it knows more about what's
[00:19:36] happening on his front than I do totally. And he's trying to inform me, but still he's there.
[00:19:41] So that traditional leadership versus ideal leadership is something to pay attention to.
[00:19:52] And if you had whatever version of a catastrophic communication failure exists, it doesn't have to
[00:19:59] be the phone lines in combat, but something that prevents you from communicating. If your people can't
[00:20:05] operate based on your intent with zero communication and just go out there and execute and tell
[00:20:10] somehow that communication line is reopened for whatever reason. Again, that is your failure as a leader
[00:20:17] that they don't know what to do if you're not there to tell them what to do. So I don't, you know,
[00:20:23] in whatever world you're in your version of a communication cutoff, your people should still be
[00:20:29] able to execute. Honour of a zone. Next little section called the method of advanced until the
[00:20:37] end of the 18th century, a physically concentrated advance, both strategic to the battlefield
[00:20:42] and tactical on the battlefield was the rule. Then Napoleon, exporting, boursays, ideas, and new
[00:20:52] divisional system introduced a distributed strategic advance. The army moving in independent fractions.
[00:21:00] But the tactical advance was still in general concentrated one. This is, you know, we're
[00:21:09] starting in a decentralized command. And you know, I mentioned Borsay already Biel, you are CET.
[00:21:14] He's another French general, 1700s. I think you, yeah, born in 1700 died in 1780, but this is
[00:21:23] another guy that had a little bit of vision, right? Had a vision about decentralized command,
[00:21:29] and that's kind of one of them. This divisional system, where you can start to get people to move
[00:21:35] on their own. And that is a better way to advance. Back to the book, toward the end of, oh, and by the
[00:21:43] way, to Dave's point, we know where we're going. And if you lose, if you got your division and
[00:21:49] Ecos got his division and carries got his division and you lose comms with me, it doesn't matter
[00:21:55] three days later, you're very supposed to be because you knew where you were going.
[00:22:00] Back to the book, toward the end of the 19th century with a development of fire weapons,
[00:22:04] the tactical advance became dispersed, i.e. and particles to diminish the effective fires.
[00:22:09] This is when we really start to get to dispersion. But the strategic advance had become concentrated.
[00:22:17] This would do partly to the influence of railways and growth of the masses,
[00:22:21] partly to the misunderstanding of the Napoleonic methods. So when we started to use machine guns,
[00:22:27] well, then people started dispersing tactically, but because of trains, we are moving these
[00:22:32] mass groups together. A revival of the distributed advance was required in order to
[00:22:39] revive the art and effective strategy. Moreover, new conditions, air power, and motor power,
[00:22:46] point to its further development into a dispersed strategic advance.
[00:22:52] The danger of air attack, the aim of mystification and the need of drawing full value from
[00:22:58] mechanizability suggests that advancing forces should not only be distributed as widely as
[00:23:02] as is compatible with combined action, but be dispersed as much is compatible with cohesion.
[00:23:10] So what they're saying, there's a balance that you have to have. We got to be as far apart as we possibly
[00:23:15] can, but as long as we're still a cohesive unit, that's the dichotomy that you have to balance.
[00:23:23] This becomes essential in the face of atomic weapons, obviously we can't be all together because we
[00:23:27] could get nooks. It's crazy that we sit here and chuckle at that, because for us, it's almost like
[00:23:35] hey, that couldn't happen, but hey, and we've covered, we've covered some significant military
[00:23:42] manuals where they talk about the actual, their planning on how they're going to maneuver when
[00:23:48] the enemy is using tactical nukes, which is crazy to think about. The development of radio
[00:23:56] is a timely aid towards reconciling dispersion with control. Instead of the simple idea of concentrated
[00:24:03] stroke by a concentrated force, we should choose according to circumstances between these variants
[00:24:11] and give some options here. Dispursed advanced with concentrated single aim. IE against one
[00:24:19] objective. Dispursed advanced with concentrated serial aim, which means when we get there
[00:24:24] we're going to go off their multiple successive objectives. Dispursed advanced with distributed
[00:24:30] aim, IE against a number of objectives simultaneously. The effectiveness of armies depends on the
[00:24:38] development of such new methods, methods which aim at permeating and dominating areas, rather than
[00:24:46] capturing lines. At the practical object of paralyzing the enemy's action rather than the theoretical
[00:24:53] object of crushing his forces. Fluidity of forces may succeed where concentration of force
[00:25:03] merely entails rigidity, a perilous rigidity. So at times, Bruce Lee, we want to be like water.
[00:25:15] Fluidity of force is sometimes better than just concentration of force. If you can move
[00:25:21] Jeff Glover on the jujitsu mats, you grab something on him and he's somewhere else.
[00:25:27] You grab something on Dean, he's countering. You grab something on Jeffy Glover, he's maneuvering.
[00:25:36] Like it's gone. It's like a piece of slime. You squeeze one part, he pops out another part.
[00:25:47] With Dean, you can't squeeze. Like it doesn't go anyone. He does the squeezing.
[00:25:50] Yeah, you're getting squeezed. That's the way it worked. All right. Just the word fluid. And I mentioned
[00:26:00] before, I talked about fluid moves to sport. Just the idea of being fluid is it's flexibility.
[00:26:06] It's the ability to be reactive to the situation in a way that puts you in a place to be
[00:26:12] available to support as you need it. But far enough away to maneuver as you need to. And I just
[00:26:19] think the idea of in this era, I'm talking about fluid when the backdrop of Warver 1.
[00:26:27] And I know we've hit this a thousand times the backdrop of Warver 1 was
[00:26:32] was whatever the opposite of fluid is. The inability to adjust to maneuver to do something,
[00:26:43] that analogy you did was like that slime thing of ice squeeze here and something pops it over there.
[00:26:48] That the being the ability to be fluid and the inherent the way you'd want to describe
[00:26:57] the organization or your reaction to things go on in your organization of being fluid and how
[00:27:02] quickly people get to being rigid with their thought processes, their ideas, their objectives,
[00:27:09] what they want to accomplish and how quickly it becomes rigid.
[00:27:12] So, so check this out. We're in World War 1, okay? We actually have a culture
[00:27:23] that views fluidity as weakness. The Victorian culture, if you want to run away from danger,
[00:27:33] you're a coward. You're weak. Now take that and bring a thread to the boardroom, bring a thread
[00:27:41] to the conference room in a company. And if Dave presents an idea to me and I back down because I
[00:27:48] agree with his idea or I back down because I see some holes in my idea, I might be viewed as weak.
[00:27:54] So I'm not going to be fluid instead. I'm going to be rigid. I'm going to stand up to Dave. We're
[00:27:57] going to fight about it. And by the way, if I rank you, I'm going to win. It's freaking ridiculous.
[00:28:04] Crazy. But we have this culture and that culture, you know, look, the culture, the reason that
[00:28:10] culture exists, especially the culture of rigidity, is directly tied to our human nature, our ego,
[00:28:18] right? Because we feel like, oh, I don't want to, I'm not going to back down to Dave. I'm not going
[00:28:23] to let that happen. It's like, actually, you know, a good call, Dave, I like your idea better.
[00:28:30] The odd thing about this is that it makes me look stronger. It makes me look open-minded and flexible
[00:28:37] and confident to be like, you know what, Dave? Like your idea. Let's roll with that. The whole room,
[00:28:41] the whole freaking conference room goes damn. Jack was got some confidence. He's good with
[00:28:45] whatever plan. He just wants us to win as opposed to actually Dave. You know what? I've heard
[00:28:50] enough from you. We're going with my plan. Every one in the room goes, oh, he's weak. I think I'm
[00:28:56] strong. I'm being weak. And everybody perceives me as weak. Everybody perceives me. This is the
[00:29:02] one of the hardest lessons to learn. This one of the hardest lessons to learn is that flexibility
[00:29:11] is viewed as a strength. Fluidity is viewed as a strength. Putting your ego and being humble is
[00:29:17] viewed as strength. And when you do the opposite, when you're rigid, it's viewed as weakness. When
[00:29:21] you let your ego flare up, it's viewed as weakness. It's viewed as insecurity. And we see this all day
[00:29:27] long. We see this all day long. Jack. Next chapter. The concentrated essence of strategy and tactics.
[00:29:45] Do I own role? Realty's for my book. Do I? I think I kind of. At first I was like,
[00:29:49] yeah, but then now it may be to the children and descendants of Beech the Del Hart. Unfortunately for
[00:29:59] you, this book was published over 50 years ago. So we are cleared. And I apologize. But that's where we're at.
[00:30:09] Hopefully people will buy this book and you'll get some support. It's fantastic.
[00:30:14] This brief chapter is a temp to epitomize from the history of war. And as soon as you hear
[00:30:20] this day, you're going to kind of be like, oh, here we go. This brief chapter is an attempt to
[00:30:25] epitomize from the history of war, a few truths of experience, which seem so universal and so
[00:30:32] fundamental as to be termed axioms. They are practical guides, not abstract principles.
[00:30:40] Napoleon realized that only the practical is useful when he gave us his maxams.
[00:30:47] But the modern tendency, which we call upon, we are not going to ask you, we covered the
[00:30:51] Napoleon's maxams on this podcast. You can Google it since echo does not know. No, do I.
[00:30:57] Check. The modern tendency has been to search for principles which can be expressed in a single word.
[00:31:05] And then need several thousands words to explain them. Even so these principles are so
[00:31:12] abstract that they may mean different things to different men. And for any value depend on the
[00:31:18] individual's own understanding of war. The longer one continues to search for such omnipotent
[00:31:24] abstract abstractions, the more do they appear on mirage, neither attainable, nor useful,
[00:31:30] except as an intellectual exercise. These principles of war, not merely one principle,
[00:31:37] can be condensed into a single word concentration. So he's saying this word concentration,
[00:31:43] which we all learn concentration of forces. He's saying, good day. All these principles
[00:31:47] and put them into the word concentration. Okay. Let's start there. But for truth,
[00:31:52] this needs to be amplified as the concentration of strength against weakness. And for any real
[00:31:59] value it needs to be explained that the concentration of strength against weakness depends on the
[00:32:03] dispersion of your opponent's strength, which in turn is produced by a distribution of your own,
[00:32:08] that gives the appearance and partial effective dispersion. Your dispersion, his dispersion,
[00:32:13] your concentration, such as the sequence and equal and each is the sequel. True concentration is
[00:32:19] a force of calculated dispersion. So he's saying even though it's really easy to say
[00:32:22] kind of concentration, it's like, oh, there's a lot more going on than that. Yeah. Here we have
[00:32:28] a fundamental principle whose understanding may prevent a fundamental error and the most common
[00:32:35] that of giving your opponent freedom and time to concentrate to meet your concentration.
[00:32:42] This is why when you cover and move, you put down covering fire. And then the other element moves.
[00:32:49] Why? It's that covering fire that doesn't allow the enemy to maneuver to meet your concentration.
[00:32:56] But to state that the principle is not much practical aid for execution.
[00:33:05] The above mentioned axioms here expressed as maximums cannot be condensed into a single word,
[00:33:10] but they can be put into the fewest words necessary to be practical. Eight in all.
[00:33:16] So far, six are positive. Eight in all so far. It's interesting. He's saying like, hey,
[00:33:21] this is probably going to change. But this is where we're at. So far, six are positive and two are
[00:33:25] negative. They apply to tactics as well as strategy unless otherwise indicated. Number one.
[00:33:33] And these are the positive ones. Number one, adjust your end to your means.
[00:33:41] Adjust your end to your means. This is another thing that's, you got to know your objective.
[00:33:49] You got to stick to your objective. He's actually saying, look, man, you got to make some adjustments.
[00:33:53] You're, your end may change based upon your means. And here's what he says. In determining
[00:34:01] your object, clear sight and cool calculation should prevail. Wouldn't that be nice?
[00:34:07] It is folly to quote, bite off more than you can chew and quote, and the beginning of military
[00:34:14] wisdom is a sense of what is possible. That's the beginning of military wisdom. What's actually
[00:34:23] possible? And this is where you, you know, you can get into some, you know, theoretical
[00:34:32] ideas about, but if you believe it. It's like, no, and it's actually interesting. I remember
[00:34:36] at the early musters. I got asked about this and I explained belief as seeing an actual pathway
[00:34:46] to victory. You, you've got to believe means you can actually see an actual pathway, a viable pathway
[00:34:54] to achieve what you're talking about. Because to think, you know what, I want to be an astronaut.
[00:35:01] Like right now, I'm 49 years old. I guess I could figure out a, not, not really. I probably
[00:35:10] have a better chance of becoming an astronaut than an NBA player, right? Same. So is there? Okay,
[00:35:17] same. Thanks for the support bro. Is there a viable pathway for me to become an NBA player?
[00:35:23] Not really. Not really. So therefore, I need to adjust the end a little bit. Find something a little
[00:35:33] more feasible. He goes on to say, so learn, so learn to face facts while still preserve faith.
[00:35:44] There will be ample need for faith. The faith that can achieve the apparent impossible
[00:35:49] when action begins. So look, we got to have a positive attitude. Confidence is like the current
[00:35:55] in a battery, avoid exhausting it in vain effort. And remember that your own continued confidence
[00:36:01] will be of no avail if the cells of your battery, the men upon whom you depend, have been run down.
[00:36:10] So this is a, again, there's very few people that would think that the military mind should focus on
[00:36:18] hey, I might have to adjust what I'm trying to get to because it seems like the military is
[00:36:25] more, you know, like we're going to get this done. Like no, this is the number one, the number one
[00:36:34] axiom he's talking about, adjust your end to your means. Number two, keep your object always in mind.
[00:36:40] Now this is a dichotomy, right? Keep your your your object always in mind while adapting your
[00:36:46] plan to circumstances. Realize that there are more, we realize that there are more ways than one
[00:36:53] of gaining an object, an object, but take heed that every objective should bear on the object.
[00:37:01] And in considering this, just just real quick, if you as a leader can understand the fact that
[00:37:12] there's more ways than one of gaining an object, your life just got a thousand times more easy.
[00:37:17] Mm-hmm. Just got a thousand times easier. I've seen countless leaders
[00:37:26] think that they know the way and want to do something a certain way and waste time and effort
[00:37:33] and resources and most important waste leadership capital to get something done a certain way
[00:37:39] when my attitude is like, I don't care. I don't care how you want to get this done. I don't care.
[00:37:45] This is what we want to get done. How do you want to do it? Cool. Sounds good. It's a viable plan.
[00:37:50] It's a minimally viable plan. Dave's plan, you know what? I might do it differently.
[00:37:55] Dave's plan looks like it'll work too cool. And by the way, do we know your plan is going to work
[00:38:00] perfectly? No, we don't. Do I know my plan is going to work perfectly? No, we don't. So why am I
[00:38:04] going to invest a bunch of resources and time and effort and arguing and leadership capital?
[00:38:08] Trying to convince you to use my plan and set a year plan when they're both a freaking gamble.
[00:38:13] Don't waste your time. Connecting, connecting those two, I guess, axioms together or those
[00:38:28] those fundamental things from a leadership standpoint of, and we even talked about this, you know,
[00:38:33] from as a leader showing people a path to the end state that might not happen today,
[00:38:40] might happen tomorrow, but it's possible if you're going to say, hey, let's bring you to the three of us.
[00:38:43] We're going to be $100 million company. And I've got no way to show you how that's going to happen
[00:38:53] other than either just belief or faith or hope for a miracle or, hey, this one product,
[00:39:02] this is going to be. We're going to have this magical product and this is going to work. And I
[00:39:07] could also say, hey, listen, our goal, we want to be $100 million company. Let me tell you,
[00:39:13] what's going to, what we're going to have to do right now, we're not. We're going to do this in this.
[00:39:18] And that's going to allow us to bring in this other group, maybe get an acquisition here.
[00:39:21] And you can start to lay out this path and people, and I've seen it in those rooms where you see
[00:39:24] the leaders lay out the path to getting there, not the exact steps we're going to take, but what,
[00:39:29] we, and all of a sudden people go, oh, oh, yeah, we can do that. And that's going to lead to this.
[00:39:34] And then we bring in more people and we bring in more resources. We bring in another company that does this,
[00:39:40] just laying out the steps. So people in their minds understand, and I'm just saying this because
[00:39:45] of the word viable, the, the, the, the, the value of people saying, oh, that's actually not crazy.
[00:39:53] What you're saying is not this magic crazy pipe dream. I can actually see how if we do this. And then
[00:39:59] if I, on that second step of as a subordinate leader, understand what you're trying to accomplish.
[00:40:05] And you're not here saying turn left to your chin right here, do this. And not telling me what to do,
[00:40:09] or how to do it. You're just telling me the end state that we want. Then I actually get to be the
[00:40:14] one that drives us to that goal. That is actually so much more believable now because it's viable
[00:40:18] because you lay that out. And then let me, let me move towards that objective.
[00:40:22] Here's a detail that I just picked up on taking what you said when you said what I said back to me.
[00:40:30] And I was like, oh, there's an, there's an error in what I said. When I, when I said a belief is
[00:40:39] seeing a path to victory. What it should actually be is seeing paths plural to victory.
[00:40:48] But in the reason I thought of this is because as you're sitting here talking about, well,
[00:40:50] if I say, okay, Dave, we're going to make a $100,000 company. And you go, oh, that sounds
[00:40:56] awesome. Come in. Yeah. But how are we going to do that? And I lay out one single path to get us there.
[00:41:04] You know, that's cool. Everything. But your, your faith in that is going to go down a little bit.
[00:41:10] But if I say, hey, listen, here's our five different lines of operations. And here's what
[00:41:16] each one of these things are going to produce. And you know what, chances are Dave, one or two of these
[00:41:21] might fail completely. They're good ideas. I like them. But we don't haven't gone far enough
[00:41:26] down them to really understand. But we know that of these ideas, we have made some progress in all of them.
[00:41:31] And we see potential. So if two or three of these paths go the way we want them to, we're going to be
[00:41:36] right where we want to be. We're going to get that $100 million. So even, you know, going back to the
[00:41:42] last podcast, having multiple avenues of approach is highly beneficial to your belief system
[00:41:51] being distributed and how you go to an objective. Right. Right. Having more than one objective,
[00:41:57] having more than one pathway to that objective. Yeah. And by the way, also saying, look, we might,
[00:42:04] we might not make this one objective over here. But we're still going to get where we want to be.
[00:42:07] Okay. Same maximum here, continuing on. And in considering possible objectives,
[00:42:15] way their possibility of attainment with their service to the object if attained to wander down
[00:42:22] a side track as bad, but to reach a dead end is worse. So especially if the dead end is the only
[00:42:31] pathway that you've got. Yeah. That's why I have in a couple different pathways is smart. Number three,
[00:42:36] choose the line or course of least expectation. Try to put yourself in the enemy shoes and think
[00:42:43] what course is least probable he will foresee or forstall. Number four, exploit the line of least
[00:42:50] resistance. So long as it can lead you to any objective, which would contribute to your underlying
[00:42:58] object. Right. Oh, yeah. It's cool path of least resistance, but it's got to be going on in the right
[00:43:02] direction. And tactics, this maximum applies to the use of your reserves and in strategy, the exploitation
[00:43:08] of tactical success. Number five, take a line of operation, which offers alternative objectives.
[00:43:16] Okay. Sorry, we went a little ahead on that one. For you, we'll thus put your opponent on the
[00:43:22] horns of dilemma. It just comes from last podcast, which goes far to assure the chance of gaining one
[00:43:27] objective at least, whichever he guards least and may enable you to gain one after the other.
[00:43:33] Because once you get one, like we make it in one line of operation and now we made a bunch of money.
[00:43:39] Cool. Guess what? We can invest in that other thing that was a little bit harder out of the gate,
[00:43:42] but now we have the money to spend on it and we can make it happen. Yeah.
[00:43:48] Alternative objectives allow you to keep the opportunity of gaining an objective. Whereas a
[00:43:53] single objective, unless the enemy has helplessly inferior, means the certainty that you will not gain it.
[00:43:58] Once the enemy is no longer uncertain as to your aim. As soon as the enemy knows what you're doing,
[00:44:02] your chances of success go down dramatically, unless they're helplessly inferior.
[00:44:08] There is no more common mistake than to confuse a single line of operation, which is usually wise
[00:44:15] with a single objective, which is usually futile. Number six on the last of the positive
[00:44:25] maxims, ensure that both plans and dispositions are flexible, adaptable to circumstances.
[00:44:33] And by dispositions, I'm just like where you're putting people. Your plan should foresee and
[00:44:39] provide for a next step in case of success or failure or a partial success, which is the most
[00:44:43] common case in war. Your dispositions or reformation should be such as to allow this exploitation
[00:44:48] or adaptation in the shortest possible time. People will argue and fight and struggle with trying
[00:44:55] to figure out how they're going to task organized, a group of people. Like, well, no, actually
[00:44:59] Dave, I think this person should report today, and this person should report to Dave, and this
[00:45:02] person should report to me. We can argue about that stuff all the way all day long. And by the way,
[00:45:07] your past, I'm past and guess what? It's our company. And I go, you know what, Dave, you go ahead,
[00:45:16] that person can report to you. Cool. That sounds good. And you look up at me in two weeks and you're like,
[00:45:21] this doesn't really make much sense. I'm okay, cool. They can report. You know, like,
[00:45:24] you don't, it's not set in stone. You don't get a tattoo on your forehead of your task organization.
[00:45:30] And by the way, it doesn't look, quote, look bad to say, hey, you know what, Fred, you're going to be
[00:45:35] working for Dave. And then a month later, say, hey, Fred, it seems like your expertise is really
[00:45:39] going to be a little bit more beneficial to life. And what he's got going on, we're going to shift
[00:45:42] you over there. Now, do you want to do this every two weeks? No, obviously not. But to put some
[00:45:49] in a position or task organization is an organized in a certain way and have it flexible,
[00:45:56] flexible dispositions. That's exactly what it is. Is the smart way to do things. And obviously,
[00:46:02] it's with a flexible plan as well. The negatives do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst
[00:46:11] your opponent is on guard, whilst he is well placed to Perry or evade it. The experience of history
[00:46:18] shows that save against a much inferior opponent, no effective stroke is possible until his power
[00:46:23] of resistance or evasion is paralyzed. Hence, no commander should launch a real attack upon an
[00:46:28] enemy in position until satisfied that such a paralysis has developed. It is produced by disorganization
[00:46:35] and its moral equivalent, demoralization of the enemy. So cool, set it up, set up the move,
[00:46:45] eight. And the last one do not renew an attack along the same line or in the same form,
[00:46:51] after it is once failed. A mere reinforcement of weight is not a sufficient change for it is
[00:46:57] probable that the enemy also will have strength in itself in the interval. It is even more
[00:47:02] probable that it is success in repulsing you will have strength in the morally. It is one of my
[00:47:09] favorite coaching moves in jujitsu. Do it harder. I was saying that to carry the other day.
[00:47:18] Like he is like grabbing your wrist. A grab that thing harder. It hasn't helped him for six minutes
[00:47:24] grabbing the wrist while he is in your guard. But if he doesn't harder, that might work.
[00:47:30] That's what this is. Like it didn't work. It's not going to work. Don't do it harder.
[00:47:35] Just because you add, hey, you know what we spend a much money on advertising.
[00:47:39] We haven't seen any bump in our sales. Let's spend more.
[00:47:47] I guess the only thing that surprised me is from the guy who is in World War I,
[00:47:52] that that was a number of weeks. Yes. Like the first thing he says is hey,
[00:47:57] don't do it. We did it for three straight years. Yeah. Maybe that's why it's his last point. Yeah.
[00:48:04] Like hey, by the way, you freaking idiot is all the other stuff. Cool. Listen, you freaking idiots.
[00:48:13] If it doesn't work, don't keep doing it. If it didn't work with 10,000 men, it's not going
[00:48:18] to work with 20,000 men. It's crazy. You can see how you get sucked into that. Tell me, yeah.
[00:48:23] Yeah. You're liking it. What? The way you get sucked into it is when you commit yourself
[00:48:29] to the outcome of your plan. This plan is going to achieve this outcome.
[00:48:34] And if I allocate, I work for you. Hey, this is a plan. We're going to do I allocate resources
[00:48:40] and doesn't work. Well, I can either abandon that plan, make me look weak. Like I owe it,
[00:48:47] or I can go, hey, we're going to allocate more resources and more resources and more resources,
[00:48:52] more resources because I'm inflexible to say, well, actually, maybe I didn't connect my ends to my
[00:48:56] means to the end and I might maybe didn't do just something, might need to do something different.
[00:49:00] Or a group or reassess or come in from a different direction. As opposed to saying, hey,
[00:49:05] you know what? Hey, boss, that plan didn't work. Let me take a step back. We need to kind of see
[00:49:10] what we did here with this marketing scheme. It didn't have the effect that we want. And before we
[00:49:13] start putting in more resources, let me get a better assess for what's going on. And kind of
[00:49:17] give that to you. And it may be that we do the same thing, but we're probably going to need to make some
[00:49:22] changes. Yeah, at least quantify your efforts, right? It's really disturbing because it really
[00:49:31] is one of these things where it is so tempting when you get close, you feel like the pressure
[00:49:38] like you try an arm lock and you almost got it. You try it again. It's like the person
[00:49:43] defended at once. The person that's going to defend it again. You spend that money in marketing.
[00:49:47] You spend that money. And you, you saw a little bit of an uptick, but it's not quite what you
[00:49:54] wanted, but still maybe we just put more money into it. I'm listening, I'm listening to you
[00:50:00] talk about some of those things. And I'm almost trying to think of what is the human nature to do
[00:50:05] that. And I think some of it is, is we kind of glorify this single-minded, this, yeah, I think
[00:50:13] it's similar. The things, there's like this glorification of, I refuse to give in. I refuse to
[00:50:19] give up. I refuse to tap. I refuse to accept defeat. And so my answer is going to be, I'm just
[00:50:26] going to send more. I'm going to send more and more. And I think the times that that perseverance
[00:50:31] pays off, there's some sort of like glorification of that single-mindedness went in reality.
[00:50:38] Okay. How much weaker does it make us look by being unwilling to say, hang on. I think there's
[00:50:48] a flaw in my plan. Let me just, I need to take a step back and rethink this. I'm missing something.
[00:50:54] I'm missing something. And the weakness that that shows, and you were talking about the before
[00:50:59] is that makes you look weak when they exact opposite is true. Yeah, well, I have a section
[00:51:05] and leadership strategy in tactics called when to quit. But I'm the big, no, never quit. Actually,
[00:51:12] totally wrong, totally wrong. When do you quit? Oh, this plan that we have is not working.
[00:51:19] We lost a guy two guys, three guys. This is stupid. Let's go in different direction.
[00:51:26] Now, just imagine doing that for battalions and brigades and divisions of soldiers, man. It's
[00:51:32] free for you. It is crazy. Just give us a lot of which we just had. If we just were to
[00:51:39] had another 10,000 soldiers at that moment, got it so tempting. Is it like, do you feel like it's
[00:51:48] maybe like, because it's like you say glorify, you know, never quit that, yeah, that never quit.
[00:51:52] And then they over-simplify it because you say persistence, right? Persistence always, you know,
[00:51:58] like, that's the way this guy was successful. He was just persistent, you know, fail fail.
[00:52:02] And by the way, the economy, right? It's a dichotomy. Like, you can say, oh, you know what?
[00:52:08] It didn't work the way we wanted to. Okay, screw it. We're going to go to something else. So there's
[00:52:10] a dichotomy in this. Right. You know, even when I was talking about like you go from the
[00:52:14] arm lock, you don't get it. You go from the arm lock, you don't get it. There's plenty of fights where
[00:52:17] the person went from the arm lock three, four times, finally they get it. Yeah. That's what I'm saying,
[00:52:22] where they oversimplify it, where they have all these cool things like, you know, if they
[00:52:26] fit first, you don't succeed, you know, try again or you know, all these things. But there's
[00:52:30] more to it than that. Some of those, yeah, some of the Pacific Island campaign. Hey, we should be
[00:52:36] done with this operation in three days. Cool. 19 days later, we're not even a quarter away
[00:52:42] where we've exposed to be. Like, guess what? We're going to present some more resources there.
[00:52:49] We're going to get it done. Oh, man. That's why this is even. This is a dichotomy. Totally.
[00:52:54] Yeah. So the persistence and the, you know, if at first you don't succeed, try and try again or
[00:52:59] whatever, the it's persistent, not in the same exact methodologies, like persistence, but you kind
[00:53:06] of got to make these little changes within that. But you can't really fit that in the little slogan,
[00:53:10] you know, a lot of time. I was just going to say, I mean, in very simplistic times,
[00:53:16] you know, I think that's one of the differences between the tactics and the strategies. I will
[00:53:21] abandon an tactic. And I will give up on a tactic very quickly if it, if it's the wrong tactic
[00:53:28] to get to the, now, giving up on a strategy is a very different thing. But giving up on the tactic
[00:53:34] or, or maybe it's not even the right word, but adjusting my tactics and adjusting the plan
[00:53:40] and getting feedback from the ones implementing the plan while sticking to the strategy or the
[00:53:45] or the long-term objective. Again, very simplistically, but the commitment to the tactic when you
[00:53:50] see people committing to the same thing over and over and over again, as opposed to going,
[00:53:54] hey, this tactic isn't working. Is there a better way to do this to accomplish that same end goal of
[00:53:58] what we want to become as a company or as a team? That difference for me is how often we see people
[00:54:04] unwilling to change their tactic. Yeah. When it's so obvious that they need to. And that's the exact,
[00:54:09] that's exactly in that section in leadership strategy and tactics. Once I explain like, hey,
[00:54:15] you need to quit what you're doing. That's failing. This doesn't mean you abandon your overall
[00:54:21] strategy. That's the actual words that I use to open it up. But that's, because that's 100% right.
[00:54:27] Just because I go, oh, you know what? This doesn't seem to be working, right? Look, when in
[00:54:31] World War One, it wasn't, hey, this isn't working. Let's surrender. No, it's, you know what?
[00:54:37] This isn't working. Let's figure out a different way to do this. Let's figure out a different way to attack. I think
[00:54:45] it's also just a freaking sanity check that you need to do. It's one of these things where,
[00:54:52] look, you beat your, I, you sense all the vogue as the, my limit for beating my head against the wall is
[00:54:59] 47 times. Like once I've beat my head against the wall 47 times, like, okay,
[00:55:04] number 44, 45, 46. Okay, 47. This isn't going to work. I got to try something else. Like,
[00:55:11] you got to check yourself. What is that number? How much are you? How much money are you willing to
[00:55:15] throw into marketing? How big? How many more people are you willing to give to that leader that's failed?
[00:55:21] How many more projects are you, you know, like the, there's things we've got to check yourself.
[00:55:25] Is it for, have you beat your head against the wall 47 times? And if you had, have,
[00:55:29] don't go the 48 time, time to reevaluate your, your tactic. Doesn't mean you need to abandon what
[00:55:37] you're trying to do. Means you need to freaking check yourself. Back to the book. The essential
[00:55:44] truth underlying these maxims is that for success, two major problems must be solved, dislocation
[00:55:52] and exploitation. One precedes and one follows the actual blow, which in comparison is a simple act.
[00:56:01] So it's pretty easy to hit them. But you got to set up the hit and you got to exploit the hit once
[00:56:06] you've done. You cannot hit the enemy with effect until you have first created the opportunity. You
[00:56:11] cannot make that effect decisive unless you exploit the second opportunity that comes before he can recover.
[00:56:18] The importance of these two problems has never been adequately recognized. A fact which goes far
[00:56:26] to explain the common indesisiveness of warfare. So we don't make decisions because we don't
[00:56:34] understand how important it is that when echoes off balance, I better freaking attack or before I
[00:56:40] get them off balance, I need to set them up so I can get them off balance. The training of armies,
[00:56:46] this is freaking epic. The training of armies is primarily devoted to developing efficiency in the
[00:56:52] detailed execution of the attack. The concentration on tactical technique tends to obscure the
[00:56:59] psychological element. It fosters a cult of soundness rather than surprise. It bleeds. It breeds
[00:57:07] commanders who are so intent, not to do anything wrong according to the book that they forget
[00:57:14] the necessity of making the enemy do something wrong. The result is that their plans have no result
[00:57:22] for in war. It is by compelling mistakes that the scales are most often turned.
[00:57:30] Gotta make the person make mistakes. Here and there a commander has issued the obvious
[00:57:36] and is found in unexpected, in the unexpected, the key to a decision. Unless fortune has
[00:57:42] proved foul for luck can never be divorced for more since it's part of life. Hence, the unexpected
[00:57:49] cannot guarantee success, but it guarantees the best chance of success. That's why we're gonna surprise
[00:57:56] people. Next section, the national object and military aim. In, look, we talk about alignment a lot
[00:58:11] and this is where inside of an organization. This is really talking about alignment. As you hear
[00:58:18] us discuss this, thinking about alignment through your organization. This is what we have to be
[00:58:24] cognizant of as leaders. In discussing the subject of the objective in war, it is essential to be
[00:58:31] clear about and keep clear in our minds the distinction between the political and military objective.
[00:58:35] The two are different but not separate. For nations that, for nations do not weigh wage war
[00:58:42] for war's sake, but in pursuance of policy. The military objective is only the means to a political
[00:58:48] end. Hence, the military objective should be governed by the political objective.
[00:58:52] Subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily that is practically
[00:58:59] impossible. So what are we trying to do in our company? What are we actually trying to do inside
[00:59:07] of our company? And if we're trying to do something inside of our company, does everybody on the
[00:59:10] team understand what we're trying to do? And are there maneuvers out there in support of what it is
[00:59:16] we're trying to do? Thus any study of the problem ought to begin and end with the question of policy.
[00:59:22] The term objective, although common usage, is not really a good one. It has a physical and
[00:59:30] geographical sense and thus tends to confuse thought. It would be better to speak of the object
[00:59:36] when dealing with the purpose of policy and of the military aim when dealing with the way
[00:59:43] that forces are directed in the service of policy. So I mentioned on the first podcast
[00:59:49] we did that he kind of goes into this objective versus object. And he uses the term object. I
[00:59:54] think it's not it's a little bit of an archaic way of using it. I mean it's only 19, whatever 30.
[01:00:00] But for us we use objective all the time and we definitely use it in a military sense. But to his
[01:00:07] point, objective we think of like airfield, right? We think of beachhead. So maybe it's a good idea.
[01:00:15] Well we'll go with it. The object in war is a better state of peace. Even if only from your own point of view.
[01:00:25] This is a, you know I always talk about climbing the ladder of alignment. This is the highest
[01:00:30] you can get and the ladder of alignment for war. The reason we're in war is because we want a better
[01:00:36] peace. That's what we're trying to do. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant
[01:00:41] regard for your, for the peace you desire. This is the long, long, long term thinking.
[01:00:49] That applies to both to aggressor nations who seek expansion and to peaceful nations who only fight
[01:00:54] for self preservation, although their views of what is meant by a better state of peace are very
[01:00:59] different. History shows that gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the
[01:01:06] object of policy. But as most of the thinking about war has been done by men of the military
[01:01:13] profession, there has been a very natural tendency to lose the site of basic national object and
[01:01:19] identify it with the military aim. So how does this happen inside of a business? We start the business.
[01:01:24] The people that are out there in the field trying to make things happen, they might lose sight of
[01:01:28] what it is we're trying to do. In consequence, whenever war is broken out, policy is too often
[01:01:35] been governed by the military aim and this has been regarded as an end in itself instead of
[01:01:42] as a merely a means to an end. Fast forward, a little bit for more than a century of
[01:01:51] the prime canon of military doctrine has been that has been that quote, the destruction of the
[01:01:58] enemy's main forces on the battlefield constituted the only true aim in war. That's what war is for.
[01:02:07] Just destroy the enemy, destroy the enemy forces on the battlefield, actually. That was universally
[01:02:12] accepted engraved in all military manuals and taught at all staff colleges. If any states
[01:02:16] been ventured to doubt whether it fitted the national object in all circumstances, he was regarded as
[01:02:22] blasphemy and violating holy rite as can be seen in studying the official records and memoirs
[01:02:28] of the military heads of the war nations, particularly in and after World War I.
[01:02:35] So absolute rule would have astonished the great commanders and teachers of war theory and
[01:02:40] ageers prior to the 19th century. For they had recognized the practical necessity of wisdom of
[01:02:46] adapting aims to limitations of strength and policy. Like how long we can try and fight this thing
[01:02:52] before saying, you know what, this is freaking not good. We're expanding all of our national treasure
[01:02:57] and we're not getting anywhere. This is a bad call. And now we're going to start hammering on
[01:03:01] cows fits again. Clause fits is influence. The rule acquired its dogmatic rigidity largely
[01:03:10] through the posthumous influence of closquits and his books upon the minds of Prussian soldiers,
[01:03:16] put particularly mokey and then more widely through the impact of their victories in 1866 and 1870
[01:03:23] made upon the armies of the world which copied so many features of the Prussian system, thus it is a
[01:03:27] vital importance to examine his theories. As so often happens, Clause which is disciples carried
[01:03:35] his teachings to an extreme which their master had not intended.
[01:03:39] Hmm. Miss interpretation has been the common fate of most profits and thinkers in every sphere,
[01:03:48] devout but uncompromising, oh sorry, devout but uncomprehending disciples
[01:03:54] have been more damaging to the original conception than even its prejudice and perblind opponents.
[01:04:02] So what happens? We get people that take things to the extreme. And they do more damage than the
[01:04:09] people that are against the idea. It must be admitted however that Clause wits invited
[01:04:14] misinterpretation more than most. Sorry Clause fits. A student of Kant at second hand he acquired
[01:04:25] a philosophical motive expression without developing a truly philosophical mind. Ouch.
[01:04:31] Sorry dude, his hammer in Clause was there. Clause wits has taken heavy's.
[01:04:35] How did you guys talk about Clause wits in a positive way?
[01:04:39] Yeah.
[01:04:40] Mostly, I mean the pull from Clause wits at the takeaway from that was there were components inside
[01:04:47] there that the things that he said makes sense and he talks about ends and me he talks about
[01:04:54] tactics and strategy and is really a good tool for people to understand. And the way the context
[01:04:59] we're using is actually I think very important and very similar to what he's saying is that
[01:05:03] the military which has this sort of outside recognition that's outside status of the
[01:05:12] the instead of being a tool to accomplish the political means or what the state wants.
[01:05:18] It's almost a means in and of itself as if the military exists for the military as opposed to
[01:05:24] this is a tool, one of many tools that actually accomplishes the political means which and
[01:05:29] to just kind of bring that back a little bit when he talked about the object being a greater piece
[01:05:37] or a better piece or whatever the term that you use and it's funny because I think I've evolved
[01:05:42] in my thinking when I hear objective I don't think bridge anymore, I don't think airfield anymore,
[01:05:47] I think goals I think outcome. So but I understand his point and I certainly remember in the
[01:05:51] beginning of my military career, what's the objective? Oh, to secure that bridge or to do whatever
[01:05:55] that particular thing is. If we've got a company and our company's object or our vision, our goal
[01:06:04] is to be the premier hardware producer for a product that every company the world needs for them to be
[01:06:12] successful and then I've got a sales team inside there and nobody's saying, well sales is like
[01:06:16] the most important thing we have, we got to sell this thing, it's the military version for this
[01:06:20] company and you're out there running the sales team and your objective is sell as many of these
[01:06:24] things as you can because that's obviously how we become the indispensable producer of this product
[01:06:31] that everybody's going to need and be the most reputable and reliable company in the world.
[01:06:35] But if you're out there selling this product and it hasn't been made yet because our
[01:06:39] operations team has been stood up or you're selling this and we don't have the support for the
[01:06:44] clients that are going to buy it to actually give them the tools that need or you're selling this
[01:06:48] and we don't have the software to update it and back it up, you can actually accomplish your
[01:06:53] objective by selling this product that doesn't help us achieve the object that doesn't actually help
[01:06:59] us be successful and I'm not defending cost-wits but there is the military is somebody's car
[01:07:07] I don't know that's all good. The the military in some ways has become this tool this means
[01:07:16] that sort of in and of itself is its own thing like the military exists to defeat you know to win
[01:07:22] wars and defeat the enemy and destroy battlefields. Once I see now it's one of several different ways
[01:07:26] and when you made that comment about the military is existance like the ideal thing you would
[01:07:31] think for the military is I want this military to exist to deter any potential opponent from
[01:07:37] ever going to war with us in terms of like what would I want from my military? I would love to never
[01:07:42] set foot on the battlefield. I'd love to never get now whether or not that's realistic but I would love
[01:07:47] a military force of people or a pornist look at and go you know what I'm good with your plan. I like
[01:07:52] your plan. I'm here to support that plan. You want to use our bridges and roads to for commerce
[01:07:57] and maybe occupy some of my towns. Yeah I let's find a compromise to make that work as opposed to no
[01:08:03] this isn't going to happen and your military shows up to compel me to do it in a way that I don't
[01:08:07] necessarily want but the object objective thing and I'm just trying to make the connection to the business
[01:08:15] world of if you think you're out there just to do this one thing and it doesn't support the object
[01:08:19] of the company or the long-term goal you're actually not successful you're not winning. I sold the
[01:08:25] most product cool can we support it? No can we build it? No can we back it up? No can the clients get what they
[01:08:29] want? No then then we actually aren't successful. What happens to our reputation? What happens to our
[01:08:34] backlog? We get crushed. Yeah and you're going to see he he he goes relatively hard on glosswoods
[01:08:41] you also explains some of the things that people missed which he kind of also blames on glosswoods
[01:08:48] but there's a lot of things that glosswoods says in the just aren't as memorable
[01:08:55] that aren't as memorable as some of his really kick ass statements and people remember what sounded
[01:09:01] cool. Yeah and I think how many chapters are in on war? I think he wrote like the first three
[01:09:07] by himself and they're really well written and super complete and then several chapters were written
[01:09:12] by his wife at her dad and he like half done and like and they've been you know hearts
[01:09:18] probably wrote this in English and glosswoods was written in some sort of Russian version that's been
[01:09:23] translated a thousand times so again yeah and his defense yeah and when you do that translation
[01:09:29] if you kind of think that maybe you know concentration and masses out of win you definitely are
[01:09:36] going to emphasize that I think this is what he meant and he yeah. Back to the book his theory of war
[01:09:42] was expounded in a way to abstract and involve for ordinary soldier minds essentially concrete
[01:09:49] you see the soldier minds are concrete to follow the course of his argument which often turned back
[01:09:54] from the direction in which it was apparently leading impressed yet buffogged they grasp at his
[01:10:01] vivid leading phrases seeing only their surface meaning and missing the deeper current of his thought.
[01:10:08] Coswitz greatest contribution to the theory of war was an emphasizing the psychological factors
[01:10:13] raising his voice against the geometrical school of strategy then fast-mull he showed that the
[01:10:17] human spirit was infinitely more important than operational lines and angles he discussed the effect
[01:10:23] of danger and fatigue the value of boldness and determination with deep understanding. It was his
[01:10:30] errors however which had the greatest effect on subsequent course of history. He was too continental
[01:10:37] and his outlook to understand the meaning of sea power and his vision was short on the very threshold
[01:10:42] of the mechanical era he declared his conviction that superiority and numbers becomes every day
[01:10:50] more decisive. Yeah so he kind of was a little bit late they didn't have any different content yet.
[01:10:54] One of the classic discussions was the what's the word I'm looking for? The relevance of
[01:11:02] class was in the 21st century you know start talking about you know like nuclear power
[01:11:07] nuclear weapon stealth airplanes and things like hey do these maximums of these do these
[01:11:12] do they hold up to the scrutiny of the 21st century of warfare the modern warfare and a bunch of
[01:11:17] discussions on that. I kind of chuckled at the idea of like his disciples the class was disciples who
[01:11:22] kind of aren't that smart but it really like what he had to say you know that'd be like me reading
[01:11:27] leadership strategy tactics and there's a chapter that says don't care and maybe like hey everybody
[01:11:33] don't care and but getting that wrong but the misunderstanding like I'm care as opposed to
[01:11:40] I don't care how we do you want to do area I don't care we'll do it your way which is a
[01:11:44] little bit different than don't care next thing you know Dave Burke, Jocco's disciples running
[01:11:49] around telling all the rest of his people we don't care and I don't care and yeah I don't care
[01:11:56] and we're now a bunch of people don't care and how easy you can see like disciple who's
[01:12:02] and I I'll never remember the quote but the the most damage is done by the concrete brave.
[01:12:10] Well you said the disciples that not the misunderstanding of his disciples did way more damage than the
[01:12:15] opponents because I'm running around espousing Jocco's you know edicts but I actually don't really
[01:12:21] know what he meant by don't care and I'm just using that one example of trying to be going from
[01:12:25] this book of like a great way of like I'm care like dude that that is not what he meant I know
[01:12:30] that's what it says on people but that's not what he was saying yeah or like knowing to quit
[01:12:34] you know what you got to tell whatever you give up shut it out yeah so he's talking about how
[01:12:42] important oh well I know what I was gonna say I was taking a note when you were writing I only got
[01:12:46] down the two letters MA and then I was looking at what that was I was gonna write I was gonna write
[01:12:51] machine gun because for me where the tactics sort of solidified where you can say yep these things
[01:13:00] hold up it's you gotta have the machine gun that's where we start to get the modern machine gun
[01:13:05] where we can start to kill a lot of people and how concentration is like the war the worst thing
[01:13:10] and just right covered move becomes totally important and it's it's important in all areas but
[01:13:14] it really starts to solidify around there well you use the example of like on steroids of nuclear
[01:13:20] weapons you know it's on my dispersion you know versus concentration with nuclear weapons
[01:13:25] I thought of another one just as I was thinking of this is hold the line jacos is hold the line
[01:13:30] like cool got it yeah we're gonna hold the line and look what we're talking about is the story
[01:13:36] behind the book the decademy leadership is chapter 12 in extreme ownership so cool we covered it
[01:13:41] why don't we have to hold right on the book of us because people still like extreme ownership
[01:13:46] we got all the line it's disappointed all cards like they took everything to the extreme
[01:13:51] and that's why the story of the patches it muster is so powerful because people are like oh this
[01:13:56] is gonna be awesome jacos is going to hammer that platoon and destroy them for violating his
[01:14:03] direct order to never wear patches that aren't professional and it's like not in care no
[01:14:09] factor yeah like with what it says right there hold the line yeah it's like it but actually
[01:14:14] living in the extremes isn't actually doesn't work usually doesn't work but the title of the
[01:14:19] book is a tree ownership yeah well there you go there's perfect examples this would happen to
[01:14:24] class but then he even get to finish his book he wrote free get three chapters and his old lady finished
[01:14:30] it up uh such a commandment gave reinforcement to the instinctive conservatism of soldiers in
[01:14:38] resisting the possibilities of a new form of superiority which mechanical invention increasingly
[01:14:42] offered it also gave powerful impulse to the universal extension and permanent establishment
[01:14:49] of the method of constricted conscription as a simple way of providing the greatest possible numbers
[01:14:55] so if you want a big army well if I want to be in charge of a bunch of people you know what I have
[01:15:00] to say look we need more people if we're gonna win cool start drafting people I want to be in
[01:15:04] charge more people cool draft more people this by its disregard for psychological suitability meant
[01:15:09] that armies became much more liable to panic and sudden collapse the earlier method however unsystematic
[01:15:15] had at least tended to ensure that the forces were composed of good fighting animals
[01:15:20] this is an interesting shot at classmates classmates contributed no new or strikingly progressive
[01:15:29] ideas to tactics or strategies he was a codifying thinker rather than a creative or dynamic one
[01:15:38] he had no such revolutionary effect on warfare as the theory of the divisional system produced in the
[01:15:43] 18th century or the theory of armored mobility in the 20th which by the way that's what kind of
[01:15:49] the delheart like is about right so he said look cosers didn't do anything compared to the
[01:15:55] theory of armor mobility like a game of that yeah I feel bad I actually feel bad talking about
[01:16:02] these guys talk is that weird I didn't know how much of a hammer he was gonna be in the closet
[01:16:08] the cool thing is I'm hearing all this but but that mean there is a lot of I understand what he's saying
[01:16:15] I mean yeah yeah yeah yeah and again why didn't like we're 286 episodes deep in this and I
[01:16:22] haven't covered one of the most respected and well-known canons of military strategy yeah
[01:16:29] Claus Witz is on war why is that this is kind of why yeah
[01:16:36] I'm going to get some grief for this what yep going out you're getting crazy well what's interesting
[01:16:42] is that if I think if you were kind of just pulse a bunch of and doesn't have to be historians that are
[01:16:47] civilians but if you look at what the military and sort of key policy makers study
[01:16:53] Claus Witz is higher on that list than heart oh you know so for sure you're not even the same ballpark
[01:16:59] you may get some heat because if there's someone that's been studied in sort of kind of lionized
[01:17:04] Claus Witz is the guy yeah you know to be so yeah there's some people out there going hey well you know
[01:17:08] I've taken some heat over the years I had a little guy named Colonel David Aquar who was a
[01:17:12] complete black sheep of the army and hated by the Navy totally and I was in the Navy yeah
[01:17:20] talking about that guy um back to the book but in seeking to formulate the experience of the
[01:17:28] Napoleonic wars the emphasis he put on certain retrograde retrograde features helped to cause
[01:17:33] what might be termed a revolution in reverse back towards true drive-alarm fair Claus Witz theory of
[01:17:39] the military aim into finding the military aim Claus Witz was carried away by his passion for
[01:17:45] pure logic quote the and this this makes it really odd this starts to make it really obvious why
[01:17:52] this stuff doesn't mend with my normal way of thinking quote the aim of all action in war is to
[01:18:00] disarm the enemy and we shall now show that this inferior at least is indispensable if our opponent
[01:18:07] is to be made to comply with our will we must place him in a situation where which is more
[01:18:11] oppressive to him than the sacrifice we demand but the disadvantages of this position must naturally
[01:18:18] not be of a transitory nature at least in appearance otherwise the enemy instead of yielding will
[01:18:24] hold out in the hope of a change for the better every change in this position which is
[01:18:30] produced by a continuation of war must therefore be a change for the worse worse the worst
[01:18:35] condition in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being completely disarmed if therefore
[01:18:40] the enemy is to be reduced to an into submission he must either be positively disarmed or placed
[01:18:47] in such a position that he is threatened with it from this follows that the complete disarming or
[01:18:54] overthrow of the enemy must always be the aim of warfare and quote this reminds me of
[01:19:05] the bath party in Iraq being completely disarmed how much did that help my freaking hurt right
[01:19:14] maybe some class witsy and people were saying yep got to disarm them completely completely good job
[01:19:20] the influence of of can't cont where's where's Darrell Cooper of Darrell Cooper's making jokes about
[01:19:26] like he's just bringing in deep the echo and I are looking at him like bro wrong crowd
[01:19:32] the influence of cont can be perceived in class wits dualism of thought he believed in a perfect military
[01:19:38] world of ideals while recognizing a temporal world in which these could only be imperfectly fulfilled
[01:19:45] so he's giving credit here's a little credit going back to to class wits like hey man he got it
[01:19:49] that you got these ideals but it's the real world and it's not going to quite go that well
[01:19:54] for he was capable of distinguishing between what was what was militarily ideal and what he
[01:20:00] described as a modification in the reality thus he wrote reasoning in the abstract the mind cannot
[01:20:06] stop short of an extreme but everything takes a different shape when we pass from abstractions to
[01:20:12] reality this object of war in the abstract the disarming of the enemy is rarely attained
[01:20:19] in practice and is not a condition necessary to peace so he wasn't even saying what he was saying
[01:20:25] he goes back and kind of backs off it a little bit cost wits his tendency to the extreme is shown again
[01:20:31] in his discussion of battle as a means to in to the end of war he opened with the startling assertion
[01:20:40] there is only one single means it is the fight he justified this by a long argument to show that in
[01:20:48] every form of military activity quote the idea of fighting must necessarily be at the foundation
[01:20:54] and quote having elaborately proved what most people would be ready to accept without argument
[01:21:00] cause would said the object of a combat is not always the destruction of enemy forces its object
[01:21:06] can often be attained as well without the combat taking place at all so there you go he's saying
[01:21:12] some of the stuff that that I do agree with more over class which recognized that quote the
[01:21:21] waste of our own military forces must set a risk parabas which means all things being equal
[01:21:29] always be greater the moral aim is directed upon the destruction of the enemy's power
[01:21:34] the danger lies in this that the greater efficacy which we which we seek recoils on ourselves
[01:21:43] and therefore has worse consequences in case we fail of success so he's got some he's got some
[01:21:50] quantifying statements about his about his thoughts and theories out of his own mouth
[01:21:59] class with here gave a prophetic verdict upon the consequences of following his own gospel in
[01:22:04] World War one and two for it was the ideal and not the practical aspect of his teachings on
[01:22:10] battle which survived he contributed to this distortion by arguing it was only to avoid the risks of
[01:22:17] battle that quote any other means are taken so it's like we're trying to avoid battle that's the
[01:22:23] only reason that we're going to do anything else because we're trying to avoid battle and he
[01:22:27] fixed the distortion in the minds of his pupils by hammering on the abstract ideal.
[01:22:34] Here's our I guess I guess the little heart's just going to go hot on everybody he says not one
[01:22:39] reader and a hundred was likely to fall the subtlety of his logic or to preserve a true balance
[01:22:43] amidst such philosophical juggle re. But everyone could catch such a ringing phrases as and here's
[01:22:49] where he gets a the branded the the class with branded statements that that are a clickbait.
[01:22:58] Here we go and they're freaking good to go like you hear me like yeah we have only one means in war the battle.
[01:23:07] The bloody solution of the crisis the effort for the destruction of the enemy's forces is the first
[01:23:13] born son of war. I mean come on dude if you're in the military you're eating these things up like
[01:23:18] like a giant nice cool mulk. Only great and general battles can produce great results.
[01:23:30] Let us hear not of general to conquer without bloodshed right that's a that's a quote from a guy
[01:23:35] that earlier was saying like hey listen you don't always want to go to war yeah but who remembers
[01:23:40] hey sometimes you can use other means to achieve victory no one's here that they want to hear
[01:23:44] but it's not here of great junk generals who conquer without bloodshed. So he branded himself put
[01:23:51] man by the reiteration of such phrases class with blurred into the outline of his philosophy
[01:23:58] already indistinct and made it into mere marching refrain which in inflamed the blood and
[01:24:08] intoxicated the mind. In transfusion it became a doctrine fit to form corporals not generals.
[01:24:15] For by making battle appear quote the only real warlike activity and quote his gospel
[01:24:21] deprived strategy of its laurels and reduce the art of war to the mechanics of mass slaughter
[01:24:27] moreover it incited generals to seek battle at the first opportunity instead of creating an
[01:24:33] advantageous opportunity. Callsworth contributed to the subsequent decay of general ship
[01:24:42] when he went in an off-coated passage he wrote. Philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a
[01:24:49] skillful method of disarming and overcoming the enemy without great bloodshed and that is the proper
[01:24:55] tendency of the art of war. That is an error which must be extroplated. So like hey this idea
[01:25:03] of bloodshed we got to get rid of that idea that you can have war without bloodshed got to get rid of
[01:25:09] that idea. It is obvious that when he wrote that he did not pause to reflect that what he
[01:25:15] decried had been recorded as the proper aim of general ship by all masters of the art of war
[01:25:22] including a pulling himself like everyone sons who Napoleon everyone in between like hey man if you
[01:25:29] can win without fighting that's what we're doing and he's saying the opposite.
[01:25:35] Closworth's phrase would hence force be used by countless blunders to excuse and even justify
[01:25:42] their futile squandering of life in bullheaded assaults. The danger was increased because of the
[01:25:50] way he constantly dwelt on the decisive importance of a numerical superiority with deeper penetration
[01:25:56] he pointed out in one passage that surprise lies quote at the foundation of all under takings
[01:26:03] for without it the preponderance at the decisive point is not properly conceivable.
[01:26:08] So that's what we're talking about. That's cool. That's maneuver warfare. But his disciples struck
[01:26:13] by his more frequent emphasis on numbers came to regard mere mass as the simple recipe for victory.
[01:26:23] Horrible. And you know what, let's assume a little idea that is like my rank right.
[01:26:29] It's a rank. Hey I outrank you that's my superiority and that's what I'm going to use to lead.
[01:26:35] I mean that was brutal. Yeah that was kind of a brutal.
[01:26:39] And he died. There's some little statements that were like hey he's it. He also said this but
[01:26:45] it's like when the general reads it, when the soldier reads it what does he want to read?
[01:26:51] He wants to read about checking ass. Yeah. And what does he want his corporal
[01:26:55] to read? He wants his corporal to read about kicking ass. So when we start reading about kicking ass,
[01:27:00] we hear what we want to hear at Coach Charles. Yes sir.
[01:27:03] We're not done yet with Karlswitz. Crosswitz theory of the object. Even worse was the effective
[01:27:10] is theoretical exposition and exaltation of the idea of absolute warfare in proclaiming that the
[01:27:18] road to success was through the unlimited application of force. There by a doctrine which began
[01:27:26] by defining war only as a continuation of state policy by other means led to the contradictory
[01:27:30] end of making policy the slave of strategy and bad strategy at that. That's I would say that's one
[01:27:36] of his most famous quotes right is that wars the continuation of state policy by other means.
[01:27:44] But he he ends up taking things to a point where it's like wars what we're like you said.
[01:27:49] What the military exists for the military. Everything else exists because of the military.
[01:27:54] The government is here to provide the military with the resources that we need to go fight battles.
[01:28:01] The trend was fostered above all by his dictum that quote to introduce into philosophy of war,
[01:28:06] a principle of moderation would be an absurdity. War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost
[01:28:12] bounds. Dude, he's getting some good quotes. They're from a sound kick ass.
[01:28:17] Unless you're a freaking soldier and war one. Yeah. The crazy thing is I'm just kind of
[01:28:28] picturing this. I'm asking myself now a question that I probably should have asked five years
[01:28:32] ago, ten years ago when I'm thinking about this on the more academic mind of how to
[01:28:37] close with any of these people that are I guess disciples of that of that kind of peer logic
[01:28:43] trend. How do they perceive the value of their own people? Because you could see the trend of thought of like,
[01:28:49] hey, this is the purpose of the military is the utter destruction or what those quotes
[01:28:56] where is that the you could make a very easy link of like, hey, my soldiers, they're just
[01:29:02] implements and tools. They're just resources to be expanded to achieve that end state.
[01:29:06] And how quickly you could make the stretch like in war war one, you could almost imagine like,
[01:29:11] yeah, they're not, they're not people, they're resources. They just give me 10,000 more resources
[01:29:16] or more tools to accomplish this thing. Yeah. I mean, you kind of phrase that as a question.
[01:29:21] I don't think there's much of a question. I'm sure I think it's pretty obvious where
[01:29:24] where these guys were coming from. And it's it's really scary that you had a culture that
[01:29:30] supported that and you had, you know, you know, it's like it's it's really strange. You think about
[01:29:41] like kippling and and kippling who wrote these very patriotic poems that fueled this culture
[01:29:50] inside of England. And his son was killed in in World War One and like the last thing they saw
[01:30:00] of him was he's blinded and he's kind of like stumbling on the battlefield before he was killed
[01:30:05] in his body. I don't think they ever even recovered his body. He's just lost in the mud and muck.
[01:30:10] And he's got a really harrowing poem. I think I know the phrase of the poem is,
[01:30:17] is my boy Jack or my son Jack. It's it's it's harrowing to read and if you know what the
[01:30:24] fuck he's talking about, which is that he, you know, he was this patriotic guy who supported
[01:30:33] England and was contributing to that propaganda. This Victorian, this this this culture of
[01:30:45] look look look you go over the top it's time to go you go and and he lost his son and you wonder what kind of
[01:30:56] you know how that just the impact that that had on him and and there is an impact when you read
[01:31:01] his poems and you see before and after you see what happened you can see that it definitely had an
[01:31:06] impact but the man the idea that tens and thousands and hundreds of thousands of people like
[01:31:16] you said like we're like okay cool that's what we're doing that's what we're doing we're going to go
[01:31:21] over there and when they say go over the top we're going to go over the top the Germans the French
[01:31:27] the Canadians the Americans the I mean that's what we're doing it's very very hard you know you
[01:31:37] talk about the value of life and your question around like what do they think of these people
[01:31:41] it's like yeah what did they and how did we get to a point where modern civilization
[01:31:50] both is a hundred years ago yes a hundred years ago hundred years ago this was happening it's
[01:31:58] like it's crazy to think about and and you can kind of see I mean what's there's another good
[01:32:08] saying it's something along the lines of like old men like to send young men to fight
[01:32:17] young men like to go fight like that's kind of a thing right and you can see how those
[01:32:23] sort of animalistic instincts that we have and tribal instincts that we have are
[01:32:30] and and heroic instincts that we have are captured and capitalized on and
[01:32:37] by like a consequence like when you read calls which are like cool I'm down with heroic efforts
[01:32:42] I'm down with tribal behavior I'm down with being brave like all those things just roll right
[01:32:51] into this so if you don't want to be that guy that's sort of like well
[01:32:57] maybe we should think about these soldiers as human beings who's doing that no apparently no one
[01:33:04] apparently no one so what you have I guess what I'm saying is you have a human instinct
[01:33:12] an a human slash animal instinct to be tribal to be heroic to be sacrificial to make sacrifices
[01:33:19] for the tribe I mean what is a hero you know I've talked about this before a hero is someone
[01:33:25] that's not doing that not making a sacrifice for himself right of the hero is someone that's
[01:33:30] making a sacrifice for someone else and that's a common that's just the definition of a hero
[01:33:35] in any language so when you say hey we've got kind of a program here that allows us to be heroic
[01:33:44] on a massive scale this is what you end up with and we kind of lean towards and we tend towards
[01:33:51] and you can see how you can see how the contrary is that you have BH La Del Hart who's saying
[01:33:58] hey not smart not smart it's better to maneuver it's better to leave it's better to retreat
[01:34:06] it's better to attack on a different day and and how is he getting branded it's getting branded like
[01:34:10] what that will you talk about will you a coward yeah is that what's going on your coward he's like
[01:34:15] hey bro I win wounded three times and gasped almost the death you fucking savages and you don't know
[01:34:21] what that was like you talk about how many times this has come up this the capacity for the
[01:34:31] dehumanization of our enemies and how there's a danger in there and there's there's a natural
[01:34:37] piece of that but you gotta keep it to a certain place but I think for me just to reconcile the dehumanization
[01:34:46] of your own men I understand the dehumanization of the enemy I understand that and I also understand
[01:34:53] that there's a limit to that too and if you go too far you can undermine your own objectives we know
[01:34:58] that we know that but the ability to do that with your own men your your own people is it's it
[01:35:06] I think that's just why cilir ones are just sitting its own category of just so hard to come to grips
[01:35:15] with with us doing that it does it's easy it's own categories for us on concern yeah
[01:35:28] right and I guess that's where we end up with these two kind of opposing theories of war
[01:35:37] and who wants to be called the wimp who wants to be called the weak right because that's
[01:35:46] what you could easily go back to be actually a heart and say like well he wants to run away
[01:35:50] he wants to you know attack people from the rear there's a time where attacking someone the rear
[01:35:54] shoot him in the back was like a horrible thing right it's a kind of cowardice yeah it's a kind of
[01:35:58] cowardice to go around and you know not line up like the other team shoot him in the back yeah
[01:36:03] you know I've been the coolest part about being on the podcast and this seat is this is I hear this
[01:36:11] live as you're reading I don't I don't get the advanced copy you don't like say Dave we're
[01:36:15] prepping this I get to hear this and I I'm thinking and I'm trying to analyzing I'm making
[01:36:21] connections and correlations and and I've kind of just been chuckling a little bit of like hard
[01:36:25] is just hammering clouds wits but he it's almost like I understand more now of why he's so brutal
[01:36:34] on the attack of him when he made that connection of he's the reason why we had generals and I think
[01:36:40] he used the word blunders which is about as nice as you can describe what those leaders did in order
[01:36:45] one is I actually think I understand why he's so brutal on him is because of what it led to and
[01:36:54] I think he's doing a good job saying I know class was as goal was not to create this circumstance
[01:37:01] and he's defending components of that but his point was this is the outcome that he created this
[01:37:06] his words and his philosophy is what facilitated this this window of warfare and our time
[01:37:13] that allowed us to dehumanize our own men on a scale that's really hard to really comprehend
[01:37:21] and and I think I'm understanding in real time why he's saying what he's saying about him
[01:37:26] it's such a brutal fashion and I understand it yeah and I kicked off this whole podcast with the
[01:37:32] last podcast by explaining what he'd been through and I said this shit left a mark on him
[01:37:38] I mean look it leaves a mark on you when you lose one guy in combat one guy in combat it's
[01:37:46] gonna leave him you're never gonna forget it you're never gonna live it down you're never gonna
[01:37:49] go a day without thinking about it can you imagine when you're battalion gets wiped out
[01:37:55] can you imagine when you're brigade when you're division when you take 60,000 casualties in a day
[01:38:02] that's what's going on and and the quote that you're reaching back for was
[01:38:10] clouds with phrase would hence force be used by countless blunders to excuse and even justify
[01:38:18] their feudal squandering of life in bullhead and assaults yeah he's talking about exactly
[01:38:24] what he lived through and that shit left a mark on him without question yeah and this is his
[01:38:34] opportunity to tell a generation of leaders contemplating the impact of that guy's words
[01:38:41] with the reality of without some logical thinking about what he really is trying to say
[01:38:47] this is the path you will go down and this is his way of saying you cannot go down that path
[01:38:52] yeah you want to go and read the rooftops of this guy and turn it into how you're gonna fight
[01:38:56] a war you're an idiot you're an idiot
[01:39:05] wars in act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds that's the last quote I give he says
[01:39:09] that declaration is served as a foundation for the extravagant absurdity of modern total warfare
[01:39:16] his principle of force without limit and without calculation of costs fits and is fit only
[01:39:23] for a hate maddened mob so he's not done yet it is the negation of statemanship and
[01:39:30] intelligent strategy which seeks to serve the ends of policy if war be a continuation of policy
[01:39:38] as clouds with its head elsewhere declared it it must necessarily be conducted with a view
[01:39:44] to post war benefit a state which expands its strength to the point of exhaustion bank rubs its own
[01:39:51] policy and by the way that's at all players in world war one
[01:39:55] cost with himself had qualified the principle of quote utmost force by the admission that quote
[01:40:01] the political object as the original motive of war should be the standard for determining
[01:40:07] both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made still more significant
[01:40:19] was a reflective passage in which he remarked that to pursue the logical extreme and tailed that
[01:40:25] quote the means would lose all relation to the end and in most cases the aim at an extreme effort
[01:40:32] would be wrecked by the opposite weight of forces within itself what's the what's the return
[01:40:39] on investment you're going to get his classic work on war was the product of 12 years of intensive
[01:40:46] thought if it's author had lived to spend a longer time in thinking about war he might have
[01:40:50] reached a wiser and clearer conclusion as his thinking progressed he was being led toward a
[01:40:57] different view penetrating deeper unhappily the process was cut short by his death from
[01:41:02] cholera in 1830 it was only after his death that his writings on war were published by his widow
[01:41:08] they were found in a number of sealed packets bearing the significant and prophetic note so he wrote
[01:41:13] a note on his writings and it said should the work be interrupted by my death then what is found
[01:41:20] can only be called a massive conceptions not brought into form open to endless misconceptions
[01:41:31] sorry class what's I mean he covered it he did his best to cover it
[01:41:37] much of the harm might have been avoided but for that fatal cholera germ for there are significant
[01:41:42] indications that in the gradual evolution of his thought he had reached a point where he was about to drop
[01:41:46] his original concept of absolute war and revise his whole theory on more common sense lines
[01:41:53] when death intervened in consequence the way was left open to endless misconceptions far
[01:41:58] excessive his anticipation for the universal adoption of the theory of unlimited war has gone
[01:42:05] far to wreck civilization the teaching of classmates taken without understanding largely influenced
[01:42:12] both the causation and the character of world war one thereby it led on all two logically
[01:42:19] to world war two
[01:42:28] theory and flux next section after world war one the course and effects of the first world war
[01:42:32] provided ample cause to doubt the validity of cross with theory at least interpreted by his
[01:42:37] successors on land and numerical battles will fought without ever producing the decisive result
[01:42:42] expected of them but the responsible leaders were slow to adapt their aim to circumstances
[01:42:49] or develop new means to make the aim more possible and maybe that's why when he was going through
[01:42:55] the eight um items that we were talking about earlier on the earlier podcast his number one
[01:43:02] thing remember you're saying the number one thing was his number eight thing his number one thing was
[01:43:08] adjust your adjust your end to your means and here he's saying the responsible leaders were slow
[01:43:13] to adapt their aim to the circumstances or develop new means to make the aim more possible
[01:43:19] instead of facing the problem they pressed theory to a suicide-licks stream draining their own
[01:43:25] strength beyond the safety limit in pursuit of an ideal of complete victory by battle which was
[01:43:30] never fulfilled that one side ultimately collapsed that one side ultimately collapsed so the
[01:43:37] Germans ultimately collapsed do more to emptiness of stomach produced by economic pressure of
[01:43:43] sea power than the loss of blood although blood which was lost in the abortive German offensive
[01:43:48] of 1918 and the loss of spirit in consequence of their palpable failure to gain the victory
[01:43:53] hasten the collapse if this provided the opposition the opposing nations with the semblance of victory
[01:44:01] their efforts to win it cost them such a price in moral and physical exhaustion that they the
[01:44:08] seeming victors will left incapable of consolidating their position.
[01:44:14] It became evident there was something wrong with the theory or at least with its application
[01:44:19] alike on the planes of the tactic strategy in policy the appalling losses suffered in vain
[01:44:27] pursuit of the ideal objective and the post-war exhaustion of the nominal victors showed that a
[01:44:32] thorough re-examination of the whole problem of the object and aim was needed.
[01:44:41] Besides these negative factors that were also several positive reasons to prompt a fresh inquiry
[01:44:47] one was the decisive part that C powered played without any decisive battle at C and producing
[01:44:53] the enemies collapsed by economic pressure that raised the question whether Britain in particular
[01:44:58] had not made a basic mistake in departing from her traditional strategy and devoting much of her
[01:45:02] effort at such terrific cost to herself to the prolonged attempt to win a decisive victory on land.
[01:45:07] Yeah England Freak and Survived Forever just by rolling the sea.
[01:45:13] Pretend you're rules the waves that's what we do in England now we're over here fighting these
[01:45:18] these people on land.
[01:45:23] Two other reasons arose from the new factors.
[01:45:27] The development of air forces offered the possibility of striking a count.
[01:45:31] The enemies economic and moral centers without having to first achieve the destruction of the
[01:45:36] enemies main forces on the battlefield air power might attain a direct end by indirect means
[01:45:42] hopping over opposition instead of overthrowing it.
[01:45:46] Good deal Dave.
[01:45:48] I mean that's always been the goal whether it's whether it's ever an approved to be true.
[01:45:53] You could make a couple arguments but if that's always been the goal we can do this for that
[01:45:57] actually fighting on the ground on the ground.
[01:46:02] At the same time so at the same time we have air power at the same time the combined development
[01:46:05] of the petrol motor and the caterpillar track opened up a prospect of developing mechanized land
[01:46:10] forces of high mobility this in turn foreshadowed a newly enlarged possibility of producing
[01:46:15] the collapse of the enemy's main forces without a serious battle by cutting their supply lines
[01:46:19] dislocating their control systems or producing paralysis by the sheer nerve shock of deep
[01:46:24] penetration of the river.
[01:46:25] So you all have seen you got vehicles that can haul ass, knock it shot up and move a bunch of
[01:46:30] troops in a short amount of time.
[01:46:32] Mechanized land forces of this new kind might also provide like air power,
[01:46:36] though in a lesser degree the possibility of striking direct at the heart and nerve system of
[01:46:42] the opposing country.
[01:46:44] While air mobility could achieve such direct strokes by an overhead form of indirect approach
[01:46:49] tank mobility might achieve them by indirect approach on the ground avoiding the obstacle of the
[01:46:54] opposing army.
[01:46:57] To illustrate the point by a board game analogy with chess air mobility introduced the night's
[01:47:02] move and tank mobility a queen's move into warfare.
[01:47:06] Analogied is not of course expressed that respective values for an air force combined with the
[01:47:10] vaulting power of the night's move with the always flexibility of the queen's move.
[01:47:16] On the other hand a mechanized force a mechanized ground force,
[01:47:19] though at lacked vaulting power could remain an occupation of the square it gained.
[01:47:32] A couple other things.
[01:47:36] These new technologies increase the range of military action against military objectives,
[01:47:44] making it easier to overthrow and opposing body such as an army by paralyzing some of its vital
[01:47:50] organs instead of having to destroy it physically as a whole by hard fighting.
[01:47:55] So if you could knock out some of the key nodes that's going to be better.
[01:48:01] The sum effect of the advent of this multiplied mobility both on the ground and in the air
[01:48:06] was to increase the power and importance of strategy relative to tactics.
[01:48:09] The higher commanders of the future would have the prospect of achieving decisive results
[01:48:16] much more by movement than by fighting compared with their predecessors.
[01:48:25] Unfortunately, those skipping ahead a little bit of unfortunately those who were at the head of the
[01:48:29] armies after World War I were slow to recognize the need of a fresh definition of the military aim
[01:48:35] in light of changed conditions and war instruments.
[01:48:41] I mean you should be absolutely rethinking every.
[01:48:44] You imagine going from not having tanks and aircraft to having tanks and aircraft,
[01:48:48] you should be completely changing the entire way you're thinking about warfare.
[01:48:56] And by the way this is after World War I.
[01:48:59] I knew we did a piece, we did a podcast on the Boer War and they learned all these lessons
[01:49:06] during the Boer War and they freaking didn't capitalize on any of them.
[01:49:09] Like World War I shouldn't have happened but just based on what they learned in the
[01:49:14] Boer War I'm going extreme I don't want to go this extreme.
[01:49:17] There are many lessons that they weren't learned during the Boer War
[01:49:21] that they could have taken back and said we need to do things differently.
[01:49:24] And they didn't freaking adjust very many of them at all.
[01:49:27] We're going back to the last podcast and one of the first comments he made about
[01:49:33] the natural resistance, the automatic resistance that will happen when you propose change.
[01:49:40] And I'm paraphrasing, I'm already exact quote, but the idea that when I
[01:49:44] suggest a change to the norm, there will be resistance.
[01:49:50] To call me even a history and an amateur is a compliment.
[01:49:53] But I even think about the advent of air power and the resistance even in the navy to the idea
[01:50:00] that air power would somehow supplant the battleship as the preeminent force.
[01:50:08] And how obvious it seems now certainly, but at the time we're thinking, hey,
[01:50:14] do you not see the potential advantage if we could somehow occupy this third dimension of battle
[01:50:21] exclusively and how much risk it creates and the resistance.
[01:50:27] And my guess would be is that for the few folks that had the audacity to vocalize those lessons.
[01:50:35] Run out of the navy and by the way remember last podcast when I talked about 17 out of 20
[01:50:40] advancements in naval warfare, one of them was air craft carriers and air power totally.
[01:50:47] That's one of the more people here. You can't get him yet. We have a battleship, bro.
[01:50:50] Right. Back off. Yeah.
[01:50:54] It's this book is getting harder and harder to listen to because because because I have the
[01:51:02] the the his the hindsight of his of of what he's saying and the context of that which he
[01:51:08] he didn't have the future context that we all have now, but it's making it just so much more
[01:51:12] damning to you know what he's saying fast forward a little bit practice in World War II.
[01:51:21] When the next war came the handful of new land forces of mechanized kind that had been created,
[01:51:28] amply fulfilled the claims that had been made for them and for their decisive effect if employed
[01:51:34] for long-range strokes at strategic objectives. Unfortunately, it's the Nazis that they're just going
[01:51:41] to say yeah. A mere six divisions of this kind were largely instrumental in producing the
[01:51:45] collapse of Poland in a few weeks. A mere 10 such divisions virtually decided the so-called
[01:51:53] Battle of France before the infantry mass of the German army had even come in action and made
[01:51:58] the collapse of all Western countries and almost inevitable sequel. This conquest of the West
[01:52:04] was completed in barely a month's campaign with amazingly small cost to the victor. Indeed,
[01:52:10] the bloodshed all around was very slight and then the decisive phase trifling by a
[01:52:16] class witsy and standard. I mean, can you imagine you fight those freaking three bloody
[01:52:24] satanic battles? I mean campaigns in World War I. Just incomprehensible and then fast forward
[01:52:35] how many years 20 years 20 years 22 years whatever and it's over and less than a month.
[01:52:42] Like that's what we're talking about and there's almost no bloodshed because it just happened so
[01:52:45] fast because we have maneuver on our side. Yeah, even between those two examples not not to
[01:52:51] marginalize what the Germans did to Poland but it's what happened to the French that seems
[01:52:58] to me more remarkable because of what they had just been through and then to see the image of
[01:53:09] Hitler at the Eiffel Tower. I mean, that's a it's hard to put in a words what that means
[01:53:18] for him to be standing with with with basically no real cost of doing it relative. Crazy, crazy.
[01:53:31] While this sweeping victory was attained by action against objectives of military nature,
[01:53:35] it was mainly through action of maneuver strategic more than tackle. So it's a different,
[01:53:40] he's playing a different game. Similar reflections apply to the even swift or conquest of the
[01:53:51] Balkans in April of 1941, which once again demonstrated the paralyzing effect of the new
[01:53:56] instruments of strategic application battle was insignificant in comparison and destruction
[01:54:01] palpably inappropriate term for the way that the decision was achieved. When it came to the
[01:54:06] invasion of Russia, a somewhat different method was tried. Many of the German generals, particularly
[01:54:11] holder, the chief of the general staff, complain of Hitler's tendency to aim at the economic
[01:54:17] rather than military objectives. But analysis of the operational orders and of their own evidence
[01:54:22] does not bear out the charge while Hitler was inclined to think that the economic aim would be
[01:54:27] more effective. It is clear that in the crucial period of 1941 campaign, he conformed to the
[01:54:32] general staff's preference for fighting battles. Thankfully, the pursuit of the same did not prove
[01:54:40] decisive, although it produced several great victories in which immense forces of the enemy were
[01:54:46] destroyed. Okay, went and killed a bunch of Russians. Whether concentration on economic objectives
[01:54:52] would have been more decisive remains an open question, but the reflection that some of the
[01:54:56] ableist of the German generals consider that the best chance of defeating Soviet Russia was lost
[01:55:01] by aiming to win battles in the classical way, instead of driving through as fast as possible,
[01:55:07] to the moral, economic objectives offered by Maskot, Maskot and Leningrad, the leading exponent,
[01:55:14] our guardian, the leading exponent of the new school of mechanical mobile warfare, wish to do
[01:55:19] on this key question Hitler had sided with the Orthodox school.
[01:55:22] I like like like we said thank God. In the series of swift German conquest, the Air Force
[01:55:34] combined with the mechanized elements of land forces in producing the paralysis and moral
[01:55:38] disintegration of the opposing forces and of nations behind. Its effect was terrific and must be
[01:55:44] reckoned fully as important as that of the Panzer Forces. The two are inseparable in any
[01:55:50] valuation of the elements that created the new style of lightning warfare, LeBlitz Kreg.
[01:55:57] So I'm going to fast forward a little bit. There's a section in here about
[01:56:04] strategic bombing and what he calls grand strategic bombing or industrial bombing and he kind of goes into
[01:56:11] into how effective it actually was. He says the actual effect which this kind of bombing
[01:56:20] achieved in contribution to victory is very difficult to assess despite much detailed
[01:56:24] investigation. The estimation of the data is confused by partisan estimate assessments, both by
[01:56:30] those who favored industrial bombing and those who opposed it on various grounds, apart from the
[01:56:36] fog thus created a correct assessment is handicapped and made almost impossible by the amount of
[01:56:45] imponderbelia in the data even more than the evidence about any other type of military action
[01:56:54] imponderbelia meaning things that can't be determined. So he's basically saying that some of the
[01:57:03] industrial bombing may have not had been effective as we thought it was. Fast forward a little bit
[01:57:11] still clear is the extremely detrimental effective industrial bombing on the post war situation.
[01:57:16] Again, we're going to think grand strategy. We've got to think about what's happening afterwards.
[01:57:19] Beyond the immense scale of devastation, hard to repair are the less obvious, but probably
[01:57:24] more lasting social and moral effects. This kind of action inevitably produces a deepening
[01:57:29] danger to the relative shallow foundations of civilized life. Think about what you're doing to this
[01:57:35] civilian populace and how is that going to affect the future? That common danger is now immensely
[01:57:42] increased by the advent of the atomic bomb. Here we are brought to the fundamental difference between
[01:57:48] strategy and grand strategy. Whereas strategy is only concerned with the problem of winning military
[01:57:55] victory, grand strategy must take a longer view. For its problem is the winning of the peace.
[01:58:04] Such an order of thought is not a matter of putting the cart before the horse,
[01:58:13] but of being clear where the horse and cart are going.
[01:58:17] I'll tell you what, with that we're approaching two hours right now, we're probably really close
[01:58:24] if not at two hours and we have a lot more to cover. Echo is a cool we wrap this one up for now.
[01:58:33] Sure. All right, so we'll come back to you one more podcast about this book and well,
[01:58:42] I've got about these books until then until then and look, we're going deeper right now.
[01:58:49] We're drinking some drinks. We're getting after it. How do we get these drinks? We're drinking.
[01:58:57] What are we doing? You just cracked another one open. Sure. Where we got. I actually real quick
[01:59:02] I had to thought that it's so clouds to it and let them harden. They're kind of like,
[01:59:06] you're watching karate kid. Yes. The OG original karate kid John Kriss. Mr. Mayaghi. Okay. So
[01:59:15] class widths. Class widths are class widths. Depends on what kind of an accent. I'm kind of like a
[01:59:21] tempting bunch of. So he's John Kriss. Strike first strike hard, no mercy. Like kind of that
[01:59:28] philosophy. That's Mr. Miyagi. No, that's John Kriss. You know kind of the bad guy, but he'll
[01:59:33] get you fired up. You'll get you fired up. Right. We kind of. Let's face it. We all want to say no mercy
[01:59:38] in this dojo. Yeah. Kind of like that. Fear does not exist in this dojo. Check. All this stuff.
[01:59:45] So he gets you fired up, you know, but Mr. Miyagi for 40 seconds by the way. Oh, really? He's
[01:59:50] in for real life. No. In the story. Yeah. I got a book about the 440 second. I got to get a
[01:59:58] better one. I got one of it as a history book and it was cool and somebody sent it to me and I was
[02:00:02] kind of stoked like yeah, but it was a history book. Wasn't a lot of first person. I was like cool.
[02:00:07] We can do history book as long as a bunch of first person counts. It really wasn't that many
[02:00:09] and then I got to get I got to get on the 440 second. Hmm. I did it. Unless Mr. Miyagi his whole thing was
[02:00:17] balance right takes Daniel son out on the river or in the lake and he has him on the boat. Right
[02:00:22] balance first before he's like, when do I learn out of fight all this stuff? What else did he say?
[02:00:27] Why learn karate and he was like, so you don't have to fight put every little thing. The balance
[02:00:34] man. It's what it seemed like to me. I don't know. There you go. Provided some more. Look,
[02:00:38] if you're right in reading these books and you're just getting it from a karate kid. You could have
[02:00:42] figured out a lot of it. Yeah, that's true. Unless you are right. We are here drinking discipline go.
[02:00:48] Sometimes you had a drink discipline go. Yeah. It's good. Unless last time I was saying how
[02:00:53] the path is a little bit easier. I don't know if the path is actually easier because it's easy.
[02:00:59] Easy is not the right word. Maybe it's comfortable. That doesn't sound like the right word either.
[02:01:06] Because like comfort you want to be capable you want to be comfortable.
[02:01:09] Nonetheless, it's more pleasurable about that. We're drinking discipline go a taste good. It's good
[02:01:14] for you. It's a win-win strategically and tactically. Okay. I think all this stuff is bringing it all up again.
[02:01:23] Oh no, it's lines. All right. Same thing with Moke. You can have some of that taste really,
[02:01:28] really good. Plus provides protein plus this healthy. Boom. This is all the joccal fuel stuff. So
[02:01:33] also we got your joint stuff, your immunity stuff, your first super cruel oil. Vitamin D3 and
[02:01:40] Cold War. Screw. Get these things at joccalfuel.com. Get the discipline go energy drinks.
[02:01:49] I'm just calling energy drinks just for because that's what we're doing. Drinking the energy drink.
[02:01:55] Get those at Wawa and Vitamin Shop. Yeah. Actually, you can get everything from Vitamin Shop.
[02:02:01] Also yes, or adjoccalfuel.com. Get the subscription if you don't want to get, uh, if you don't
[02:02:06] want to forget about, um, you know, restock it out. If you subscribe to whatever you want from
[02:02:13] Joccal fuel shipping's free and shipping can be expensive. Let's face it. And we want to not
[02:02:19] expend resources that we don't have to. A little indirect attack. Get subscription. All of a sudden
[02:02:28] shipping's free. Yeah. Extra. Your resources are spared and can be utilized for other offensive
[02:02:34] operations. Yeah. That's kind of like a kind of badass way of saying that, right? Yeah, kind of. I agree.
[02:02:40] I agree. Yeah. Yeah. Fully. Also speaking of operations, origin USA American made stuff.
[02:02:46] Durable goods clothing. What that means is you want to get some American made jeans.
[02:02:52] American made out of American made denim made out of American made cotton.
[02:02:57] Or junior says where you can get this stuff. How else? As athletic where some, uh,
[02:03:00] jujitsu stuff, guise rash guards, belts, wallets, boots. I still have your boots. By the way. Oh,
[02:03:07] I think I'm going to need those soon. Yeah. Don't worry. They're downstairs in the car.
[02:03:12] Yeah. I don't know. I've been the last origin USA. That's where you can get this stuff.
[02:03:15] Real good stuff. It's a big deal to made in America the way it is made in America from the
[02:03:19] beginning all the way up into the final product. Yeah. We have a factory full of awesome American
[02:03:27] people up there creating this stuff, sewing it, printing it. I mean, just every aspect,
[02:03:34] cutting it, sewing it. It's just legit. And if you follow that, if you if you've pulled the thread
[02:03:40] on a pair of jeans, you're going to end up in a cotton field in Texas, or in george. Like that's
[02:03:47] where it's common from. So, know your roots. Let's just speak it in roots. Also,
[02:03:54] jocco has a store. That's his roots. It's called jocco stores. So, you can get the discipline equals
[02:04:00] freedom or good or get after it. All you can get the shirts, the hats, hoodies, some rash guards on there.
[02:04:09] Stuff. Just stuff. Anyway, yeah, check that one out. Jocco, it's at joccostore.com. And yeah,
[02:04:14] if you like something, get something. We also have a subscription situation there called the
[02:04:18] shirt locker. Do you want to cool kind of off shoot conceptual designs? I don't think you really
[02:04:28] figured out how to describe your designs yet. No, it's a work in progress. You know, I see, but
[02:04:32] each time you got to progress, you don't progress to your description. Yeah, but just like, um, what
[02:04:38] he call warfare. Yeah. You know, you don't, you know, you're not always progressing. Same same. But you
[02:04:43] want to. Hey, sometimes you go forward, sometimes you go backwards. You know, hopefully the whole
[02:04:47] grand, uh, what he call freaking grand strategy. Yeah. Hopefully I end up forward. Hopefully I end up
[02:04:54] achieving the goal of explaining how cool the shirt locker is. It's you already did a better job.
[02:05:00] Right there. You just needed a little help. A little help. Okay. Good. You get some criticism.
[02:05:04] Some direct feedback about your weekend. It's a good repetition. I'm over here trying. And,
[02:05:10] you know, and I think the people are responding. You know, people seem to like and
[02:05:14] seem saying, I got to admit when I learned the master and I saw some people that had,
[02:05:19] you know, shirt locker shirts on totally represent extra level of connection. Yeah. I agree. I'm not
[02:05:25] just exact same thing. You know, yeah, sure. That's at jobless.com. So yes, I know for that if you're down.
[02:05:30] And, like, subscribe to this podcast too. We also have Jockel unrabbling podcast that I'm doing with
[02:05:35] the Derell Cooper who knows what's going to happen. We're getting crazy on that thing.
[02:05:39] Got all kinds of topics. We're digging into, um, we don't always agree on stuff. It's come to
[02:05:45] find out the D.C. Sometimes it gets a little hectic in the podcast room. Check out that the
[02:05:52] Jockel unrabbling podcast. Check out the grounded podcast. Check out the warrior kid podcast. You can
[02:05:56] also check out. We have another alternative podcast called Jockel underground. You go to jockel
[02:06:05] underground.com. If you want to hear some amplifying information. If you want to hear some other
[02:06:10] topics that are adjacent to yet not fully embedded with Jockel podcast topics, but look,
[02:06:18] even though I think about leadership 20 hours a day, there's other things I think about like
[02:06:24] psychology, like sociology, like questions, do answering questions from people. So there's a lot of
[02:06:30] stuff going on that. Also, it gives us the opportunity to have an alternative platform besides the
[02:06:37] mainstream platforms, which we do not control. We don't mind, you know, being on those platforms,
[02:06:44] but they could make moves that would, we would mind that we would not appreciate and we know you
[02:06:50] wouldn't appreciate. So in order to prevent us from being in a situation that we have lost total
[02:06:56] control, we have some contingency plans. It's called jockel underground. Jockel on around.com.
[02:07:00] You can join. We'll get you this little extra podcast, cost $8.18 a month. That way, we have it if we
[02:07:08] need it. And if you can't afford it, it's cool. We still got your back. Email assistance at jockel
[02:07:16] underground.com. We've got a YouTube channel where I am the assistant director for many of the videos
[02:07:22] and hence some of the videos have very high quality. Some of them that I don't work on,
[02:07:27] a little bit subpar, but cool. Echo is working on it. He's working on improving. Yeah. Yeah.
[02:07:34] So there you go. Oh, psychological warfare. It's an album, jockel album with jockel tracks,
[02:07:39] where, you know, if you want to skip the workout, you want to cheat on the diet. When you have
[02:07:42] those feelings, you need some help. Boom, jockels there to help. Get you through those moments of
[02:07:46] weakness, sort of play the tracks, boom, and around we go. You can get those anywhere you get MP3s
[02:07:52] that's where you can get them. Amazon, Google Play, all those places. Don't forget about flip side
[02:07:56] canvas.com. If you want to hang some cool stuff on your wall, which you probably do,
[02:08:01] things that remind you of the path. Go to flipsidekames.com. Dakota Meyer.
[02:08:07] Imagine having someone from Dakota Meyer's hanging in your house. This freaking just legit.
[02:08:13] If you think about Dakota Meyer, you just be that cool. I'm gonna meet after it. That's true.
[02:08:20] Right? That's what I think. Yeah. You know what's funny. Dakota, Dakota and I when we talk,
[02:08:25] we will have conversations and that we will be laughing hysterically about stuff that he's not
[02:08:31] surprised. He actually makes me laugh harder than anyone currently in my regime of contacts.
[02:08:40] Interesting. Yeah. Feel fun. Feel. See you. Okay. See you up, too. That's true. Yeah. That's a good point.
[02:08:46] Is there a different kind? Yeah. Yeah. That's true. You know what? Feel while getting me laughing
[02:08:55] on a tactical level? Sure. With with with then with Dakota man, sometimes we're laughing at us.
[02:09:02] Strategic deep love. Yeah. So we got that flipsidekames.com. Dakota Meyer. Well,
[02:09:10] it's got a bunch of books. Final spin. It's a book poem, manuscript, transcript, new form,
[02:09:21] new format of literature. Sure. Notice how I said that. Yeah.
[02:09:25] I did. Yeah. New format of literature. My wife says the literature because she's British.
[02:09:29] Uh-huh. Literature. Yeah. So a new form of literature, which I invented. The text. Text.
[02:09:36] You got to go. Yeah. If you want to observe the text. That's the high brow. Yeah.
[02:09:40] Deal. Did you? I did. You don't know. Yeah. You tell me that.
[02:09:43] Did I teach you that? That's what I say. Did they say that? And uh, when you went to get your
[02:09:47] masters, if they say, if you, if you, if you reference the text in this situation, like they don't
[02:09:52] call it a book, because you're just like a loser if you just have a book, you have to refer to the
[02:09:56] text. Yeah. The text. Yeah. We don't like that. Anyways, if you want to check out the text,
[02:10:03] you can check out final spin. You can pre-order it right now. Also, leadership strategy and tactics
[02:10:08] field manual, the code, the evaluation, the protocol. Discipline. There's freedom field manual.
[02:10:13] Way the word. You're going to want to read through mic and the dragons about face by
[02:10:16] hack worth. Extreme ownership in the dichotomy. A leadership. There's all the things that we're
[02:10:20] talking about when it comes to leadership and all these different books. Also speaking of leadership,
[02:10:25] we have a leadership consultancy. What do we do, Dave? We solve problems through leadership.
[02:10:30] But aren't, but aren't, what about problems that aren't really leadership related?
[02:10:37] All your problems, leadership problems. In that crazy. It's true. If you want us to come and help you
[02:10:43] inside your organization, go to echelonfront.com. We also have an online training program,
[02:10:50] EF online.com. It's extreme ownership, academy. We have, we have courses on every chapter. We have
[02:10:59] live Q&A. That we do. We have leadership primers. We have questions that we got all
[02:11:03] cut. We have a forum on there. We're going to all kinds of stuff on there. To help you with
[02:11:07] the most important skill that a human being can have, which is leadership, leadership can prevent
[02:11:11] things like freaking the battle of the song. Check.
[02:11:19] Master 2021 Orlando, done. Next up, Phoenix, August 17th and 18th, Las Vegas, October 28th and 29th.
[02:11:32] These are our leadership conferences. Come and get it. We also have the FTX, where you,
[02:11:40] where you get your gear on. Get set up with a high speed laser tag on, get taught some of the basic
[02:11:46] tactics, military tactics, and then you go with your team and you conduct operations. You put
[02:11:54] these strategies and tactics and principles that we talk about all the time. You put them to use
[02:12:00] and you see how they work out and you learn and you get debriefed. So if you want to do that,
[02:12:07] check out the FTX San Diego July 12th and 13th, go to echelonfront.com. If you want to help service
[02:12:13] members active and retire their families, gold star families, you can check out Mark Lees,
[02:12:19] mom, mom, and Lee. She's got a charity organization and if you want to donate or you want to
[02:12:23] get involved, go to americazmightywariers.org. And if you want more of my exhaustive explanations or
[02:12:33] you need more of echelons disjoined and delirium. Perhaps you need more of Dave's exhilarated expositions.
[02:12:43] You can find us on the interwebs on Twitter, on the gram and on Facebook. Echoes,
[02:12:49] adecrotrawals. Dave is at David R. Burke and I am at Jockel-Willink and to all the military personnel
[02:12:59] out there. Thank you for taking these tactics that we are talking about and putting them to work
[02:13:07] around the world to keep us free. And the same to our police law enforcement firefighters,
[02:13:13] paramedics, EMTs, dispatchers, correction officers, border patrol, secret service and all first responders.
[02:13:18] Thank you for keeping us safe here at home and everyone else out there. Well, if you know the way
[02:13:34] broadly, you see it in all things. So I've got an idea. Try your best to open up your eyes,
[02:13:43] look around and see the way in everything that you do. And until next time, this is Dave and Echo
[02:13:56] and Jockel. Out.