Jocko Podcast 233: Pressure-Test Yourself and Your Methods. The Boer War

2020-06-12T03:33:08Z

Join the conversation on Twitter/Instagram: @jockowillink @echocharles 0:00:00 - Opening 0:00:47 - The Boer War. By Jay Stone and Erwin Schmidl 1:29:11 - Final thoughts and take-aways. 1:33:05 - How to stay on THE PATH. JOCKO STORE Apparel: https://www.jockostore.com/collection... Jocko Fuel: https://originmaine.com/origin-labs/ Origin Jeans and Clothes: https://originmaine.com/durable-goods/ Origin Gis: https://originmaine.com/bjj-mma-fit/ 1:53:10 - Closing Gratitude.

AI summary of episode

You know, like we're going to see, well, like we're going to see in Vietnam, like we're going to see in Afghanistan, like we're going to see in Iraq. But if you don't know juditsu, it all just seems like kind of like a whirlwind, like, yeah, somebody, oh, do you remember like, if your leg was over his leg or under his leg, you would have to be like, what are you talking about? And, you know, you know, you know, you had like the whole thing going on, the whole kind of, you know, mystical sort of vibe, you know, talking about how well. So like the other day, right, where I was like, I'm like, you know, focusing, you know, doing some stuff on my computer for a long time. But some people the way they use indoor fins, almost like it's like this just throw away and they turn like, no, friends, you just sort of feel better in this and like ambiguous sort of way. Like in the beginning it kind of feels like a little fight because you're like, whatever, but in training, it'll work because you're not, you know, and it's mad. Oh, yeah, you do this like under your nose, but you know, above your lip and above under your nose, just like, oh, you'll make you, but man, if you're at all fired up to use your term, you can just grit through that, you know, and it's different because if you have, because they used to use that if you want to choke someone you put your finger in a nose and you can lift their chin. You know, like man, what if he does really put it, the pressure point on me or whatever, and I'm thinking, okay, all the times I've been training and competing or whatever, like what if someone put a pressure point on me, like during jujitsu? So like your head just kind of naturally does it, but if you're mad or if you're ready for it, like if someone's like, oh, I know this guy always does this. He's like, what kind of stuff you like, she's like, whatever you like. Because we don't have like juditsu like this, even though the map and I talk about this, like, you know, when we're talking to people, don't have training it. and when you kind of think about it because like you're right, like, okay, so doing that, the nose thing like when you want to lift your head. It's like makes you like, like just like depression is a real thing. I was like, You know, and you know, and you know, You know, That's my, it's my torment. Well, it's like, okay, you can kind of understand why someone who doesn't know any better would think that because remember back in the day when you're like a little kid and then guy can be bigger than you, but in Hawaii, I mean I'm sure they say they have an expression in Hawaii. And then you're going to be doing a competition where you're kind of like maybe like you're focusing too hard on conservation or something like this. You know what I mean like you know you happen to get like the you have I happen to get a good grip and Greg train admittedly is smaller than me as well. I don't know if he was just openly refuting the effectiveness of jujitsu or what, but he was like, he'd like basically like I just do pressure points on you. You know, I made like a face like it, like I cared and then just slapped the psycho arm lock on. whatever, like everyone's all, yeah, like you'll get a guy in his, liver and his hands will come all the way down here, recoil in this like way, whatever, but yeah, But you know, the move, where the movie is like, hey, you know, the cops ready to, ready to, you know, do something to the bad guy. Because if you don't know what that little crack feels like, and it happens to you for the first time, you're going to get, you're going to get beat down. and I start like digging into the back of your ear, you're going to be like, oh, it's just going to make you move. I mean, if you're really in touch with like your feelings or whatever, like, sometimes you feel kind of stale, like inside because you're not out. So someone has you like in the mount or on your back or whatever and you feel like real, like, kind of helpless. Oh, but those like that was how, how, how they and the guy was like, they'd be like, oh, let's go. Like, you know how like when you take some time off, you want it one at one. You know, before you know, juditsu and someone winds up in a good position, like, let's say you just get in a big scramble in a real fight.

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Episode transcript

[00:00:00] This is Jockel podcast number 233.
[00:00:03] With echo Charles and me, Jockel willing, good evening echo.
[00:00:07] Good evening.
[00:00:08] So the last podcast we were reviewing a book about the Boer Wars
[00:00:15] and we were going to pick up where we left off last time,
[00:00:18] which is what the British did with the lessons that they learned,
[00:00:22] the military reforms that they made,
[00:00:25] and how they made this transition and then where it ended up
[00:00:29] in World War I.
[00:00:32] So the name of the book is the Boer War and Military Reforms
[00:00:37] by J. Stone and Irwin Schmittel.
[00:00:41] And let's take it back to the book.
[00:00:45] So picking up where we left off.
[00:00:48] This is the, this is when they start talking about the,
[00:00:52] the reforms that got made.
[00:00:55] From the top down appointments were made in a casual,
[00:00:58] random manner that often resulted in matching of poor,
[00:01:02] and poor matching of personality skills or personal
[00:01:06] inclimations, inclinations to the demands of a particular post.
[00:01:12] So the way that they were appointing officers was just kind of random.
[00:01:18] And then the way they were matching up teams was also kind of random.
[00:01:22] And then you take the wrong personalities and mix them together.
[00:01:25] You're not going to end up with good leadership.
[00:01:28] Continuing on, if locating and assigning qualified officers
[00:01:31] to proper post proved a problem,
[00:01:34] the same must be said of the selection of individual units
[00:01:37] and even private soldiers.
[00:01:38] What unico-heasin had existed vanished quickly in South Africa.
[00:01:42] Littleton's division for no apparent reason,
[00:01:45] shrink in a few weeks from eight battalions to five and a half.
[00:01:48] Regiments were broken up into smaller units.
[00:01:50] Then reconstituted into mixed battalions.
[00:01:52] This was done with a seeming disregard of structural and historic uniformity
[00:01:56] with adverse consequences on a spreder core in an army with strong
[00:02:00] rencha mental ties.
[00:02:03] So they take a bunch of teams.
[00:02:06] They get to South Africa and they split them all up and mix them all up.
[00:02:09] This is just a bad move.
[00:02:11] I used to be, I used to feel like I was kind of cheating a little bit.
[00:02:14] When it came to when it wouldn't task you to bruise her,
[00:02:17] it was going through our pre-deployment workup.
[00:02:19] Because we would split up and we'd mix up.
[00:02:24] But when we had to do a training operation,
[00:02:25] we would get in our units and we'd stick to them for the most part.
[00:02:28] Because it was just so much better.
[00:02:30] So much better.
[00:02:31] When you're working with people you work with.
[00:02:34] And they just threw that out the window here.
[00:02:36] Yeah.
[00:02:37] Wait, you said you felt like you're cheating?
[00:02:39] Yeah, I felt like I was cheating.
[00:02:41] Yeah.
[00:02:42] Because it was so much more of a fact.
[00:02:44] It was just such an advantage.
[00:02:47] And they'd try and give us multiple targets where it would.
[00:02:50] Where you could kind of convince yourself that it would be a good idea to take these guys
[00:02:55] and move them over to this platoon and take these and just know.
[00:02:58] Well, we'll just stick with the platoon integrity.
[00:03:01] Yeah.
[00:03:03] And I'm not saying that you shouldn't do interoperability because you should.
[00:03:07] And you should be able to mix people up.
[00:03:09] But you should also have that kind of baseline.
[00:03:12] And there's a reason that the regimental historical a spree to court.
[00:03:16] That's real.
[00:03:18] Continued on bureaucratically, the system was a nightmare as an official account of manpower was
[00:03:25] was sometimes lost for months at a time.
[00:03:27] The lack of coherence was not due to want of paperwork.
[00:03:31] For if anything, the pre-war structure was overly centralized.
[00:03:36] In 1898, the broaderic committee on decentralization, heard testimony from the general commander
[00:03:44] at Aldershot that it took 12 signatures, including two orders from London to return an unsatisfactory driver.
[00:03:52] So you got some micro management going on, some centralized command.
[00:03:55] That's never good.
[00:03:58] Fast forward a little bit.
[00:04:00] Staff work with us fell on about 70 officers, some well trained, but many useless, although pleasant aristocrats.
[00:04:06] Boller later claimed that in Pretoria, I found Robert sitting in one building with his Hindu staff,
[00:04:13] Kitchener and another with his Egyptian staff and Kelly Kenny, in a third with an English staff, all pulling against one another.
[00:04:20] With so many centers of control functioning at once, it should come as no surprise that time and again key points would be left on guarded, isolated,
[00:04:30] but tines on supported or critically needed guns on assigned the saving grace to an otherwise chaotic system was Robert's phenomenal memory and attention to detail.
[00:04:38] So you got these guys that have their own little silo set up, you know, you got Kitchener that had worked in Egypt and worked with the Egyptians and he brought them into South Africa and same thing with Robert's with his Hindu staff.
[00:04:54] They all had their own little clicks.
[00:04:56] That's not going to work out good. You're not working together.
[00:05:00] Troops and because of that, fast forward a little bit. Troops sometimes went hungry, cavalry lacked, sometimes lack courses and hospital arrangements rarely proved adequate.
[00:05:10] Kitchener's misunderstanding of staff principles was the best demonstrated where when he wrote about the battlefield, imposing his will,
[00:05:18] rather than staying at his headquarters and manifesting it through properly organized staff channels.
[00:05:25] So again, that means he doesn't trust his people, he's out there on the battlefield trying to tell people exactly what to do and what kind of oversight or you're giving when you're out there on the battlefield,
[00:05:34] barking orders at people to tell him exactly what to do.
[00:05:38] I'm not going to work out well.
[00:05:41] Alan, be summed up, summed up the view of a commander of a subordinate column by noting one is always at high pressure, one is probably under the same general for about a month at a time,
[00:05:52] when he is played about and not one's column derags he goes off.
[00:05:56] That's what the subordinates were saying.
[00:05:58] Oh, you're going to show up here for a month. You're going to bark orders. You're going to yell. It tells do stuff when we're all worn out. You're going to bail.
[00:06:04] The drawbacks of Kitchener's system are obvious over centralization isolation from the field and time lags.
[00:06:14] After a year of frustration, Kitchener agreed to the appointment of Ian Hamilton as Chief of Staff.
[00:06:20] This was an admission that given the greater size complexity and distances of modern warfare coupled with extreme dispersion of forces that no individual could single-handedly run an entire war.
[00:06:30] But that was a year deep.
[00:06:34] This is something that works. That's something I see a lot as people that are people that they're too egotistical to say, hey, you know what it needs, I need to hire number two.
[00:06:44] It's all it is. It's just ego kicking in.
[00:06:48] They talk about running the rail road because that was a big part and the British really didn't have the capability.
[00:06:56] They didn't have that in there in their capabilities of, hey, we need to run this rail.
[00:07:02] The British military needs to run a rail road and they didn't really have that capability.
[00:07:08] Also, circled one note in here about the fact that what Roberts ultimately did was resort to having hostages, civilians on the trains to try and keep them safe.
[00:07:22] Interesting advancement here. The soldiers benefited from the first individual field dressing kits and identification cards. This information proved so useful.
[00:07:32] That in 1906 dog tags were introduced. So there's the introduction of dog tags in the world. I thought that was interesting. They also found that the Royal Army Medical Corps.
[00:07:42] So they realized some of the things that they needed to do from a medical perspective. Another thing they say here, a major complaint of medical officers was the enormous amount of red tape,
[00:07:52] Surgeon spoke of an inability to operate because of long hours spent behind the desk.
[00:07:58] Check out this statistic. Over the course of the war, pay water and sanitation were largely responsible for an annual sickness rate of 958 men per thousand.
[00:08:12] So almost every single person you are going to get sick and they're not reporting like minor cults. They're reporting hey, this guy was out of duty.
[00:08:20] So that's why all the support people out there that are listening to this. All the military support people out there.
[00:08:26] Doesn't happen if you're not there logistics wins wars. You can't win a war if everyone's sick.
[00:08:36] Fast forward a little bit in all of the in all areas that changes rot by the Boer war or by no means limited to higher organization nor to big ticket items such as larger guns, hospitalships or armored chains trains.
[00:08:50] Assuming we minor changes occur as well. What stand out are the changes in the mundane
[00:08:56] items of soldierly life such as uniforms and personal equipment. Perhaps the most obvious of these was the evolution toward uniformity of battlefield attire among all types of troops.
[00:09:08] The adoption of the India inspired khaki colored drill field uniforms by all except the Highlanders economy and camouflage potential became the new standard of production yet it was only with the widespread use of smokeless powder that these qualities could take precedence.
[00:09:26] Previously rapid fire weapon tree had been restricted by the heavy smoke that would cover battlefield under those circumstances camouflage uniforms seem super superfluous and needlessly unattractive.
[00:09:36] So this is where you start getting camouflage uniforms because before there'd be so much smoke on the field that it was just pointless to even have camouflage. No one could see you anyway.
[00:09:44] So you might as well look good. If you're a Brit.
[00:09:48] Pre-war dress standards in the British army had always emphasized excessive smartness to the point of making it the most unservisable and unwarkable in the world.
[00:10:00] In the eyes of some contemporaries perhaps the most pernicious effect of smartness. So they had these really nice looking uniforms which were totally unfunctional.
[00:10:12] However, there was a need to discipline men to take cover during pre-war training. Having to pay for damaged uniforms discouraged ready to use the ground.
[00:10:20] So these guys were having these uniforms that were so nice that during training they wouldn't want to get on the ground.
[00:10:26] Regarding the rest of the kit whenever possible is lightened including the adoption of aluminum canteen first developed in Germany.
[00:10:36] So they're making stuff.
[00:10:38] This is why some of these things this we start getting the first modern war. You know there's a couple wars that you can talk about with that.
[00:10:44] Were the first modern war? These are some of the things that make you start saying, this is these are legit movements forward toward modern war.
[00:10:52] To outfit an entire army in the same manner had advantages aside from ease of supplying economy.
[00:11:00] Now this is I made a quick note here.
[00:11:04] I always talk about decentralized, right? decentralized command everything's going to be decentralized and it does.
[00:11:12] That being said, some things should be centralized and if they're not centralized there's going to be problematic.
[00:11:20] For instance, do we want everyone in our platoon of 40 guys? Do we want everyone to have different weapons? What do you think?
[00:11:32] No, no we do not. We want everyone to have the same weapon. So where are we going to get that weapon from?
[00:11:38] We want to be decentralized. The same weapon we all have the same parts. We all have the same ammunition. That's what we want. We don't want everyone carrying their own different type of weapon.
[00:11:50] Uniform same thing. We want everyone to look the same medical kit. Where is that medical kit going to go on your gear?
[00:11:56] You want it in the same spot. So if you get shot, I'd come over. I know where your medical kit is. So there's some things that absolutely have to be centralized.
[00:12:04] So occasionally, like I'll be working with a company, and there's someone that doesn't want to kind of you. Doesn't want to use whatever standard doesn't want to follow some procedure.
[00:12:16] And I always have to bring this up, you know, that there's some procedures absolutely have to be centralized.
[00:12:22] When you're in the battle of Ramadi, you have near and far recognition signals.
[00:12:28] You want everybody to know what those are. You know, and we had everybody in Ramadi knew what the recognition signal was from a long ways away.
[00:12:38] We all, everybody knew Army Marine Corps, everyone of the same thing. Believe me, you want that centralized. You don't want 12 seals going out on an operation.
[00:12:46] And they have a different recognition signal than the Army guys. So yes, there are times when things must be centralized.
[00:12:54] Of course, fast forward a little bit, the essential piece of equipment for all ranks in virtually all services was now the rifle.
[00:13:04] More potent powders and improved smaller caliber bullet design made possible higher velocities and more precise shooting at ever increasing ranges.
[00:13:14] So this is we're using the rifle. That's what we're doing.
[00:13:18] Both sides, besides realize the potential of bicyclists as the boars distributor company of cyclists among their generous and the British cold cyclists from very units, various units and retrain two full battalions.
[00:13:34] Out there on their on their bikes getting after it.
[00:13:38] Imagine if they had modern mountain bikes and you know now they have the mountain bikes with the electrical with the electric boost. Have you seen those things?
[00:13:46] Hmm.
[00:13:48] John Dudley, the hunter, the hunter.
[00:13:50] He uses one of those things to get out to different hunting locations. Why?
[00:13:56] Very, it's quiet. It's silent. Can take it anywhere. It's light.
[00:14:02] It's, it's viable.
[00:14:04] Yeah, it's totally viable.
[00:14:06] Yeah, communication was perhaps one of the most consistent problems encountered in a swift moving war fought over tens of thousands of square miles of terrain.
[00:14:16] For messages to Europe, the ocean, it cables sufficed but within South Africa, telegraph cables were often cut.
[00:14:23] Thus, signal flags were used but had limited ranges of eight kilometers and transfer rates of eight words per minute.
[00:14:31] Much preferred was the heliograph with a range of over 40 miles on clear terrain and a speed of 12 words per minute.
[00:14:40] Heliographs had the advantage of being undetectable if not in direct line of sight. What's a heliograph you might wonder?
[00:14:49] It's a mirror.
[00:14:51] It's a mirror. You're using a little mirror to reflect and send Morris code or whatever.
[00:14:56] 40 miles. You got to have some altitude to do that because the horizon is 12 miles.
[00:15:02] So big is that what? Like this?
[00:15:04] I have no idea.
[00:15:05] I think it's bigger. It must have been some kind of machine with a little amaranic.
[00:15:10] Well, too, if you're talking for miles, that's like huge then.
[00:15:18] That's not the kind of carrying in your pocket.
[00:15:20] Well, after the blocks of take a historical look at the heliographs of the past 40 miles.
[00:15:27] Well, let me get it.
[00:15:28] It would have to be trash cancels.
[00:15:30] At least. I think trash can't lay it in.
[00:15:33] Could be.
[00:15:34] Could be.
[00:15:35] Looking to the other.
[00:15:36] Can you imagine the number one form of communication that you have is using a mirror and reflecting it towards your body? Who's 40 miles away?
[00:15:44] By the way, this is what?
[00:15:47] 100 and 100 years ago, 110 years ago, something like that.
[00:15:52] And now we got an iPhone or a pocket we can talk to people in space and health.
[00:15:57] War time experience clearly showed the need for better equipment for reconnaissance communication and ranging.
[00:16:05] So there you go. Those are some of the reforms.
[00:16:07] Now we dip into a little bit more tactical stuff.
[00:16:14] During the course of the brewer war, every branch of the British army experimented.
[00:16:20] Experience to change and nowhere was this more evident than in tactics.
[00:16:25] For the infantry, the foremost consideration was the enormous increase in firepower.
[00:16:29] Proper maneuvering and deployment which could lead to initial superiority of position or psychological advantage became even more important.
[00:16:35] As concentrated rapid fire had become so devastating that once battle had been joined,
[00:16:41] nearly impossible to rectify any initial year errors without suffering serious casualties.
[00:16:47] Battles were now resolved in uneven pace. A few minutes at a tactical disadvantage could prove more decisive than hours of marginal superiority.
[00:16:57] What are we talking about there? What we're talking about is, all of a sudden, if you got the tactical advantage, you were at a massive advantage,
[00:17:07] not a little one, a massive one. And you could get yourself to a position through this speed,
[00:17:12] surprising violence of action. You could get if you used speed, surprise,
[00:17:15] violence batching and you got the advantage, you were at a massive advantage.
[00:17:20] A massive advantage.
[00:17:23] Marksmanship was fast forward a little bit. Marksmanship was becoming a matter of soldier selecting individual targets and ranges rather than collective mass volley fire.
[00:17:33] And this in turn, necessitated a new type of training for one as for his one,
[00:17:38] boor noted of 35 men whom we took prisoners after they had fired up to add us up to 350 paces,
[00:17:47] not a single one had his site correct.
[00:17:50] Most of them in kept their sights at 800 and 850 yards because no order to change had been given.
[00:17:57] That's centralized. That's centralized command. You're at 350 yards. You imagine your capturing.
[00:18:04] By the way, just in case you don't notice, when you have your sights set for 850 yards or 800 yards and you're shooting at someone that's 300 yards away,
[00:18:13] you're not going to hit him. That's not happening. You're going to miss him.
[00:18:16] So imagine you come, you capture your opponent and they don't even have their sight set and you ask him why not?
[00:18:23] Well, we didn't get ordered to. Crazy. Keep your weapons dope.
[00:18:32] The British infantry drill of 1896 had placed two little emphasis on the firefight and too much on depth of formations.
[00:18:43] At Clenesso, the boor's were outnumbered for the one yet less than a third of the British army was involved in the attack.
[00:18:50] The boor's understood modern small arms. Captain Wrightman and American military observer noted,
[00:18:55] I did not learn of any case when the boor's had determined to hold their ground that the frontal attacks succeeded by its own power.
[00:19:07] So what are we hearing right here? We're kind of hearing a little bit of that flanking movement coming in to play. Big time.
[00:19:13] Never heard of the frontal attack working.
[00:19:17] Am I going to tell you the frontal attack never works? I'm not going to tell you that. I'm going to tell you though.
[00:19:22] You best be leaning towards flanking maneuvers. The futility of the old attacks in front of the assault was compounded by an infantry termed by the times by the time history as being in different shots.
[00:19:36] Careless of cover slow to comprehend what was taking place or to grasp the whereabouts of the enemy always surprised or lost helpless without their officer. In a word, well disciplined but ill-trained.
[00:19:49] One might say untrained. Think about those descriptions.
[00:19:55] How would you like your military unit to be described as indifferent shots you can't hit anything?
[00:20:00] Careless of cover you're not protecting yourself slow to comprehend what was taking place needs no explanation or to grasp the whereabouts of the enemy.
[00:20:10] You don't even know where the bad guys are always surprised or lost.
[00:20:15] That's a nightmare helpless without their officer. These are the worst descriptions of amongst the worst descriptions that you can give.
[00:20:22] And then what's interesting is that in order to well disciplined, and you know me, disciplines at the top of my list. But if you're so well disciplined, but you can't think for yourself, you're worthless.
[00:20:35] The provisional course of musketry for the year 1902 took the bold step of abolishing the volley.
[00:20:44] So now we're not going to get online anymore and shoot on command as well as encouraging fire from cover and the use of any kind of rest natural artificial sound. That's the first little step they're taking.
[00:20:54] And I want you to pay attention as a little bit 1902.
[00:20:58] So now they're starting to take the lessons from the brewer war and say, okay, guess what? We need to learn not to fire from cover. We need to start shooting individually.
[00:21:08] And the reason I say pay attention to that date is that they're going to make changes and then they're going to regret back.
[00:21:15] They're kind of going to go to what you know. It's like, you know, when you get the you get the wrestler.
[00:21:23] And he's going against a sick jujitsu guy and you say, look, don't take this guy down. You got better hands.
[00:21:31] And then he gets caught with a little shot and what does he do? It goes right back to what he kind of knows. We're at the trap.
[00:21:40] It's a trap. Your habits are a trap.
[00:21:47] Continuing on the defenses increased power drastically reduced troop densities.
[00:21:57] So how many people do we have on the battlefield? We're starting to spread out.
[00:22:01] Wellington had fought Waterloo with 69,000 men on a two mile frontage.
[00:22:07] The boorers had held their front front with only 300 men to the mile.
[00:22:13] Did you hear that? 69,000 for two miles and 300 men to a mile?
[00:22:20] That's how much different it was. That's how dispersed they got.
[00:22:25] Continuing on a little bit larger, more dispersed battlefields destroyed the ability of a single general to command a battle.
[00:22:34] And even in the most broad of terms, I'm going to say that again, larger, more dispersed battlefields destroyed the ability of a single general to command a battle even in the most broad of terms.
[00:22:46] So you got all these people that spread out over 300 miles.
[00:22:50] And you got to communicate with a freaking mirror. Right? You're not going to. So what you need to learn how to use decentralized command.
[00:22:57] You need to learn how to give commanders intent.
[00:23:01] Greater Alliance had to be put on lower echelon officers and NCOs.
[00:23:05] Frequently non-professional officers were expected to lead by personal example in battle.
[00:23:09] This disproportionate, their disproportionate losses testified to this role.
[00:23:14] Under South Africa's fluid battle conditions, small unit command became more critical. And this is the same way the military is now.
[00:23:22] You can't expect a platoon commander that's out there in the battle of Ramadi. He's out there.
[00:23:28] He's not, he's making decisions. He's making calls.
[00:23:35] At least that's the way it should be. Does communication, modern communication start to allow for micro management to take place?
[00:23:43] Yes, it absolutely does. Which one?
[00:23:46] Alpha 2. Which direction are you moving? I want you to be 200 meters.
[00:23:51] It's not taking to 200 meters. That's what can happen nowadays. It's not good.
[00:24:01] In South protection and for the good of the army officers began to leave their countrymen.
[00:24:09] It's behind and play a less conspicuous role in advance. So now we're not wearing our badges that say we're in charge.
[00:24:17] Roll models such as Bullar who remained in the thick of the fighting at Kalenso until wounded became a thing of the past.
[00:24:23] Senior officers now kept further to the rear and the tactical role of Junior officers was enhanced.
[00:24:29] In the early months of the war, the British were fortunate in that their unique organizational pattern of eight small companies per battalion allowed them to have sufficient
[00:24:37] complement of officers to whether the heavy early losses.
[00:24:42] But yes, so now we're moving more toward decentralized command.
[00:24:47] Interestingly, it was the volunteers and militia. So the volunteers and militia, you remember these are like the reserves people that were doing part time.
[00:24:55] They proved most adaptable to new forms of warfare probably because of their closer ties to the civilian mode of thinking.
[00:25:03] They have opened minds at the bottle of Dorn, the city of London Imperial volunteers advanced to by rushes and used covering fire while the guards were still moving forward in relatively dressed line cover move.
[00:25:20] I love getting to the root of things.
[00:25:23] Like it, that's, that's, that's, it's not incredible. You have these civilians that are reservists and they go, hey guess what, you shoot all move.
[00:25:32] They didn't even taught that. They figured it out. You shoot all move when I get in a good spot. I'll shoot you move. Ready go.
[00:25:39] Meanwhile, the pros, the Gordon's were already, all rise, all forward, march. That's what they're doing.
[00:25:48] Yeah, it's like their creativity was trained out of a certain creativity was trained out.
[00:25:54] Always have to give that warning about discipline inside of a unit.
[00:25:58] Because if you have so much discipline inside of a unit, people stop thinking, yeah, and that's the last thing as a leader that's the last thing you want.
[00:26:05] It's the last thing you want anywhere, right? You have a company. You don't want people to stop thinking about how to do things better.
[00:26:12] You have a GJ2 school. You want everyone just to learn the moves that you teach them and not think of anything? No.
[00:26:17] Creativity should be nurtured. Creativity should be watered.
[00:26:22] It should grow and rewarded. You know, like you're thinking back to that way, you just said about like they didn't adjust their sights because they weren't ordered to.
[00:26:34] So you've ever watched coming to America?
[00:26:36] Yes. So in the beginning, he was ready Murphy and Murphy are senior hall.
[00:26:43] Yes, sir. So he was going to get married. What do you call it?
[00:26:47] A ring marriage marriage marriage, where his wife is going to be like the ultimate servant wife, right?
[00:26:55] And essentially, she was like those people not adjusting the sights because they weren't ordered to because this lady was going to do everything.
[00:27:03] Like everything that he wanted, everything will think.
[00:27:06] And she proved it or whatever. Just real briefly, it kind of went and noticed this little part, but it made it kind of basically the same point.
[00:27:13] So this movie had a lasting impact on your philosophies. Continue.
[00:27:17] Well, I'm telling you, there's nuggets and Easter eggs in there all in there. So he was like, hey, so you're going to do everything.
[00:27:22] You know, he was like, hey, let me talk to you for a minute. Right in the middle of the marriage ceremony.
[00:27:26] Let me talk to you for a minute in the back room, whatever.
[00:27:29] And he's like, she's like, yeah, your service, whatever. And he's like, hey, so I want to get to know you and she's like, yeah, I've just been raised to serve you.
[00:27:39] He's like, what kind of stuff you like, she's like, whatever you like. He's like, dang.
[00:27:43] He's like, so anything I tell you to do, you'll do. She's like, yep.
[00:27:46] It's like anything I tell you what you'll do. She's like, yep, like happy too.
[00:27:50] She's, she's, she's, so he's like, hey, barked like a dog. She starts barking like a dog.
[00:27:53] He's like, uh, who, like, I rang a tang or something like this. She starts doing. He's like,
[00:27:57] Just hop on one leg. She starts doing it all at once, right?
[00:28:00] And he's like, all confused.
[00:28:02] His dad walks in.
[00:28:04] Like, all you guys are getting along with whatever. And he's like, um, he's like, oh, please excuse us to the wife, right?
[00:28:10] Me and was she still hopping on one leg and not hooting like our anger tang. Still didn't get ordered to stop that.
[00:28:16] So I, he's like, hey, can you excuse us? You think she'd be like, okay, thanks.
[00:28:19] So walk out. She hops out. Still doing the ring a tang thing. You seem saying.
[00:28:23] She didn't get ordered to stop. Same thing.
[00:28:26] Even though it'd be kind of common knowledge, but she was trained her whole life to follow his orders.
[00:28:31] Same thing. Same thing. It's interesting that that scene from that movie from 1984 or 86.
[00:28:39] So whatever. Has just been floating around in your brain.
[00:28:43] Wait, negate grab the arm to find a poor warmth.
[00:28:46] I'm spra- I'm telling you.
[00:28:47] And the London Imperial volunteers. Yes, same thing.
[00:28:51] Well, their creativity versus the Gordon's who are just hopping on one leg and hooting like our anger tangs.
[00:28:58] Or what happens? Because they weren't ordered. Well, the point there is these concepts are everywhere.
[00:29:04] You got to watch out. Yeah, same same. So I'm with you.
[00:29:08] Be careful. The lap just like was that Eddie Murphy's character or our senior halls character.
[00:29:15] In that scene? Yes. Eddie Murphy.
[00:29:17] Just like Eddie Murphy didn't want someone that lacked creativity.
[00:29:22] You as a leader do not want people that just are going to follow orders.
[00:29:26] Yeah. I know it's hard to understand that. But it's true.
[00:29:31] Yeah, after watching that movie, I understand it's more clear for sure.
[00:29:35] But that's well, was part of the point though of the movie.
[00:29:38] Literally your analogy is proved by all authorities.
[00:29:42] It's impressive.
[00:29:44] It's...
[00:29:46] Continuing on.
[00:29:48] The agile infantry of 19...
[00:29:51] The agile infantryman of 1901 who ran and crawled across the battlefield relatively unencumbered
[00:29:58] by bulky equipment and directed primarily by whistles was in marked contrast to the 1893 image of the professional soldier,
[00:30:06] which still pervaded many of the regulations.
[00:30:10] So by 1901 they had advanced. They were moving. They were... they were traveling lighter.
[00:30:16] Advanced is where now made under the cover of rolling barrage.
[00:30:21] And what is that? That's when you're launching artillery at people.
[00:30:24] So the enemy gets their head down and that's how you're going to move.
[00:30:26] That's cover move.
[00:30:27] First demonstrated at the Battle of Peter's Hill.
[00:30:30] Early, earlier methods that depended on accurate low angle of fire of shrapnel and high explosives on enemy positions proved ineffective.
[00:30:38] The avoidance of independent, a frontal attacks wherever possible became matter of universal consensus.
[00:30:45] As presented in infantry drill.
[00:30:48] So they have by...
[00:30:50] The end of the war realized frontal attacks no good.
[00:30:54] Psychological preparation for the bayonet assault went far beyond the military training and was reflected in numerous contemporary accounts and drawings.
[00:31:03] That such occurrences were rare was of little relevance.
[00:31:07] Interesting that the boor is claimed contempt for cold steel as no position or peace of terrain seemed worth dying for.
[00:31:16] Europeans used to fighting in far more restricted areas under strict discipline,
[00:31:21] what on occasion stand in the defend position to the death.
[00:31:25] So this is the weird thing that they... they kept...
[00:31:30] They kind of kept this idea behind the bayonets and the cold steel.
[00:31:35] So there's an American journalist named Julian Raoff and he had this little quote.
[00:31:40] We have learned that even British vowler displayed by a number of men equal to the foe is of no conclusive value under the new condition.
[00:31:50] And that if all modern armies could entrench themselves and then and could then compel their enemies to meet them in frontal attack war would be abandoned as soon as possible.
[00:32:04] Our sorry would be abandoned as impossible.
[00:32:07] What he's saying there is if you could get in an entrench position and get your enemy to attack you,
[00:32:13] war would be abandoned because it would seem impossible.
[00:32:16] You're not going to be able to take out these positions not against and what's crazy.
[00:32:21] This is what world war one is.
[00:32:24] Entrench positions attack. It doesn't work.
[00:32:26] A trench position attack doesn't work. Doesn't work.
[00:32:29] And this guy, this American journalist is saying this.
[00:32:33] And in 1902.
[00:32:38] Previously the British were hesitant to adopt field entrenchments despite numerous contemporary experiences to the contrary.
[00:32:45] They feared that a defensive psychology bred by reliance on field works and by field works.
[00:32:50] They mean trenches and ditches and foxholes did not bold well for a victorious army.
[00:32:55] Like that's a negative attitude.
[00:32:58] That's pattern right.
[00:33:00] Digging in. That means we're defending. We're not defending. We're going on offense.
[00:33:05] Bullards famous prewar jack in the box memorandum.
[00:33:09] And which I look for. I couldn't find it.
[00:33:11] It's perhaps the most indicative of the English way of war.
[00:33:14] Battles he felt could not be won by officers or men who ducked in action.
[00:33:20] Think about that.
[00:33:21] That's when you're telling your MMA fighter, hey bro.
[00:33:24] Don't you need to just go out there and throw punches.
[00:33:27] And if you get hit, that's part of it. That's how you win because you're a man.
[00:33:32] Don't you don't need to move you don't know. Don't worry about head movement.
[00:33:37] Prewar army regulations recognize two types of entrenchments.
[00:33:45] The half hour and the one hour type, both of which were earth embankments and the one hour.
[00:33:52] At what the one and a half feet high differing in width. So the only the only had the most you're going to dig it is half an hour.
[00:33:59] You can't dig an effective fox hole in a half an hour. It's not happening.
[00:34:04] The British infantrymen did not even carry a shovel and was a custom's perregulations to native laborers or engineering building any necessary entrenchments.
[00:34:14] The final proof of this change in doctrine was the issuance of shovels to two thirds of the infantry and light picks to the remainder by 19.
[00:34:21] So by 1903, they realize you know what? We got to give two thirds of these guys shoveling.
[00:34:25] The others guys are going to pick axes.
[00:34:29] Entrenching tools.
[00:34:32] It is ironic how many of the war's lessons for infantry could have been learned during peacetime.
[00:34:37] Be they the value of well constructed entrenchments or light and combat loads.
[00:34:43] The enhanced difficulty of reconnaissance or the new dangers of the fires own.
[00:34:47] The misplaced faith in the firing line is self sufficient protection at long ranges or the essential nature of the turning movement in combination with all frontal attacks.
[00:34:59] If they would have trained that saying if they would have trained harder, they would have been able to figure a lot of this stuff out.
[00:35:09] Now as they looked at this, it's a quote here, the bulk of the British officers preferred to believe that failure was due to a lack of training and discipline.
[00:35:21] So we start to get back. We start to head back in the wrong direction that saying hey look if our guys would have been more disciplined.
[00:35:27] Then they could have they could have done better.
[00:35:31] We're not quite so 100% sure about that.
[00:35:39] It's the idea of you know what a jiu-jitsu move isn't working.
[00:35:43] Like if I'm showing you a foot walk and you're saying hey the guy you know the guy's not tapping.
[00:35:51] And I look at your foot walk and I say do it harder.
[00:35:55] That's my recommendation.
[00:35:57] Yeah. Same deal.
[00:36:01] This is not good.
[00:36:01] Yeah.
[00:36:01] Go harder is not an effective way of correcting something that isn't working.
[00:36:09] I have I run this with businesses business.
[00:36:11] We'll show me their strategy that they're using their marketing plan, their growth plan or whatever.
[00:36:15] It's not working.
[00:36:17] And I say well so what are you going to do now?
[00:36:20] Well we're going to do it. We're going to put more money into it.
[00:36:23] We're going to do it.
[00:36:23] We're going to do it harder.
[00:36:27] Sometimes you need to overwhelming force.
[00:36:29] But sometimes you've got to look at that and say wait we really haven't gotten anywhere.
[00:36:33] And now we're just going to go harder.
[00:36:35] Poor more assets into this.
[00:36:37] Squeeze harder on the foot.
[00:36:39] How hard should you have to squeeze on the foot for it to work.
[00:36:41] There's a different mistake that you're making.
[00:36:43] Let's figure out what that is.
[00:36:45] Yes.
[00:36:45] When is the time to go harder maybe when it's kind of working?
[00:36:49] Yeah.
[00:36:49] That's why I'm saying what are you getting?
[00:36:51] If you're putting a foot lock on me and I'm not barely even reacting to it,
[00:36:55] we're judging that as ineffective.
[00:36:59] Yeah.
[00:36:59] And you start to squeeze hard maybe I feel a little bit but I'm barely still not even reacting.
[00:37:05] If you see me start to react.
[00:37:07] Yeah.
[00:37:07] What do you always say when you get some little moment of beauty with me?
[00:37:11] Mm-hmm.
[00:37:12] You always go sense of earth's sense of earth's sense of earth's.
[00:37:15] So if you see a sense of urgency you think oh okay.
[00:37:18] Maybe I could go a little bit harder to make that make something happen there.
[00:37:20] Yeah.
[00:37:21] Then it does feel like it depends kind of on how hard you're going to begin with.
[00:37:25] Because if you're maxing out and I sense a slight sense of urgency, I'm like man.
[00:37:31] Yeah.
[00:37:32] If I go harder that might not be you know might be diminishing returns on that one.
[00:37:36] So it's like so yes.
[00:37:38] Because you're contrast your output with your ROI and see if you should just go harder.
[00:37:46] Sometimes it's face it Brad just go harder and it'll work you know.
[00:37:50] Yeah.
[00:37:51] Sometimes it does.
[00:37:53] But there's probably a mistake that you're making.
[00:37:56] Right.
[00:37:57] Most you get to moves you shouldn't have to you shouldn't have to you shouldn't get tired doing a
[00:38:02] Gigi to submission.
[00:38:04] Yeah.
[00:38:05] Right.
[00:38:06] I mean occasionally you like maybe some weird choke that your grip is getting tired.
[00:38:11] Yeah.
[00:38:12] And then you're going to be doing a competition where you're kind of like maybe like you're focusing too hard on conservation or something like this.
[00:38:17] And this guy's kind of picking up the pace on you and it's a competition so it's like you know a different environment.
[00:38:23] You know in a way.
[00:38:24] And then yeah, so maybe go a little bit harder.
[00:38:27] Even then it's like man you could you could think your way through that you know unless you're admittedly admittedly being lazy.
[00:38:35] Then you could you go harder.
[00:38:37] At least a little bit.
[00:38:39] When you're going to go harder you have to make sure that the direction that you're going is going to be fruitful.
[00:38:46] Yeah.
[00:38:47] You ever when you're training like you get like let's say someone's on.
[00:38:55] Sure.
[00:38:56] You know what you know you know I do this to kind of Greg train sure.
[00:39:01] They kill get a good.
[00:39:03] He put a bow and arrow choke on me.
[00:39:07] And I mean it was legit like he and I had you know I had like a little bit of his ghee and a little bit of my ghee.
[00:39:14] Yeah.
[00:39:15] And I just sat there and you know he went and we were already doing like six minute rounds.
[00:39:21] Yeah.
[00:39:21] And he got it pretty quick.
[00:39:23] You know he got it within let's say probably within two or three minutes.
[00:39:28] So he had three or four minutes of me.
[00:39:32] Yeah.
[00:39:37] And I just kind of had the you know bit down and kind of flexed my neck and I'm holding his ghee and my ghee.
[00:39:41] And I had I had pretty good grips on both.
[00:39:44] You know what I mean like you know you happen to get like the you have I happen to get a good grip and Greg train admittedly is smaller than me as well.
[00:39:52] But he went hard and harder for four minutes.
[00:39:57] And let's face it. What is the drop dead time for a bone arrow choke to work like at what point you say hey it's been 45 seconds.
[00:40:08] Yeah.
[00:40:09] And this guy did not tap and I put my knee in his back and I've arched hard and I pulled hard and this guy didn't tap.
[00:40:15] The rest of probably from 45 seconds on is a waste of energy.
[00:40:21] Yes.
[00:40:22] Especially if you're pull if you're if you're maxed out.
[00:40:25] And the energy is to pull you know like that's it right there.
[00:40:28] I mean that's not counting like you know because you can make adjustments and they could take like a good three minutes sometimes.
[00:40:33] When you're like let me adjust here try okay I didn't worry.
[00:40:36] He had entered the submission attempt.
[00:40:39] Yeah.
[00:40:39] There's no longer setting up.
[00:40:40] He had entered this submission.
[00:40:42] This was to make me tap.
[00:40:44] Yeah.
[00:40:45] Yeah.
[00:40:45] And I just sat there and so anyways.
[00:40:48] I can't remember if he held on till the round ended. I don't think he did. I think you know with 30 seconds left he let go and we you know but he was just done after that.
[00:40:59] He was so gasped.
[00:41:01] He was gasped like he just did of 20 minute metcon.
[00:41:06] Check your ROI.
[00:41:10] Whatever. I can't help but kind of relate to him a little bit because you get into that position where the men the submissions in on jocco shoot.
[00:41:17] You think I'm going to risk adjusting or a.
[00:41:21] We're just standing in a youth no.
[00:41:23] No, no, no, no, no.
[00:41:24] I'm going for straight up.
[00:41:26] I'm be lining for that submission.
[00:41:28] You're just going to maintain do or die.
[00:41:30] But seriously, you get me in a bone arrow choke and there's been 45 seconds.
[00:41:36] Yeah.
[00:41:37] Think about how long 45 seconds this.
[00:41:39] Yeah. That's a long time.
[00:41:41] Yeah.
[00:41:41] And it doesn't work. You're going to keep pulling.
[00:41:44] No.
[00:41:45] You're not at all. You're not at job.
[00:41:47] But I am saying that I can relate.
[00:41:49] Yeah.
[00:41:49] With the attitude for sure.
[00:41:51] Well, I wonder did he see you did you see that you had that grip?
[00:41:55] Yeah.
[00:41:56] Yeah. So a lot of times, yeah, after the 45 seconds you're like,
[00:41:59] Brother, grip is jamming me up.
[00:42:00] So that's the issue.
[00:42:01] The issues in my choke.
[00:42:02] It's that grip right there.
[00:42:03] How good of a job.
[00:42:05] Did I do?
[00:42:06] Of giving him a false sense of hope.
[00:42:10] Right.
[00:42:11] Like how much did I go?
[00:42:13] Yeah.
[00:42:15] Right.
[00:42:15] How much did I give that to him?
[00:42:17] Where he's thinking it must be close.
[00:42:19] Yeah.
[00:42:20] No, that's, yeah.
[00:42:22] That's such an interesting strategy.
[00:42:24] I do that with the plane just laughs.
[00:42:26] Yeah.
[00:42:27] No, that I'm mine.
[00:42:28] Yeah.
[00:42:28] Well, sometimes when you do it, it's like you have a ton of condescending.
[00:42:32] Yeah.
[00:42:33] I do it to you.
[00:42:34] I absolutely will have a ton of condescending.
[00:42:36] I'm just saying your move is ineffective.
[00:42:39] Yeah.
[00:42:40] I was like,
[00:42:41] You know, and you know, and you know,
[00:42:43] You know,
[00:42:46] That's my, it's my torment.
[00:42:48] Version.
[00:42:49] Back to the book.
[00:42:52] There was, this is fast forward.
[00:42:54] There was, however, one aspect of British passification policy that did cast,
[00:42:59] lasting disgrace upon their methods, the concentration camps.
[00:43:02] The military gave three pretexts for their existence.
[00:43:05] First, they were meant to protect the isolated,
[00:43:07] Blue or families who's met a gone off to fight second.
[00:43:10] They were meant to separate the commandos from the supplies and intelligence that their families could provide.
[00:43:15] And third, it was claimed that the subsequent isolation would force the burgers to surrender.
[00:43:21] 28,000 whites and 14,000 Africans died in these camps of various diseases.
[00:43:27] The reasons for this disaster were many.
[00:43:32] Again, modern war.
[00:43:34] This is our first real look at concentration camps.
[00:43:39] And you know,
[00:43:41] I, I don't know, I don't know what the intent is.
[00:43:45] And we'll have to study more to find out the intent.
[00:43:50] I could see both sides.
[00:43:52] I could see the intent of being those things that they talk about.
[00:43:55] Hey, we wanted to protect them.
[00:43:56] We wanted to keep their supply lies separate.
[00:43:58] Like I could see that as the intent.
[00:44:01] I could also see the intent as we've been here for two and a half years.
[00:44:06] And we're not winning.
[00:44:07] And we're going to break that or wheel to fight by by killing them, by putting these camps and making the lives miserable for their families.
[00:44:17] That's, I mean, that's, I don't know what 27 movies you're about to bring up.
[00:44:24] But you know, the move, where the movie is like, hey, you know, the cops ready to, ready to, you know, do something to the bad guy.
[00:44:30] And then they pull up in the car and there's the, there's the cops kid, right?
[00:44:34] Like they, they go to the family.
[00:44:36] Right. And that's what breaks the guy.
[00:44:38] That's what makes him have to comply.
[00:44:40] So it seems like maybe,
[00:44:43] and again, I don't have the research on this, but I could see it being either way.
[00:44:46] That the, the, the, the, the public facing, hey, we're just trying to protect them.
[00:44:52] But behind the scenes, guess what, we're going to, we're going to take their families.
[00:44:56] And see how much they want to fight once we've got their families.
[00:44:59] And that is jacked up and they admitted that that's why they kind of broke.
[00:45:04] So one of the major reasons why they broke.
[00:45:07] True lies.
[00:45:09] True lies.
[00:45:10] One of them, you know, do that.
[00:45:12] Um, Arnold, I'll just go to the, they have Jamie Lee Curtis in the end.
[00:45:16] What do they do?
[00:45:17] No, they took the daughter.
[00:45:18] Oh, isn't it one of the lethal weapon movies, too?
[00:45:22] Yep.
[00:45:23] Yep.
[00:45:24] See, this is a common theme.
[00:45:25] And brother, that's how. Yeah, that's a good move. Really? When you think about it, it's a good move.
[00:45:29] Yeah.
[00:45:30] It's effective.
[00:45:31] You get that. So that's what I'm saying. People call, you know what?
[00:45:33] This is a good move.
[00:45:34] We're going to get their families.
[00:45:36] And it's, and, and it's messed up.
[00:45:38] Even if they're intent wasn't to let them die and starve and dive disease,
[00:45:42] even if they're intent wasn't to we just have your family.
[00:45:44] Yeah.
[00:45:45] That's just jacked up, and it's all right.
[00:45:46] The leverage.
[00:45:47] You know,
[00:45:48] Mailbrew prisoners of war generally fared better than their family,
[00:45:52] since the army had at least some experience in this area
[00:45:55] and was aiming at reconciliation.
[00:45:58] So, you got soldiers that go into prison of war,
[00:46:01] at least they understand how to soldier,
[00:46:03] at least they understand how to, at least they understand how to,
[00:46:05] you know, clean and, and, and, and, and,
[00:46:08] stay disease free.
[00:46:10] Where's the families had no idea?
[00:46:12] By May 1902, after two and a half years of fighting,
[00:46:17] the cost and morale, physical and monetary terms had made it to the same place.
[00:46:21] The military terms had made itself felt on both sides,
[00:46:24] the guerilla war had inflicted more than twice the casualties of the conventional phase on both sides.
[00:46:30] A Trishin became the critical factor,
[00:46:33] the deliberate destruction of 30,000 farms.
[00:46:37] Hundreds of square miles of farmland, three, or, sorry,
[00:46:41] 6.3 million sheep filled Britain with a sense of guilt.
[00:46:47] The leader of the opposition was moved to question the supposed methods of
[00:46:50] barbarism in parliament,
[00:46:52] stripping the country had only hardened the booze reserve.
[00:46:56] Concentration camps proved both expensive and debilitating on the British's will to win.
[00:47:02] So, you know, this is sort of like a Vietnam situation
[00:47:07] where the people back in America are looking at what's going on in Vietnam
[00:47:11] and seeing it as a nightmare.
[00:47:14] And that's sort of what they're saying here,
[00:47:16] that the British are seeing what's happening or hearing about what's happening.
[00:47:19] And they're starting to have a sense of guilt about it.
[00:47:24] Not even the vast wealth of Britain could sustain the seemingly endless struggle in South Africa
[00:47:30] in the face of increasingly uneasy, domestic and hostile international opinion.
[00:47:35] So, you also got the world looking at it, what do you guys do in down there?
[00:47:39] You got the women and children dying in concentration camps?
[00:47:43] We're not okay with that.
[00:47:47] The cumulative effect of these various factors was to soften the terms
[00:47:51] ultimately offered to an accepted by the booze in May of 1902,
[00:47:55] the reasons given for their surrender included the devastation of country,
[00:47:58] fear of those in concentration camps,
[00:48:00] and increasingly hostile native population lost in property
[00:48:04] and an inability to keep British prisoners.
[00:48:08] From the British perspective, these were more psychological than military causes for victory.
[00:48:14] As late as since I'll think about that,
[00:48:17] and we've covered that multiple military strategy taxes.
[00:48:21] Like you break the will of the people.
[00:48:23] It's not a, hey, we beat you on the battlefield here, there or wherever,
[00:48:26] but when you break their will psychologically,
[00:48:31] that's how you're going to win.
[00:48:32] And that's exactly what happened here.
[00:48:34] As late as December 25, 1901,
[00:48:37] the times of London still spoke of large areas of South Africa,
[00:48:40] where columns of less than 600 men could be overwhelmed.
[00:48:44] Over 21,000 booers now laid down their arms to the British,
[00:48:48] a force equal numbers to that with which they started the war.
[00:48:51] Of the 24,000 booers who died in the war,
[00:48:54] only 4,000 could properly be judged as dying in combat.
[00:48:58] The remaining 20,000 consisted primarily of women and children victims of the camps.
[00:49:06] The British lost 22,000 men, two thirds of whom died from disease.
[00:49:12] In the end, superior numbers of wealth and will to power had won out in conjunction with a radically reformed approach to modern warfare.
[00:49:22] And, again, this is a modern war where, you know, you've got civilians dying.
[00:49:33] It's a freaking nightmare. And you also have the big Imperial power with all the strength and all the people and all the supplies.
[00:49:45] You know, kind of coming to a draw with a bunch of peasants, with farmers, with untrained gorillas.
[00:49:58] You know, like we're going to see, well, like we're going to see in Vietnam, like we're going to see in Afghanistan, like we're going to see in Iraq.
[00:50:05] Hmm.
[00:50:12] The last section really gets into how this, how those things that were learned are put into play.
[00:50:22] And they talk about Robert's here and and what his emphasis was on administration and communication.
[00:50:30] And they actually started bringing naval officers in to help because naval officers had a good reputation for being, you know, good at communication, good at administration.
[00:50:41] You know, that the navy, the navy is a very logistically heavy organization. You've got ships at sea.
[00:50:54] They have to be fueled. You have sailors on board that need to be fed. There's a administrative part of it that is incredibly challenging.
[00:51:02] And you got to do all this while you're on the ocean.
[00:51:05] So they're good at that. The navy is very good at that.
[00:51:08] Robert's also eliminated outdated exams and encouraged personal evaluation of senior officers in order to get people advanced. So that was solid.
[00:51:20] Greater importance was placed on field work during the increasing numbers of maneuvers held in the decade after the war.
[00:51:26] So after the war they're looking around on, we better train. We better fix the way we're training and we better fix who we're putting into these good positions.
[00:51:34] These officers are positions who we put in there.
[00:51:41] It was claimed that of the 40,000 dead are wounded suffered by both sides in the war. Only 50 were a result of the sword or the lance.
[00:51:53] In the light of the Dickinson's committees finding that a more prominent position must be given to the training of cavalry soldier in the use of the fire weapon.
[00:52:02] The carbine despite its greater lighter weight gave way to the longer ranged Lee and Field Short rifle. The British thus became the only rifle armed cavalry in Europe in 1914.
[00:52:15] The survival of the sword as a secondary weapon. So they kept the sword on hand.
[00:52:23] Listen to this. You know that term stick in the mud. Yeah. Like all that guy's a stick in the mud. Doesn't want to change. No, it doesn't want to change. Hey, he's hey we're doing this new. We're going to start working, you know, go go plot it.
[00:52:35] I like to stick with the old stuff. You know what I mean? Like stick in the mud. They don't want to change.
[00:52:39] Holy cow, I thought that meant useless like this whole time. Oh, no. Just stick in the mud.
[00:52:44] Yeah, stick in the mud.
[00:52:46] I mean, you don't want to change. The survival of the sword as a secondary weapon was a testament to its original pervasiveness and the disinclamation to waste all the material and training previously invested.
[00:53:01] So they also have what's that bias called Mr. Bias.
[00:53:04] You invested a lot into what is it lost investment bias. Oh, sunk cost fallacy. So here we go. They invest. They bottle these swords and then they trained all these people and how to use the swords. They're like, hey, we bottom we train people. We're going to stick with them.
[00:53:19] It was claimed that the lands interfered with a very cavalry function saved the charge for it in combat dismounting firing concealment.
[00:53:26] Regardless inferior to the sword and protracted maylaes and difficult to master when little time or money could be spared for a third weapon. The lands was consigned to the dustbin of history.
[00:53:37] Maintenance of the sword on the other hand rested upon tradition.
[00:53:41] It's cheapness as compared to a pistol and the fact that it was always loaded.
[00:53:46] Like I can I can I can put myself in the room to the military group that's sitting around talking of discussing should we get pistols or should we give swords and someone's someone's in the back.
[00:53:58] You know, some old school guys in the back saying, what are you going to give these another gun they already have a gun.
[00:54:03] What happens if they run out of bullets? You know what happens if they need to take time to load that thing your sword is always loaded.
[00:54:10] You know, and it's hey, well, you can't really argue with that and they're old man in the back wins and we keep keep keep making swords and keep training people in the swords.
[00:54:18] So I thought that that was interesting.
[00:54:23] I don't know, so I have a section here saying it in snow fog and dusk or dawn that they still thought that the sword could win battles.
[00:54:31] How big is that sword?
[00:54:32] I don't know probably just the normal length you think a sword to be like, you know, four three or four feet.
[00:54:38] Yeah, I don't know, seems big.
[00:54:40] I have a navy sword.
[00:54:42] Seems cumbersome. It's ceremonial.
[00:54:44] Yeah, you know, can carry it around though.
[00:54:46] Right.
[00:54:47] I did not carry my sword and come back.
[00:54:50] Yeah.
[00:54:52] The return to more traditional cavalry tactics was fraught with difficulties.
[00:54:57] Years of training led to broad front of the tax to avoid concentric fire, concentric fire, meaning we're surrounding the area.
[00:55:03] And we're starting to have blue on blue situations taking place. By 1911, it was clear that the reactionaries had won the day in the matter of cavalry tactics.
[00:55:12] Other armies constructed conscript infantry. It was bleed could never stand to charge. That's an arrogant statement.
[00:55:19] Hey, look, we will continue to do these mounted charges because of bunch of conscripts, drafties.
[00:55:27] They're not going to withstand the charge.
[00:55:29] You can hear the brish talking about no one would be able to withstand one of our charges at bunch of conscripts.
[00:55:37] Further more faith was placed in tactical imponderables, such as ammunition giving out, or that some local condition would lead to surprise or a major battlefield role, despite evidence to the contrary, provided by the blue or war.
[00:55:52] So they would still talk. I've been in so many of these conversations as things started new tactics come out.
[00:56:03] I've been in so many of these conversations because I was in training for a long time.
[00:56:08] I mean, I was in training as a young, enlisted seal for, I don't know, a couple years.
[00:56:15] I was at training cell at CELT1, which was a good crew of guys. Master Chief faculty was in charge. It was just legit.
[00:56:26] But you know, we had all these little discussions. It's a new tactic or whatever.
[00:56:30] And then once a war started, it was on because now we had to make sure we figured out our tactics and make them right.
[00:56:36] And there is always, you know, people with different opinions.
[00:56:41] I'll tell you what, I used to sit. I probably pulled so much leadership understanding from sitting in those meetings and not saying anything to see in two people dig in and getting a fight over.
[00:56:52] Should you do this or should you do that?
[00:56:54] I could, that's why these, as I hear these things being talked about, I can, I can picture it.
[00:57:00] You know, I can picture someone saying, there's no way I can understand a charge from all cavalry unit.
[00:57:06] It's impossible to think because you do think that. You know, you know what else this happens?
[00:57:12] You ever, like, I'll, like, I'll train fighters.
[00:57:16] And you think there's no way that this could ever happen.
[00:57:20] And sure enough, it happens because it's a fight.
[00:57:27] Yeah. Anything can happen in a fight.
[00:57:29] Yeah. We're wild. The, you know, how like when someone does like a self defense demonstration.
[00:57:38] It's like, sure, okay, someone's holding your neck here and you hit them to the rib cage and that'll bring their hands down here, right?
[00:57:45] So it like their whole instruction or demonstration kind of relies upon the enemy to react or not withstand certain charges that you're throwing at them, you know?
[00:57:56] And so, and then you compare it to like a real fighter, whatever, like everyone's all, yeah, like you'll get a guy in his,
[00:58:03] liver and his hands will come all the way down here, recoil in this like way, whatever, but yeah, everyone's in a wild, but proud, partly ever really when you consider how many punches and kicks are thrown to the, to the ribs, you know, totally.
[00:58:14] It's just like, proud. That's not going to happen. And here's what's even worse than that.
[00:58:18] When I say to you, hey, you, when you grab me by the neck and I punch you in the ribs,
[00:58:25] your grip is going to get loose for a second.
[00:58:29] And then you say, well, it might not. And I go, okay, hold my neck and then I just punch you in the ribs.
[00:58:37] And you know, because we're not in a fight, we're just kind of standing there and I catch you off guard and punch you with your ribs, you know, I give you a nice body shot.
[00:58:47] Yeah, your hands get a little loose, but you're not trying to kill me at that moment.
[00:58:52] You're, you weren't even ready for it. And so therefore I reinforce the idea.
[00:58:57] It's like if the in this situation, if I said, okay, I'll tell you what mate, I'll tell you what, why don't you go down there and stand with your troops?
[00:59:04] And I'm just going to charge it to you and see who can stand there. It's like, no, I'm going to stand there.
[00:59:10] Yeah, I remember my wife's brother one time. I don't know if he was just openly refuting the effectiveness of jujitsu or what, but he was like, he'd like basically like I just do pressure points on you.
[00:59:25] Oh, yeah, so.
[00:59:26] But not the kind of I'm going to hit you in a personal way.
[00:59:29] I'm going to put my finger on you and then give him a mock.
[00:59:32] Yeah, you know, all these things. And then so you kind of think like first off, like you kind of consider it for a second.
[00:59:39] You know, like man, what if he does really put it, the pressure point on me or whatever, and I'm thinking, okay, all the times I've been training and competing or whatever, like what if someone put a pressure point on me, like during jujitsu?
[00:59:49] I don't think I would ever, I don't think you'd even feel it in a competition. That's what I'm thinking, right?
[00:59:54] I was like, even the most, I mean, really what's a pressure point?
[00:59:58] I want behind your ear, you know, your jaw and like these other he did one like by my neck.
[01:00:02] Yeah, and I'm like, interesting. So I was like, okay.
[01:00:06] And I realized like, yeah, Brad, you won't feel pressure points when you're for real fighting.
[01:00:11] So I was like, all right, even when you're just training like, Brad, you're not going to feel that.
[01:00:14] So I was like, I do it. And I just, I was like, okay, like, we're kind of fighting just in my mind.
[01:00:19] I wasn't getting fired up outwardly or nothing. And did it. I was like, oh, pressure point and Brad, all you have to do is be like, okay, this pressure point is dumb.
[01:00:27] And then when he puts it on, you don't feel it.
[01:00:30] But put it this way. Like if I'm just cruising next to you or something, even like you and I start like digging into the back of your ear, you're going to be like, oh, it's just going to make you move.
[01:00:39] Just because it's like, Brad, your mind's not like, oh, that thing right now.
[01:00:43] I had a guy. This was, this was, I might have been trained in GJ to like,
[01:00:48] maybe six months.
[01:00:52] And I had to remember this term, traditional martial artists.
[01:00:56] Yeah, to you, man.
[01:00:57] Oh, I forgot about the, I thought about the abbreviation. So I had a traditional martial artist who is talking me about, well, you know, I pressure point this and you know, this is Bob, Bob, Bob.
[01:01:08] And of course, bro, you think I'm fired up for GJ to now.
[01:01:12] You're going to see me out fired up. I was for GJ to when I had been training for six months.
[01:01:17] I mean, I was ready to rock and roll at any time.
[01:01:21] And so this guy, who, he was a seal too. And, you know, you know, you know, you had like the whole thing going on, the whole kind of, you know, mystical sort of vibe, you know, talking about how well.
[01:01:39] And you know what I'm saying, I have no mystical vibe whatsoever.
[01:01:43] I'm like, let's fight.
[01:01:44] Yeah, that doesn't. Let's fight.
[01:01:46] And we actually, in this particular situation, we were, I had mats because as soon as I started training, I got mats. So I had mats, three feet outside of my office in the day.
[01:01:59] And where I was working at the time.
[01:02:02] So, you know, he starts talking to some like, hey, let's fight.
[01:02:05] Okay, so cool.
[01:02:07] And I think I actually started in the bottom on the bottom. And he tried to pressure point my neck, you know, my neck and I arm lock the shit out of him.
[01:02:20] You know, just, you know, he's in my guard. He's giving me, you can't give, you can't deliver anyone a more beautiful arm lock than holding your arm straight on their neck and trying to dig your thumb into their trachea or whatever whatever the pressure point is.
[01:02:36] Yeah.
[01:02:37] And of course, I was like, wow.
[01:02:40] You know, I made like a face like it, like I cared and then just slapped the psycho arm lock on.
[01:02:46] And yeah, that was my, the end of my belief in pressure points.
[01:02:51] Yeah.
[01:02:52] You know, there'd always be guys that would have some of the prisoner handling techniques would be what they call it. They called it pain compliance.
[01:03:01] Oh, yeah, you do this like under your nose, but you know, above your lip and above under your nose, just like, oh, you'll make you, but man, if you're at all fired up to use your term, you can just grit through that, you know, and it's different because if you have, because they used to use that if you want to choke someone you put your finger in a nose and you can lift their chin.
[01:03:22] Yeah.
[01:03:23] Try that to somebody that's angry.
[01:03:24] Yeah.
[01:03:25] No, what you have to do is, and what's what's lame is all you have to do is actually just choke their face. You just put a rear naked choke on their face and then it'll open up and you'll crush their jaw and it's all nasty and it hurts. That's pain compliance.
[01:03:38] Yeah.
[01:03:39] And so yeah, and when you kind of think about it because like you're right, like, okay, so doing that, the nose thing like when you want to lift your head.
[01:03:45] Did you ever learn that?
[01:03:46] Oh, yeah, I did that.
[01:03:47] Did you learn that in your jitz?
[01:03:48] Yeah.
[01:03:49] And it, it does work in jitz and training.
[01:03:52] Yeah.
[01:03:53] It can work in competition too, but you're, you make a good point when you try to do it to someone who's mad.
[01:03:58] Yeah.
[01:03:59] Usually even in competition, people aren't mad.
[01:04:01] Yeah.
[01:04:01] It's like, it's like sport.
[01:04:03] Like it even feels like a sport, especially the more you train. Like in the beginning it kind of feels like a little fight because you're like, whatever, but in training, it'll work because you're not, you know, and it's mad.
[01:04:13] It's like, oh, without that, like that's more pain than this whole role has presented.
[01:04:17] So like your head just kind of naturally does it, but if you're mad or if you're ready for it,
[01:04:22] like if someone's like, oh, I know this guy always does this.
[01:04:25] And you don't let it affect you.
[01:04:26] It won't affect you.
[01:04:27] Here's what's really jacked up.
[01:04:29] It, you know, you and I both pretty much agree that it doesn't work if you're mad.
[01:04:34] Yeah.
[01:04:35] It wouldn't happen to you.
[01:04:36] You give him your father.
[01:04:37] So it works even less.
[01:04:39] You're just messing.
[01:04:40] Yeah.
[01:04:41] Yeah.
[01:04:42] I can see that little, little sequence for sure.
[01:04:44] Mm.
[01:04:47] Continuing forward.
[01:04:49] Vali Fire was obsolete as a skirmishing infantry or now limited to using it only as ranging techniques,
[01:04:56] reconnaissance observation dispersion and above all marksman ship or now stressed.
[01:05:01] So this is still right after the war.
[01:05:04] Roberts, the ever proponent of marksman ship eliminated the old bulls eye and replaced it with modern
[01:05:11] smaller moving and disappearing head and shoulder targets that appeared at unknown ranges and
[01:05:16] forced the men to judge distance for themselves.
[01:05:18] By 1907, the qualification involved 180 shots over half of which were at range of between
[01:05:25] 300 and 600 yards.
[01:05:28] So that's awesome.
[01:05:30] That's that's an incredible improvement to go from shooting bulls eyes.
[01:05:35] And you know, I always heard that this came in America after World War I that that's when they started
[01:05:43] shooting.
[01:05:44] So man, save silhouette targets and moving targets, but here you go.
[01:05:48] This is pre World War I.
[01:05:53] Had the British responded to increasing fire power by a recourse to harsher discipline and a ready
[01:05:58] acceptance of higher losses as did some of their continental brethren, they would no doubt
[01:06:03] of evolved a different set of principles.
[01:06:05] So.
[01:06:06] So the British instead of responding to increasing fire power by harsher discipline because you know what I could say as a leader is.
[01:06:13] Hey, when the machine gun shoots, we need to go and when it doesn't work, we go harder and it's still not going to work.
[01:06:21] That's what some of the continental did.
[01:06:24] So as it was, they preferred to recast their system into a more intelligent less mechanical
[01:06:31] surgery following Robert's dictates first proclaimed in November of 1900.
[01:06:37] The British solution was a reasoned response to the realization in South Africa that officers could no longer be heard and dare not be conspicuous.
[01:06:47] This is just such an important aspect.
[01:06:50] Every aspect of modern warfare emphasized the individual.
[01:06:55] Dispergent, which means spreading out independent fire, which means pit selecting your own targets, use of cover, which is sacred.
[01:07:05] Iner minute rushes, which means we're going to go whenever we feel like it's the right time to go, not just when everyone tells us to go, not just when we're ordered to go.
[01:07:13] And the sheer scale and intensity of the battle, the greater psychological isolation on the battlefield had to be overcome.
[01:07:20] So that the loss of five men and 25 advancing over 250 yards would hardly stop and advance while it was known that 50 out of 250 would.
[01:07:28] So this is just this this whole little paragraph is is so important to understand that the British had learned lessons and had actually come up with an effective way of fighting in a modern way.
[01:07:48] An indication the new British attitude was the substitution of infantry training for infantry drill in the 1902 manual, the combined training manual which applied to all ranks addressed this issue directly.
[01:08:02] Success in war.
[01:08:04] And here it is, success in war cannot be expected unless all ranks have been trained in peace to use their wits.
[01:08:13] We want people to think. Generals in commanding officers are therefore not only to encourage their subordinates in doing so by affording them constant opportunities of acting on their own responsibility.
[01:08:28] They will also check all practices.
[01:08:31] So that means stop all practices which interfere with the free exercise of judgment and will break down by every means in their power, the paralyzing habit of
[01:08:42] an un-reasoning and mechanical adherence to the letter of orders and to retain when acting under service conditions.
[01:08:50] And you believe that's that's what we talk about all the time. That's what we talk about on time at Slamfront. That's what decentralized command is.
[01:08:58] Every leader is a thinking person. We want everybody to lead. That's what they're talking about.
[01:09:02] We want to set a culture where if you where we want you to think outside the box and we want to stop anything that prevents people from making decisions and showing initiative.
[01:09:15] Captains. So that's a pretty low ranking officer. We're not only granted more independence, but we're also forced to take a hand in the education of subalterns, a role traditionally managed by the kernel.
[01:09:27] So now we're looking at our our captains and saying, you better train these young lieutenant's get them up to speed with anticipate with the anticipated isolation of battlefield and just to reemphasize what they mean by isolation of the battlefield.
[01:09:39] We're all spread out. There's 300 people over, you know, a mile front. We are not close to each other. So you get psychological isolation.
[01:09:47] How are you going to act when you're alone? And you get the actual isolation of being separated from maybe from the other people that are with you. Maybe from your squad, but definitely from the senior leadership.
[01:09:58] With the anticipated isolation of battlefield and constantly intermingled lines, it seemed a necessity to develop informed and assured officers to prevent rearward drift.
[01:10:13] The lower British companies with 120 men as compared to continental units twice their size seem to specially well suited to increased individual training now requires they may be units a little bit smaller.
[01:10:24] Key elements of new training for infantrymen included practice at various intervals of pacing accuracy of maintained direction use of cover and independent fire familiarization with intermixed units.
[01:10:35] And the development and acceptance of interchangeable command necessitated by casualties sustained among leaders. This is everything we used to run and trade it. Oh, we're going to put all your leaders down. You're going to use cover. You're going to use independent fire. You're going to mix up your units.
[01:10:52] The post-war developments entire thrust was toward a simplification of techniques that would allow for mastery by the lowest ranking soldier keeping things simple. The provisional infantry manual of 1902 went so far as to eliminate several traditional drill positions and all field bugle calls accept the charge.
[01:11:16] The reason you have a field bugle call is so that you can tell them massive people to do everything at the same time and they're getting rid of all those to say, hey, individual leader, you know,
[01:11:28] some more than leaders out there make things happen. The only one they keep is the charge. And why is that probably because that British bravado and courage is still a real thing. And because if you have one emergency situation, you want to at least be able to say, hey, look, we better freaking just charge hit the call.
[01:11:53] Physical and bay net drills were brought down to the squad level and the company replaced the battalion as the training tactical unit since it was regarded as the largest force commandable by an individual under battle conditions.
[01:12:05] So they used to try and direct 500 or 700 people by one man now they're down to a company of 120.
[01:12:13] The new manual stressed the many lessons of the war and was so recognized even at the time noted for example the tasks allotted infantry upon the occupation of a position.
[01:12:25] The forward placement of skirmishers with an eye to maximizing firepower camouflage utilization of rests determination of ranges and clearing of fire zones. So many tasks on so low level necessitated, necessitated a soldier who could think for himself.
[01:12:42] All those things still do those things. We get into a position we get to a perimeter machine gunners are checking out there for their getting in position there came a flashing themselves they're getting covered position. You got the the point man figure not where the extract will be everyone's doing this stuff decentralized.
[01:13:00] So many tasks on so low level that's what we're talking about.
[01:13:07] But the initiative. The impetus toward greater initiative by all ranks in the tactical sphere was one of relatively short duration as military emphasis began to shift toward continental warfare.
[01:13:22] So you had all these great changes taking place the lessons learned from the blue war and.
[01:13:31] They started to get influenced by. They started to get influenced by what what the continental armies were doing the French the Germans.
[01:13:41] The Russians, which was the old school stuff.
[01:13:45] The newer tactics were based on the belief that success in war depends on morale depends more on morale than on physical qualities.
[01:13:56] Same thing. So they're saying look it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter. These little running around and skirmish lines and all that and taking cover. That's not what's important. What's important is the morale.
[01:14:08] The skill. This is what they thought skill. This is a quote skill cannot compensate for want of courage energy and determination. Boy is that a lie. No one wants to hear this. That's a lie.
[01:14:25] You think you're skill. That's like the tough guy right that rolls into the gym. This you have a courageous guy rolling it off the street. You know he's courageous. He's fired up. So he has energy. He's super determined. I'll take someone in here.
[01:14:40] Cool. Roll with Jeffy Glover over there.
[01:14:44] Yeah, because guys will say that too. I don't care how trained you are. I'm like ferocious. I used to be. I mean there was definitely a time when that was a much more prominent thought.
[01:15:00] Well, if it really went down. Yeah, I would just get nuts on you. Yeah, you know, and you're just looking at them going. I'll tell you what. Once you get nuts right now.
[01:15:14] Well, it's like, okay, you can kind of understand why someone who doesn't know any better would think that because remember back in the day when you're like a little kid and then guy can be bigger than you, but in Hawaii, I mean I'm sure they say they have an expression in Hawaii. They call it amp now. So if you just amp out on a guy.
[01:15:31] Yeah, you can you could take them for a couple of reasons. One, you're just going like you feel less pain and you're just going in whatever you have all this crazy energy or whatever. Well, you know what that is that's surprise violence of action.
[01:15:43] Yes, surprise violence of action. You're going to get nuts. Yeah, you're going to amp out on a dude. It's going to be surprise going to be violence of action. You're going to get the upper the tactical upper hand and now this dudes days and that's how you went. That is a factual thing.
[01:15:56] And yeah, and you can even get a factual thing with two untrained. I just realized, hey, I just said that's a factual thing. And it sounded like I was saying that that would work. It works if you're not if you're going in someone that's equally as untrained as your dumbasses exactly right. And that's the point. So you get a guy off the street, brother, that's usually how they are. They don't know. They have no idea what like.
[01:16:19] They think that if you get a choke on them that they did some sneak attack lucky thing or something like that's what it feels that they just don't know. So yeah, make sense that they think that you can kind of understand.
[01:16:29] That's where let's go again comes from. Yeah, a big time when someone's a go to old.
[01:16:34] I'll take that you get you stuff whatever. You know, it's not going to work on me. Cool. You choke them and then they get up and they go, well, let's go again.
[01:16:43] You know, cool. Let's go again. Yeah, you know, those those Gracie and action videos. Oh, but those like that was how, how, how they and the guy was like, they'd be like, oh, let's go. Yeah, I just need to just go harder.
[01:16:55] Yeah, that's literally what they'd say. You know, it's like the same deal the same deal the same deal the same deal.
[01:16:59] Yeah, I've got to watch the same.
[01:17:01] But I can't, you know, can't do nothing. You know why, though, and I remembered I remembered this too, where.
[01:17:08] You know, before you know, juditsu and someone winds up in a good position, like, let's say you just get in a big scramble in a real fight.
[01:17:15] And you just wind up in this weird and they get you deep in some headlock or something like that, right?
[01:17:21] Because you were just scrambleing in whatever you wound up in a headlock.
[01:17:24] A lot of times, juditsu positions feel like randomly like landed on positions if you don't know juditsu.
[01:17:31] So someone has you like in the mount or on your back or whatever and you feel like real, like, kind of helpless. You're like, oh, this seems like we just sort of landed here, you know.
[01:17:40] So if I just go harder and maybe keep my eyes open a little bit better, whatever.
[01:17:44] Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[01:17:45] You know, so you're saying for the victim of juditsu, yeah, that person doesn't understand that the position that you end up in is a position that you know very you dictate deliberate.
[01:17:58] Yeah, I'm not a person out of the house now.
[01:18:01] Oh, yeah, which is known. Yes, exactly right.
[01:18:04] But yeah, if you don't know juditsu, it feels like, oh, he just sort of wound up there.
[01:18:08] Because we don't have like juditsu like this, even though the map and I talk about this, like, you know,
[01:18:12] when we're talking to people, don't have training it.
[01:18:15] The map of juditsu side mount, my own guard, like, half guard, like all this stuff, I would have super clear when you know, you just super clear.
[01:18:22] You know, exactly where you are at at pretty much every moment of a juditsu situation,
[01:18:27] meaning or losing.
[01:18:28] But if you don't know juditsu, it all just seems like kind of like a whirlwind, like, yeah, somebody, oh, do you remember like, if your leg was over his leg or under his leg,
[01:18:37] you would have to be like, what are you talking about?
[01:18:40] But if you know juditsu, you'd be like, no, I remember one leg was over one leg was under, who was total half guard situation.
[01:18:45] Like, I don't, there's a lot of things that I don't remember.
[01:18:47] I do remember every single position for sure.
[01:18:49] And you know, it's cool when I would train young leaders and see a leaders and put them through dynamic.
[01:18:56] Dynamic situations where they had to make calls and make decisions and it's the exact same thing.
[01:19:02] You know, and I'd say, well, where were you getting shot at from?
[01:19:05] Was it from this building of this building and they would have no idea or, you know, where did you place your machine gunners?
[01:19:10] They would have no idea what happened or do you think you have all your people?
[01:19:14] And they would have no idea.
[01:19:16] And then the better that they got the more training we put them through, the more they understood the positions,
[01:19:21] the more they would recollect what was happening, the more they could see what was actually happening as it was happening.
[01:19:27] And that's the way you need to train.
[01:19:30] The more time you spend training for these pressure situations, the more you're going to see the better control you're going to have.
[01:19:39] The better mind control you're going to have.
[01:19:42] Because that's a whole part of it.
[01:19:44] You know, that's one of the best reasons for juditsu being so good for self defense is
[01:19:50] you're used to getting, you're used to having somebody grab a hold of you and grind on your freaking head and grab hold of you.
[01:19:59] That's why also you need to spend some time boxing and doing moi tie.
[01:20:04] Because if you don't know what that little crack feels like, and it happens to you for the first time, you're going to get, you're going to get beat down.
[01:20:14] Yeah, especially in the face.
[01:20:17] Oh yeah, get someone punch you in the nose or whatever. It's like, it's not nothing.
[01:20:22] Yeah, it's a jam you up for sure.
[01:20:24] Yeah.
[01:20:25] It's got to be careful.
[01:20:27] Continue on.
[01:20:29] New criteria had to be drawn as to which qualities were desired in the infantry.
[01:20:36] By 1906 Ian Hamilton, and you got to read the book if you want to get all the background on Ian Hamilton,
[01:20:41] was unfavorably equating initiative and intelligence with smartness on the parade field,
[01:20:49] as a cause of rapidity and cohesion of movement all.
[01:20:53] And so what he's saying is hey, initiative and intelligence is kind of moving us away from cohesion,
[01:21:01] when we're on the drill field.
[01:21:05] Another guy Higgs believed that the war of masses necessitates mass tactics led to a tightening up of British formations
[01:21:15] to mean a density of one man per yard in an advancing line by 1911.
[01:21:22] So we can see that this is a nightmare.
[01:21:24] So this guy is saying this guy, hey, you're saying hey, mass,
[01:21:29] war of masses means mass tactics we need to function together.
[01:21:33] And that leads to if we're going to function together, we better be close together to the tune of one man per yard.
[01:21:40] That's a nightmare.
[01:21:42] This in turn was recognized as an overreaction to the South African extension since it seemed far easier to concentrate men on the battlefield than this bread the mountain.
[01:21:52] This is what we call modern day dispersion.
[01:21:56] You got to spread out.
[01:21:57] And I wrote about it in leadership strategy and tactics.
[01:22:00] Different reasons why you want to get close to someone else when you're when they're shooting going on.
[01:22:04] All kinds of reasons subconscious reasons actual tackle like I want to hear what you say.
[01:22:09] I'm a little bit nervous.
[01:22:11] I want to get close to you.
[01:22:12] We stick together and all those things.
[01:22:14] All of a sudden you look at look around you.
[01:22:16] You got five six seven eight guys right next to you.
[01:22:18] And that's not good.
[01:22:20] One grenade, one machine gun fire can can take you all out or at least several of you out.
[01:22:27] And it's already hard to fight it.
[01:22:31] But when you go into the battle situation, already tight grouped, it's going to be it.
[01:22:37] It's going to not work out well.
[01:22:40] The French and then the British began to consider frontal attacks.
[01:22:47] The most decisive of all.
[01:22:49] So you see what now this is again, this is like 1911.
[01:22:52] They're starting to regress.
[01:22:54] This regressive theory was given official sanction in the 1912 FSR, which feels service regulations.
[01:23:04] And marked the greatest split with the brewer or experience.
[01:23:09] Whereas the brewer wore led primarily to a modern approach to warfare,
[01:23:13] downgrading battlefield cavalry and fostering initiative and firepower.
[01:23:17] Manchuria proved regressive.
[01:23:19] And so what's Manchuria is the the Russo Japanese war, which was the another big war that took place.
[01:23:28] And they were using the old school tactics.
[01:23:32] But they were also fighting old school against old school.
[01:23:36] And they were both playing by the rules.
[01:23:44] So if you and I decide to have a war of attrition,
[01:23:47] if you and I decide, hey, we're going to have a boxing match and the rules are.
[01:23:50] We can only punch.
[01:23:51] Then we stand there and punch each other in the head.
[01:23:54] And if you're bigger and stronger than me, then you can win.
[01:23:58] And so what and so then it looks like you're better than me, right?
[01:24:02] Hey, you're bigger and stronger than me.
[01:24:03] And you will beat me.
[01:24:05] And we bring all the next challenger and you're bigger and stronger than him.
[01:24:08] And you beat him.
[01:24:09] And then we bring in a 300 pound guy.
[01:24:11] And he's bigger than you.
[01:24:12] And he beats you.
[01:24:14] How did he beat you? He was bigger and stronger.
[01:24:17] But he used the same tactics, but he was just bigger and stronger.
[01:24:20] So what are we going to do?
[01:24:21] We're going to make our military, our groups bigger and stronger.
[01:24:24] What happens when you go out and throw a punch and someone does a double egg takedown.
[01:24:30] Put you on the ground, get side control, get mount and then choke you.
[01:24:34] No matter how big that person is.
[01:24:36] Simplicity and elasticity of movement were among the prime lessons of South Africa.
[01:24:41] Formalism was on its way out, but individual responsibility was still quite a way off.
[01:24:47] So this part here runs through a little bit of timeline that we've been tripping through.
[01:24:52] I've been kind of jumping around a little bit by 1904 both the scale and completly.
[01:24:56] Going back to 1904 by 1904 both the scale and complexity of military exercises had increased.
[01:25:02] For the first time the army and the navy cooperated in trial and vision and re-embarkation under fire.
[01:25:09] The troops were now were by now scarcely visible.
[01:25:12] So they were using camouflage.
[01:25:13] They were hiding by virtue of improved technique and equipment.
[01:25:16] No attack on entrenchments was considered successful at odds of less than six to one.
[01:25:22] And there was no volley fire.
[01:25:23] So that's 1904 by 1905 maneuver battalion and brigade training.
[01:25:28] It become considerably more decentralized increasing responsibility of low agriculture.
[01:25:33] So so 2005, our sorry, 1905 we're still moving in the right direction.
[01:25:37] 1906 exercises featured controversies over the effectiveness of machine guns.
[01:25:42] So that was when we started.
[01:25:45] This is like traditional martial arts and someone say, hey man, if you get punched in the face,
[01:25:53] you'll give this reaction.
[01:25:56] And someone saying, well, with machine guns, you'll have this reaction.
[01:25:59] People are saying, well, I don't know about that.
[01:26:01] So now they're having a little debate about what's going to work and what's not going to work.
[01:26:05] 1907 experience was marked by complaints from the territorial that despite expectations of their ability to perform on an
[01:26:11] divisional level they never trained as such.
[01:26:14] So now we're starting to see that the trainings fallen off.
[01:26:17] Maybe a little bit, 1908, the problem.
[01:26:20] Consistive mobilization and concentration of an entire army of four divisions, a tax cavalry and
[01:26:25] salary services in the friendly area.
[01:26:27] Senior roles of the roles of senior personnel, large formations and logistics are coming to force.
[01:26:32] So now they're focused on the big movement, the big logistics in deference to private property,
[01:26:39] which is where they were running these big exercises.
[01:26:42] Tables were laid down to demonstrate positions so that they're just saying, hey, this is our position laid down some tape here
[01:26:48] because they didn't want to dig in because it's private property.
[01:26:53] Far more what have been achieved with actual digging, but that had to do a weight to the acquisition of larger government-owned training areas.
[01:27:00] 1909, the maneuvers marked a contrast to those of 1904 to 1906 as the infantry was adopting,
[01:27:08] appreciably denser formations so they're going backwards.
[01:27:13] Denser formation, less dispersion, greater commitment to reserves and more emphasis on the counterattack by 1910.
[01:27:22] There could be little doubt that the British tactical practices had largely drifted from the military.
[01:27:29] From those of all during the Bure War, to those of the more conservative French.
[01:27:35] The memorandum on Army Training, 1910 emphasized a winning the preparatory action through strong advancecards to be followed by a commitment of a central reserve.
[01:27:46] Central reserve, this is, oh, oh, no, commanders in the back and he's going to commit the central reserve under the direct control of the commander.
[01:27:57] Who was to apply them at the decisive point as part of a prepared plan?
[01:28:03] You see where this is going? We're doing Kata. We're doing Kata. This is what we're going to do.
[01:28:10] This is the plan. Once you hit here, then you follow up with this. It's all prepared.
[01:28:14] Yeah, that's another, it reminded me of like when I talk about that martial arts and demonstration.
[01:28:20] When they demonstrate on actual victim, right?
[01:28:23] Or it's like you're going to hit him here in the ribs, their hands or their hands and they buckle over.
[01:28:27] You know, then you employ the knee, you know, here and whatever.
[01:28:31] It's not only that they're predicting the other guys movement.
[01:28:35] It's they're predicting it and then their next move is dependent on that very prediction.
[01:28:40] Yes.
[01:28:41] So when it like doesn't happen in real life, it's like man, I'll jam you up big time.
[01:28:46] And this is actually the last section of this book. We're going to read the last thing. And this supports what you just said.
[01:28:54] Concentrations were to be completed before and not during the battle.
[01:28:59] Meaning we already know what we're going to do and we're not going to make adjustments, which is, which is the idea that you're talking about.
[01:29:08] This idea that this is what we're going to do. This is the reaction we're going to have.
[01:29:13] And the the Mike Tyson statement of no survived, no plan survives the first punch in the face, the common military, which is no plan survives the first enemy contact.
[01:29:25] That idea is thrown away.
[01:29:27] And we've gotten to a point through doing these fake, you know, drills where you start believing your own ideas.
[01:29:36] They don't work. This is why when we started using Simunition and paintball in our seal training, we started changing the way we were doing business.
[01:29:47] Because when we started that it was like 1992, 1993, they used it a little bit in the 80s, but on a broad level.
[01:29:55] To actually go to, you know, to run drill after drill iteration after iteration, really didn't start until the 90s.
[01:30:03] And then it really took hold after after the war started because then people were saying, well, wait a second.
[01:30:11] This is more the drills that we did with paintball and with Simunition.
[01:30:18] When with the war started, they were validated even more.
[01:30:24] It wasn't the opposite. You might think, well, you know, once the war started, the real bullet start to finally,
[01:30:31] the things got more validated.
[01:30:36] And what's, what's horrible about reading this and seeing the regression is that we know where it leads.
[01:30:47] We know that it leads to World War I. We know that it leads to trenches.
[01:30:51] We know that it leads to not not maneuver warfare, but to a Trishin warfare.
[01:30:57] We know that it leads to 10 million, 10 million military deaths and 7 million civilian deaths.
[01:31:09] That's, that's where all this goes.
[01:31:13] Because we didn't learn from history.
[01:31:18] We let arrogance get in the way.
[01:31:24] And you know, like I was saying, with the two people deciding to fight, right? The Russo, the Russo Japanese war.
[01:31:30] If you and I both, let's say have conservative minds and we're kind of stuck in the past.
[01:31:36] We're both the stick in the mud.
[01:31:38] That's, okay, right? That's what we're going to do.
[01:31:41] You and I are going to stand there. We're going to go blow for blow.
[01:31:45] We're going to box. That's what we're going to do.
[01:31:49] And that's what the, that's what the brits were kind of looking around the world saying, oh, you see boxing does work.
[01:31:55] Because look how the Russians fared here and look at how the Japanese fared here.
[01:31:59] We see that boxing does see what happened over there.
[01:32:03] But it doesn't mean that grappling doesn't work. It just means that you're not paying attention to it.
[01:32:09] Means that they decided that they were going to box.
[01:32:14] And if, if you decide you're going to box, guess what? You're going to get punched in the head a lot.
[01:32:19] And when you come against a force that's equal to yours is going to be very, very hard to overcome them without taking massive damage.
[01:32:29] And that is World War I.
[01:32:34] And we need to make sure that we don't let that happen.
[01:32:38] Test yourself.
[01:32:41] Evolve.
[01:32:46] In every aspect of your life, test yourself.
[01:32:50] Evolve.
[01:32:52] Make sure that you are making progress.
[01:32:56] Make sure that you are continuing to learn and continue to progress.
[01:33:04] And not progress.
[01:33:08] And with that echo, turn on.
[01:33:11] If we want to continue to learn, if we want to progress rather than regress.
[01:33:17] What do you got for us?
[01:33:20] Progress.
[01:33:21] Always get better. Always progress.
[01:33:23] Try to.
[01:33:24] Step forward, not backward.
[01:33:26] Staying the game.
[01:33:27] Get in the game.
[01:33:28] Staying the game.
[01:33:32] Get in the game.
[01:33:33] Staying the game.
[01:33:34] That's it.
[01:33:35] Anyway, we do that by working out.
[01:33:39] We're working out.
[01:33:40] We're doing jigs.
[01:33:43] We are eating healthy.
[01:33:45] Guess what?
[01:33:46] You know how people sometimes go, hey, you know echo Charles, what did you learn?
[01:33:50] What have you learned from jackel over the last five years doing a fash.
[01:33:54] You know the first thing that I learned from you, what's that?
[01:33:59] You want to know what it is?
[01:34:00] You said exercise.
[01:34:03] Is the singular thing that will impact the most aspects of your life.
[01:34:12] And I never really thought of that before.
[01:34:14] Maybe because I was too close to it and exercise is just kind of part of been part of my whole adult life.
[01:34:20] And much of my youth was like focused around exercise.
[01:34:23] But when you said that and you laid out, hey, it helps you here.
[01:34:26] It helps you somewhere else.
[01:34:28] I recognized.
[01:34:29] Yes, this is a something I never really thought of.
[01:34:32] I never thought of the impact because I because exercise was just part of my life.
[01:34:35] I never thought of the positive impact that it had on my life.
[01:34:38] But when you pointed out that exercise is the most universally complimentary thing that you can do for your life.
[01:34:48] And look, there's people right now.
[01:34:50] Oh, what kind of idiots would you say?
[01:34:52] Well, you meet head saying that.
[01:34:54] Yeah.
[01:34:55] Which we take as a compliment.
[01:34:56] But it meet head saying that, right?
[01:34:58] You think exercise is going to, you know what?
[01:35:01] It's going to exercise is going to.
[01:35:03] It's going to.
[01:35:04] So when you, when you kind of go, oh, you know, we want to work out.
[01:35:07] Like, no, think about what I think about how that impacts every part of your life.
[01:35:12] Get in the gym, start lifting, start training, start working out,
[01:35:18] run, swim, do calisthenics, get after it, man.
[01:35:23] It's going to make your whole life better.
[01:35:25] Yeah.
[01:35:26] That is true.
[01:35:28] A little interlude. Yeah. No, it's the fully and man, it's like, okay.
[01:35:34] So we're in quarantine 2020 right now.
[01:35:38] So you can kind of fall into a thing.
[01:35:40] I mean, if you're really in touch with like your feelings or whatever, like,
[01:35:43] sometimes you feel kind of stale, like inside because you're not out.
[01:35:46] You're not doing anything or, and not only you're not out doing anything,
[01:35:50] you're not out doing anything for kind of extended periods of time.
[01:35:53] You know, some, some people straight up haven't left their house months.
[01:35:57] Haven't left the house.
[01:35:59] So that can like weigh on you.
[01:36:01] Of course, psychologically, but I think it's like physiologically too.
[01:36:05] Like in your brain, like chemically, it, it got to have some kind of weird effect.
[01:36:09] Definitely. I think that's scientifically proven that there's some kind of weird effect.
[01:36:13] I think that's actually the literature that I read.
[01:36:15] So I said that we were going to read it.
[01:36:16] There were some kind of weird effect there.
[01:36:18] Oh, good.
[01:36:18] So obviously, I don't know the literature, but I know the feeling.
[01:36:23] So like the other day, right, where I was like,
[01:36:25] I'm like, you know, focusing, you know, doing some stuff on my computer for a long time.
[01:36:29] And I felt like off. I didn't feel good.
[01:36:31] And not to mention there's some negativity out there and there's didn't need streets.
[01:36:35] Yeah.
[01:36:35] Right now.
[01:36:36] So man, I was feeling like off like man, I don't know, man.
[01:36:39] This is all worth it.
[01:36:41] I don't know what I really meant by thinking that,
[01:36:43] but it was those types of feelings, you know?
[01:36:46] I was like, man, I'm going to go outside and my home gym is outside.
[01:36:50] It's a little covering there.
[01:36:52] It's cool to nice, but it's outside nonetheless.
[01:36:54] So I go outside and I feel like the sun, I'm like, okay, you know?
[01:36:58] It's cool. Something to the sun, but I'm still kind of feeling it.
[01:37:01] But I did my first two sets, which are warm upsets, by the way.
[01:37:05] And it was like my brain just like switched back on to like living mode.
[01:37:12] And life is like here.
[01:37:14] Now here's the problem with that.
[01:37:16] The problem with that is that a lot of people don't make the transition
[01:37:22] to the gym.
[01:37:24] That's the hard ones.
[01:37:26] They get there.
[01:37:27] They know they're going to feel better.
[01:37:28] And if they don't know they feel better, they should know that they're going to feel better.
[01:37:32] But they don't.
[01:37:33] You're at least have that thought in your mind.
[01:37:35] You know, you kind of know.
[01:37:37] Sometimes you're, yeah, I feel, I don't.
[01:37:39] When you say you felt off, you kind of know that to feel on.
[01:37:46] You got to go out there and just jack some steel.
[01:37:50] It's true, right? Well, okay.
[01:37:52] So when you do lift weights and you have to lift weights a certain like intensity or whatever.
[01:37:57] And it's pretty low.
[01:37:58] Especially if you're used to lifting weights, it's pretty low intensity that you have to pass that threshold.
[01:38:02] That it'll trigger a biological physiological response.
[01:38:05] That is positive.
[01:38:06] Yeah.
[01:38:07] Door fins and there's other things.
[01:38:08] Yeah.
[01:38:09] But these are always here like when people the way some people, you know, whatever not everybody.
[01:38:14] But some people the way they use indoor fins, almost like it's like this just throw away
[01:38:18] and they turn like, no, friends, you just sort of feel better in this and like ambiguous sort of way.
[01:38:24] But it's a real thing.
[01:38:25] It's a real thing.
[01:38:26] It's like makes you like, like just like depression is a real thing.
[01:38:30] Like the opposite of depression, like that boost you get from working out is literally a real thing.
[01:38:36] Oh, yeah.
[01:38:37] So yeah, the critical and then consider that notion, that affects everything you do.
[01:38:44] So if you if you're a stronger healthier and have the better attitude, I don't know one thing.
[01:38:52] Well, I mean, maybe I could think of one, but right now I thought, I had I don't know one thing that that won't improve.
[01:38:57] Like it's like tangibly, measurably improved totally good to go.
[01:39:01] Oh, yeah.
[01:39:02] So anyway, yes.
[01:39:03] So we want to be working.
[01:39:04] We want to be working 100% which means we're going to need some fuel.
[01:39:07] We will need some for sure.
[01:39:10] So we got to eat right.
[01:39:11] But supplementation supplementation.
[01:39:15] If you're into it and here's the thing.
[01:39:17] This is all kinds of supplementation.
[01:39:19] Here's in my opinion, most important type of supplementation.
[01:39:22] Currently for me and I do, I am one of those people who like I do wish I was on this train.
[01:39:28] Be like, oh, wow, look at him.
[01:39:30] Before I ended up getting on it.
[01:39:32] So this is a kind of fuel we like.
[01:39:35] Joccal fuel.
[01:39:36] Joccal fuel, right?
[01:39:38] Anyway, joint warfare for your joints.
[01:39:40] Crill oil for your joints and antioxidants in there.
[01:39:43] General health.
[01:39:44] This is good life.
[01:39:45] This is going to help you.
[01:39:47] For sure.
[01:39:48] Omega 3s all day.
[01:39:50] Also discipline and discipline go kind of the same thing.
[01:39:54] Yeah, sure.
[01:39:55] Yeah, we have some options there to kind of get you up on step,
[01:39:58] whether it's the powder discipline go joccal bomber ice teeth.
[01:40:03] Lemonade mix.
[01:40:04] Every day.
[01:40:05] Every day.
[01:40:06] Um, did discipline go in a can.
[01:40:08] You got that.
[01:40:10] We just came out with the D.
[01:40:12] Yeah.
[01:40:13] We vitamin D.
[01:40:15] Oh, you see this?
[01:40:16] Yeah, that's not what the D.
[01:40:17] That's where you're going to.
[01:40:18] We're talking about sunshine.
[01:40:19] Well, that's true.
[01:40:20] That's a big D.
[01:40:21] Yeah.
[01:40:22] Sometimes we have to kind of fake that sunshine a little bit.
[01:40:24] Get that vitamin D.
[01:40:25] But one of the reasons I made the vitamin D is because I did my blood work.
[01:40:30] Yeah.
[01:40:31] The area I was lacking the vitamin D.
[01:40:35] So guess what?
[01:40:36] I know I'm not the only person.
[01:40:38] I'm living a healthy lifestyle.
[01:40:40] Yeah.
[01:40:41] I'm living San Diego, sunny San Diego.
[01:40:43] I surf.
[01:40:44] I'm outside.
[01:40:45] I shoot my bow outside.
[01:40:46] I run outside.
[01:40:47] No.
[01:40:48] I'm in the sun and I still had.
[01:40:50] So guess what?
[01:40:51] I know there's other people that need to get on the D.
[01:40:53] Yes.
[01:40:54] The D train.
[01:40:55] D train.
[01:40:56] Get yourself some vitamin D.
[01:40:58] This is good man.
[01:40:59] Mulk.
[01:41:00] But by the way, um,
[01:41:02] one thing I know,
[01:41:04] the situation is they put you in a certain scenario.
[01:41:06] You want to take advantage of it.
[01:41:08] How's the Mulk train recipes going in your house?
[01:41:12] Because in my house, because both my daughters are home from college.
[01:41:15] They're on the Mulk.
[01:41:16] Hmm.
[01:41:17] It's a lot of pain.
[01:41:18] Even.
[01:41:19] Oh, yeah.
[01:41:20] They're making all kinds of stuff with Mulk.
[01:41:22] Yeah.
[01:41:23] The law of Mulk that put it in everything.
[01:41:25] I never tried the wrong Mulk yet.
[01:41:27] You, well, it doesn't taste like anything.
[01:41:29] It just gives you protein.
[01:41:31] But you can put it in whatever you want.
[01:41:33] It's like a cool little base.
[01:41:34] Yeah.
[01:41:35] Yeah.
[01:41:35] Interesting.
[01:41:36] Is that swinging with Mulk Munkruder and thing like this?
[01:41:38] It's just plain plain.
[01:41:40] But you can put it, you know, my, uh, middle daughter.
[01:41:43] She likes to make smoothies with fruit.
[01:41:47] You know, let's put the blueberries.
[01:41:49] Oh, milk.
[01:41:50] She's doing all kinds of radical things.
[01:41:53] Oh, milk.
[01:41:54] Just different kind of milk and stuff.
[01:41:56] And so she's on that wrong M.
[01:41:57] Wrong Mulk train.
[01:41:58] Hmm.
[01:41:59] My son on the other hand,
[01:42:00] he told me that.
[01:42:02] That the best flavor, which this was weird is the darkness.
[01:42:06] Yes.
[01:42:07] I understand.
[01:42:08] That's what he's down with right now.
[01:42:09] Yeah.
[01:42:10] So he mixed one up this morning as I was on my way here.
[01:42:13] And I took a little bit.
[01:42:15] Peter.
[01:42:16] Of course.
[01:42:17] I don't know if it was like this.
[01:42:19] What do you have?
[01:42:20] You have your twin brother, Jade.
[01:42:22] You got your little brother.
[01:42:24] Hmm.
[01:42:25] Can you not talk?
[01:42:25] And then you have your sister.
[01:42:27] I have a older sister.
[01:42:28] Okay.
[01:42:29] Did you guys fight?
[01:42:30] And like want to stab each other when it came to food at all?
[01:42:34] No.
[01:42:35] Okay.
[01:42:36] So that's what it was like in my family when I was growing up.
[01:42:38] And if I can't, absolutely.
[01:42:40] Everyone is ultra like dog wolf pack protective of their own food.
[01:42:46] Good.
[01:42:47] So, you know, I, my son was mixed up the darkness.
[01:42:50] He put it down on the counter.
[01:42:52] And he was going to turn around and kind of put the stuff away.
[01:42:54] And he saw that I was in the vicinity.
[01:42:56] And he immediately turned back around and grabbed.
[01:42:58] He got into his own protective custody.
[01:43:01] And I looked at him and said, give me some of that milk.
[01:43:04] And he, you know, he kind of, he recognized it.
[01:43:07] Debo style.
[01:43:08] I had a debo his, his milk.
[01:43:11] But I just had a little hitter.
[01:43:13] And, and I kind of went into an agreement.
[01:43:16] Look, it's not my favorite.
[01:43:17] But that's it.
[01:43:18] It's good.
[01:43:19] Yeah, the darkness.
[01:43:20] Oh, yeah.
[01:43:21] The dark.
[01:43:22] So, all right.
[01:43:23] Anyways, get some milk.
[01:43:24] Some strawberry milk.
[01:43:25] Some mint milk.
[01:43:26] Some some peanut butter.
[01:43:27] Get some, get some D3.
[01:43:29] You can get it all at the vitamin shop.
[01:43:32] Or you can get it online at originmain.com.
[01:43:37] You can also get geese there.
[01:43:38] Do you just, let's face it.
[01:43:39] Do you just, just coming back.
[01:43:40] I think it's going to be like the economy.
[01:43:41] It's going to come back even stronger.
[01:43:43] Yes, very possible.
[01:43:44] Actually, that seems to be the case even in theory.
[01:43:50] Not to mention my practical practice.
[01:43:53] But think about it.
[01:43:55] Like, you know how like when you take some time off,
[01:43:56] you want it one at one.
[01:43:57] It's time to go back here.
[01:43:58] Like, oh man, I can't wait to get back.
[01:43:59] Right.
[01:44:00] That's the they've been tricking stringing us along for a long time.
[01:44:04] You know, us wanting to get back and stuff.
[01:44:06] So, yeah, it's going to be way more strong.
[01:44:07] And that's not to mention the people who,
[01:44:09] Hey, I'm going to start, I'm going to start.
[01:44:10] I'm going to start.
[01:44:10] I'm going to start.
[01:44:10] I'm going to start.
[01:44:10] Oh, there you go.
[01:44:11] It's just going to start.
[01:44:11] Oh, it's just going to start.
[01:44:13] You did it.
[01:44:13] Now they're really going to start pent up.
[01:44:16] Pent up.
[01:44:16] Pent up demand.
[01:44:17] So, it's just going to come back strong.
[01:44:19] These jeans boots.
[01:44:21] T-shirts.
[01:44:23] Whatever you need.
[01:44:26] We're getting there.
[01:44:27] Made in America by the way.
[01:44:29] Yeah, no big deal.
[01:44:30] But every single thing I just said is 100% made in America.
[01:44:33] There's nothing being imported.
[01:44:35] There's no little parts.
[01:44:36] And not just being, not just flying in a bunch of parts from all over the world.
[01:44:38] And sewing them together.
[01:44:39] No, they're growing it and sewing it.
[01:44:42] Growing it and finding it.
[01:44:44] We're just made.com.
[01:44:45] Go check it out.
[01:44:46] And that does provide that.
[01:44:48] Sao parć.
[01:44:49] Yeah.
[01:44:50] Bington.
[01:44:51] Also.
[01:44:52] More support.
[01:44:53] More items for to represent and maintain yourself on the path.
[01:45:00] You know sometimes the way you say that like in a lot of things that you say, especially
[01:45:05] during this support section, you kind of wind it up.
[01:45:09] And you kind of say it like you're going to have a new approach.
[01:45:13] But there's not.
[01:45:14] But that's the gift that keeps on giving for sure.
[01:45:17] First time every time.
[01:45:18] As we say in the industry.
[01:45:20] So you know when you say there's clothes that you can represent.
[01:45:26] And I'm thinking what is he going to say?
[01:45:28] It sounds like he's thinking he's making a move.
[01:45:30] He's going to try something new.
[01:45:31] Represent while on the path.
[01:45:33] And I'm okay.
[01:45:34] I guess we're going with.
[01:45:35] We're going to go with you.
[01:45:36] All right.
[01:45:37] So we're going to go with you.
[01:45:38] If you need to represent while on the path.
[01:45:40] Yes sir.
[01:45:41] Oh yeah.
[01:45:42] How can you do that?
[01:45:43] Should we not represent while we're on the path?
[01:45:45] Should definitely represent.
[01:45:46] If you can represent.
[01:45:47] That's what I think too.
[01:45:48] I don't know.
[01:45:49] I might be alone.
[01:45:50] Yeah.
[01:45:51] But I'm probably not alone.
[01:45:52] Why?
[01:45:53] Because I see them.
[01:45:54] I see the people.
[01:45:55] You know, I see the.
[01:45:57] The people representing in the wild.
[01:45:59] That's what I see.
[01:46:00] Check.
[01:46:01] Anyway, if you want to represent on the path in the wild in private, where you like.
[01:46:05] Jocco store.com.
[01:46:07] That's where you can get your shirts.
[01:46:10] Hats, hoodies,
[01:46:12] Dismalin equals freedom.
[01:46:14] Good.
[01:46:15] Take the high ground on the high ground.
[01:46:16] We'll take you.
[01:46:17] Take that the truth.
[01:46:19] So there at jocco store.com.
[01:46:21] Yeah, man.
[01:46:22] If you see something that you like, get something.
[01:46:24] Some patches on there too.
[01:46:25] Women stuff.
[01:46:26] Women stuff on there too.
[01:46:27] Get something for, you know, your.
[01:46:29] Your lady.
[01:46:30] Uh.
[01:46:31] Personnel.
[01:46:32] In whatever capacity is that in like, is that not good person.
[01:46:35] Personnel, right?
[01:46:37] Sure.
[01:46:38] Mothers, wives, girlfriends, daughters.
[01:46:40] Cousins that may be female.
[01:46:42] Neighbors.
[01:46:43] That might be female.
[01:46:45] Represent.
[01:46:46] They can represent too.
[01:46:47] Boom.
[01:46:48] Well, day anyway.
[01:46:49] Yeah.
[01:46:50] Douglas, door.
[01:46:51] Duck up.
[01:46:53] Also, you can subscribe to this podcast.
[01:46:53] If you feel like it.
[01:46:55] You can do that wherever you listen to podcasts.
[01:46:57] We also have some other podcasts.
[01:46:59] We got the thread.
[01:47:00] Why is it taking so long for me to figure out the new name for the thread?
[01:47:04] The reason is because the thread,
[01:47:06] I like the name and now I want to get hit with a bolt of lightning for the new name.
[01:47:10] It hasn't hit me yet.
[01:47:12] Normally, I get bolt hit with bolts of lightning.
[01:47:15] You know, I think that's a rare occasion that you get, I actually get hit on a fairly regular basis.
[01:47:20] Wack.
[01:47:21] Here's a new idea.
[01:47:22] Wack.
[01:47:23] Here's a new idea.
[01:47:24] So we're a little bit.
[01:47:26] We're waiting.
[01:47:27] I got my lightning rod out and waiting to get cracked.
[01:47:29] But we're bringing that back grounded podcast where we talk about you.
[01:47:32] Just do a warrior kid podcast for the warrior kids in your life.
[01:47:36] And don't forget to give yourself some warrior kid soap from Irish Oaks Ranch.
[01:47:41] Comment is that available on jocquistort.com?
[01:47:43] Yes, sir.
[01:47:44] Oh, is that 100%.
[01:47:45] 100% boom.
[01:47:47] Well, actually technically where your kid soap, I think that's a new one.
[01:47:51] Yeah, yeah.
[01:47:52] That's good.
[01:47:53] There's jocquistort soap.
[01:47:54] Killer soap.
[01:47:55] Killer soap.
[01:47:56] Oh, there.
[01:47:57] All the different kind of options so that you, your family, the people you know, you can all.
[01:48:02] Stakely.
[01:48:04] You got a steak.
[01:48:07] We got a YouTube channel.
[01:48:09] YouTube video version of this podcast.
[01:48:12] So you can subscribe to that.
[01:48:14] If you want, if you're walking down the street and you're thinking you wish that things were exploding,
[01:48:20] you're wishing that things were just shaking you wish that there was military vehicles,
[01:48:25] smashing into walls.
[01:48:28] Well, you can you can subscribe to the YouTube channel.
[01:48:32] You can see all that stuff.
[01:48:34] Right.
[01:48:35] Sure sometimes.
[01:48:36] And robots.
[01:48:37] You know, everyone's on all throw a robot in there.
[01:48:40] And there's, if you want to, you can watch this video.
[01:48:42] There's also little excerpts that you can, there's a little point that got made.
[01:48:48] You got to like to share that with Fred.
[01:48:50] Sure.
[01:48:51] You can share it with Fred.
[01:48:52] You don't have to share him a two hour and 42 minute podcast.
[01:48:55] You can just give him 12 minutes.
[01:48:57] Maybe 17 minutes because echo doesn't like to edit things down.
[01:49:00] Well, he's not going to make it into a three minute video.
[01:49:03] But not without putting some damn star wars effects in it.
[01:49:08] Sure.
[01:49:11] Anyway, yes, sometimes.
[01:49:13] Sometimes.
[01:49:14] You know, it's fun.
[01:49:16] Also psychological warfare.
[01:49:17] You don't know what that is.
[01:49:18] It's an album.
[01:49:19] Tracks.
[01:49:20] Yep.
[01:49:21] Album with tracks.
[01:49:23] Jocco tracks.
[01:49:24] Anyway, when you have in moments of weakness, psychological warfare will,
[01:49:28] actually help you through those moments of weakness as if Jocco is there personally.
[01:49:33] Help you and you through that moment.
[01:49:35] Same thing.
[01:49:36] Flipside canvas dot com to code of Myers company.
[01:49:39] He's selling psychological warfare for your wall.
[01:49:43] Check that out.
[01:49:45] I also got some books.
[01:49:47] We got the code.
[01:49:48] The evaluation of protocols.
[01:49:50] We got that has a very direct methodology for you to grade yourself.
[01:49:57] Have for you to know exactly what you're trying to do to project your path.
[01:50:01] Write your path.
[01:50:02] Follow your path to victory.
[01:50:04] Get the code.
[01:50:05] The evaluation of protocols.
[01:50:07] We got leadership strategy and tactics.
[01:50:09] Field manual.
[01:50:10] We got way the warrior kid.
[01:50:12] One, two, and three for all the way in the warrior.
[01:50:14] For all the warrior kids out there.
[01:50:15] We also have Mikey and the dragons.
[01:50:18] Which is just live.
[01:50:23] Get teach your kids your young kids.
[01:50:27] How to overcome fear.
[01:50:29] Think of what that does to a little kid's life.
[01:50:32] It changes their life.
[01:50:34] Get a Mikey in the dragons.
[01:50:36] Discipline goes freedom field manual.
[01:50:39] Extreme ownership and that I caught a man leadership.
[01:50:42] The books that started in it.
[01:50:45] Also we have echelon front, which is my leadership consultancy.
[01:50:48] Where we solve problems through leadership.
[01:50:50] Go to echelon front dot com for details.
[01:50:52] If you want me or one of the guys at echelon front to come and talk at your company or to come and start working with your company or start consulting at your company,
[01:51:01] don't go to a speaker's bureau.
[01:51:04] Go to echelon front dot com.
[01:51:06] EF online.
[01:51:07] If you want to interact with me.
[01:51:11] Go to EF online.
[01:51:12] I will be live.
[01:51:13] I am live.
[01:51:14] Multiple times per week.
[01:51:16] Pre-scheduled.
[01:51:17] You come on.
[01:51:18] You can ask me questions.
[01:51:19] You can ask the rest of the team questions.
[01:51:21] It's not overloaded with people.
[01:51:24] It's not like when I do an Instagram live where there's 87,000 questions coming in every second.
[01:51:29] No, these are.
[01:51:30] This is much more controlled.
[01:51:32] So if you want to interact if you want to ask me a question.
[01:51:36] Go to EF online dot com.
[01:51:39] And come and get some.
[01:51:41] Also we have the master, which is our leadership.
[01:51:44] Conference.
[01:51:45] Our leadership event.
[01:51:47] We're going to be in Phoenix, Arizona on September.
[01:51:50] 16th and 17th.
[01:51:51] And we're going to be in Dallas, Texas, December 3rd and 4th.
[01:51:54] Extreme ownership dot com.
[01:51:55] If you want to come every event that we've ever done has sold out.
[01:51:58] So if you want to come.
[01:51:59] Go and register.
[01:52:01] And of course now we have EF Overwatch.
[01:52:05] If you are in a company.
[01:52:08] And you want leaders that understand the principles of extreme ownership that we talk about here.
[01:52:14] Go to EF Overwatch dot com.
[01:52:16] And if you're a veteran that wants to get hired by a company that understands these principles.
[01:52:23] Same thing back at you.
[01:52:25] If you want to support a charitable organization.
[01:52:29] Go to americasmightywariors dot org.
[01:52:32] It is Mark Lee's mom, momily.
[01:52:36] And she works all the time tirelessly to help service members, their families,
[01:52:43] gold star families and military personnel that are deployed around the world.
[01:52:50] You can go to that website to either donate or get involved.
[01:52:54] And if you haven't heard enough of my monotonous monologues.
[01:53:02] Or you need more of Ecos uncoupled orations.
[01:53:07] Then you can find us both on the interwebs on Twitter, on Instagram, and on Facebook.
[01:53:12] Echo is at Echo Charles.
[01:53:15] And I am at jacquilin can thanks to our military men and women who signed on the dotted line.
[01:53:23] And wrote a check with their lives in the service of our country.
[01:53:29] And thanks to police and law enforcement and firefighters and paramedics and EMTs and dispatchers and correctional officers and border patrol and secret service.
[01:53:39] Who do the same right? Check with their lives for our safety here at home.
[01:53:47] And everyone else out there make sure you build on your lessons.
[01:53:53] Do not regress.
[01:53:56] Check with the past question what you're doing.
[01:54:00] Pressure test yourself and your methods.
[01:54:03] Question your methods. Your old methods.
[01:54:06] Make sure that you never get complacent.
[01:54:10] And that you never allow your ego to overrule moving in the right direction.
[01:54:16] It is easy to slip.
[01:54:20] It's also easy to think that just because you're getting after it.
[01:54:24] Just because you're training hard just because you're pushing yourself that you are doing it correctly.
[01:54:31] Don't settle for that. Yes, get after it. But do so in the smartest possible way with humility and an open mind to learn.
[01:54:43] Until next time.
[01:54:45] This is echo and jacquil.
[01:54:47] Out.