Jocko Podcast 256: An Hour Lost Today is an Hour Lost Forever. Time is Running Out. W/ Dave Berke.

2020-11-20T22:59:32Z

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AI summary of episode

But on top of it, it's like sometimes we like, like, even you'll be like, hey, put this on a t-shirt or I'll be like, you know, like suggesting, like a t-shirt and it's a good, it's a fun, good idea or cool or cool. I feel like motivation is like kind of there's like short term in long term and you know like I was thinking of something very specific at the time where you know people get mad when they get angry at something that motivates them like super hardcore but only short term and then if somebody someone's the opposite if someone's really happy or I don't know thankful or whatever that keeps them sort of motivated long term. Whoever's making their smart people, like, you know, how you can, you know, some jokes are like, brother, that's like not even a, it's like a cheap joke that's not funny. I mean, you need people that are going to clean the, the toilets, you know, you got, you got some, you know, you got a people that are going to, and look, these are what we, this is what I did when I got the military, right? Like, you got, okay, you got most improved, then you got like hardest worker or something like that, you know, how you never get that one? You're at best you're going to have like even when you're doing your work up, you run in that work up is, work up is probably even worse because work ups, you know, the flying schedule shifts are on a bunch to get all these different calls, but you I would say routinely the best you're ever going to get is half your squadron there at any given time. If some of those were like, for some solid work you did on this little thing, that you thought maybe wasn't that huge of a deal, but you did some good work in people saw what you did and you were like, hey, hey, look, you didn't save the world, but you did really good with that little, whatever you did. Yeah, the late times I'll tell you, hey, I'm late because of this specific reason or whatever, but that's already, but nonetheless, like that is I agree with you where you're wasting other people's time people are waiting for you like that's it's it's kind of inexcusable in a way. The reason I didn't say anything when you, when you read that, because I had a little like, is I'm going to listen what General Clark has to say before I get to me, but that at, on its face, though, when you said that, my first thing was was, oh, okay, I don't think that's right, but I'm, obviously he's going to say something about it, but we get this question and business all the time. Yeah, you know, when you're like in elementary school and you have like the award for most improved, that's like kind of alleviates that issue, right? Like, you know, when you get like, you know, MVP of the football game, it's always the same guy, the quarterback, whatever the guy in, you know, you obviously depends on the game. You know, whether it's like when I'm starting to write a book like I know what that book is, I know the end state Like, that's okay as opposed to, hey, we got to get this paperwork going or this, whatever other thing going on is so he might have been out in front of the curve for all I know for the, for the era that he was in saying, it's okay from the general down in the private, is it shut down normal ops to go to the unit. So this is just, you know, you just kind of prescribes this weird like four mile walk that everyone's going to go on, which tells me earlier when I said they weren't that working out wasn't really like a thing. And like you get measured all these odd measurements like angled or like elbow to wrist, like angled to knee. I know I tried, but the cool thing was, you know, my commanding officer at the time was like, you know, that makes sense. I think if you if you imagine like a corporation, like a giant corporation and division size corporation with whatever 10 or 15,000 people and they were going to start a physical training program, this might be an okay program. There's something you said I was thinking about in my contrast between aviation, my time in a fighter squadron versus my time in Anglicore, which is kind of the biggest contrast is, and I don't know how it is elsewhere, but the infantry or the ground units when I was with them have a kind of pre-regimen like their days and it's kind of a typical workday, whereas a fighter squadron operates 24 hours a day. And eventually we made a deal where we gave ourselves like a waiver to be five minutes or eight minutes late because if you were going to be there at two o'clock in order to be there at two o'clock, you had to show up at one and drive or and so we were just like, you know what? Like if you, like, you know, you're like, I can come up with this true though. and they're like, hey Halloween party, you know, there's going to be, I don't know, 100 people. And so if you connect the idea of thinking in and states around your people and also letting your people know, you're not going to fly off the handle, and jump right in, they're starting to micromanage them when they get these little hiccups, these little deviations, because you actually in your mind, Joko, haven't thought about all the things that happened between here and here. And we and we can solve those things, too, using the exact same approach, which is if you have that attitude as a leader, when your people run into problems, then I'm not going to be pan-extricking about what is the boss going to think, because he's going to say, I expect those things happen. So as you're thinking, I was laughing because you know, when you're talking about even the way you're saying NAM like anybody in the NAMS, the NAMS is like this thing. You know, like why am I going to prepare like take 30 minutes to prepare this and prepare that for something that I don't have to be there at that. When you start talking about people that are in the lowest scoring brackets of the, of the AzVab, like they can't get in the military, but they're also not going to be applying for a job with that's going to take some some high level cognitive abilities. They weren't like, oh, you're just going to, you, there was some gunfire near, but no, like these guys were in 18 fire fights, and they got a name with the V. I don't know what you, it'd be like one of those um, you ever see those TV physical competitions where they're doing all these up, like you'd run the obstacle course, then you would do berm runs, but you would be in a little team. And maybe, I don't know, maybe I'm my experience, which is nothing, but in my experience, is like under appreciated or whatever, like not flying off the handle and things go wrong. His point, I understand his point though, and the idea that I'm going to write that person office unwilling to do it, to me, it was more like, how much of my, how much energy am I going to devote to try to find the way that gets you to our need to be? When I got the seal teams, I was cleaning toilets, but then you, you're, you're going to move up and you're going to move on, but at some place you need some people that are going to have some pretty fundamentally non-high cognitive skill requirement jobs. And that just helps them get used to how operating together, what people are like, what it's like for that leader, what how that leader relates to the troops, how the troops relate back to the leader, you train, how you operate, you work, how you train. Hey, like Dave's in his aircraft and he's like wait a second go a little bit further to the right go a little bit further to the left. So that 97% is, I think actually correct not all, but I think it's point two is like, hey, if you're in charge of people and they're not, they're not up to standards, you need to spend most of your time figuring out what you're doing wrong.

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Episode transcript

[00:00:00] This is Jockel Podcast number 256 with Echo Charles and me, Jockel willing.
[00:00:07] Good evening, Echo. Good evening. And joining us once again is Dave Burke,
[00:00:12] Good evening, Dave. Good evening. And tonight we are going to rap the final installment
[00:00:19] on guidelines for the leader and commander by General Bruce Clark. This is the subject of podcast's
[00:00:26] plural 251 252 253 254 255 and now find me 256 so much to learn taking the lessons that were
[00:00:35] passed on to Colonel David Hackworth who served the career of Vietnam wrote the book about face
[00:00:41] taught me many leadership lessons well he learned those lessons from this book written by General Bruce Clark
[00:00:48] who served in Korea World War II World War I who led many soldiers trained even more
[00:00:57] including one that he didn't even know about me. And we are trying to pass those lessons on.
[00:01:06] So for the final installment let's get back to the book guidelines for the leader and commander
[00:01:14] chapter 11 physical conditioning there you go Echo Charles. I'm sure your interest just got peaked.
[00:01:23] Here we go. I would like to pass on to you for such implementation as maybe practical
[00:01:28] within your several commands and within your various types of headquarters and units some
[00:01:32] thoughts on the problem of physical exercise, physical condition and physical training.
[00:01:36] This is a complex subject. It success depends on the program. Each commander works out
[00:01:42] to fit his needs and facilities and then enthusiastically and energetically pushes. While many
[00:01:49] of our units and individuals are in fine physical shape this is not universally true in many commands.
[00:01:56] I believe it can be made more nearly universally true by a more general concept as to its importance
[00:02:03] and to a consideration of the implementation of practical steps that can be taken in this field
[00:02:08] without materially interfering with our other activities. What greater you giving general
[00:02:15] Clark for simplicity on that whole opening? I'm not getting them a good grade. Luckily he redeemed
[00:02:20] your energy he redeemed himself in the end of this book with some real simple clear concise.
[00:02:26] So he thinks that you know the simple statement is people should be working out.
[00:02:32] I believe strongly that good physical condition is one of the evidences of the
[00:02:36] free in a unit as well as of morale in an individual. So it helps both your team and you as a person.
[00:02:43] Now here's where we have a serious beef. Serious beef. Probably one of the most serious beefs
[00:02:51] ever for me with general Clark. This topic is called calistenics at end of day.
[00:03:01] Echo you're probably going to want to throw down with this one. You're going to throw in with him.
[00:03:05] On one occasion I visited a unit and observed calistenics being conducted during the first period
[00:03:10] of the morning. This was being done in the normal way by a junior sergeant conducting the
[00:03:14] exercises with the senior non-commissioned officers and officers standing around to supervise and monitor.
[00:03:22] Possibly the ones who needed the exercise the most were the ones observing. That's a good one.
[00:03:26] You don't want to be that guy. You don't want to be that guy that's standing there with
[00:03:30] a small arms telling people they need to do more pull ups, right? You don't want to find yourself
[00:03:37] in that situation. No, you're not going to. No, sorry. But then he says this, I do not think calistenics
[00:03:44] or other physical training exercise in the first hour of the day is good. Of course, as we know,
[00:03:51] definitely think that working out in the first hour of the day is good. If they are done
[00:03:55] strenuously enough to be of any value so that the men work up the perspiration, the men then
[00:04:02] wear the same wet clothes throughout the day or until such clothing dries off them. Similarly,
[00:04:07] if men performed exercise or requiring them to sit on the ground or lie on the ground, they start
[00:04:11] off the day with dirty and maybe wet clothing. Now for me, general clerk, I'll do respect. I think
[00:04:16] we can just take a shower and change clothes when we're done working out. I think we can overcome
[00:04:21] that in the modern era. Yeah, I got to admit that kind of surprised me as being the first reason
[00:04:27] that he's talking about. Yeah, why not to work out first thing in the morning? Yeah, because we could
[00:04:31] just we could just shower. Seems easy to solve that from you. I will say this though. I think he's
[00:04:38] coming from a time period where they didn't have this full like this was only an idea that was just
[00:04:44] coming to fruition, right? So it wasn't a thing yet. It wasn't a thing to work out. So people didn't
[00:04:49] have work out clothes. People didn't have work out shoes. People didn't have work out bag. You know,
[00:04:57] these people didn't have a workout bag. Didn't have your little freaking re-bock bag or whatever
[00:05:02] that echo Charles takes to 24 hours of fitness. So get your curls on. So they didn't have that back then.
[00:05:10] So he's thinking, yeah, you showed to work and the first thing we're going to do is build up a
[00:05:13] sweat and our going to be wet the clothes all day. All right, we'll give you, we'll cut you some
[00:05:16] slack. And then he says, I believe it is far more reasonable to devote the last hour in the afternoon
[00:05:23] to physical exercising and physical training so that the men can go from it to the showers and get
[00:05:29] into other clothing for supper and the evening. This is the time when the mind is tired and training
[00:05:35] requiring mental attention is least effective. Okay, so that's okay. So all right, so we're going to
[00:05:41] just going to jump past like all the whole thing about the doing you're working out. Because I think
[00:05:44] it's just, I think we're beyond that now in the modern era. Yeah. I don't think we're, I think we can
[00:05:50] work out whenever it makes the most sense not based on our sweat and clothing. I think can we put
[00:05:55] that, can we set that one aside? I agree. So now this is interesting. This is the time when the mind
[00:06:02] is tired and training requiring mental attention is least effective. Doesn't it take a certain
[00:06:07] level of mental effort to do a hard workout? Don't you think? Is it Dave? Yes. I wonder if he's thinking
[00:06:18] like intellectual effort. Right? I get that and I get that too like for instance, this might
[00:06:24] sound stupid. When I'm going to, when I'm going to, let's say it's late at night and I'm like tired
[00:06:34] and I've got some more reading to do. I'll read until I'm just going to fall asleep and then I'll
[00:06:42] get up and brush my teeth, whatever take my supplements as echo likes to say. So I'll do my little
[00:06:48] evening routine floss and then, and then I'll have like, you know, I stood up. So now I'm, I can read a
[00:06:56] little bit longer. I can go a little bit longer and then I go to sleep. So when you do something,
[00:07:01] I guess that, that what I'm saying is you get bored. So maybe this is a good plan. Hey, it's the
[00:07:06] end of the day. You're kind of tired. You don't feel like focusing on this, what you call it, Dave,
[00:07:11] intellectual work. Yeah. Yeah, you don't, you don't, you're, you've spent your intellectual energy,
[00:07:17] but you can still just go jack some steel possibly. Okay. I don't agree. I don't agree. I think
[00:07:24] that that's the case for some of us that like, no, man, when you're mentally exhausted, I mean,
[00:07:31] sure there are some circumstances, but as a general sort of way and approach to working on,
[00:07:36] and no, man, I don't know if I can get there quite yet. Okay. But we'll see what you're doing.
[00:07:40] So you want to have, you want to be mentally fresh for your workout. Yes. Okay.
[00:07:47] All right, back to the book in two divisions at NIN number gate in which I served, everyone
[00:07:50] stopped activities at four o'clock on two days a week with the exception of the necessary
[00:07:55] duty officers, guards and everyone from the, from the commanding general. Everyone from the commanding
[00:07:59] general on down took physical exercises. This physical exercising consisted of activities that
[00:08:05] provided a real workout, none of this echo Charles. Real workout. Certain well organized selected
[00:08:14] games were allowed, provided that everyone played organized calisthenics were allowed, but the bulk
[00:08:20] of the units engaged in a four mile trot and fast walk to be completed in 50 minutes. Yes,
[00:08:28] bro, we're talking 12 minute miles or whatever. This is not a challenge.
[00:08:34] And here's what, as I thought through this, it started to make a little bit more sense.
[00:08:37] Combat boots with proper socks were worn by all personnel in order to get the men used to
[00:08:41] prevent damage to their feet, right? Above the top of the boots, everyone was permitted to
[00:08:45] prescribe their own uniform within the realm of decency. This gave men a feeling of freedom
[00:08:50] which added to the relaxation and benefit of exercise. Okay. So that's cool. I do not think
[00:08:55] this lack of uniformity hurt the discipline of the unit. It was not a show. Men traveled the
[00:09:02] previously laid out formal courses as individuals being checked at the start and finished
[00:09:07] to record their times in order to motivate the slow ones by falling. So this is just, you know,
[00:09:12] you just kind of prescribes this weird like four mile walk that everyone's going to go on,
[00:09:18] which tells me earlier when I said they weren't that working out wasn't really like a thing.
[00:09:24] Yeah, it wasn't because if they're thinking 50 minutes and four miles, but the only thing I can say
[00:09:30] about that also is if you're talking about a whole division or a whole brigade of people,
[00:09:37] like these are not all front line soldiers, obviously. These are administrative people and
[00:09:44] whatever the general himself. So yeah, I don't know. By falling the courses individuals instead of
[00:09:52] formation, no one exercise so strenuously as to do himself damage regardless of his physical
[00:09:57] condition or age, care should be taken in starting such a program to work into a reasonably
[00:10:04] so as not to increase the sick call rate. I think if you if you imagine like a corporation,
[00:10:11] like a giant corporation and division size corporation with whatever 10 or 15,000 people
[00:10:17] and they were going to start a physical training program, this might be an okay program. You got 50 minutes,
[00:10:22] you got to go out, you got to move four miles, go for a walk, whatever. I think that's
[00:10:26] I think that's almost the perspective that he's coming from.
[00:10:35] I don't know, though, because didn't he just say a real work? Yeah, and there should be
[00:10:39] sweating. I mean, I'm not sweating after a after 12 minute miles for four miles and I swear to
[00:10:45] a lot as you know. Well, let's just be thankful that we are where we are, where we've learned
[00:10:54] so much about physical training and which has changed a lot. I mean, did you see that picture I
[00:11:00] posed at the other day of I was like yelling at one of my friends back in the day and he's doing
[00:11:05] cable crossover. I couldn't tell what he's doing. He's doing just cable crossovers. Yeah, oh yeah.
[00:11:13] Hardcore building the thing that's building the what the lower packs.
[00:11:21] Leave it to you to try to yell at him while he's doing that. It's just like you think dead
[00:11:26] I think we were just messing around actually. Physical exercise program, the Secretary of
[00:11:30] the Army has written to commanders about the tendency to move troops from barracks to work and
[00:11:34] from barracks to training areas by vehicle instead of marching them when it is practical. Well,
[00:11:40] two march. He pointed out that is very important that the troops retain the ability to march
[00:11:44] and especially was and this was especially important in mechanized and motorized armor units. So
[00:11:51] that's a great point. When you have the opportunity to march instead of riding a vehicle,
[00:11:57] you should march instead of riding a vehicle. That's one thing that's cool about buds. In buds,
[00:12:03] you run to dent, you run to breakfast and back, you run to lunch and back, you run to dinner and back.
[00:12:08] It's milder, it's milder. You're doing six miles a day before anything. Before the day before you
[00:12:13] get credit for anything, you ran six miles. Yeah. As a pilot, do you, because I was watching some
[00:12:20] videos of some pilots that I came across. And do you guys kind of have to stay in physical
[00:12:28] condition just to endure like flying a plane essentially? I mean, the physical fitness standards
[00:12:35] are universal across the Marine Corps and all the same. There is a unique level of fitness that
[00:12:43] is associated with flying and it kind of comes and goes with how much flying you're doing.
[00:12:47] But there's not like a separate type of aviation fitness other than there are things about
[00:12:51] aviation that will fatigue you that you won't get fatigue doing other things and that's two
[00:12:56] for other things as well. But like the PT in the Marine Corps doesn't they don't care what your job is.
[00:13:01] Can you train for the, like, let's say you did a disassociated tour and you weren't flying
[00:13:08] for 18 months and now you knew you were going back to a squadron you were going to be flying.
[00:13:13] Is there any exercises that you could do to get ready for flying? You can't train for G
[00:13:18] tolerance. Exactly. So that's a perishable thing. You know, there's a, you know, a
[00:13:24] robegan anaerobic, there's certain muscles that are good to be strengthened. But if you have
[00:13:29] him phone, it's the Gs that will that you cannot train for. You can't replicate those Gs and
[00:13:34] you can't train for those Gs at all. Well, I mean, okay, let me challenge you. Now you can train
[00:13:39] for the technique and you can train to the muscles to do that, but you can't replicate the actual
[00:13:45] feeling of the Gs. But that being said, if you take someone that's in really good shape,
[00:13:50] versus someone that's not really good shape, the person that's in really good shape is going to do better.
[00:13:54] But maybe, I mean, okay, I mean, you have to use your muscles. Yeah, you do, but like larger
[00:14:03] muscles don't, don't mean better G tolerance. But what about just conditioning? Yeah, no, absolutely.
[00:14:12] Yes, a better condition person is going to be able to endure all things being equal,
[00:14:19] be able to endure the rigors of flying more than the other person, but that doesn't mean he's
[00:14:22] going to have a higher G tolerance. Did I ever tell you about my buddy, what, what, when my
[00:14:28] platoons all went backseat in the F-18s? So we went through the whatever training you go through,
[00:14:34] so you can get called to go the backseat. So we all go through, well, he showed up late. And so he missed
[00:14:40] the whole briefing on how to, what is it called, how to push the blood to your brain? He missed all that,
[00:14:47] and then he missed whatever, and then he showed up, I think he was out. I think he was breaking the night before.
[00:14:53] And so there's a little covered move and like we snuck him back into the class and put his name on the
[00:14:57] roster and it's all good. Well, then he showed me, we get up to Fallen and he didn't know what to do. He just
[00:15:03] got in the plane. He's like, cool, I know what, you know, whatever. And he passed out the entire time.
[00:15:07] So he, he was just like wake up and then just pass out again because he didn't know to, to put the
[00:15:13] blood to his head. He didn't know to do that. So he just passed it out and they had video on it.
[00:15:16] Does that make sense that they had video of it? Totally. He was just, he was just flopping around the
[00:15:20] thing in the cockpit and we were laughing and he said, I had no idea. He just didn't remember anything.
[00:15:26] He was just passing out. Yep. Well, can she get like hurt like that? Like if you passed out
[00:15:31] Olympian, can't you neck? Because you know those that video that you play at the mustard that die
[00:15:36] in the what he would he called those diffusions. And he, he passes out and it's like probably
[00:15:42] still getting smashed from the force. Yeah. I don't think there's any real risk of
[00:15:47] pervangering from doing that. It's more just being humiliated. Yeah. Yeah. That's actually that's what
[00:15:53] I was that's what I meant like do you guys train? Do you guys have a specific like training or
[00:15:57] team for that? Because man, you don't really realize that I mean, maybe do, maybe don't. You don't
[00:16:03] but when you see guys flying planes and doing all that stuff, you don't really understand like what
[00:16:07] you're going through physically in there, you know, right? Is there an ideal physical build for
[00:16:12] fighter pilot? I don't think so, man. I mean, just like with every marine, there are all shapes and
[00:16:18] sizes. I mean, my body type is drastically different than others. And if you were going to be an
[00:16:25] F-18 pilot or let's say an F-35 pilot, you were going to design an F-35 pilot human. Yeah. How
[00:16:31] tall would that human be? Six foot. How much would they weigh? 190 pounds. So that's it. Does
[00:16:38] like, so there is an ideal. That's because if he's six four, he's cramped in the cockpit. If he's six,
[00:16:44] if he's five, five, he can't reach the pedal over there. Right? I mean, there's issues.
[00:16:51] There are there are legitimate anthropometric issues that is a truth. And like you get measured
[00:16:57] all these odd measurements like angled or like elbow to wrist, like angled to knee. There's all sorts of
[00:17:03] physical measurements. The window is pretty broad. And even, you know, for me to say six foot 190,
[00:17:09] I'm just talking about like a lean, strong guy. Does that mean a five foot six, a hundred and 25 pound
[00:17:16] person can't be good about? No, they totally absolutely can't. Absolutely can't. With that person,
[00:17:20] maybe struggle a little bit with like looking over the shore? Yeah. They wouldn't. They're by
[00:17:24] type as if you're six four in your banging your head against the canopy, which guys in my
[00:17:27] squadron, guys whose call signs were stretch because they were so tall. At the end of the day,
[00:17:32] I don't think any would come back and say, I'm better because of my build or my height. So even that
[00:17:36] answer is like the window is broad enough to say then anybody and there's pilots out there,
[00:17:42] that are pretty good pilots out there that aren't six foot 190. Is there a cut off?
[00:17:46] Hi, or minimum technically? Yeah, I think it's pretty small. I think it's very short like
[00:17:52] five one five two, you know, you can accommodate someone that short and I think I've known guys
[00:17:57] that are six five six six flying fighters. So dang, there's a big window in there. Do they call
[00:18:04] a pedals? They do. They call the pedals. Now they're adjustable. So the image of not being able
[00:18:10] to reach the pedals is more fun. But I'll tell you what, as a taller guy, a taller dude and
[00:18:17] there's, you know, when you get into an airplane that somebody else has flown and they're on
[00:18:20] the shorter side, you get in your, you're, you're, you know, it's like being in the back seat of a car
[00:18:24] and you immediately have to push those pedals all the way back because the dude in front of you is
[00:18:28] way shorter than you. So it's adjustable like a cat-alact. It is. It's the adjustment is not too far away
[00:18:34] from the, the cockpit temperature adjuster. Oh, that's right. You know, you can adjust that
[00:18:39] temperature. Check. All right, going on. I do not wish to discourage anyone who gets exercise from
[00:18:45] golf tennis bowling hunting, fishing, gardening, walking skiing, etc. In fact, I encourage such
[00:18:50] activities during off time. When spring arrives in long daylight hours of the year with us, it's
[00:18:57] good time to start physical training program. He goes on. A commander should have no objection to
[00:19:03] to, to the closing of any headquarters at four o'clock two days a week in order to devote this
[00:19:08] time to physical exercising. Nor should he object to the stopping of other activities in most T O E units,
[00:19:15] at four o'clock two afternoons a week for this purpose. So he's talking about you should always
[00:19:21] train two days a week, which once again, I mean, in the Marine Corps, you guys do PT every single day,
[00:19:28] right? Well, not aviation units. Oh, really? Yeah, I mean, when I was with the ground units,
[00:19:35] there was every single day and there was a time allocated to that. The squadrons that I would in,
[00:19:40] I was in, didn't do five day week, five day week PT. I thought that was pre-standard in the home military.
[00:19:48] Well, that's what he's saying. He's saying only two days a week. Yeah, I mean, I think what he's saying,
[00:19:52] it's interesting, because you mentioned the common, this guy was, you know, steeped in the world
[00:19:56] or won. This is a guy saying you need to prioritize time for PT. Now, I mean, two days a week,
[00:20:02] now looking back as, you know, reflecting on that, but he was probably a pioneer saying,
[00:20:06] hey, commanders, shut your unit down to go work out. Yeah. And you should do that. Like,
[00:20:10] that's okay as opposed to, hey, we got to get this paperwork going or this,
[00:20:13] whatever other thing going on is so he might have been out in front of the curve for all I know
[00:20:17] for the, for the era that he was in saying, it's okay from the general down in the private,
[00:20:21] is it shut down normal ops to go to the unit. No, absolutely. I, you know, I believe you're 100%
[00:20:27] right? He was the guy that was spearheading working out. Look, you got to get out there two days
[00:20:33] a week. He doesn't even say minimum, right? Because that would be sort of like, hey,
[00:20:38] minimum two days a week. He's saying two days a week. You got to get out there.
[00:20:43] In connection with this physical exercise program, I think we might well give thought to delaying
[00:20:48] the evening meal on Monday through Friday in order to give them more time to get cleaned up
[00:20:52] shallard and dress to the, they will not feel the or urge to rush right to work,
[00:20:57] well, right from work to supper. This was, this, at the reason I want to read the sections,
[00:21:02] this would have advantages other than physical conditioning by serving the evening meal in the
[00:21:07] enlisted messes as early as we do. We leave the soldier with over six hours of time after supper
[00:21:13] before he is scheduled to be in bed to do things that sometimes lead to trouble. More exercise
[00:21:19] in a later meal hour in the afternoon would tend to reduce free time in the evening and would
[00:21:24] absorb energies and would encourage them to go to bed earlier. It has been found to be an overall
[00:21:30] advantage to serve the heavy meal at night instead of a noon on duty days. I believe we
[00:21:35] give enough time off to our food service people so they can live with these changes in the feeding
[00:21:40] program. Oh, that's so classic. Alcohol, I've written before chapter three about the
[00:21:50] intent, use of alcohol and the end of the desire, ability of cutting down on the quantity of
[00:21:55] consumption of alcohol. One of the reasons for this is to help improve the physical condition
[00:22:00] of our officers and men. Obesity, I would like to say a word about personnel being overweight,
[00:22:06] while they are not very many such personnel in most commands. There are some who are eating
[00:22:13] more than their physical activity burns up. The commander should bring this to the attention of
[00:22:17] such individuals with a view to more exercising or less eating or both other problems.
[00:22:25] This is the last section. Other problems. This is just a broad statement. This is something
[00:22:33] that echo that you used to say all the time on this podcast. Other problems, I believe that
[00:22:38] such a program as I suggested will automatically help to solve the problem in those units which
[00:22:44] have one of men and garrison changing out of fatigues for evening social activities. It should
[00:22:49] help reduce other unfavorable statistics as well. You used to say on this podcast all the time,
[00:22:54] echo that the most universally helpful thing that a person can do is exercise. It will help you
[00:23:03] in all aspects of whatever you're doing, which is a good point. What he said is, hey, if you exercise,
[00:23:11] every problem that you have is going to be improved. So echo is the pioneer on that one.
[00:23:19] There's something you said I was thinking about in my contrast between aviation, my time in a
[00:23:23] fighter squadron versus my time in Anglicore, which is kind of the biggest contrast is, and I don't
[00:23:29] know how it is elsewhere, but the infantry or the ground units when I was with them have a kind of
[00:23:35] pre-regimen like their days and it's kind of a typical workday, whereas a fighter squadron operates
[00:23:39] 24 hours a day. So they're running in shifts the whole time. So standard work week is there's always
[00:23:45] a third or a half of the unit there from Sunday night till Friday afternoon. So that cycle is a little,
[00:23:51] it's kind of thinking in my head just the getting the whole unit together and in this in a squadron
[00:23:56] almost never happens. You're at best you're going to have like even when you're doing your work up,
[00:24:01] you run in that work up is, work up is probably even worse because work ups, you know, the flying
[00:24:06] schedule shifts are on a bunch to get all these different calls, but you I would say routinely
[00:24:11] the best you're ever going to get is half your squadron there at any given time. Most of the time,
[00:24:15] not always like that, but I would say 90% of a typical fighter squadron cycle is you have two or three
[00:24:21] shifts and you'll never have more than half your squadron there at any given time.
[00:24:26] Well before the war in the 90s at the team, we used to PT as a team five days a week, as a team.
[00:24:33] Maybe one day would be what they call the individual PT, which guys would legitimately individual
[00:24:38] PT, they'd go do whatever, you know, do jits or whatever they were going to do. But the other days
[00:24:43] it was like, oh, Mondays are run, Tuesdays is swim, Wednesdays individual PT, Thursdays,
[00:24:49] oh course, Friday's Monster Mash. That was kind of a typical schedule at the end of the
[00:24:55] back in the group. What's the Monster Mash is just, oh course, both paddle just come up with
[00:25:01] some crazy sort of various, what would you call it? I don't know what you, it'd be like one of those
[00:25:06] um, you ever see those TV physical competitions where they're doing all these up, like you'd run
[00:25:13] the obstacle course, then you would do berm runs, but you would be in a little team. So it'd just be
[00:25:18] some kind of, we call it a Monster Mash. Like American Ninja Warrior? Yeah, like American Ninja Warrior,
[00:25:23] but as teams. Gotcha. And is the platoon back in the, this is obviously pre-war, but back in
[00:25:29] was the platoon kind of together all the time. Yeah, so the platoon was together, but the team wasn't.
[00:25:34] So there'd be two platoons out in the desert. There'd be, no, there'd be one platoon out of the
[00:25:38] desert. There'd be one platoon up a foul and there'd be another platoon in the jungle somewhere,
[00:25:42] but there'd still be three platoons back at the team and all the support people from the team.
[00:25:47] So the platoon is like that was the element that at the lowest level, they were together. You
[00:25:52] didn't really break up platoon's very often. Not very often. That's cool. You're going through your work
[00:25:56] up together, but you gotta remember a seal platoon is small. Right. A seal platoon is only 16
[00:26:01] guys. Sometimes in the past, we bumped them up to 18. Sometimes we've even bumped them up to 21,
[00:26:07] depending on manning and personnel and mission, but the general seal platoon 16 people. And post, post
[00:26:15] war did that become the task unit was together for the most part, but they did almost like
[00:26:20] elevate up that they yes. Then they all the sudden they, they made the task unit, which is two
[00:26:26] platoons together with a headquarters unit over it. And they had the idea, it took them all
[00:26:31] a while to like actually make it happen. So there were some good vision on the bond behalf of
[00:26:36] naval special warfare commanders to say, actually, you know what, we should probably put a bigger unit
[00:26:43] together. Because 16 guys is very limiting. Right. What can you do with 16 guys? I mean, if you
[00:26:49] man up vehicles with 16 guys, you man up, whatever, you man up three vehicles. Now there's six people
[00:26:56] in those vehicles. Driver gunner, driver gunner, driver gunner, you put the rest of the guys in
[00:27:00] that that gives you 10 assaulters. What can you take down with 10 assaulters? The answer is not very many.
[00:27:04] So went into a task unit mode with now you had two platoons plus you had headquarters and then
[00:27:09] you get attachments of EOD and maybe you get a some kind of a radio man to help you out. So all
[00:27:14] of a sudden, you know, you got 35 or 40 guys going out the door. So it turns into a better situation.
[00:27:20] It's a really good call. I remember one of the, one of the first things I was in a platoon,
[00:27:27] I was in an org platoon, which meant we were going out on a ship and we had to do hydrographic
[00:27:31] reconnaissance, which is old school, lead line and slate. Lead line and slate meaning you had a
[00:27:36] lead line, you had a piece of rope with a piece of lead on the bottom and you you tied little knots
[00:27:43] every six feet for fathoms and you would go and swim in a line and dip that lead line and see how deep
[00:27:49] the water was and then you died for obstacles before the Marines came in. This is World War II straight
[00:27:54] up UDT underwater demolition team stuff. Well, when you're in the org platoon, you actually did that a lot
[00:28:00] because you were supporting Marine Corps landings. So so we were, we had a 16 man platoon and I didn't
[00:28:09] an org like that with 16 guys and it was really hard because you have a, you have a boat party
[00:28:13] of guys and then you have like a radio man. So there's two or three guys that aren't in the water
[00:28:18] and somebody's staying with the boat. So there's another two guys that are not in the water. So all of a
[00:28:22] sudden you've got you've only got seven guys to do the recon or nine guys to do the recon or whatever.
[00:28:29] So that's, that's not good. So I remember writing a point paper. I was like an E4 and I wrote a
[00:28:36] point paper to my commanding officer that the org platoons should have four more personnel in the platoon.
[00:28:43] And I think we actually got like they gave us like two more guys. Pretty cool.
[00:28:48] So, I mean, who did I think I'm was such a, it's pretty funny. I look back at that.
[00:28:56] I standard naval letter format when I'm sent to you. I know I try. Yeah. I know I tried, but the
[00:29:02] cool thing was, you know, my commanding officer at the time was like, you know, that makes sense.
[00:29:05] Hey, we can't give you four, but we can give you two. Make it an 18 man platoon. We had an 18 man
[00:29:10] platoon. I'm pretty sure. I can't even remember. You know what's weird is, I can't even remember what
[00:29:16] yeah, I don't, I can't remember if he gave us two more people. Maybe give us one more. I think he gave
[00:29:22] us at least one more person because I think I know exactly who it was. But anyways, all right. So there's
[00:29:29] the physical conditioning thing. The next section is called chapter 12, the creating of superior units.
[00:29:41] Four basic principles. I have found that there are four basic principles which apply to the
[00:29:45] problem of creating army units which are considered superior. First, the superior unit must be
[00:29:53] created from the ordinary run of personnel. How awesome is that? You're going to make a superior
[00:30:01] unit. But anybody that's ever served in the military knows that you're going to get what you get.
[00:30:09] And yet we all know that there's units that are freaking awesome and there's units that are horrible.
[00:30:15] And both the awesome units and the horrible units have run of the mill people in them. They came from
[00:30:21] the, they come from the same pool of soldiers in this case. It's all the same people. You don't get
[00:30:25] to pick your little team of your superstar athletes in this case. And it's the same thing in business,
[00:30:32] right? It's the same thing in business. You get businesses that are in the same market
[00:30:38] and one of them is crushing and the other one's not. Well, why is that? Why is that? You're both
[00:30:44] getting to hire from the same group of human beings in the country, whatever country you're in.
[00:30:50] So the superior unit must be created from the ordinary run of personnel second, classified according
[00:30:56] to ability, the men in a unit fall naturally into three groupings, upper, middle and lower. The
[00:31:02] excellence of a unit depends upon the ability of the commander to bring the men of the lower group to a
[00:31:08] degree of proficiency which makes them an asset to his unit team. So this is we're going to
[00:31:14] get a some stuff where I'm, I'm not sure about. I'm not sure about this is one of them. And he talks
[00:31:22] about a little bit more. I mean, he talks about your focus being making the people that are,
[00:31:26] he's basically saying you got a really good people, middle people and bad people. He's saying
[00:31:30] the focus is like, make the bad people better, make the bad people a, a, a, a plus for the unit.
[00:31:36] I don't necessarily agree with that. I agree with that, should be a focus, a singular focus,
[00:31:44] I don't think it should be the full. I would rather take my people to the top and make them totally
[00:31:48] awesome and make my people that are in the middle like really, really good. I'm not going to focus
[00:31:54] my efforts on the turds. The reason I didn't say anything when you, when you read that, because I had
[00:32:01] a little like, is I'm going to listen what General Clark has to say before I get to me, but that
[00:32:07] at, on its face, though, when you said that, my first thing was was, oh, okay, I don't think that's
[00:32:12] right, but I'm, obviously he's going to say something about it, but we get this question and business
[00:32:18] all the time. Is, is they, leaders will devote all their attention to their bottom performers,
[00:32:21] like almost all their attention. It's like, why would you invest all of your time in your least
[00:32:27] productive people? Why wouldn't you invest most of your, most of your time in your most productive
[00:32:32] people? I get, you don't, you don't ignore those people, but if you're devoting, and again,
[00:32:36] let, he's going to say something. I'm sure. But when you said that, I had that reaction of,
[00:32:41] well, it's like if you, let's say, on a level of 1 to 5, you're a 5, and echo is a 1.
[00:32:50] 1 being the worst 5 being the best. So if I take my efforts, and I'm able to,
[00:32:58] I'm able to double your power, I can turn you into a 10, I can only turn echo into a 2.
[00:33:03] 2 exponentially positive returns on Dave Burke. Kind of not. All right, next. Third,
[00:33:13] all men that does, this is such, this is such an interesting one. Third, all men desire to do
[00:33:21] what is wanted of them. All men desire to do what is wanted of them. Okay, so that's the first
[00:33:31] part. So let's, let's absorb that, and then he goes on to just take some ownership here,
[00:33:37] when they do not, it is because they have not been adequately motivated and instructed.
[00:33:46] So have you ever had anybody in your squadron that straight up just didn't want to do what was,
[00:33:54] what was wanted of them? You know, I would say yes in the sense that, yeah, there are people
[00:34:02] that I've had in my units that fit that bill, and we did something about that. His point, I understand
[00:34:09] his point though, and the idea that I'm going to write that person office unwilling to do it,
[00:34:16] to me, it was more like, how much of my, how much energy am I going to devote to try to find the
[00:34:22] way that gets you to our need to be? So while I don't disagree with that comment, yeah, I've
[00:34:28] had people in my, in my sphere, multiple times throughout my career that simply didn't get what
[00:34:34] they needed to be. And could you say, hey, that's sort of a fault of leader? Yes, 100%. But the leader
[00:34:40] also still has to make a little measurement of, am I going to devote 100% of my time to getting
[00:34:44] that guy from a one, two, a two? Remember to go, hey man, this investment in you right now is going
[00:34:48] to take away from all this other stuff, and I'm going to cut you loose. Yeah, and by the way, what's what's
[00:34:52] 10 times zero? Yeah, if the person's a zero, well now, so listen, I think all men is an overstatement.
[00:35:02] I think you could throw a percentage on there. That's upwards of 97%. Yeah, 97% that want to
[00:35:10] want, they want to do a good job. They want to do a good job. And to his point, as a leader, your default
[00:35:18] should be, is that they're not the problem. Your default to be is the percentage is so high that
[00:35:22] you might as well just go in the assumption that the problem isn't with them. So that 97% is,
[00:35:28] I think actually correct not all, but I think it's point two is like, hey, if you're in charge of
[00:35:33] people and they're not, they're not up to standards, you need to spend most of your time
[00:35:37] figuring out what you're doing wrong. Yeah, most people don't need to be fired that need to be
[00:35:41] led. I think we wrote that in extreme ownership or in dichotomy leadership. I think it's in
[00:35:45] dichotomy leadership. Most people don't need to be fired. They need to be led. Most people. Yeah.
[00:35:49] All people? No, you're going to get, and you know when you see this, and I don't,
[00:35:53] well, you didn't get to see this because you were an officer, then you went through OCS. When you go
[00:35:59] through like Navy Bootcamp, you see some people that don't want to be there. They do not want to
[00:36:05] be there. They're there for 15 minutes. Like this ain't for me. And they're going to do whatever
[00:36:09] they got to do to get, they don't want to do what is wanted of them. They don't. Yeah. They want out.
[00:36:16] Fourth, the best unit in an organization is always the one which is excellent or better in all things.
[00:36:24] If you agree with these precepts, let us analyze and apply them to the basic problem of the
[00:36:29] commander who is striving for a superior unit. Application to the units, applications of the principal
[00:36:34] student. The problems of polishing ordinary units until they emerge a superior are primarily the
[00:36:40] problems of raising individual performance and capabilities to a superior level. The many truly
[00:36:45] outstanding units which have been produced in our army, giving, giving ample evidence that these
[00:36:50] problems can be solved. Based on the fact that they're percentile scores on the AFQT, which is
[00:36:59] like the AzVab, which is the basic intelligence test that you take when you're coming in the military,
[00:37:05] as in the list of guys. Do you take it to become an officer? Yeah. No, no, take it. Take the AzVab.
[00:37:09] Yes, absolutely. Okay. So you take like a basic test. It's sort of an SAT and ACT type test.
[00:37:18] Totally. How smart are you? It's basically what it is. And then he ranks it out in three groups.
[00:37:23] And it's the upper third, the middle third, the lower third. But he's got this little thing in here.
[00:37:28] And he's got the scores listed and I'm not going to go into those. But the upper third is
[00:37:36] 11 percent and 34. So the upper, the top two groups combined, make up 45 percent. So 45
[00:37:44] percent of people are in the 65 percentile and higher of that testing. 43 percent are in the middle.
[00:37:52] So you're almost done. And then the last 12 percent is people that are in not below a group,
[00:37:57] but the second of the lowest group. So if you get between 0 and 9 on the on the AzVab,
[00:38:02] and these aren't, this is actually the AFQT, which is the old AzVab. So the scores won't correlate
[00:38:07] to what we know about since we didn't take the AzVab in 19th. We can take the AFQT in 1958.
[00:38:14] So what he's saying is you're going to get mostly people that are either in the middle group
[00:38:20] or in the higher group, which is great. Now I'm sure that there's some people that are
[00:38:23] think, wow, that's the difference. You know, I'm in the civilian world and we get these people.
[00:38:27] They're, they're not, no. When you start talking about people that are in the lowest scoring
[00:38:34] brackets of the, of the AzVab, like they can't get in the military, but they're also not going to be
[00:38:42] applying for a job with that's going to take some some high level cognitive abilities.
[00:38:47] They're, they're just not going to be there. So I've got a very interesting book that I'm going to
[00:38:52] cover on the podcast and, and it's, it's really, it's, I've been reading it for a while. I've actually
[00:38:59] actually actually showed it to you several months ago because I've been stewing on it, but
[00:39:03] it's during the Vietnam War, they, they needed people. They needed people,
[00:39:12] to be in the military. They needed people to be in the military to go to Vietnam. And so they
[00:39:17] started to lower the standards and the main standard that they lowered was the, the IQ level,
[00:39:24] or I don't know if you want to call it the IQ level, but that's basically what's the intellectual
[00:39:27] level, the, the, the intelligence level. And they started getting these, these people in the military
[00:39:34] that were just, they just didn't have the mental capacity to, to do really any job.
[00:39:43] Um, even, and you know, you know, you think about in the military, there's some pretty,
[00:39:48] there's some jobs that don't take a lot of intellectual horsepower, right? I mean,
[00:39:52] you need people that are going to clean the, the toilets, you know, you got, you got some, you know,
[00:39:57] you got a people that are going to, and look, these are what we, this is what I did when I got
[00:40:01] the military, right? When I got the seal teams, I was cleaning toilets, but then you, you're,
[00:40:05] you're going to move up and you're going to move on, but at some place you need some people that
[00:40:08] are going to have some pretty fundamentally non-high cognitive skill requirement jobs.
[00:40:19] Well, they started letting people in that this didn't have the capability. It's a really sad,
[00:40:22] and these guys, a lot of these guys went to Vietnam. They had, obviously, that higher casualty rate,
[00:40:26] that higher, more of them got killed, because they just didn't, they just didn't understand things.
[00:40:32] And the guy that wrote this book that I'm reading, he went, he's talking about going through bootcamp.
[00:40:36] And he basically gets paired up with one of these guys, and all the drone structures knew it.
[00:40:42] They called him like McNamara's morons. That's what they'd call these guys when they'd come in.
[00:40:48] And he got assigned one of these guys basically to, to help get him through bootcamp. And one of the
[00:40:54] most, like one of the opening scenes is they're telling him, hey, you know, right, right your address
[00:41:01] on this postcard and write a message to your family. And not only did he not know how to write,
[00:41:07] but he didn't even know what his address was. He didn't even know what his, what street he lived on.
[00:41:12] It didn't, he didn't know that it teach him how to tie his shoes. And they had to teach him how to
[00:41:17] tie his shoes, not just hey, this is how you do it. No, like, they had to teach him
[00:41:21] for extended periods of time how to tie his shoes. So these are people that are really in a,
[00:41:28] really, you know, in a low intellectual level. And we brought, I think, was about a hundred
[00:41:34] thousand of them into the military, which is just uns, just horrible, just horrible.
[00:41:41] So my point in saying all that is we're talking about, you know, in this civilian sector,
[00:41:48] you're not getting that person either to apply for your job in accounting, right? So don't think
[00:41:52] to yourself, well, you know, my accounting department, they're my guys, my people are,
[00:41:56] they're, they're not smart either. No one I talking about that. We're not talking about that.
[00:42:03] So he goes on to say that those in the upper groupings are the best educated and quick
[00:42:10] as to learn, can be well motivated, but need to be challenged to develop their full potential.
[00:42:15] The middle groupings are average run of American use. They're easily controlled.
[00:42:19] They're both take well the discipline, learn easily, respond to good leadership, but are usually
[00:42:25] capable of more than and they must be pushed. The lower groupings are the ones that need special attention.
[00:42:31] And again, this is where you and I are kind of like, hmm, the lower groupings are the ones who need
[00:42:35] special attention. The disciplinary problem in this group is higher than average. I agree with that.
[00:42:40] The individuals require special motivation instruction. I agree with that. They're attitude,
[00:42:45] constitutes a special barometer of the spread of core of the unit. This group contains also
[00:42:53] many of the misfits who, if they cannot be assimilated, must be eliminated.
[00:42:59] So it's interesting that he's calling for like special attention on this lower group.
[00:43:08] And then he says in a single squad, crew, go, well, I'm just, I'm thinking in my mind as I'm
[00:43:14] hearing you talk about this. Just things that I've heard you say on this podcast, things we've
[00:43:17] talked about on your podcast. And I'm trying to kind of consider what's in general,
[00:43:23] Clark's head as I'm hearing this. Obviously, I'm trying to put myself in his position.
[00:43:27] We've talked about this before and I think the way you said it was anybody on your team
[00:43:32] has the potential to undo your entire plan. And so I'm trying to make this connection
[00:43:39] ahead of the things he's talking about, why you devote so much effort to these people. And I'm
[00:43:43] just trying to place them out of why he's saying it the way he's saying it, which there is,
[00:43:49] if they're on your team and you keep them on your team, these aren't people you get rid of,
[00:43:51] but they're on your team and they are under performers, a little performance. They still have the
[00:43:55] potential of undoing your plan. And so I'm trying to piece the things that he's thinking,
[00:44:00] almost, I don't know what he's going to say, but I do understand that. You know, the flip side of
[00:44:05] that, the other thing I've been thinking about, we work with companies that some of the companies
[00:44:08] we work with, how this philosophy is, hey, we're going to pay more. And we're going to track to higher,
[00:44:14] higher bar, a higher average level because we are a higher paying organization. So we're going to,
[00:44:20] and there's a bunch of economic theory behind that. And their belief is that they're going to
[00:44:23] track better talent. And you know what they end up with? The exact same problems is all other organizations.
[00:44:28] They still have a bell curve. They still have under performers. And this is something you said too,
[00:44:32] is even in the sealed teams and people create this image on their mind of what a seal is and
[00:44:36] they're, you know, the superhuman. And how many times have you said no, they're people,
[00:44:42] the exact same thing at Top Gun where people place these guys on a pedestal. If they're
[00:44:46] somehow all of them uniquely capable, we had a bottom 12% at Top Gun 2. We had under performers
[00:44:55] at Top Gun just like everyone else. So for me to think about it, if you're in a leadership role,
[00:45:00] the takeaway from this is that what is required for all this is your leadership more than anything.
[00:45:07] Now, I do want to hear his thoughts on that, but your under performance can still undo your plan.
[00:45:13] And there's no like free pass of, hey, we just have a better screening process. We don't
[00:45:16] weed out those people. We know that that's not true. Those problems exist in the same bell
[00:45:21] curve in any, every organization. Yeah. And the other thing that affects the bell curve is the bar
[00:45:27] that everyone has to be staying above. So the bottom 12% at Top Gun, they're the bottom,
[00:45:35] tell a percent of Top Gun, they may be the top tier of some other organization somewhere,
[00:45:42] but at Top Gun they're the bottom 12% and they're making the same kind of mistakes relative
[00:45:48] to their job. It's the same thing in the seal teams like, oh yeah, the the seal teams, they have
[00:45:53] a, we have a bottom part of the bell curve. Now, those people might be really good if they had
[00:45:59] some other jobs somewhere. You know, in Task Unit, Bruce, we had to get rid of one guy. It was a
[00:46:05] great guy. He was a hard worker. He just didn't quite have the capacity to get the job done.
[00:46:10] I guarantee he went to his next unit in the Navy and was the best sailor they had. I can, I can, I can
[00:46:15] guarantee that because he was a hard worker. He wanted to do a good job. He just didn't quite have
[00:46:22] that decision-making process. And maybe I shouldn't have said the best sailor, but he's going to be
[00:46:27] a really good guy, a really good guy. And so, but the bar is higher for what you're being required
[00:46:36] to do. Right? This is what you're like a top gun. You're being required to fly this jet at these
[00:46:43] at these G's and make these decisions and maneuver and remember what's happening and debrief
[00:46:48] and communicate and pay attention to nine different things at the same time. You're required to do
[00:46:52] all that stuff. And the people that are barely able to do it, they're the bottom of the bell curve.
[00:46:59] You put them, you know, driving an Uber and they're going to be the best freaking Uber driver.
[00:47:04] You know, in, well, at least in the top, let's say the top 5% of Uber driver because I've had
[00:47:09] some damn good Uber drivers before. So, so, yes, that bell curve exists everywhere. You're not going
[00:47:16] to get away from it and you do have to lead. And I agree with your point. Why general clerk might
[00:47:25] be saying, hey, you're going to pay attention to that bottom 12% because no one in the top
[00:47:33] 88% is going to, well, there's a much less chance of them torpedoing your whole mission. Right?
[00:47:42] Those knuckleheads, they're holding the freaking trigger to the torpedo and they could fire that
[00:47:48] thing off at any moment. So, you got to pay attention to them. That might be the, the, the genesis of
[00:47:53] his, of his focus on these individuals. That probably where the, what's the thing? You're only
[00:48:01] as strong as your weakest link kind of. Yeah. The loss of your head. Yep. Yeah. Maybe that's where
[00:48:06] it came from. It's, it's from that, definitely from that concept that broad concept. Yeah. He goes on
[00:48:14] here. Single squad crew or section will probably contain men of all three groupings. Certainly,
[00:48:18] they will appear in any platoon or company. This presents a practical problem in the handling and
[00:48:22] instructing of men in, in perfecting the teamwork of the squad crew, second or platoon. The leader
[00:48:28] can afford to adopt only one approach to handling his men. He must assume that they all want to
[00:48:36] do what he wants done. When any number do not respond to this assumption, the fault is more
[00:48:43] probably his than theirs. So, his assumption is everyone wants to, that's a greatest assumption to
[00:48:49] make. The assumption and that's what I like about this assumption that all men want to do what
[00:48:53] what is wanted them to do, what, what we want them to do. That's a great assumption to make because
[00:48:58] that means when they don't, it's our fault. And that's exactly what he's saying. He's taking full
[00:49:01] ownership. And then he says, this is like, oh, what's word for word for something that I
[00:49:05] brief on. What is on a daily basis to companies? If they don't respond, he should check his procedures,
[00:49:11] instructions, and subordinate leaders to determine where in lies the trouble. When only one or two
[00:49:17] individuals are involved, punitive action or elimination, maybe an indicated. So, if you got a platoon
[00:49:22] or a company, you got a company of 150 people and everyone gets it except for two guys. Okay.
[00:49:26] Well, maybe I need to check those two guys and maybe I need to get rid of them. But if you've got
[00:49:31] whatever, 20 people that don't understand what they're supposed to be doing, guess what? It's on you.
[00:49:39] We arrive now at the fourth precept, the best union in the organization. Always the one which
[00:49:44] is excellent or better than all things, which is based upon the premise that no unit commander has
[00:49:48] enough time to make his unit superior in all things at all times. How therefore should he spread
[00:49:55] his efforts? It's obvious that his unit must be proficient in marksmanship, communication,
[00:50:00] supply administration, tactics, physical fitness techniques, maintenance, etc, etc, etc.
[00:50:04] If his unit is not proficient in any one of these things, his team is not sound and will fail him
[00:50:10] when the test comes. How then must he manage? So, we got all these things and you obviously can't
[00:50:16] be, and he's making a difference or making a break between superior, which means you're
[00:50:26] awesome at this thing and being good at it. First, he should avoid putting too much stress on any
[00:50:33] one thing, so as to overemphasize it in order to make a show of it. If he practices this method,
[00:50:40] he will do so at the expense of other important things. This is a commoner. So, you shouldn't be the
[00:50:45] master of anything you should be the jack of all trades. Second, he must stress adequately all of the
[00:50:51] many facets of the training job. Even though he is not an expert in each, he must direct a
[00:50:57] subordinate to be an expert and the commander must then supervise and check his subordinate's work.
[00:51:02] The latter is important. So, you're not going to be an expert as the leader, not going to be expert.
[00:51:06] You got some nugs under you that are going to be the expert, nothing.
[00:51:13] Next section is called motivation. Wovement into the entire pattern are the threads of motivation.
[00:51:18] This motivation is manifestly important because it comes from a spree enthusiasm,
[00:51:21] a route, effort, competition, and accomplishment. The people in each of the top middle and lower
[00:51:27] groupings need to be motivated in different ways and in varying degrees, which is a little different
[00:51:32] than when he said earlier, says the leader can only afford to adopt the one approach when
[00:51:35] handling his men. Little, little dichotomy. You got different people that are going to get motivated
[00:51:41] in different ways. In encouraging students to learn, we motivate them by one or more of the following.
[00:51:47] One, show a need to develop and interest both those are explaining why. This is why this is
[00:51:55] important. That's what the need is. Here's how you get someone to develop and interest and
[00:51:58] something you explain to them how it's going to help that. Maintain the interest. That's also
[00:52:04] explaining why. Then he's got some other things encouraging or really success, giving recognition
[00:52:08] and credit, using competition, giving rewards, awarding punishments. These same things
[00:52:13] may be used to incite a body of mentor military unit into action. Undoubtedly, every commander,
[00:52:18] sometime during his career, after being assigned a difficult task, has soon, soon thereafter,
[00:52:24] considered how he would present this task to his subordinates, how he would appeal them to get the
[00:52:28] job done. In short, on what he would base his efforts to motivate them to tackle the job with the
[00:52:36] will necessary to attain the goal sought. He will probably use many factors to motivate his unit.
[00:52:44] Some of them may be specifically mentioned and some may be implied, for instance, except as a
[00:52:49] last resort. He would not mention punishment in this case of failure. His men would know him well enough
[00:52:55] to know that he would not stand for failure. The real art in motivating a group of men to accomplish
[00:53:00] a common mission is to reach each man in such a way that all men in the unit are incited to the extent
[00:53:06] of their several capabilities. Of course, the kind of mission to be performed by the men will be
[00:53:12] will determine the motivating factors used, but there is one element that must be kept in mind.
[00:53:17] And that is that no amount of motivation will incite to man to undertake,
[00:53:23] and that is what he knows is manifestly beyond his capabilities. So big chunk about motivation
[00:53:32] there. I was talking, I can't remember who is the client or if he was the EF online the other
[00:53:38] day. But when you get told the proverbial, you get tasked with something that doesn't make any sense
[00:53:47] and the boss just says, shut up and have your team do it. What do you do? How do you
[00:53:51] handle that? What do you say to the troops? And I'm like, I will find a reason why all day long
[00:53:57] that is awesome. You know, I will go, and I'm not going to go, I don't. I'm going to say, hey, listen,
[00:54:02] boss just told us this is how we're doing it. And you know, we're going to do, we're going to
[00:54:05] knock this thing out of the park. That way, I'm going to build some trust with a boss. He's going to
[00:54:09] realize that we can get the job done. When he realized that we can get the job done, he's going to
[00:54:13] start to listen me. Once he starts to listen to me, I'm going to get this changed. So right now,
[00:54:17] we're going to crush this thing and the guys go, yes, or I'm going to say, hey, look, no,
[00:54:22] I'll just be able to do this. Where the only people that can get this done, the boss knows it.
[00:54:27] We know it. So we're going to knock this thing out of the park. Like, I'm going to figure out a reason
[00:54:32] there's got to be a reason why that makes sense to do this thing. And believe me, if I can't
[00:54:37] find a reason to work it and told to do something that makes no sense whatsoever is going to get
[00:54:42] people unnecessarily gounded or killed or it's unethical or it's immoral or it's illegal. That's what's
[00:54:50] going on. Otherwise, I can figure out a reason. And I'm talking about a good, I'm not talking
[00:54:55] about making something up to trick people. I'm talking about I will figure out a good, freaking
[00:54:59] reason to go forward to make this happen. And that's what you need to do as a boss. That's that's why
[00:55:05] the Y is so important. Talks about awards in the army. We use freely a system of awards and
[00:55:17] prizes in order to motivate men to often these go to the men in the top of the upper group.
[00:55:24] They provide no incentive for improvement to those in the lower group and little for those in the
[00:55:29] middle group because the men know that the award is beyond their ability to achieve these prizes
[00:55:35] make good articles for the unit papers, but they're overall effectively unit is negligible.
[00:55:42] It is well to recognize the outstanding men and we do this through proficiency pay and promotion.
[00:55:50] However, our system awards must go beyond this recognition of individuals. This is a great point.
[00:55:56] You know, so often we're sitting there rewarding the people that are doing well.
[00:56:01] Who actually probably don't need any additional motivation. Look, should we recognize them? Absolutely.
[00:56:07] But what are we doing for the middle group and even the lower group to make sure that they're
[00:56:12] feeling like they're moving forward in a positive way?
[00:56:16] Yeah, you know, when you're like in elementary school and you have like the award for most
[00:56:20] improved, that's like kind of alleviates that issue, right? A little bit.
[00:56:24] Because usually it's like someone in the middle, maybe even the bottom, a lot of the times when you
[00:56:29] still get that cool like trophy or whatever, because you improved so much. Is that right?
[00:56:34] A little backhanded smack though. I guess you rack up some most improved.
[00:56:42] I've gotten every four years. No, I don't think it is though. I don't think it is a backhanded thing
[00:56:48] because it's true. Like, you know, when you get like, you know, MVP of the football game,
[00:56:52] it's always the same guy, the quarterback, whatever the guy in, you know, you obviously depends on
[00:56:58] the game. But it's like, that's why he's already training, by the way. And he's already talented and
[00:57:02] gifted and he's working hard and he's focused. Yeah. And the word, the guys in the middle, you do
[00:57:09] run that risk big time, where it's like the guys in the middle is like, oh yeah, well, I don't even
[00:57:13] have an expectation of the award, you know, but if you get, if you get most improved,
[00:57:19] but you can get most improved. That's good. You know, especially if everyone respects it,
[00:57:23] because everyone typically does respect that if you're improving. I had, there's something called
[00:57:28] the Navy achievement medal. Did you ever get Navy achievement medal? So Navy achievement medal is like,
[00:57:33] you know, it's sort of like, it's a, it's a strong pat on the back. Well, say, and you know,
[00:57:38] you might get one with something happens. You know, you're a young and list of guys. I think I had
[00:57:43] six Navy achievement medals, which is totally ridiculous. I would get those things all the time for
[00:57:47] like, what's it for? Like, oh, I would run a communications course. When these are all from the 90s,
[00:57:53] it'd be like, you know, petty officer willing ran an outstanding, you know, good,
[00:57:57] communications course. He organized, led and developed the Bob of a bot. Nam. Stoner used to
[00:58:01] like laugh every time I put my dress uniform on because I had five Navy achievement medals.
[00:58:06] I'm like the big rack of stars across my Navy across my NAMS. Get some. Yeah. But I
[00:58:14] feel like, I know, but I feel like I was kind of that guy. Like, I was working hard and they were just
[00:58:19] giving me awards and I was like, cool, whatever. I don't care. I didn't care at all. Yeah. I wasn't like,
[00:58:25] check out my NAMS. Well, then, okay, then I guess if you kind of go into it, I mean,
[00:58:31] in all kinds of environments, right? There's all kinds of different awards like that that are
[00:58:35] that are, you can get without being the top like producer, whatever. Like, you got,
[00:58:40] okay, you got most improved, then you got like hardest worker or something like that, you know,
[00:58:44] how you never get that one? No. Okay, I was not a sales. As far as like expectations of metal,
[00:58:49] that one was on in every release. But, but you get those. How many NAMS do you have Dave?
[00:58:55] One. What did you get to them? I got an end of tour NAMS. Dang. So when was this when you were
[00:59:00] like an incident or a, yeah, first tour, yeah, first tour in a squadron. So as you're thinking,
[00:59:07] I was laughing because you know, when you're talking about even the way you're saying NAM like anybody
[00:59:11] in the NAMS, the NAMS is like this thing. This NAMS team of metal is like an irractive five of those.
[00:59:18] Totally. But, you know, it's something that's actually cool that you said is there's a couple
[00:59:24] different ways to view. Like the award system in the military can be a little questionable.
[00:59:28] There's people who can kind of peel that bag and go, man, is that legit or not?
[00:59:32] We had two different categories of the same award. We had what we called an endotur award,
[00:59:36] so, okay, you know, pedagy offshore willink has been with us for three years. He's leaving the
[00:59:40] squad or the unit or whatever and he's going, we want to recognize his body of work.
[00:59:44] It's kind of like a participation award. It doesn't have a ton of meaning other than
[00:59:48] you survived your three years. We want to thank you in your way out. There was something else we
[00:59:52] called was an impact NAMM or we had a term called a strived by NAMM. Oh, we called it a spot NAMS.
[00:59:58] Yeah, same same thing. It was just a spot. Just the same. It's the same thing.
[01:00:01] A crack in a spot. Which means like it was going out of style.
[01:00:03] Oh, there's no way to make this, this, this, make this serious. This five man's.
[01:00:10] The behind behind that is like you can take a middle or the road dude.
[01:00:13] Middle road guy who's, who's not your all-star quarterback, not your top tier guy. And he's
[01:00:17] over there doing some good work. Yes. So maybe that was me. Do you? Yeah, maybe I don't know.
[01:00:22] They were trying to encourage her. Five is a bit ridiculous. I don't have five of anything,
[01:00:28] but there is a way to, to, when you, when you recognize somebody for their work,
[01:00:35] it's a heck of a lot better to recognize them for something they're doing when we call the impact
[01:00:38] or the spot as opposed to, well, you've been with us for five years. You get to watch. Like,
[01:00:44] that's our thing. So here's your, here's your, you've been here for five years as opposed to,
[01:00:48] hey, that thing you did that specific thing. If you could recognize people for that,
[01:00:53] in this leadership little system you're trying to create is, it's really good to recognize
[01:00:57] people for the work that they do when they do it as opposed to, well, we just sort of have this
[01:01:02] process that by these wickets or these little checkpoints you get recognition, which over time
[01:01:07] sort of undermines the value of it. And, and again, five's a, whoa, that's a lot of the name is not it.
[01:01:15] I mean, you're talking about straight up essentially a participation trophy. Like, you, oh, you've been
[01:01:19] here five years. My name was a participation award. I was leaving, captain's got names.
[01:01:25] I don't care if you were the number one captain or the number 12 captain when you left. You got an
[01:01:30] am. And the number one guy, guy didn't go, well, I actually earned this one. And the number 12 guy didn't
[01:01:35] think of this as garbage. It had no real meaning. The impact, what you call it, a spot. The spot
[01:01:41] name. That's a, that's, there's a lot more legitimacy to that than, hey, thanks for being here.
[01:01:47] Do you got to look on your Facebook, like you're all fired up for my names?
[01:01:51] Well, here's the thing, but that's a perfect point right there because if there, if a spot
[01:01:56] name and a regular participation trophy name is the same sort of thing, then it's like, oh, wait,
[01:02:01] you got to differentiate those two because if you're, you're saying you got to five. There is a
[01:02:05] differentiation on the name that is you can get a V, which is when it becomes a combat award. Yeah.
[01:02:10] So a name with a combat V or a combat distinguishing device is what they call it. So it has a V on it.
[01:02:18] And that's, that's a legit award. And I, a lot of guys in tasking a bruiser got names with Vs.
[01:02:24] And those names with Vs that the guys got in tasking a bruiser were hard earned. They weren't like,
[01:02:30] oh, you're just going to, you, there was some gunfire near, but no, like these guys were in 18
[01:02:35] fire fights, and they got a name with the V. And, and you know, the, some of the guys in, in tasking a
[01:02:41] bruiser, some of Stoner's guys, they got the R com, which is the Army Commendation Medal with the V.
[01:02:47] That was a huge deal because those things are tough to get the R. And that came out of those things.
[01:02:52] And that came from the, from the Army recognizing what you were doing, which, which added that,
[01:02:57] which added to that as well. Yeah. There's a couple things in the military have a little bit of
[01:03:01] sanctity. The V, whether it's a name, a com, whatever it is, the V that has, there, there's,
[01:03:07] me, you can't just get a V. You got to earn that combat distinguishing device. The other one of
[01:03:13] them, Rincor that, shouldn't say the Rincor, Navy the Rincor is what we call the car. The
[01:03:17] combat actually ribbon, they don't like to just, you don't just, that's not a participation award.
[01:03:21] You, you got to earn that car. Yeah. And the C.I.B. in the Army, which is the combat
[01:03:26] infantry badge, which means you, you, you, you, you've been in combat. Yes. Yeah. And that's, that's what,
[01:03:32] that's what Hackworth called out, uh, the Admiral for Admiral Borda for wearing a combat V.
[01:03:41] On his name, it was actually, I think it was, it was a name with a V on it. And he, and Hackworth said
[01:03:47] this guy was in Vietnam, but he wasn't using on a ship. He wasn't in direct combat with the,
[01:03:51] and Admiral Borda killed himself. Yeah. Over this drama over it, it's crazy. Now that I'm,
[01:03:56] you know, we're sitting here laughing, you're like, oh, this, we can't never get serious again. All
[01:03:59] we have to do is talk about Admiral Borda and, and, and, and Colonel Hackworth called him out for
[01:04:04] wearing a combat V and he kills himself in the Navy yard. Back to your five Nams. If some of those
[01:04:17] were like, for some solid work you did on this little thing, that you thought maybe wasn't that
[01:04:22] huge of a deal, but you did some good work in people saw what you did and you were like, hey,
[01:04:26] hey, look, you didn't save the world, but you did really good with that little, whatever you did.
[01:04:30] That's different than a participation trophy type situation.
[01:04:33] Prudition. All fired up. I was stoked, you know, I was trying to work hard, trying to do a good job,
[01:04:38] and people were giving me cool recognition, and I appreciated it. I'm just saying that you fast forward it
[01:04:43] from 1995 to like 2009, and we're back from Ramadi, and I'm putting my dress uniform on and
[01:04:53] stone or sees me, and we're laughing, because I have five Nams, which is really, really, really,
[01:04:57] it's also especially ridiculous. I was an officer, and it's like an officer, if you're an officer,
[01:05:01] you got five, I mean Dave Burke, you know, who is in the Marine Corps for 24 years?
[01:05:06] Had one NAMM, and there I was walking around with five. That's kind of, it's just,
[01:05:09] it's not fun to be funny about it. So to the officers and chiefs that gave me recognition as a
[01:05:16] young and listed guy, I appreciated it, it meant a lot to me, but over time it did become a little
[01:05:23] bit funny and a little bit ridiculous that I was walking around with five Nams. I'm going to have to
[01:05:26] now post a picture, I don't think I have any of this stuff anymore, but I realized that I'm
[01:05:30] probably coming off as NAMM obsessed at this point. You are a little bit, but I'm sure they
[01:05:37] end. I'm going to write you up for one. So you ever got to employ you the month at, you know,
[01:05:41] you, I was in the military, my whole life, right? No, you worked at Wendy's. Oh yeah, I was never
[01:05:46] in play the month. Okay, but isn't that the same thing? Employee the month?
[01:05:52] I would rather get a NAMM than employ you the month at Wendy's. But it's the same thing.
[01:05:56] It's just not in the military, you're just saying. It's a similar thing. Nams were harder to get
[01:06:01] that employee the month. There was no guarantee that a NAMM was being issued.
[01:06:04] Right. They got to choose somebody, but still same deal as far as the structure. You seem
[01:06:10] saying where it's like you're getting awarded for something you did even though in your mind,
[01:06:16] it might not be that big of a deal. But as an individual like process, it's kind of a thing.
[01:06:22] It's something. It's just not nothing, you see. We'll go with it. We'll go with it.
[01:06:28] All right, back to the book. Summary and conclusion, the job of those of us who are privileged to
[01:06:33] command to create superior units from the ordinary run of manpower made available to us. This manpower
[01:06:40] falls into upper middle and lower groups about equal and strength that have different capabilities,
[01:06:45] present different problems and need to be handled differently. All of the men in a unit must be
[01:06:50] assumed to desire to do what is wanted and when they do not, they have not been properly handled
[01:06:56] and instructed. And I would add the word led there. The best and most reliable unit is usually
[01:07:03] the one that is excellent in all things, even though it might not be superior in any way.
[01:07:10] So that's the different he breaks out the hierarchy of adjectives, the highest adjective being
[01:07:16] superior and then below that is excellent and excellent is better to be excellent in everything
[01:07:21] than superior and one thing. Throughout the whole job runs the problem of motivation, this problem
[01:07:26] is not solved unless steps are made to motivate the unit carefully thought out and applied in
[01:07:31] such a way that their effect is felt by all men in the unit. Finally, excellence of the unit is measured
[01:07:37] by the extent to which those of the lower third of the unit are developed to play their part
[01:07:42] of the unit team. You know, still 100% on board with that one. As far as I'm concerned,
[01:07:49] motivation is about understanding why you're doing what you're doing and giving people ownership.
[01:07:52] You want to motivate people, tell them why they're doing what they're doing and let them take
[01:07:55] ownership about it and run with it. I feel like motivation is like kind of there's like short
[01:08:03] term in long term and you know like I was thinking of something very specific at the time where
[01:08:09] you know people get mad when they get angry at something that motivates them like super hardcore
[01:08:14] but only short term and then if somebody someone's the opposite if someone's really happy or
[01:08:18] I don't know thankful or whatever that keeps them sort of motivated long term. That's good. I would agree
[01:08:24] that unless they have like some sort of weird underlying fear of something that might sustain them
[01:08:31] long term. Yeah, you could get into some details but I think a broad statement that like some
[01:08:35] kind of an anger would be a short more of a short term motivation and a happiness, a satisfaction,
[01:08:44] a gratification would be more of a long term. I would agree with that. I would tend to agree with that.
[01:08:49] All right, now we're going to get into, um man, I thought those were kind of like, hey we'll
[01:08:54] just burn through some of those chapters. I'm sorry because I wanted to get to this chapter which
[01:08:58] is called chapter 13, Mission Type Order, the problem of control in World War II, those who
[01:09:05] served in armored divisions and probably in other units as well learned that mission type orders were
[01:09:09] requirement if the most was to be obtained from a command. Since then we have had and mission type
[01:09:16] so what mission types orders are just in a nutshell is you tell somebody what needs to happen,
[01:09:21] you let them go for your how to do it. It's very, it's the basis of decentralized command.
[01:09:28] Since then we've had to consider the control of operations in the fluidity and unpredictability
[01:09:35] of nuclear battle. As battle becomes more complex and unpredictable responsibilities must be
[01:09:42] more and more decentralized. Thus mission type orders often will be used at all echelons of command
[01:09:49] and probably will be the rule at the division and higher levels. This will require all commanders
[01:09:55] to exercise initiative, resourcefulness and imagination operating with relative freedom of action.
[01:10:03] And this is what's weird, you know, he he oscillates between these sort of like,
[01:10:07] everyone should be, you know, how do we control the man and he literally says in that earlier chapter
[01:10:12] the the middle group is easier to control and now he's saying hey you need to let them go and operate
[01:10:19] and it's really scary. I thought he was going to start talking about nuclear war. What do you
[01:10:23] think about nuclear war? I think centralized control. I want 17 people to make sure that that is the
[01:10:30] right move before that freaking fire button gets hit and those two keys get simultaneously turned. But
[01:10:38] he's like no decentralized command. That's pretty scary to me. In our tactical, in our tactical
[01:10:46] forces we have built in organizational flexibility. We must recognize this and capitalize it
[01:10:52] in our orders to get maximum combat power. We must have plans flexible enough to meet rapidly
[01:10:58] changing situations. But careful planning is not enough. This must be coupled with the readiness to change
[01:11:05] and adapt the situations as they are not as they are expected to be. Awesome. What's interesting
[01:11:11] about that is he says we need to make plans flexible enough to meet rapidly changing situations.
[01:11:17] And he says, but careful planning is not enough. When I think of careful planning, I think all
[01:11:21] this guy is going to sit there and plan every detail. I don't think of somebody that's thinking,
[01:11:24] hey, we're going to come up with a very flexible plan. A flexible plan to me is not careful planning.
[01:11:30] I guess I might be reading too much into that. But I always felt like I cheated all the time
[01:11:36] because I came up with flexible plans for things. Yeah, it seems like a carefully plan or a
[01:11:44] plan plan carefully is like you carefully carefully plan for contingencies. Yeah, I guess carefully
[01:11:50] plan doesn't necessarily mean to be doesn't need to be overly detailed and fat. Carefully plan
[01:11:55] could be like, hey, we want to be careful that we don't put too much detail in here.
[01:12:01] And then yes, being able to adapt to situations as they are, not as they were expected to be,
[01:12:06] that's a critical way to operate. To train commanders and staff officers for operations in
[01:12:12] war where mission type orders will be widely used. It is necessary that tactical courses in our
[01:12:16] schools teach the use of such orders and that when widely employ mission type orders in our
[01:12:22] peace time operations, I love that. So when you're going to give people assignments to clean up the
[01:12:30] building, you don't say you mop and you scrub and you clean and you go, no, you say,
[01:12:35] how I'm building clean? This is what time it needs to be done by and you let them go execute it.
[01:12:38] Boom, decentralized command mission type order. And think about that. I just kind of blew that
[01:12:47] off, but that's a real thing. Like if you don't train people and you don't live like this,
[01:12:53] then you won't get good at it. You have to actually live like this. This has to be your way of life.
[01:13:00] If the way that you run your day-to-day operations is micro management, how can you expect
[01:13:09] anybody to do anything other than be micro management when you get into a bad situation,
[01:13:13] get into combat situation. Something really solid on EF online that I was exposed to when
[01:13:21] you were like, hey, when you're in a meeting or you're having a meeting or something and everyone's
[01:13:26] there with their pan and paper waiting for you to say something to write stuff down and then we
[01:13:30] start talking and then they start writing stuff down or whatever. It's bad sign. Yeah, it's a bad sign,
[01:13:34] but it even, but it feels good. It feels good. You know, and can do anything unless big job
[01:13:38] man rolls in. But the big ego in the plan. You're really a horrible leader if they're all sitting
[01:13:44] there waiting. Yeah, we got two or three questions. We already know what we're doing. We know what we're
[01:13:49] going. Yeah, we're good. Oh, this is beautiful. Scope of a mission type order. Basically a mission
[01:14:00] type order needs to cover only three important things. One, it should clearly state what the
[01:14:06] commande what the commander issuing the order wants to have accomplished. That's number one. This is
[01:14:12] what this is what you need to accomplish. Number two, it should point out the limiting or control factors
[01:14:17] that must be observed for coordinating factors. So, okay, you can't go across this area. You can't fly
[01:14:25] over this region. You can't enter into this zone. Here's the limitations. And then finally,
[01:14:31] it should delineate the resources made available to the subordinate commander and the support which
[01:14:36] he can't expect or count on from sources outside of his command. That's all you need to know.
[01:14:42] Tell me what to do. Tell me what the limitations are. Tell me what resources I have. Other than that,
[01:14:47] leave me alone. I'm going to go make it happen. That's that might be the clearest definition
[01:14:57] of a mission type order I've ever read in my life. That's all you need. I got asked one time
[01:15:03] I was in my first deployment to Iraq and my boss is like, what information do you need and how
[01:15:10] much time do you need to launch on a mission? It was like, I need to know where the location of the
[01:15:16] target, the frequencies of the friendly forces, and I need 15 minutes and we'll go. Yes.
[01:15:30] Confidence in subordinate commanders, there is a strong reluctance at every headquarters to
[01:15:36] relinquish the authority to direct the details of an operation. This reluctance is clearly seen
[01:15:42] in the embellishments attitude in order as it threads its way down to company level. Careful
[01:15:47] judgment must be made at every echelon of command in stating the limiting and controlling factors
[01:15:52] of a mission type order. Confidence must be placed in judgment and ability of the subordinate
[01:15:57] commander. Too often what starts off as a broad mission type order at the high echelon ends up with
[01:16:03] volumes of my new detailed and restricting instruction specifying how to get the job done when
[01:16:13] it finally gets down to company level. Many officers hearing this may think they would like to have
[01:16:19] a command functioning under such a system. Meaning I would love it if people would just do exactly
[01:16:24] what I told them to do but you don't want that. Others who may say they would like to work under such
[01:16:28] a system really are disturbed by thoughts of it. There are some officers who require something
[01:16:33] in writing before they will take significant action. A mission type order requires the subordinate
[01:16:39] commander and his staff to make basic decisions and plans based upon a careful analysis of the
[01:16:43] situation. If the basic decisions or plans are not successful there is no paper foxhole into which
[01:16:49] they can crawl. Mission type orders require initiative, promptness and resourcefulness which are
[01:16:55] not always forthcoming. Problems in service schools based upon such orders bring forth a variety of
[01:17:02] solutions which are difficult for the faculty to grade. Sometimes looms as a very important problem.
[01:17:10] What do you got? There are so much there. You haven't given this example of just cleaning the building.
[01:17:18] Just that little example of cleaning the building. The worst thing I can do as a leader is to tell
[01:17:24] you how to do that. The minute I tell you how you know what you're going to do exactly what I told
[01:17:30] you. I'm going to say this and this. What are the chances I get it all as a leader? Zero. What
[01:17:38] you're actually going to do is what I told you to do. I'm going to miss a couple of things and
[01:17:42] actually the outcome is not going to be what I want. I'm going to expect him like hey you didn't do this
[01:17:46] and what happens is I trust you less. I'm going to make sure I manage even more which means you
[01:17:50] have even less initiative the next time. The connection from how to initiative and what I wrote down
[01:17:55] was how by me telling you how to do what I want you to do and I'm not saying like teaching you how to
[01:18:00] do something. I'm telling you how I want it done. That's the how you're talking about. Of course,
[01:18:04] I want to teach you how to do a task or a job. I need to train you. He's talking about this is how
[01:18:09] I want you to do this task which is totally different than the exact opposite of initiative.
[01:18:15] Because if I tell you how to do it, you're going to do exactly how I told you to do it.
[01:18:19] And then the things that I've missed, the things that I've committed, I don't know because I'm
[01:18:23] farther away from the problem than you are. I'm going to trust you less because the outcome is
[01:18:28] going to be the one I want. I'm going to micromanage more. I'm going to undermine your initiative
[01:18:30] even more and then when you're out there doing it on your own and I actually can't get to you
[01:18:34] which is the connection from the training to the real world. There's why you have to live this all the
[01:18:37] time. That's when teams and organizations fail because I'm not going to be there to solve this
[01:18:41] problems for you but I've bred this in you the entire time because I'm always telling you how I want you to
[01:18:45] do it and you're like, cool, I'll do exactly how you told me to do it and I'm not going to do this.
[01:18:50] I'm not going to do that. You even know about this over here. I'm just not even touching that because
[01:18:52] you didn't tell me about that at all but if you go the exact opposite which was hey,
[01:18:58] however you want to get this done, that's all good. What we need to get it done is by 1600
[01:19:02] on Wednesday because what happens at 1700 on Wednesday is this and this and in fact,
[01:19:05] all that go make it happen. All of that is your initiative to go make that happen.
[01:19:11] Just the connection between me telling you how I want it done versus your initiative and the
[01:19:17] inverse relationship between those two and how often we see that done wrong.
[01:19:21] That's what you're driving with a micromanager direction, give her. You know driving with you,
[01:19:29] you're just like whatever takes it here, whatever kind of thing and that's a good move. Even if
[01:19:33] I make wrong turns, whatever, you'll help. But what else can you help? And you'll help whatever.
[01:19:38] But you get in, you ever drive with somebody who's like hey, don't be in this lane, this lane is like
[01:19:42] too slow or whatever. And it's like okay, make this turn. It's got like a micromanager, what do you call them?
[01:19:48] Front seat drive, back seat driver, whatever. That kind of person. Let's say it's your
[01:19:53] significant other. I'm not saying it's my significant other. Not my friend. That's not hypothetically.
[01:19:57] Hypothetically. Yes. Someone who you drive with a lot is the same. So in every time it's like,
[01:20:03] hey, you know, we're going to go this route. Hey, get out of this lane, go in this lane. Okay, take this turn.
[01:20:08] You know, okay, it's coming right, you know, like really kind of micromanaging you're driving
[01:20:13] situation. After a while you sort of, you kind of get used to that.
[01:20:18] Yeah. And now of a sudden you're not paying attention. They go, wait, tell you,
[01:20:21] you're supposed to take that turn. You're like, why didn't you tell me that? It's a weird subconscious.
[01:20:24] Why don't you tell me Sarah? Charles. It's a subconscious, almost dependence.
[01:20:32] For sure. That's 100% what it is. That's 100%. That's the initiative comment that I'm the
[01:20:37] connection to. It was like, I'm going to take no initiative because I'm you've been training.
[01:20:41] Yeah. You just wait to be told what to do exactly right. So just like how you're saying where now
[01:20:48] if let's say I'm dependent on you to give me directions, you don't, you know, the leader,
[01:20:53] whatever, he doesn't always get it right or whatever. I make the wrong
[01:20:57] call or you don't give me direction. We'll say you don't give me direction. I take no action. And then,
[01:21:01] of course, it's done wrong. Now you trust me less and now and around and around we go.
[01:21:06] You know, so I'm thinking, and I'm micromanage you more and I stifle even more of your initiative.
[01:21:11] Even more. Exactly right. You know what's crazy about this and Dave V. and I
[01:21:15] were talking about this before we press record is like, I basically think in commanders intent.
[01:21:22] Like I think the way my mind works, I think in end states and everything else to me is just
[01:21:28] sort of this almost like an annoyance of reality. And I'm so far like when I want to do something,
[01:21:36] I'm so there that everything else is just sort of going to fall in the place and I'm not even thinking
[01:21:40] about it. You know, whether it's like when I'm starting to write a book like I know what that book is,
[01:21:45] I know the end state and I want it looks like and now I just have to get those words out of my
[01:21:48] system when we're going to launch something. It's like, I already know what's going to happen.
[01:21:54] Now even if you think about something as stupid as this podcast of me being like echo,
[01:21:59] can you make a podcast and you're like, well, let me go figure it out. You figured out, I'm like,
[01:22:01] I don't even care nothing. I care zero. You show up with what you could have shown up with a with a
[01:22:07] freaking a tape recorder and I would have been like, okay, is that what it sounds good? All right,
[01:22:12] we're good because I know what I know where this is going to go. I know where we're going.
[01:22:16] And so wherever we're going to get there, it's like an annoyance to me and it's an annoyance of
[01:22:22] reality because of where my mind is what I'm thinking about where we're going. And that's a positive
[01:22:29] thing for a couple reasons. Number one, if you're working for me, if you're making stuff happen,
[01:22:34] if you're good, you're good to go. I mean, you can just, you make stuff happen. We're good. We're
[01:22:40] totally good. I'm never going to bother you. Never going to bother you. So that's rad. And then also
[01:22:45] the, the, I'm not going to call up in these details, which means that step that I take is going to be
[01:22:54] a big one. It's going to be a big step. It's not going to be a little, and I'm not going to take half measures.
[01:23:00] Yeah, we're going in the distance. So I'm thinking and acting in kind of living in like
[01:23:05] in a commander's intent kind of way. Yeah, it's not kind of, for those of us that are inside that
[01:23:14] sphere, the byproduct of you is a leader thinking in outcomes and in states. If that's how you're thinking
[01:23:20] and leading your people, the natural reaction of the people around you is to fill in all those things
[01:23:26] to make sure that happens. And if you can take it a step further, if you can take it a step further
[01:23:31] as a leader, and also be comfortable with the other side of it, which is a phrase that you use all the time,
[01:23:37] which I love, which is, you got to expect those things to happen. Then it's no factor if exactly
[01:23:43] how you had this picture in your mind, you got to live these two little, little, little,
[01:23:45] little, little problem here. Yeah, those things are going to happen. And we and we can solve those things,
[01:23:51] too, using the exact same approach, which is if you have that attitude as a leader, when your
[01:23:56] people run into problems, then I'm not going to be pan-extricking about what is the boss going to
[01:24:00] think, because he's going to say, I expect those things happen. Those things are going to happen.
[01:24:03] And I'm going to end up solving that as well. And so if you connect the idea of thinking in
[01:24:08] and states around your people and also letting your people know, you're not going to fly off the handle,
[01:24:13] and jump right in, they're starting to micromanage them when they get these little hiccups,
[01:24:16] these little deviations, because you actually in your mind, Joko, haven't thought about all the things
[01:24:21] that happened between here and here. You're really care was going on in here. Cool, you go off the
[01:24:24] act, cool. I expect those things to happen. But the minute you lay that all out, like all these
[01:24:28] 30 steps to get there and one doesn't go right, and then you're involved in that,
[01:24:33] what that does is stifle your people makes it so much harder for them to get to your
[01:24:37] end state. So just combine the two of thinking in those end states, and then letting your people
[01:24:44] solve those things along the way, and not overreacting to the problems that occur as you're getting
[01:24:48] there, because things are messy. Those things are messy. But by the way, if you're thinking about
[01:24:53] all those things in between, you don't even, you're not even going to think about it. I think about
[01:24:56] the end state. A bigger picture. You're going to be thinking like, hey, we need to move
[01:25:00] to this next ridge on. You're not thinking about where you're going to end up in two days on this
[01:25:05] operation, or we're going to end up strategically in three months. You're like, you're not even thinking
[01:25:09] about that. You're thinking about, wait a second, there's an obstacle right in front of us. What are we
[01:25:12] going to do? And me, well, I'm like, I'm care. I literally don't get as 19 different ways to solve that
[01:25:18] problem. Pick one of them and roll with it. Oh, you, oh, it didn't work. And you got to try again,
[01:25:22] cool. Whatever. I'm still over here. And guess what? I'm looking off in the distance. So we're good.
[01:25:27] That's a good point. And maybe, I don't know, maybe I'm my experience, which is nothing, but in my experience,
[01:25:34] is like under appreciated or whatever, like not flying off the handle and things go wrong.
[01:25:40] Like if you, like, you know, you're like, I can come up with this true though. Like, yeah,
[01:25:46] you know, people have this misconception of you. Like, oh, what if Dr. Guggets
[01:25:50] Maddo you for making this or doing that? The reality is you don't really get mad at mistakes.
[01:25:56] You know, like you might tease me a little bit of whatever. But yeah, like you don't get mad.
[01:26:01] But what that does is, and what I was listening to you did say that and stuff. It made me remember.
[01:26:06] Yeah, that's true. Like, I don't have a fear of making the wrong move if we both know where
[01:26:11] we're sort of going. And guess what? That means you can move. That means you can, you can make two,
[01:26:16] three, four, seven moves. You can make seven moves. And you never had to talk to me.
[01:26:22] And six of them were right. Nine of them were right. 11 out of 12 were right. There was one
[01:26:27] wrong one. It set you back a half a move. And then you press forward and there was no factor.
[01:26:32] If I was concerned that Jocquo is going to get mad at me for, I don't know, what if I make the wrong
[01:26:37] decision on this? Like, should we do this or should I do this or should I not do this or whatever?
[01:26:41] But I'd be like, you're going to keep making this in time. Like, probably it would work way
[01:26:46] work. Yeah, somebody quoted you on Twitter. It was like a great way to not waste your people's
[01:26:51] time is to not make the, to every, not make sure that you're the one that's making all decisions for.
[01:26:56] Not make them rely on you to make those decisions. That's a great way to not waste their time. Yes.
[01:27:01] And the beauty of that is that they're going to get you to where you want to go faster.
[01:27:05] For sure. I think you're right. I don't want that. For sure. All right. So this is how they
[01:27:09] close out the section. This is, once again, this is such a, there's a dichotomy with general
[01:27:13] Clark. And this is part of that dichotomy right now. And he's talked about it before the channel of
[01:27:19] suggestion. I have said many times that a commander has two channels within which to operate.
[01:27:28] He has the channel of command, barking orders and the channel of suggestion. I believe that a good
[01:27:36] commander who has subordinate to our trained and have the confidence to use mission type orders
[01:27:41] can operate almost exclusively using the channel of suggestion,
[01:27:47] preserving the channel of command for for use only when he wants to give special emphasis to an order
[01:27:55] to relieve someone or to take disciplinary action. That's the only time he's talking
[01:28:02] other than that. It's like, well, how do you want to do it? What do you think we should do? The only
[01:28:06] time he's going to bark orders is when he's going to fire someone, which is what relieves means
[01:28:11] by the way, and in the military relieves someone means you're firing them or to give disciplinary
[01:28:16] actions. Every other time, almost exclusively, it's channel of suggestion. You just made the leap
[01:28:23] by saying it was in my hand as when I'm hearing suggestion. I'm not even hearing suggestion. I'm
[01:28:27] hearing questions. Hey, what do you think? How do you think which isn't even what is that
[01:28:31] in saying in word? Because suggestion means like, hey, what maybe we should do this, you're taking
[01:28:35] it a step further, which is how do you think we should do this? And then the flip side is who is
[01:28:40] that the hammer of, you know, as a commander, you have that hammer. You can drop that hammer.
[01:28:44] I can fire somebody. I can relieve somebody. I could reduce their rank. I could take their pay.
[01:28:49] There was a lot of authority in command. How often do you want to pull out that hammer? Man,
[01:28:56] the more, you know, you just pulled out the big, the big hammer, right? What about the little hammer?
[01:29:02] If the little hammer is even worse, the little hammer of like, actually Dave, we need to do it this way.
[01:29:07] Smack. Little, you know, actually Dave, I don't like your idea. Smack. And meanwhile,
[01:29:11] you're getting all dinged up. And now you don't want to make any moves anymore. The suggestion is,
[01:29:17] is, is actually question. How should we do this? Yeah. Channel of suggestion. Here's the final
[01:29:24] little section. And this is, I briefed you earlier, Dave, I said, there's going to be some moment
[01:29:28] to read that you're going to say yes. So this is that section, further the mission of the higher
[01:29:34] headquarters. I went to Levinworth and people think of Levinworth, they think of going to prison
[01:29:39] because there is a military prison there, but there's also the war college. I went to Levinworth
[01:29:43] over 20 years ago. So it is difficult for me to remember all the things which I must have learned
[01:29:47] then at the command in general staff college. The one thing that I have never forgotten and which
[01:29:52] is stood me in good stead was the teaching of general McNair, then common don when he stated,
[01:30:00] quote, when you receive an order or a directive from your next to higher commander, do everything
[01:30:08] you can and in the best way you can to further the mission which he wants to accomplish.
[01:30:17] And quote, and officer who follows his advice and uses it to interpret his instructions will find
[01:30:24] that he can act wisely properly and aggressively with confidence, he will have no problem in operating
[01:30:28] in an environment with mission type orders. So when your boss tells you to do something,
[01:30:34] freaking do it and do it to the best here ability. Leadership strategy and tactics.
[01:30:42] I always have to go to this page, but it's the things that says how to succeed is a new leader.
[01:30:48] Page 157 and then on page 158, it says lastly get the job done. Get the job done. That's what
[01:30:56] you're supposed to do. And that's what he's talking about. When you get told to do something,
[01:31:00] do it. People talk to me and how do I build a good relationship with my boss? Do the job
[01:31:04] and do it well. Kick ass. Give your boss credit. You'll start building a good relationship with him.
[01:31:17] Chapter 14. Organization for performing tasks on the company in small unit level. The purpose of
[01:31:22] this chapter is set forth a concept of which I've found from experience improves training,
[01:31:27] uses time devoted to training more efficiently and increases responsibility prestige and
[01:31:32] morale of the non-commissioned officer, leader and platoon leader.
[01:31:41] Organization, use organizational units or teams even for work details. I'm not going to read this
[01:31:47] section, but what he says, we're using this example today of cleaning the building. What he's saying is
[01:31:53] when you clean the building, do it as a platoon. So use mission type orders and then do it as a platoon.
[01:31:58] And that just helps them get used to how operating together, what people are like, what it's
[01:32:05] like for that leader, what how that leader relates to the troops, how the troops relate back
[01:32:10] to the leader, you train, how you operate, you work, how you train. And then there's the last
[01:32:19] section in this part is let the leader lead his men, which is the same thing. Under the detail
[01:32:24] procedure of performing necessary unit tasks, all training teams are represented at all scheduled
[01:32:30] training. This may make a good showing in their training accomplished records, but does not necessarily
[01:32:36] mean that they have actually received as teams the training that is shown on record. However,
[01:32:41] maintaining unit integrity while performing daily tasks will also enhance real benefits,
[01:32:49] which we derive from our team training. So every day you should live, you should operate,
[01:32:57] the way you are going to live and operate.
[01:33:04] Chapter 15, wasting soldiers' time. The value of time. We Americans have always been conscious of the
[01:33:10] value of time, Benjamin Franklin expressed this by saying that time is money. In our country,
[01:33:14] the efficiency expert who comes into examine ways of doing things to eliminate wasted
[01:33:19] motion is highly paid for his services. He commands that high price because he is a saver of time.
[01:33:27] In the army, we speak of resources in terms of the three M's. Men, money, and materials.
[01:33:34] To these three, we must add time. However, there's a distinct difference between time and the
[01:33:39] other three resources. If we do not use our money or materials today, they are available tomorrow.
[01:33:45] To a lesser degree, this is also true of men. It is not at all true of time. For the time,
[01:33:51] it is a highly perishable commodity. An hour loss today is lost forever.
[01:33:58] Echo Charles. That's true. I feel like he's training a lot of soldiers today, I'm certain.
[01:34:07] It costs several thousand dollars a year to maintain each soldier in the army. I consider
[01:34:10] that it is probably a cost of five dollars per hour per man for the soldiers training time.
[01:34:14] That is available to the company commander. Thus, when the commander weighs an hour of his company's
[01:34:19] time, he may be wasting as much as a thousand dollars. We would not want to be embarrassed if some
[01:34:26] age to see key became interested in investigating this in the field. That's an interesting way to think
[01:34:29] about. Think about, you know, company is 150 men. But think about your company. Think about your
[01:34:35] business. Think about your team. You got people sitting and you want prepared for the meeting or
[01:34:41] the meeting starts late or whatever. Whatever it is. Think about what you're throwing away.
[01:34:45] You're wasting people's time. We are engaged in a contest with the communists in which there
[01:34:54] is no civil matters in which no civil metal will be awarded for second place. I'm certain that
[01:35:00] it is unnecessary for me to dwell on the importance of the role of the US Army in this contest.
[01:35:04] Our mission is to become about ready to my way of thinking combat readiness has no upper limit.
[01:35:13] A unit is never 100% combat ready because there is always room for improvement in the
[01:35:18] development of military skills. Reaction time, marksmanship and the like combat readiness is a
[01:35:23] gold toward which we are constantly moving, but which we should never feel we have wholly achieved.
[01:35:29] Our progress will depend on our use of the resources which I mentioned previously.
[01:35:34] I want to stress the importance of using time wisely.
[01:35:40] And then he goes through a bunch of how we waste time, time is wasted in administration and paper
[01:35:46] work and red tape. And he says this, you should consider it unforgivable.
[01:35:57] You should consider it unforgivable to remove a man from a scheduled formal period of instruction
[01:36:02] or practical work to take care of administrative matters. You cannot requisition a replacement for
[01:36:09] a lost hour of training. He also says here, we waste time when we overcome it are units.
[01:36:18] Or perhaps I should say we do not make the best use of our time. That's something we got to
[01:36:23] pay attention to on an individual level. You over schedule yourself and you actually add up wasting time.
[01:36:28] Here. The same wastage is presented on the individual level when the strength of a unit is
[01:36:34] filtered away to participate in contest of non-military skills to paint rocks or plant flower beds
[01:36:42] in a likeness of the units insignia. That's a shot right there. You go around military
[01:36:49] paces in America. There's some painted rocks out there, people. There's some white painted rocks
[01:36:53] that align in some roads. And I'm going to tell you, some private painted those rocks. They probably
[01:36:58] got in trouble. It's a little bit of a punitive measure. Oh, like punch. Yeah.
[01:37:09] It is training activities themselves which have the greatest potential for wasting a soldier's
[01:37:13] time. This comes about mainly because of ina-enatic with planning lack of foresight and lack of
[01:37:19] preparedness. Soldiers expect to be well trained. They feel short-changed if they're not.
[01:37:24] If you're in charge of training people, which if you're in a leadership you are,
[01:37:27] position you are in charge of training people and you're wasting your time. You are completely wrong.
[01:37:32] Here's another section. I got a read read. What are the instructions clear?
[01:37:38] There is no end of time wasted when one who is to perform a mission or job is not fully and clearly
[01:37:44] instructed. The instructions are misunderstood. The end result is not what was desired.
[01:37:50] It must be done over. In fact, if things go wrong, the leader, in fact, when things go wrong,
[01:37:57] the leader should check first to see if his instructions were not the cause.
[01:38:02] It is said that general Grant assigned his adjutant the mentally slowest officer he could find.
[01:38:10] Grant read his orders to his adjutant and if the adjutant could not understand, grant
[01:38:17] rewarded his orders until he could. Ask yourself, are your instructions and orders so clear
[01:38:25] that every man, underlined every, doesn't underline much near every man in your unit, can
[01:38:31] understand them. When you issue orders, you are instructing someone. Remember that as an instructor,
[01:38:38] you only teach when someone learns. That's the, I always tell that started with the lowest
[01:38:48] common denominator, right? It's matter of fact, it's in, I think it's in dichotomy.
[01:38:54] Well, hey, lay for safe. I'm telling them, hey, I want you to brief to the lowest
[01:38:59] con-common denominator in the platoon. Whoever you think is going to have the hardest time,
[01:39:04] brief to your machine gunners, your new guy machine gunners, I want them to fully understand the plan.
[01:39:15] I mean, that is the entire second law of combat brief. Almost verbatim that he just described
[01:39:21] about the plan that's understandable the way he communicated and then to the lowest common denominator
[01:39:25] and then to me in my mind that actually comes back to the common he made earlier, which was
[01:39:30] the effort you got to expand from your lowest people in the bottom of your folks to
[01:39:37] for them to understand that that comedy made before by devoting time to that, that's the time
[01:39:41] he's talking about. So it takes his adjutant who he considers to be of the lowest intellectual
[01:39:46] level, his bottom third guy. And I'll spend as much time as I need until that guy gets it.
[01:39:52] And if he gets it, they're good to go. And so even pulling that together, that common made. I mean,
[01:39:58] that is that is simple right there. So good. Do you fully, this is the last section here,
[01:40:07] do you fully utilize your soldiers' time? I am not optimistic as to believe that we can eliminate
[01:40:12] wasting of time as we have yellow fever, but we can improve our performance in this regard.
[01:40:16] We can control this problem by the exercise of sound leadership techniques among which are
[01:40:20] planning good job management issuance of clear instructions and thorough follow-up. The most
[01:40:25] valuable resource available to a commander in the army is the soldier's time.
[01:40:31] As leaders, we must use this resource to the best advantage. I know of no better reputation for an
[01:40:38] officer or non-commissioned officer to have with his men, then that he is a good manager and does
[01:40:43] not waste his soldier's time. If he has that reputation, he will probably not waste his men's
[01:40:49] lives and badly there. That's powerful. I've been doing a lot of talking about leadership capital,
[01:40:55] on the F-Online. In fact, I've been going kind of a Zerak talking about leadership capital on the
[01:40:59] F-Online. And I've been talking about how to build leadership capital, how to lose leadership capital.
[01:41:03] And this is one that I haven't mentioned yet. And it's probably one, it's probably a little bit
[01:41:08] of a blind spot to me because I am a free coin it comes to time and wasting time. And so it's one
[01:41:14] of those things where I would, it's so important to me that I've never, I've never walked into a meeting
[01:41:20] two hours late to have a bunch of people waiting around for me to show up. Like, that doesn't,
[01:41:24] that's not happening. But if you want to expend leadership capital unnecessarily and lots of it,
[01:41:31] make people wait around for you, make them waste time. The phrase being late is unacceptable.
[01:41:41] The reason it's unacceptable is because it's waste peoples' time. You could be the best pilot in
[01:41:49] the squadron. And if you waste peoples' time, you're going to lose leadership capital. You could
[01:41:56] be an average pilot. And if your reputation is that you don't waste people's time, they don't care
[01:42:03] if you're an average pilot. Your leadership capital is directly correlated to how you treat them
[01:42:12] and how you respect them and how you respect their time. Time wasted was always the, it was always
[01:42:19] the most frustrating and the most obvious thing that would happen. I think I've said this on the podcast
[01:42:22] before. Everybody who's had their time wasted by someone else knows exactly what that feels like.
[01:42:27] You can think about it right now, sitting around in the auditorium, sitting around whatever this,
[01:42:31] that time of yours that's being wasted because of somebody else. I don't care how good that
[01:42:36] somebody else is at their job, their task or anything else. If they are at time,
[01:42:39] a wester, you're losing leadership capital. Let me ask you this about being late.
[01:42:45] Oh, man, here we go. It's time to be. I need your opinion on what if it's, let's say,
[01:42:51] Halloween party and they're like, hey Halloween party, you know, there's going to be, I don't know,
[01:42:56] 100 people. There's a lot of people who are fashionably late scenario. You're getting to,
[01:43:00] or what have you. You know, so there's 100 people invited or whatever, 100 plus because
[01:43:07] bring who you want it. It's not like a guest list. You're not invited. It's not that. It's just
[01:43:11] we're having a party, whatever. And starts at, I don't know, wasting time. How long is this going to take?
[01:43:17] Speaking, all right, it starts at five. Okay. Say, five p.m. Okay.
[01:43:22] Goes all night. I don't know. Whatever. And you're like, all right, and you get there. It's
[01:43:28] 630. Other people are there. But you get there at 630. Is that what you see people say? Is that bad?
[01:43:35] It's for a game late. If I send you an invitation to my Halloween party. And I say, the party starts at five
[01:43:40] and goes till midnight. I don't care when you show up. If I say echo be there by seven and you show up at
[01:43:49] 730. Is there a difference between those two? I think so. Yes. Yeah. But yeah, so my questions
[01:43:56] more about that first scenario, whatever. Like if it's like, hey, the party starts at five.
[01:44:00] Yeah, I was going to say the party starts with or without you. Yeah, I'm super concerned about you.
[01:44:04] Yeah. Nobody's sitting around waiting for you to get. But the contrary, the podcast starts when
[01:44:11] you're here. So when you're not here, the podcast doesn't start. You're the ones with the SD
[01:44:18] memory cards that go in the little machines over there. So when you're not here at three o'clock,
[01:44:24] the party's not starting. We're waiting. Understand. You're of your talking like it's for real.
[01:44:30] I was here at 258. What up? You made it in. Yeah. It was legit today. As much as hassle I give you about
[01:44:35] Hawaii and time and being late. You're not late. Very often. Do you play with fire? Yes,
[01:44:43] yeah, every day. I think. And technically a lot of times there's a minute, maybe if you set
[01:44:48] you were one of those people, if you set your watch like five minutes fast, you probably be on time all the time.
[01:44:52] Yeah, if I believe it or if I didn't know, is it the what? Yeah, I've done that before too. Well,
[01:44:57] Ian, how are you to tell you like, oh, I come from a long line of late people.
[01:45:00] There, my words. I'm from my dad. He's so very cracked up because I said, like, you got your
[01:45:07] DNA. You said you got your 23 and me. I said it came back. You got the
[01:45:13] old genius. Yeah, sir. But, and you know, you kind of look into it all like, why am I late or
[01:45:20] whatever. So I would go to work late when I used to work at the cloud. I would be there late.
[01:45:25] I was there late one minute two minutes. Five minutes sometimes probably more time than I was on time.
[01:45:30] Probably for real. I'm not finding this hard to believe. It doesn't seem like a stretch.
[01:45:35] And the thing is technically you are right. Like I'm wasting people's time. Especially if
[01:45:39] if people depend on me to get there at that time. You know, I'm not getting paid. You know,
[01:45:44] it's the kind you got to clock in. So you're not getting paid if you're not there. So it's not that.
[01:45:48] It's like if you were depending on you to be there. But is there like a briefing to start the night?
[01:45:53] No, no, you didn't start. It's like clock in and you're there. I mean, it would piss me off.
[01:45:57] You know, yeah, I do. It's the most un reliable person that I put no value in as a human.
[01:46:04] Thank you. And I did it. But, so I analyzed like, why am I like that?
[01:46:12] Because even if I'm like, I need to be late less. You know, just wouldn't change. Why am I like?
[01:46:16] And you should change the statement. I need to be late less. Do I not going to be late?
[01:46:20] Yeah. But draw a little bit of a harder line in the sand. I understand. And your right.
[01:46:26] My problem is you're right. The thing is you're right. But when I when I really be truthful,
[01:46:30] it's because I don't care about what's going on there. You know, like why am I going to
[01:46:35] prepare like take 30 minutes to prepare this and prepare that for something that I don't have to be there
[01:46:41] at that. I have to be there at a certain time. So of course I'm running the risk. If I did, if I would
[01:46:45] have my way, I would never be late at all. But I would never be early at all either. For things I
[01:46:50] don't care about, you know, like like that. I had one time in my life when I was going to college
[01:46:56] at and it was really hard to get parking. And eventually I figured out a system. But I had a
[01:47:03] seal buddy that he was going to college tune. We would study together. And we are but we were both
[01:47:08] on time all the time for everything. And eventually we made a deal where we gave ourselves like a
[01:47:14] waiver to be five minutes or eight minutes late because if you were going to be there at two
[01:47:20] o'clock in order to be there at two o'clock, you had to show up at one and drive or and so we were
[01:47:25] just like, you know what? Hey, if you're five minutes late, 10 minutes late doesn't matter. Like I don't care.
[01:47:29] I don't want you being here an hour early so that you're not one minute late. So we made a little
[01:47:35] packed and just said, hey, bro, I'll be there between one and one fifteen boom, all good. And I
[01:47:41] try and get there and one and maybe I get there at one o'clock, maybe he get there at one twelve or
[01:47:44] whatever. Eventually I figured out I would just put my bike in the back of the car and just
[01:47:50] park at the top of the hill and just bike no factor. Yeah, see you now here. So you're going to
[01:47:54] solve these problems. So on the flip side and this is all in the spirit of getting down to the whole
[01:47:59] late thing because I agree with you at the end of the day and if you think if you really be honest,
[01:48:03] like I'm not late, really, you know, anymore. Back in my day, for a whole late. Yeah.
[01:48:10] So what are you trying to think of when I was late? No, you were late a little bit the beginning,
[01:48:15] but then, but then like I didn't, I probably remember you being late three times total. Yeah.
[01:48:20] And this is not including a four minute grace period. Which sometimes I think you do just to
[01:48:27] just to, you know, what do you mean grace period? You know, like sometimes if you're supposed to
[01:48:31] be here at one, you're here at one o'clock. Yeah. Four minutes late. It's possible. Yeah, the late
[01:48:36] times I'll tell you, hey, I'm late because of this specific reason or whatever, but that's already,
[01:48:40] but nonetheless, like that is I agree with you where you're wasting other people's time people are
[01:48:45] waiting for you like that's it's it's kind of inexcusable in a way. But if you show up 15 minutes early,
[01:48:54] aren't you wasting your own time a little bit? No, because what are you going to do when you get there?
[01:49:00] You're going to prep. Yeah, well that depends. Yes, depends on me. All right. Sun Siu told us 2,500
[01:49:06] years ago that the one that shows up the battlefield first wins. Yeah, you know, as far as battlefields
[01:49:11] go for sure. But certain circumstances, if you're there, let's say, okay, yeah, I'm going to meet you
[01:49:19] for brunch. You know what's in my bag right now? Well, I could prep the next book I'm reading on the podcast.
[01:49:25] When I show up here early, if there's no one here, cool, I get to read. I get to get ahead.
[01:49:29] Oh yeah, okay, so that's a good point. Okay. Yes. Question answered because yeah, if you show up fit and you
[01:49:34] got to be thinking I guess at the end of the day. So if you show up 15 minutes early, you're not wasting
[01:49:41] your time because you can still choose what to do. You're not forced to wait around for not waiting.
[01:49:47] Yeah. You should be proactive. We're making something happen. Yeah, and you have that option.
[01:49:51] I mean, technically, I guess if you're waiting for someone you have that option, but like to be
[01:49:54] there putting you in that position, rather than you making the decision, putting yourself in
[01:49:58] that position potentially. I understand. Back to the book, chapter 16. So I was super fired up when
[01:50:07] I read this chapter title and then beyond so the guy got a little less fired. I got into it. But
[01:50:13] because the chapter is will you wait for it or will you go get it? It's a whole day. This is the
[01:50:22] chapter I've been waiting for. But what he's talking about is information. I'm so fired up for
[01:50:29] gathering information and are you going to wait for information to come to you or you're going to
[01:50:32] go get it? I'm still I'm so fired up about it, but I'm not as fired up as I was. It's just like
[01:50:36] which is going to make things happen. But he goes in here. There's more than one school of
[01:50:43] fought concerning how a commander can acquire reliable information. One school contains it to
[01:50:49] command or should analyze reports that come to him from his subordinate units and staff. The other
[01:50:53] advocates at the commander should go see for himself yet another endorses a combination of these methods.
[01:51:00] As a commander from company to army group and an as a observer of others holding such
[01:51:05] positions in three wars, let's get a few a little bit cool the right. I have come to certain conclusions
[01:51:13] myself. Moreover, since my retirement from the army, I have worked as a consultant to research
[01:51:18] organizations, baking studies of command control and communication problems for the army,
[01:51:22] the result of this active and retired experience might be helpful to students and practitioners
[01:51:27] who should who would like to excel in the art and techniques of command or ship in general ship.
[01:51:33] And then he goes here looking back, it seems to me more than ever that my best information on both
[01:51:39] our own forces and the enemies was obtained by visiting or observing subordinate commanders.
[01:51:47] There you go, I guess he's saying go get it. This is done either by Jeep or fixed wing airplane,
[01:51:53] borrowed from the artillery, small radius. He goes on. He says this.
[01:52:00] As a core commander in Korea with five divisions on the line, I often left my headquarters by
[01:52:06] chopter by chopper after morning staff briefing and I visited the five division headquarters
[01:52:10] in turn from left to right. The divisions knew when I was coming, the division commanders were told
[01:52:14] that they need not wait for me and that I would talk to the chiefs of staff over a cup of coffee.
[01:52:20] We discussed the latest situations. Then we discussed the problems which had been presented
[01:52:25] by them on a previous day. Then I noted what they wanted my core headquarters to do to help them.
[01:52:32] So that's all good. He's gathering information. And then he says, I told them the situation of the
[01:52:37] 8th Army and of the I Corps as I knew it. Not only is he out there receiving information, he is
[01:52:44] telling them what is going on. He ends up saying that he did that. It's funny. I was reading this
[01:52:54] and he says, generally the next day repeated this as a result. I was not only the core commander,
[01:53:00] but the core commander liaison officer and to a large extent the core communicator with the lower units.
[01:53:05] And I put in parentheses when I was reading this, it was a static war because at this point
[01:53:10] Korea, it was almost trench warfare like they weren't moving. And then what's interesting,
[01:53:16] fast-forwardal would be says, this was an astatic situation, but such command techniques are not
[01:53:21] unusual and mobile warfare. So get out there, get that information. He's got this section in here.
[01:53:32] History is full of instances where the commander being at the critical point at the critical time
[01:53:36] turned the tide of battle to victory or conversely the commander not being on scene. His force was
[01:53:42] defeated. A few such examples have been related so dramatically as in the poem shared and dried
[01:53:48] by Thomas Buchan and Reed. So we're talking civil war. We're talking general Philip Sheridan,
[01:53:55] union general who was five foot five. We're talking about height a little bit earlier.
[01:54:02] Well, he was known as Little Phil. Also known as fighting Phil and the battle of Cedar Creek
[01:54:08] October 19th, 1864s when this went down. One will recall that early in the morning. Sheridan was
[01:54:14] at Winchester, Virginia 20 miles away from his command when news of a new battle arrived.
[01:54:21] He mounted his horse and took off at full speed for the field of combat. Reed's stirring
[01:54:27] verse traces Sheridan's progress through five standards, stands as giving equal credit to both
[01:54:32] him and his horse. The six stands are shows what happens when the commander arrives at the critical
[01:54:37] point of battle and at a critical time. Quote, the first, the general saw were the groups of
[01:54:45] stragglers and then the retreating troops. What was done? What to do? A glance told him both.
[01:54:52] Then striking his spurs with a terrible oath. He dashed down the line, mid-a storm of
[01:54:59] Hazaz, which I had to look up. That's an old form of hooray. So the people started, ah!
[01:55:06] The wave of retreat checked its course there because the site of the master compiled it to pause.
[01:55:16] So there you go. The commander shows up on the battlefield and he turns this retreat into an
[01:55:22] advance and they ended up kind of smashing the Confederates in that battle. It is inconceivable
[01:55:28] that the same result could have been attained on an automated battle field.
[01:55:32] Nor could Sheridan have been brought. Could have Nor could Sheridan have brought order out of chaos
[01:55:41] while seated before a display panel 20 miles away. You need to get there.
[01:55:46] Need to get there. Then he talks about why commanders should be forward.
[01:55:56] He talks about the computer stuff and again he's right and this originally came out.
[01:56:02] I think in 1963 and then this version was 1973. So he's talking about computers.
[01:56:10] So God only knows what that consisted of in 1973, like a mobile command computer.
[01:56:17] We need to get a, I need to do some research on that one. He says these are fine until
[01:56:22] disorderly and confusing conditions that occur so often in battle materialized.
[01:56:27] They do not realize the roles of judgment. So he's talking about all these computations and these
[01:56:32] things that they set up and he said once those are cool and everything's cool. But then once
[01:56:37] the mayhem happens, they do not realize the roles of the judgment and experience factors which
[01:56:42] must be used in handling tactical battle reports. Inevitably, these lead to a working principle
[01:56:49] such as and so here's what the commanders are using to judge their information when they're using
[01:56:55] the computer based data. Discount by 50% all very favorable or unfavorable operational reports
[01:57:02] which come into your headquarters from your subordinate units and then question the remainder.
[01:57:07] So it's basically like this just junk. It's just junk. And then he talks about the helicopter
[01:57:16] and using that to stay forward, which is effective as well. He's got this whole, this whole chapter
[01:57:22] ADP and war will it work. It's automatic and data processing. So we're not going to cover much of
[01:57:33] this and he sets up this sort of hypothetical situation where he starts asking a bunch of
[01:57:37] questions about how well this ADP, how well it's going to work to use ADP during war. And a lot of this
[01:57:45] you know he's talking he's literally talking about like are there going to be power sources
[01:57:49] available. So it's really kind of nitty gritty stuff. But then he says I would not be honest with you
[01:57:55] if I did not point out that commanders at all echelons are apprehensive of the tendency to use ADP
[01:58:02] to facilitate centralization of command and control. I can foresee disastrous effects from indiscriminate
[01:58:09] from indiscriminate centralization or over centralization and loss of flexibility in modern
[01:58:16] fluid war. Why is that? Because now all of a sudden the leader can track everything that everyone's
[01:58:22] doing. Hey, like Dave's in his aircraft and he's like wait a second go a little bit further
[01:58:25] to the right go a little bit further to the left. We know exactly where you are. Wait don't drop the bomb
[01:58:29] yet. Okay drop it now and we're trying to micro manage. Will ADP cause the commander to be more
[01:58:37] command post bound and thus reduces ability to be at critical points at critical times?
[01:58:42] Well, it's a tentative up in a yes with its increased speed and capacity for information. Will ADP
[01:58:49] in the hands of staff officers or of higher headquarters tend to encourage them to put increased
[01:58:56] burden of reporting on lower echelons who are often busily engaged in the vital conduct of battle.
[01:59:02] How crazy is that, Dave? It's not picturing what I saw from the top and the command center,
[01:59:09] you know picturing this being 19 was 76. We said yes the answer to that question is yes it will.
[01:59:16] Yeah so that's what happened in the military. All of a sudden we have the ability to get information
[01:59:19] so we're going to reply to the information. We're going to want more of it and you're going to
[01:59:23] demand it at a time that is totally incompatible with when they should be giving it the information.
[01:59:28] You want to know what's going on? Yeah. Well the reason you don't know what's going on is
[01:59:31] I'm in the middle of doing something right now. Yeah. The god of little situation I'm trying to handle.
[01:59:35] Yeah. Yeah so that's how he explains the whole ADP thing.
[01:59:46] Chapter 18 making progress and improving a military organization. It is the aim of anyone who's
[01:59:50] privileged to come in a company, batay and brigade or division to leave in it is to leave it in
[01:59:54] much better shape than he found it and to be sure his superior's recognized that fact.
[02:00:00] And he goes through this little plossess method which he's gone through before when he
[02:00:05] earlier podcasts, which you're going to make little incremental changes to get better.
[02:00:11] He goes over this section about protecting your image as a commander. A word about headlines,
[02:00:16] most commanders who have sought headlines to establish their image and I'm using those,
[02:00:20] those are, he's putting those in quotes. In the minds of their men and their
[02:00:25] peers have sooner or later have been plagued by unfavorable headlines. Produce a superior,
[02:00:31] well-rounded in solid unit and your image as a commander will be secure as will your military future.
[02:00:40] And then this is the, this is the last thing that we are going to cover. I think.
[02:00:47] Well no it's not, not clear to you that. Yeah this. All right so chapter 19
[02:00:53] techniques of troop orientation and informed education. One of the most important duties of
[02:00:59] a commander is to keep his troops informed and oriented. This is done in many different ways
[02:01:04] with varying degrees of effectiveness. A technique I found very effective was to inform an
[02:01:10] orient by posters and personal visits. So he's talking about posters literally posters that you
[02:01:15] hang on the wall. And this is why when you were talking about simplicity earlier Dave,
[02:01:20] this is this is kind of knocking out of the park. And when I said earlier on this podcast,
[02:01:25] when I was giving him a grade of a D minus for his simplicity of language and his opening,
[02:01:31] he makes up for it here with these posters. In 1956 I took command of the 7th US Army
[02:01:39] in Europe at a time when the relationship of the troops with their German neighbors was at a low
[02:01:44] ab due to a number of things. I think this is also when hack worth was working for him.
[02:01:48] After studying the situation, I concluded that the transition from an army of occupation to
[02:01:54] the status of a guest army in a host nation had not been accomplished. So there's the wrong culture.
[02:02:00] There's the wrong culture from from occupation status to like host to a guest to a host nation.
[02:02:08] This is in Germany. So we went in there, we're occupying force. These were our enemies and now
[02:02:12] we're saying, all right, that's not the deal anymore. Now they're the host nation and we're the
[02:02:17] guest. So he can you imagine trying to shift that culture? That's a tough culture shift.
[02:02:22] I said out to bring about this transition not only for the soldiers, but for the dependence and
[02:02:27] US civilian employees in Germany and so he comes up with this poster that the poster is called
[02:02:33] soldier. And the soldier, the poster just has this picture of a soldier who looks badass
[02:02:39] and it says soldier, this is why you're in Germany. And it's got bullet points to play your
[02:02:49] part on the NATO team to help maintain peace by being constantly combat ready to be a good
[02:02:56] neighbor to our German neighbors to fight if necessary for the rights of free men in the world.
[02:03:03] Simplicity score. Dave, what are you giving him? That's a significant improvement over the
[02:03:11] year. The most improved. Most improved award. So very obvious. So that's what he did. He made this
[02:03:19] poster and and then he did these visits. He did these visits where he would take the troops and
[02:03:28] send them to check out what was happening at the Berlin wall. So it's another way to make people
[02:03:36] understand why. And not only would he send the troops, but he would if he could send the dependence
[02:03:42] there as well. So they understood why. You go see the Berlin wall and then he made and this is the
[02:03:47] last thing we're going to cover again. He's making this so simple and so clear. So along with
[02:03:54] that campaign to get people to see the wall to understand what the purpose of being there was to
[02:04:00] understand why we were there. He made this poster. There's a couple pictures of the wall and it says why
[02:04:08] and it says have you ever wondered why must the communists build walls and fences to keep people
[02:04:17] from fleeing the land where they were born? Why must they charge their fences with electricity
[02:04:25] which can kill people who try to escape? Why armed guards along these walls and fences shoot
[02:04:33] and kill their own people who try to escape from their homes? Why despite these walls and fences
[02:04:42] and guns have over 4 million people left their homes, property and friends and risk their lives
[02:04:49] to escape in the past 15 years? Why the communists surround themselves with walls and fences when
[02:04:58] history shows that this has often been the first step in the self destruction of an empire?
[02:05:05] Then he says why were these affectives? These posters and Operation Luxe which was actually
[02:05:14] traveling to the Berlin Wall were effective because they used the most efficient techniques of
[02:05:20] of informing and orienting the soldier and of having his commander tell him in basic and simple terms
[02:05:29] about situations which are close to him and affect or could affect him personally. He gets it
[02:05:38] across as simply as possible. So there you go. That wraps up our review of guidelines for the leader
[02:05:49] and commander. I have initiated the publication through Jockel Publishing of this book. We are
[02:05:55] reaching out to try and figure out what needs to happen there but it's underway. Bozac has it for action.
[02:06:04] So we'll get it out. We'll get it published. I'm sure that we will continue to refer to it.
[02:06:10] There's so many good lessons here. Even that last lesson that these posters were effective
[02:06:17] because they used the most simple terms to explain to the soldiers why they were doing what they're
[02:06:25] doing. Something that I've been talking about for 20 years explaining people why they're doing
[02:06:29] what they're doing and that is such an off that's such a such a response. We use all the time at
[02:06:34] S.L.M. front all the time. My people aren't doing this. My people don't want to get on board
[02:06:40] that tell them why they're doing what they're doing. Explain it to them in terms that they can
[02:06:45] understand. That's what he did. That's what he's telling us to do. Telling us to be more effective,
[02:06:55] telling us to be more efficient, telling us to not waste time telling us to be in good physical
[02:07:02] condition and to strive always. Remember what he said. You're never a hundred percent combat
[02:07:12] effective. You never get there. You always have to strive to be better. So thank you general
[02:07:21] Clark for that. Yeah, Coach Charles. Mr. Speaking of getting better or at least always trying to
[02:07:31] get better striving to get better. Yes. Do we have any recommendations on you know making that happen?
[02:07:38] Yes, we do. Dave. We do. I just thought Dave looked at his watch. He's just looked at his watch thinking
[02:07:45] all right. I know I have worked to do. You know what's funny. You know what? I know Dave has worked to
[02:07:52] do. I know I have a job. I know there's one person. I must say they don't have work to do, but they
[02:07:59] might have less work to do. They might have a less of a stringent timeline to follow. Well, you did
[02:08:05] say might because you know you never do know. Okay. All right. All right. All right. All right.
[02:08:13] Okay. Okay. All the work I have to do. I'll tell you part of the work I have to do is inform my people
[02:08:20] our people. All right. Let's do it. On how to get through or should I say move forward on this path?
[02:08:26] We're all on boom. We're working out. We're taking due to if we can. We're reading. We're
[02:08:32] we're surrounding ourselves with good people. It's a sliding scale I understand. Nonetheless,
[02:08:38] these are things we're trying to do on this path. We need supplementation. Don't worry.
[02:08:43] Jocco is fuel. It's called jocco fuel. Supplementation for your whole body all the way up to your brain.
[02:08:51] The last cell in your brain. Anyway, what we got joint warfare? We got a lot of stuff. I told you my wife
[02:08:56] has an injury. That's a lot of feeding or joint warfare. It's not our feet. All right. That's what I'm talking about.
[02:09:01] Well, yeah, every day. So, joint warfare. Super krill oil. These are all for your joints.
[02:09:06] Three bones keep yourself in the game. Don't even have to worry about them anymore. You take this stuff.
[02:09:11] Also, we have discipline. Just for your brain. Ish. It's not just for your brain. It's what I'm saying.
[02:09:19] True. It's for your body too. So discipline, discipline, go and then discipline, go in the cans.
[02:09:25] It's all the same family. We'll say that accurately.
[02:09:28] Wait a minute. Accurate. Yeah. It's true. Yeah. A little note on discipline go in the cans. So,
[02:09:39] look, are we at war? Yes. I would say yes. I mean, from a business sense, we're at war.
[02:09:48] We've had, we've been attacked. We had an act. Well, let's just say this out of
[02:09:51] it. And when we've had an act of war against us, another very large energy drink company
[02:10:01] has spotted an insurgency happening. They didn't like it. They're trying to maneuver to shut
[02:10:09] down some of our manufacturing. But guess who had contingency planning? Yes, us. But where
[02:10:17] and where. So right now, hey, we are in a wall-watt in Florida. We want to be all over the East
[02:10:25] coast in a wall-watt and then we want to hit the rest of the stores across the country. If you're in
[02:10:28] Florida, go to a wall-watt, get some go, try some go. What flavors do you recommend? Dave?
[02:10:39] All of them. Let me ask you this. How many
[02:10:44] are you, are you, have you drank one flavor enough where you shifted to another flavor?
[02:10:50] Like I've done that with milk where I'll go on milk. I'll go on mint milk for three weeks. Then
[02:10:55] all of a sudden I'm like, well, that's strawberry. But right now, I'm on that pumpkin's,
[02:10:58] I'm on that smashing pumpkin pumpkin, pumpkin spice. That's that was crazy good. So have you,
[02:11:05] have you gone, are you go to rotate daily? Are you doing random out of the box? What are you doing?
[02:11:09] I try to go random out of the box or out of the fridge. I try to go random out of the fridge. I have
[02:11:14] not done that the last seven days. Because you're just straight. Dude, I am straight after
[02:11:20] burn orange. That's what I'm right now. So my older two daughters kind of speak their own language.
[02:11:28] And one of the words that they've been using a lot lately is if something is very good,
[02:11:33] then it's a fantasy and they say it in various funny ways.
[02:11:37] But then they've shortened it to say, FANTO. Oh, that's a FANT.
[02:11:44] And so the other day, my middle daughter took a drink of afterburner orange. And she said,
[02:11:52] oh, that's a FANT, like a FANTO.
[02:11:58] So there you go. There's a little, yeah, like orange FANTO, right?
[02:12:01] Yeah, there's a orange FANTO. I'm going to have to agree with that one. The orange afterburner
[02:12:07] orange. Yeah, that's the kind of the number one right now. It's good.
[02:12:11] Factually. I'm still just just jocopommer all day. Yeah. And I'm just having a chance.
[02:12:16] I will have probably for every four jocopommer. I will have one orange or one
[02:12:22] sour apple sniper. Maybe a DAX average, even though DAX average, people like my wife's DAX
[02:12:28] average all day. Yeah, I could see that. Sometimes I just want to get a little like the coat of
[02:12:34] my mind set. Sure. Just go get some of that. That can just that can is legit. Yeah. Yeah.
[02:12:41] Yes, sure. But yes, so yes discipline energy drink essentially. I said it. Yes, I said what I said.
[02:12:51] Energy drink ish health energy drink. It's real energy is what it is. It's real energy.
[02:12:57] Yeah. So nonetheless, yes, these are the supplementation elements that we can call upon
[02:13:04] on this path. Also, jocchi imagine milk. So you got all these different flavors of milk,
[02:13:10] protein in the form of dessert. He just meant a smashing pumpkin. I'm with it. I'm with the smashing
[02:13:15] pumpkin. Oh, yeah. What about kid approved to buy a kid's kids are all over that? It was declared
[02:13:22] a full fantasy in my house. Full fantasy. Is that the largest declared
[02:13:27] last smashing pumpkin? A full fantasy. Full fantasy. Okay. I'm going to kind of remember that
[02:13:32] see if it sticks. Well, actually, I don't know if I want to do that nonetheless. It does sound cool.
[02:13:36] When you say that your daughter said, but you can't start bringing it out. I can tell you that I won't
[02:13:41] start calling things like that. Oh, that will move in UFC was a full fantasy. Yes. Thank you.
[02:13:49] Not really, you're gonna flow. No, probably not. So speaking of full fantasy. Oh, that was cool.
[02:13:54] Yeah. This is a good cool. Speaking of cool and full fantasy. Jocco IT is also out there.
[02:13:59] Another light refreshing element that we haven't spent that much time talking about, but that's fine.
[02:14:05] It's still out there and it's still going strong. Of course. You can get that in a can as well.
[02:14:10] Right. You can get all this stuff at originmain.com. You can get it at the vitamin shop.
[02:14:16] Nationwide. You can get it at wall off Florida. This is what it was right now. It's November.
[02:14:22] Hopefully we'll get that whole East coast take a minute. Now, look, when I post that
[02:14:25] we're in a wall the other day. Everyone's all fired up and like, okay, what about 711, what about
[02:14:29] AMP and what it look, well, that's what that's the goal. Like I said, Florida's a little bit of a battleground state.
[02:14:37] So we hope, you know, when you you're hoping, but people in Florida will get after it.
[02:14:42] Yeah, fully. Wait, is Jocco IT in a wall or just the discipline. Just the discipline.
[02:14:46] Yep. Yeah. Okay. Well, there you go. Boom. Also at originmain.com, you can get this stuff. Also at originmain.com.
[02:14:52] You know, there's stuff. You just do stuff. Geese, rashguards. Some very, you know, whether
[02:14:57] it be workout clothes, clothing shirts, but on top of that American made denim jeans.
[02:15:05] Also did you get new deltas? No, no, yeah. Okay. Did you get new deltas?
[02:15:10] Yeah. So the new deltas, they're freaking legit. And yeah, they're just the old deltas. I thought
[02:15:21] with the best thing that you could put on your legs. But now the new deltas, which if you're ordering
[02:15:27] deltas now, they're the new deltas. And they're freaking the best thing ever. And they're what? They're kind of,
[02:15:32] um, like stretchy-ish. I mean, they say they do have, they do have stretch to them. That way,
[02:15:40] when you throw that full fantasy roundhouse kick. You're good. You're not ripping your pants.
[02:15:48] Yeah, that's good. For sure. Okay. Well, then you have it full fantasy stuff. Um, yeah, Jeanne's boots.
[02:15:55] All American made stuff. These are big deal. And, and I think we all know that and we all know why.
[02:16:01] Also, we have our own store. Yeah, I said it. I said what I said. All right. It's still jocquist store.
[02:16:08] So that thing, what you just said, I said what I said, you know, that's kind of a thing too, right?
[02:16:13] From, I, yeah, I don't know. Okay, what's the other thing? My daughters are saying. Okay. All their
[02:16:19] daughter. I like that one. I think it's very fun. Delby. I said what I said.
[02:16:22] Yeah. Yeah. There is this joke, like, you know, the name of the memes online. Yeah.
[02:16:29] There's this joke that it was like, I forget even the joke, but it was, it was really funny. And
[02:16:35] since since then, I started to appreciate memes. Oh, yeah. I appreciate memes. And I even appreciate
[02:16:40] people that have, you know, like a hat that says veteran of the meme wars and they have,
[02:16:47] they've awarded, they've been awarded whatever award you get for the meme. Maybe they got a name.
[02:16:51] We're five, five names. Spot names. So yeah. The memes are good. Yes. But somehow, I don't,
[02:17:01] the memes don't float in me. It's always my son that shows me memes. Yeah. I don't know what the hell
[02:17:07] he subscribes to. Oh, is it some cram as you call it? But he shows me some memes that are funny.
[02:17:13] Yeah. They're really funny. Yeah. Whoever's making their smart people, like, you know,
[02:17:17] how you can, you know, some jokes are like, brother, that's like not even a, it's like a cheap
[02:17:22] joke that's not funny. And then somewhere like you got to be, whoever thought of that made that
[02:17:26] joke up is like a smart, funny person. Right. You know, like there's some impressive stuff on
[02:17:31] their frill. Like I inadvertently, well, or inadvertently, whatever, subscribe to like a bunch of them.
[02:17:39] That's really good. Yeah. Full grown man fully memes all day. But yes, I said what I said,
[02:17:47] it's our store. Okay. Still called Jockel store. So anyway, yes, Jockel store. This where you can
[02:17:52] represent with clothing, t-shirts, hoodies, discipline equals freedom. Good, all this stuff. Here's
[02:17:58] the thing. I said this last week, I'm saying it again. It's a big deal. We have a t-shirt club.
[02:18:06] Okay. So this is what the t-shirt club kind it is. It's like, okay, look. The t-shirt club is
[02:18:12] echo coming up with a lot of different t-shirts and me saying dude, we can't make a million
[02:18:17] different t-shirts because how are we going to keep a million different t-shirts
[02:18:21] in stock and how many and all that stuff. Yeah. And then you come up with a big creative.
[02:18:31] Yes, that. Well, you know, I guess it depends on you. You had the
[02:18:35] end state in mind. Yeah. Right. You figured out way to solve that problem. Well, I think it's good
[02:18:41] because also on top of that, which, um, yes, that's true. But on top of it, it's like sometimes
[02:18:47] we like, like, even you'll be like, hey, put this on a t-shirt or I'll be like, you know, like suggesting,
[02:18:52] like a t-shirt and it's a good, it's a fun, good idea or cool or cool. Because that's face that you
[02:18:58] come up with ideas for t-shirts that are fun and I come up with ideas for t-shirts that are cool.
[02:19:03] Oh yeah. Super cool. Extra cool. Are you done? Are you denying about that? No, no, no, no.
[02:19:09] Oh, good. It's true. It's 100% true, actually. But we can't just start like you said, just throwing
[02:19:15] these shirts on like or whatever, but the idea of, you know, so these ideas for shirts that they,
[02:19:21] they're doable. Also people, the people always say, can you make this t-shirt, can you make that
[02:19:25] t-shirt? That'd be a cool t-shirt. Yeah. And there's some that I'm like, that are shirts that we talk
[02:19:29] about. And then someone, you should do this shirt. But like, yeah, we just talked about that kind of thing,
[02:19:33] you know. So it's like all these ideas, hey, we'll throw it in one month. We'll have it, you know,
[02:19:38] you can have it. And it just goes on and on. It's good. A little subscription situation. Anyway,
[02:19:44] it's good t-shirt. Well, fun. Okay. So because you're kind of kind of just giving me a look,
[02:19:52] when I said I come up with cool t-shirt ideas, I'm going to say one, that will be available
[02:19:58] through the t-shirt. What is it subscription? Sure. Yeah. So here's one. podcast number 53.
[02:20:08] There's one part. This is the chosen Rev. Reservoir. We're talking about the book,
[02:20:12] colder than hell. And there's one point where the Marines are fighting for their lives.
[02:20:20] And there are assaulting down a hill. And there's a guy that guy that's writing the book is
[02:20:26] writing what he's seeing. And he sees these guys getting up and charging in one of the Marines
[02:20:31] is not holding a gun. He's holding a freaking axe. And he's charging at the Chinese communist
[02:20:37] mess and assaults their position. And so that's what I want to put it on a t-shirt. A silhouette,
[02:20:46] somehow of a crazy picture where you can tell that there is a Marine with an axe running down
[02:20:54] a sulting a communist position. And all I'm going to say is on that is like,
[02:20:59] cold, do the hell podcast 53. That's it. You know, I want that t-shirt. Yeah, I agree that is actually
[02:21:08] Dave impressively awesome. That's a cool shirt. Oh, good. She'll make that a group to
[02:21:15] agree. So anyway, yes. So you know, stuff like that. Anyway, check it out if you want. It's that's on
[02:21:21] jockelstore.com as well. Also, subscribe to the podcast. Maybe I've been already. You don't that mean.
[02:21:29] I don't know. Don't subscribe. Subscribe, right? That's a thing. It'll be cool if you subscribe. Yeah,
[02:21:32] that way you're listening to it. Yeah, we're making them. Yeah. We're probably making them fast.
[02:21:37] And you can listen to them, which is interesting. Awesome. Yeah. Yes, you are. Because you have
[02:21:44] we have talk about gas. Yeah. The unraveling podcast. Well, that's that's on a different thread.
[02:21:50] Now, by the way, someone's not going to do a different thread. Yeah, they're like, hey, you
[02:21:53] have an unloaded unraveling. Whatever you know, you say, you did. Because I think it's a different thread.
[02:21:58] So you got to look for it or what it is. So it's called the unraveling. It's actually called the
[02:22:03] jockel unraveling podcast. So search for jockel unraveling and you'll find it's it's Darryl Cooper
[02:22:09] and me talking about. I've been listening to them. They're freaking legit. You know, it's awesome.
[02:22:16] So check that one out. We also have the grounded podcast, which we haven't recorded one in months.
[02:22:21] You know, because we've been on quarantine. So we haven't had a wait. We haven't recorded ground
[02:22:26] a podcast. So we'll we'll knock on those and I know I owe war your kid. And I got where your kid
[02:22:31] for coming out. So we'll get some more your kid once done as well. We got a YouTube channel. If you want
[02:22:35] to see echoes videos that he's super proud of where he makes a bunch of stuff blow up and whatever.
[02:22:42] Or with airplanes, whichever. Yeah. It's good. Also the video version for this podcast by the way.
[02:22:50] If you want to see what good deal Dave Burke looks like. Yeah. Nonetheless, yes, YouTube channel.
[02:22:55] Good. You can subscribe to that. Yeah. Subscribe to that one. Did you say we're like official
[02:22:59] or whatever on there? Officially, yeah. We're, oh yeah, yeah, they're like fairfax. Oh yeah. So yeah,
[02:23:05] that's how you can tell that that's the real one. So I think it's just jockel podcast. Yeah,
[02:23:09] jockel podcast, YouTube channel. Oh, good. Boom. Also psychological work. Did you brief podcast?
[02:23:14] Did we say it? Oh, yeah. No, we didn't. Okay. Yes. Deep brief podcast. Jockel and Dave Burke.
[02:23:18] Chuck has read my notes. Yeah. Well, I can see you know, I see you write something on my way
[02:23:22] to second. We got another podcast, but it comes out on this thread. We haven't broken it out yet
[02:23:27] onto another thread. I don't know if we will. Maybe maybe not. We'll see what happens. But anyways,
[02:23:31] it's really it's us talking about what we do at echelon front working with clients. And it's
[02:23:39] just all, it's like 100% leadership. Right. It's a leadership injection indirectly into your veins.
[02:23:44] There's no, there's no books to be read. They're short. They're like a half an hour, 45 minutes.
[02:23:48] Yeah. Would you call it like a case analysis kind of situation? In a case analysis,
[02:23:53] somewhere just lessons learned. You know what it's like? It's like some of those books that
[02:23:58] that I've covered actually have been covered in recently. Those direct reports from combat
[02:24:04] from World War II. They're like, this is an interview. We want to get this information to the
[02:24:08] troops as quickly as possible. That's what the debrief. It's a freaking debrief. It's Dave and I
[02:24:12] debriefing what we do on a daily basis to help companies and help leaders lead their companies.
[02:24:20] So that's the debrief podcast is. Yep. Also psychological warfare. It's an album with tracks,
[02:24:26] a joccal getting helping you pass your moment to a weakness, straight up, in whatever capacity
[02:24:30] that you might run into moments of weakness. Uh, flip side canvas decoder Myers company making cool
[02:24:36] stuff to hang on your walls that will keep you on the path written a bunch of books and got a
[02:24:41] bunch of books. Uh, we got a book called About Face. I wrote the forward for that. It's by Hacworth.
[02:24:45] This whole series of whatever we just did six podcasts about guidelines for the leader and commander.
[02:24:51] I found that through About Face, which is my favorite book, which I wrote the forward to.
[02:24:54] So you can check that out. Leadership strategy and tactics field manual. We got the code,
[02:25:02] the evaluation, the protocols. We got the new edition of the discipline. It was freedom field.
[02:25:05] Anyway, this is the Christmas New Year's gift book. This is what your people want. Wrong.
[02:25:12] Am I right? You're correct. I'm correct. Uh, about to new material in there. It's like something
[02:25:16] like 40 new pages in there. And if someone you know wants to get on the path back on the path,
[02:25:23] needs to get on the path. If you want to stay on the path, get them that new version of the
[02:25:29] discipline equals freedom field manual. Got way of the warrior. Kid for field manual coming out.
[02:25:35] How the kids like in a day? My kids are so stoked on that. That's a little section that they really like.
[02:25:41] Oh, right on. That's good. There's let's just say there's layers in the book later.
[02:25:49] Let's say that there's layers. So, way the warrior kid for field manual.
[02:25:54] Young Mark meets a kid. Like last day at school, the kid wants to be a warrior kid, but he's leaving.
[02:25:59] He hasn't said anything because he's shy. He comes up and says, oh, Mark, I really wanted to hang out with
[02:26:04] you and your friends and be a warrior kid like you. But I'm leaving, I'm moving. And so Mark goes home,
[02:26:10] last day at school. Now Uncle Jake's there and he says, oh, you know, I met this kid. He wanted to be a
[02:26:14] warrior kid, but I can't help him. And Uncle Jake, of course, says, yes, you can. You're going to
[02:26:19] write him a field manual. What's that? It's instructions on how to be a warrior kid. So that's what the book
[02:26:24] is. Way the warrior kid for field manual. Don't forget about warrior kid. Way the warrior kid one,
[02:26:28] two and three. Don't forget about Mikey and the dragons. And of course, don't forget about
[02:26:33] extreme ownership and the dichotomy of leadership. Don't forget that I have a consulting company.
[02:26:39] Leadership consultancy. We solve problems through leadership. Whatever problems you have in your
[02:26:43] organization. It's a leadership problem. And what we do is we solve those problems through leadership.
[02:26:49] Go to ask them from dot com for details. Go to EF online. If you want to ask me a question. If you want
[02:26:53] to ask Dave a question, live. We will be sitting there answering your questions. If you want to
[02:26:59] go deeper on the materials that we talk about, we have video courses on there. So check out
[02:27:05] EF online dot com. We only have one muster in 2020. It's in Dallas, Texas, December 3rd and 4th,
[02:27:13] go to extremotorship.com for details. This is our leadership conference where we get granular,
[02:27:24] where we interact, where we explain these principles. So you can take them and make your business
[02:27:31] and your life better. We have EF Overwatch dot com. If you need executive leadership inside your
[02:27:38] company, you need middle management inside your company. You want people to understand the principles
[02:27:43] that we talk about here. Go to EF Overwatch dot com. And if you want to help service members.
[02:27:48] If you want to help active duty people, you want to help retired people. You want to help their
[02:27:51] families. You want to help gold star families around the world. Then check out Mark Lee's mom's
[02:27:56] charity organization. Momily, she has an organization called America's Mighty Warriors dot org.
[02:28:02] You can check that out if you want to donate or if you want to get involved. And if you
[02:28:07] let's say you want more pain. You just want more pain. We can deliver. You can get more of my
[02:28:14] distressing diatribes. You can get more of Ecos misplaced monologues. And obviously you can get some
[02:28:22] more of Dave's concentrated confabulations. You can find us on the in-webs on Twitter,
[02:28:33] on Instagram, which Eco will only refer to as the gram and on that face.
[02:28:39] Dave is at David Arborck, Eco's At Equatrals, and I am at Jock O'Willick, and thanks to
[02:28:46] General Bruce Clark and Colonel David Hackworth for passing these lessons onto us. And for
[02:28:52] your service to this great nation to enter everyone out there in uniform. Thank you for
[02:28:58] standing the watch and for keeping us safe and also to police and law enforcement and fire fighters
[02:29:03] and paramedics and EMTs and dispatchers and correctional officers and board patrol and secret service.
[02:29:10] Thanks to all of you for standing the watch here at home. And everyone else out there
[02:29:16] remember this one thing from General Bruce C Clark, an hour lost today, is an hour lost forever.
[02:29:33] Don't waste time. It is running out. And with that until next time, this is Dave and Eco and
[02:29:43] Jock O'Willick out.