Jocko Podcast 188 w/ Dave Berke: USMC TACTICS PT.2: Every Moment is Important

2019-08-05T22:54:51Z

Join the conversation on Twitter/Instagram: @jockowillink @davidRberke @echocharles 0:00:00 - Opening 0:00:43 - MCDP 1-3: Tactics 2:59:32 - Support: How to Stay on THE PATH 3:23:03 - Closing Gratitude

AI summary of episode

This long game this long plan is recognizing what we're doing now this it isn't going to work forever we're going to have to change we have to see where we're where we're going and that is going to change all the time and that requires is a leader to be looking up and out all the time you asked that question the muster when should we be thinking strategically. And you know, people like conflict avoidance, like the idea of conflict avoidance is what you're really trying to do is, are you actually going to be able to convince the person of what's the best thing in their world and the best outcome that you're trying to get to? Like, you know, and I've no, I've told you and the team is like, hey, you guys want to know why I don't sleep because I'm paranoid of what's going to happen. Because what you don't want to have is, now the conversation with Jaco, I don't know what's going to happen, but eventually he's going to win and I'm going to be proved that he's smart of me and sooner or later. You're going to sit there and you're going to be in the combined arms dilemma because you're going to come out looking, looking bad because you're now back peddling trying to explain things that shouldn't need to be explained in the first place. In some of the things in the combined arms side I know this as an aviator look the enemy doesn't have an unlimited number of directions to attack us from all the time they're actually places where they can attack areas we control areas we have dominance over and so if you think about. If you're going to change GJ2, you're going to want to get a G. If you're going to want to do G and no GJ2, origin main.com, this is RJ2 company. I want the worst possible environment because I know more than likely that other guy, that other company, they're going to win it in that and we're going to go on the attack. It's like, yeah, that seems like good things like what I want, but that's not what you want. And when the Marine Corps talks about doing this they don't know if it's going to be the aircraft or the indirect fire or the machine because they don't know which one it's going to be. All the time all the time and that it's that vision of looking of if you don't have an idea of where you're going to be down the road you're never going to get to where you need to be and they're going to try maneuver but guess what we're going to immediately fire back at you we're going to fire back at you hard The first time, well, it was, I don't know if it's the first time, but when they started using boats where we're all of a sudden in areas, you know, Charlie, the two and showing up in areas where the enemy had no freaking idea that Americans would be in these spots and be able to engage them. And if you're going to make that investment in that time and that commitment to doing that, spend as much time as you possibly can, taking advantage of whatever it is you've created by going through that work and doing that. I'm thinking this is going to be awesome because I'm not going to overreact to this arm bar I'm going to and guess what happened. And what I hear from leaders of, you know, you know, I got to have a direct conversation with this person and tell him what's going on. That vision isn't isn't always just literal vision is it's actually where where is this organization going to go because when you're inside in your tactical guy like most of your employees are doing tactical things. We don't have the market, but you know what you have, you've got 25 people you know quickly you can communicate, you know, fast you can get back It allows you to do this thing that actually, if you kind of think about it in some terms, decentralized command, you could actually make an argument that it's the most important thing in combat in this particular case because it's so required because you as a leader can't be in 15 different places. Lastly, outweigh is whatever discomfort you might be feeling when they hate we're going to suck it up and operate in bad weather or we're going to do things our competition doesn't want to do because it's sort of sucks. Yeah, like, you know, how many times the late babbin came up to me and said hey man, I could really use it, really either or jpe, he didn't even know. It's actually being able to just see what the terrain looks like and recognizing that is the best place to be to recognize where the commanding event is going to occur to bring my forces to bear. The the saw guys they all dump their mags and then their silence and then it's who can get reloaded to quickest but what they did in that moment is take away the advantage of the enemy because the enemy is attacking them and their immediate reaction is oh you're going to shoot it us. That book, the stories in all three of those books, just like with the podcast, my kids are learning things that I didn't think they were able to learn at their age and they are and their lessons that are applying to their, my daughter's going in fifth grade. So when you want to create that sense of urgency, when you want to get people to understand the importance of time, and that we never waste time and that we feel guilty for that word if we're idle. You know what I think of one of the best examples that I can think of when I think of combined arms effectiveness being used effectively was when we were in the body and the enemy would utilize combined arms attacks. I'm like, that's exactly right because if they did come down to your world, they don't have every single minute of every single day of all the context you have for the problem you're dealing with, and no matter what they do, it's going to be wrong because they don't understand it as well as you do. It allows you to think about what it means to be a leader and how to actually problem solve in real time and the recognition that you got to think about that's up every single day. The action drills and the seal team to we were learning from the Vietnam guys when they got contacted in the jungle the very first thing they did was hit the ground and everyone unloads a magazine into their field of fire period and the story that's what's going to happen. If there was a question between, hey, you know what, we can save, we can make this a little easier on the volunteers or we are on the employees or we can adjust this a little bit and save a little bit of money here or hey, it doesn't matter if the people that are attending might not be able to see the whole. We've got the triangle, arm lock, sweep, combination, happening no matter which way they're caught in that dilemma, which way are they going to get tapped out or swept or end up in a worse position. So actually, when you have a mission of 24 airplanes, you've got guys that are dedicated as fighters to shoot down enemy aircraft and you know what? If you want to see what Dave Burke looks like, you can see, if you want to see what anything, the guests, if you want to see what I look like, then you can go to there. And guys, you know, so one guy's like, hey man, we just got here, I'm tired, I'm trying to sort out my ammunition. I'm trying to get you to do what I want you to do, because it's going to benefit you, and it's going to benefit the team. When we get into leadership and we get into relationships, if I've got someone that's got a strong, passionate idea about something, I am not going to attack that idea with my passion and my strong feeling. You're going to lose because you know what your enemy is doing right now. And you would think that in striving for it, it would come to be clear how you actually do it and how you actually give people decentralized commanders by actually letting go. But most of the time, there's a way to maneuver that's going to make that whole situation infinitely better than your direct assault on their brain. I'm going to manipulate Dave into wanting to do good work by giving him this false sense that I'm going to give them some control over his own fate.

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Episode transcript

[00:00:00] This is Jockel Podcast number 188 with David Burke and me, Jockel Willink. Good evening, Dave.
[00:00:07] Good evening. And on the last podcast, number 187, David and I dug into the first two chapters.
[00:00:18] We tried to make it a three. We only made it to of the Marine Corps,
[00:00:23] our doctrinal publication, MCDP, one DAC-3 tactics. So if you haven't listened to that podcast,
[00:00:30] that's 187, then go there and start. Because now we are going back to the book starting with
[00:00:38] Chapter Three. Here we go. Chapter Three is called gaining advantage.
[00:00:47] And like the other chapters, it starts with a couple quotes. The first quote.
[00:00:53] In war, the power to use two fists is an incredible asset.
[00:00:59] To faint with one fist and strike with the other yields an advantage.
[00:01:04] But a still greater advantage, lies in being able to interchange them,
[00:01:09] to convert the faint into the real blow if the opponent uncovers himself.
[00:01:17] And that's BH, Liddell, heart. It's kind of a controversial figure a little bit.
[00:01:24] But he was British officer, wounded in World War I.
[00:01:31] You know, last podcast we were talking about how you made it through World War I and then you involved in World War II,
[00:01:39] right? Crazy. BH Liddell, heart, one of those guys who was wounded in World War I took a couple years to recover.
[00:01:47] And then went back into World War I, battled a song, wound it again, gasped.
[00:01:53] Wounded gas taken off the line in his entire battalion was wiped out. So he ended up being a writer, a military theorist.
[00:02:02] And I'm sure I'll cover some of his books on here at some point. They're really interesting books.
[00:02:06] And he had a very interesting perspective, very, very, I would say, contrary and perspective on warfare,
[00:02:13] especially contrary in regards to World War I. Hey, this doesn't seem like it was a great idea.
[00:02:20] When you're battalion gets wiped out, the battle of the song, I think that's might be a thing to walk away with it with.
[00:02:27] And the other quote that this starts with is, the challenges to identify and adopt a concept of war fighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the realities of the modern battlefield.
[00:02:41] What exactly does this require? It requires a concept of war fighting that will function effectively in an uncertain chaotic and fluid environment.
[00:02:48] In fact, one that will exploit these conditions to advantage.
[00:02:53] So you hear, they mentioned that the uncertain chaotic that keeps saying that over and over again.
[00:02:58] I think they're trying to tell us something.
[00:03:01] But isn't it interesting to look at those uncertain chaotic things and say to yourself, good, where we will exploit these things that are happening?
[00:03:12] Yeah, that's our opportunity.
[00:03:14] The chaos is our opportunity to overwhelm our opponent. That's what we want to take advantage of.
[00:03:20] And there are those of us that when we see that, I'm actually super excited.
[00:03:27] I'm saying those of us and I'm actually talking about myself. When I see chaos, I actually get excited and love it for some reason.
[00:03:38] So here we go, getting started gaining an event gaining advantage. A basic principle of martial arts is to use the opponent's strength moment to begin to gain more leverage than one's own muscles alone can generate thereby gaining an advantage.
[00:03:51] The same concept applies to tactics. We strive to gain advantage over our adversary by exploiting every aspect of a situation to help us achieve victory, not by overpowering him with our own strength.
[00:04:04] This chapter will discuss several different ways of generating leverage to gain advantage over the enemy. This is one of those things that when I saw it, when I read this, when I read this for the first time, I wasn't training due to it.
[00:04:17] When I read it for the second time, I was this had a whole mother meaning. This had a whole another meaning when I read this and actually understood it. I was talking with one of the guys I trained with. I'm trying to think of who it was.
[00:04:31] I might be a Greg train.
[00:04:34] When you learn to move, so if I show you move, Dave and you've been training just a year and a half, you're going to pick up 12% of it, 20% of it, maybe the first time.
[00:04:48] I show it to Dean one time and he captures 90% of it because he has that. Like you try to explain some maneuver, we could do this drill. Like you could explain to me the way that you would do a maneuver in a jet plane.
[00:05:03] I would understand 10% of it, maybe 4% of it. I don't know. Whereas you explain it to one of your old teammates from Top Gun, and they're going to understand 90% of it. Oh, I understand all that other stuff and now you're just telling me this little tiny detail that I didn't know. Got it.
[00:05:21] That's what it was like reading this book from your read it later when I did you do everything when you when you when you know the way bragged that you see it and all things.
[00:05:34] We just had that conversation the other day.
[00:05:36] I went back to look at this in my mind. I'm going to review this because I want to kind of have it fresh in my mind because I've read it. I've read it actually read it a few times. I can't remember exactly the last time I read it, but it was well before any of this.
[00:05:54] And when I read it, it wasn't a review. It was it was like a whole new book the way I was reading it because I was just seeing things in there that I couldn't make any connections to before that could make the connections now parts of because it's so simple as straightforward.
[00:06:08] But because the things are saying they apply everywhere and you can see what this is saying everywhere.
[00:06:13] And it's true throughout from the beginning to end. You see these things in there. It's awesome to see it that way.
[00:06:20] Back to the book, consider the American Indian ambush technique a small number of warriors could would draw superior force of pursuing cavalry into a canyon or similar similar close terrain.
[00:06:31] There are larger force of warriors lying in a weight would quickly surround an ambush the soldiers who thought they had been pursuing a retreating enemy.
[00:06:39] By exploiting the cavalry's initial advantages of strength momentum, the American Indians were able to seize the initiative and gain advantage through the use of this classic ambush.
[00:06:49] Method.
[00:06:50] Fire sack. Are you familiar with that doctorate term? Yes. That's basically what they're describing.
[00:06:58] Hey, we're going to surround you completely and shoot you.
[00:07:01] Yep.
[00:07:02] I used to set that up where I would capture the friendly seals that were going through my training.
[00:07:08] Capture them in a fire sack. It would be a bloodbath.
[00:07:13] Combine arms. The use of combined arms is a key means of gaining advantage. It is based on the idea of presenting the enemy not merely with a problem.
[00:07:23] But with a dilemma and they've got that italicized. Yes.
[00:07:28] It's based on the idea of presenting the enemy not merely with a problem, but with a dilemma.
[00:07:36] A no-win situation. We combine suboining arms, organic fires, and maneuver in such a way that any action the enemy takes to avoid one threat makes him more vulnerable to another.
[00:07:49] This is what we do in Gjitsu. We've got the triangle, arm lock, sweep, combination, happening no matter which way they're caught in that dilemma, which way are they going to get tapped out or swept or end up in a worse position.
[00:08:02] For example, an entrenched enemy should discover that if he stays hunkered down in fighting halls, marine artillery and aerial blast amount, if he comes out to attack, marine infantry will cut him down.
[00:08:12] If he tries to retreat, marine armor and air power will pursue him to his destruction, that is combined arms.
[00:08:18] The combined arms dilemma.
[00:08:21] A good example of the use of combined arms at the squad level would be the squad leader positioning squad automatic weapons and grenade launchers to provide support by fire while infantrymen with rifles assault position.
[00:08:35] The firepower from the automatic weapons keeps the enemy in their fighting halls while grenades make those holes untenable.
[00:08:41] These supporting fires keep the enemy from reacting effectively to arm maneuvering infantry force. The enemy forces are placed in a no-in situation.
[00:08:50] You know what I think of one of the best examples that I can think of when I think of combined arms effectiveness being used effectively was when we were in the body and the enemy would utilize combined arms attacks.
[00:09:09] So for example, US and Iraqi forces, US and Iraqi friendly forces had outposts. We had checkpoints and what the enemy would do is they would start off from a very covered position.
[00:09:24] This is a low threat for them way to attack as you get into a couple of buildings away. You can either start with mortars or you start with machine gunfire.
[00:09:35] So there's a let's say there's an Iraqi checkpoint and there's a couple of Americans there, but it's mostly Iraqi checkpoint. First thing the enemy does is start lobbying mortars and what is everyone doing mortars start.
[00:09:45] They all take everyone takes cover because you have to take cover if there's mortars going off you have to take cover. Once you take cover, now the enemy gets up with the machine guns and gets good position when you start to reveal yourself there there with machine guns.
[00:09:57] But they've got the machine guns rock and roll and they've got your head down even deeper out come the RPGs and the RPGs are coming in and slamming direct fire into your position.
[00:10:07] And while that all is happening in comes a vehicle born ID that rules all the way through the gates and detonates and blows up.
[00:10:15] So that is what that is a classic use of combined arms dilemma. You doesn't matter what the way you go you're going to be in trouble.
[00:10:24] For sure and having lived through that scenario repeatedly and how often they would do that.
[00:10:30] I think that distinction of a problem versus a dilemma is the critical thing because with a dilemma you actually have to react.
[00:10:38] One of your choices can't just be here we're going to ride this thing out and let it play itself out and you actually have to react because if you do nothing that initial move that they're making that by itself.
[00:10:48] If you don't react indirect fire you just stand there that could be the problem that that ends up being effective for them so you actually have to respond in a way then allows them to move down the road.
[00:10:58] And when the Marine Corps talks about doing this they don't know if it's going to be the aircraft or the indirect fire or the machine because they don't know which one it's going to be.
[00:11:06] But the key is creating a situation that the enemy has to do something enough they choose to do nothing.
[00:11:11] Good.
[00:11:12] Yeah, then the first move is going to kill him. Yeah, that isn't typically what happens but it forces them to do something which is what you're looking that's the advantage of looking exploit and being on the receiving in that it sucks.
[00:11:24] It's it's awful feeling of what that feels like if hey we have to do something and then you start to play it out.
[00:11:30] And you're mind like if I do this then this and it could it could be actually paralyzing if you're not careful that it will paralyze you and do nothing which is everybody's bad.
[00:11:38] Yeah, there's a couple things number one obviously we see this in jujitsu and you get stuck where the person's coming out with multiple attacks now two year point.
[00:11:48] If I do a if I attempt to sweep you but I don't actually attempt to sweep you I just faint at sweeping you you don't have to really defend it because I didn't really do it.
[00:12:01] So therefore if I try to sweep you if if I want to get a reaction from you I actually have to try and do it and like you just said if you don't defend it you're getting swept.
[00:12:09] Yeah, so you have to actually do it. It can't just be not that you can't faint not that we don't you don't do little faint and and false moves to set people up because you do that all the time you do it in combat.
[00:12:22] But if you really want to get reaction from them you got to commit to that movement it's got to be real and it's the same thing when you're dealing with human beings. Yeah, you know when I say if if I deliver an ultimatum to you.
[00:12:34] Because the project wasn't done and I go Dave if you don't finish this project on time you're fired.
[00:12:41] If I say that I have to actually do it.
[00:12:44] Otherwise I lose all this respect I can't just make these idle threats they need to be real.
[00:12:54] And on the receiving end I mean that that for me and I talked about that I think the last podcast about that.
[00:12:57] I'm so junior I'm so novice at this and I remember talking to you about it early on. I would claim like man why am I so tired why do I get so and one of the things I was doing is sort of overreacting to every single thing and exerting myself a hundred percent all the time.
[00:13:14] And I remember one of the thinking about okay I'm not going to overreact to these things that were happening and remember one of the first times I'm consciously thinking about that on the mat and somebody was setting up an arm arm arm arm.
[00:13:25] I'm thinking this is going to be awesome because I'm not going to overreact to this arm bar I'm going to and guess what happened.
[00:13:32] I got submitted in the arm bar.
[00:13:34] Yeah I was like and it's like it's like you said it has to be the faint has to be real.
[00:13:41] And that was me and it completely novice move of totally out maneuver in this guy he's going for that faint arm bar because what he really wants me to do is over commit to that so it can set up a choke.
[00:13:51] Or the arm bar any tap me about five seconds in an arm bar because I did no reaction to it and it's and that's really that's what the dilemma is and on the on the receiving end is recognizing.
[00:14:01] That faint could be the death blow if you actually don't respond to it correctly.
[00:14:06] If he's not doing it just as a faint he's actually doing it to reveal your weakness which is the key to that in the Marine Corps operates.
[00:14:12] Expecting they don't have some massive numeric advantage and when could go to war thinking they've got five to one man powered vanage they go to war with the numerical disadvantage.
[00:14:20] To create these points of friction so the limited resources create a problem that the enemy has to respond to and if they don't respond they kill them anyway.
[00:14:27] Yeah and that's the important thing so the other part that you mentioned was.
[00:14:31] You're you're in this dilemma.
[00:14:34] What what are you going to do and you said you've got to do something.
[00:14:37] And that is true because the best case scenario if I'm if I'm attempting to catch you in the combined arms dilemma or in an arm lock.
[00:14:46] The best case scenario for me is you don't react and then you just get you just get crushed by whatever that first initial salvo is the what what I would.
[00:14:56] The worst thing for me is when you attack me.
[00:15:00] I mean to be straight up.
[00:15:01] I mean I'm not saying this works every time right but.
[00:15:04] But if I'm getting attacked.
[00:15:06] One of the most unexpected things that you can do back to me is you attack me.
[00:15:12] So oh you start machining shooting machine guns at me. Oh guess what you didn't know I had claymores out in this surrounding area and as soon as I the machine gun fires I'm clocking off claymores and in one second like the saw guys.
[00:15:25] They would have their claymores set up and if they get attacked the first thing they're doing is igniting claymores so that that immediately they're they get fire superiority from the claymore going off.
[00:15:35] So what can we do and more important.
[00:15:38] How can we set ourselves up preemptively so that when these things unfold we have an immediate action drill that puts us from the defensive to the offensive very very quickly right when we learned.
[00:15:52] The action drills and the seal team to we were learning from the Vietnam guys when they got contacted in the jungle the very first thing they did was hit the ground and everyone unloads a magazine into their field of fire period and the story that's what's going to happen.
[00:16:07] You could the saw guys it was the same thing oh we get contacted and it was a great story that tilt told was everyone dumps their mag and then there's silence because everyone dump their mag on both sides the the the NVA and the the saws.
[00:16:21] The the saw guys they all dump their mags and then their silence and then it's who can get reloaded to quickest but what they did in that moment is take away the advantage of the enemy because the enemy is attacking them and their immediate reaction is oh you're going to shoot it us.
[00:16:36] You're going to try and get us in some kind of a combined arm dilemma okay cool watch this because they're waiting for the before he rockets their com that's what their goal is and they're going to try maneuver but guess what we're going to immediately fire back at you we're going to fire back at you hard and then we're going to see winds that next little race to who can.
[00:16:52] Yeah and even the idea of being eventispitting and being prepared for that expecting that to happen which actually in remoday we were I wasn't we were shocked that the enemy was attacking us we actually did some preparation and some thought went into that.
[00:17:07] In some of the things in the combined arms side I know this as an aviator look the enemy doesn't have an unlimited number of directions to attack us from all the time they're actually places where they can attack areas we control areas we have dominance over and so if you think about.
[00:17:20] They actually had a limited number of things they could do and if we prepared enough we could actually have pre plan responses into the most likely areas that immediately we could respond with as we're ducking getting our heads down as opposed to.
[00:17:33] No preparation no expectation this happening and actually then we can't respond well but the idea of being attacked in combat.
[00:17:57] Modern tactics is combined arm tactics that is it combines the effects of various arms infantry armor artillery and aviation to achieve the greatest possible effect against the enemy artillery and infantry for example are normally employed together because of their mutually reinforcing capabilities.
[00:18:15] The infantry provides close support to the artillery protecting them from dismounted threats while the artillery provides the infantry with timely close accurate and continuous fire support.
[00:18:26] The strength of the arms compliment the strengths of the arms compliment and reinforce each other.
[00:18:32] At the same time the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of each arm are protected or offset by the capabilities of the other.
[00:18:41] Division commander in 1941 general patent had the following comments regarding combined arms.
[00:18:49] There is a tendency in each separate unit to be a one handed puncher by that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot the tanker to charge the artillery man to fire.
[00:19:02] Not the way to win battles if the band played a piece first with the piccolo then with the brass horn then with the clarinet and then with the trumpet there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music.
[00:19:17] To get harmony in music each instrument must support the others to get harmony in battle each weapon must support the other team play wins.
[00:19:30] It's so huge it's so important to think about that and look that's one of the beautiful things about the ethos of the Marine Corps and why TBS is so important is.
[00:19:41] When we say every Marine is rifleman that's not just words that's that's a right now does that mean every Marine is his competent as an infantry man in the Marine Corps.
[00:19:50] No it doesn't if you're an infantryman you're going to be more confident in those things but at the basic school.
[00:20:00] For a Marine officer I had exposure to virtually every single arms profession in the Marine Corps and in business we see this.
[00:20:05] When we talk about hey if I'm on the sales team do I need to be an expert in marketing no.
[00:20:11] Do I need to have a hundred percent understanding of what's going on with IT no.
[00:20:14] But actually what you need is a good understanding of that and a relationship strong enough to leverage what they're doing not just because it's help but because actually that can be the difference maker in you being successful.
[00:20:26] And the ones where we see them wall themselves off from their silo and don't have any basic understanding they can't leverage that capability when they needed the most.
[00:20:35] And in the Marine Corps I was not an expert in artillery I was not an expert but I understood it enough to be able to communicate with them and understand what they a could contribute and be more importantly how I could help them.
[00:20:47] Which in turn let them do the exact same thing for me.
[00:20:50] And in business too we they they wall themselves off this is what I do you do that and they they're on the opposite side of offense inside the same company.
[00:20:57] It doesn't mean you have to be a hundred percent of everything they do but you have to understand it and how it contributes to what you're doing.
[00:21:05] Cover move.
[00:21:07] You you got to cover move do it.
[00:21:10] First law of combat cover move.
[00:21:12] Why is it the first call off combat because that's what teamwork is because you have to work if if you're not working together if you don't have a team that's working together you don't none of the other.
[00:21:21] I can give you this great simple plan and if you and I don't have a good relationship and it doesn't matter.
[00:21:27] Yeah it doesn't matter.
[00:21:28] What about prioritize next year? Oh, but we're not working together the team doesn't matter.
[00:21:35] Manuver maneuver provides us a means to gain advantage over the enemy and too many battles one or both sides have sought to gain advantage and combat through fire power and attrition.
[00:21:45] In World War one one side would rush across no man's land under mergers fire and attempt to push and opponent off desired terrain if the attack succeeded and few did.
[00:21:56] The evicted forces counterattack in the same manner usually reoccupying the same terrain they had before.
[00:22:02] These battles were fire power and attrition contest and the advantage lay with the side that had the most personnel and equipment to expend.
[00:22:12] To the tune of 60,000 casualties in one day.
[00:22:16] The constant casualties in equipment was high and often produced no decisive results.
[00:22:22] We want to avoid this type of engagement.
[00:22:26] We want to avoid this type of engagement.
[00:22:29] This type of engagement. Okay from a combat situation obviously we understand what that is we don't want it from an individual dealing with another individual from a leadership perspective.
[00:22:39] If what I get out of my confrontation with you is that I've expanded a bunch of leadership capital.
[00:22:49] I've damaged our relationship.
[00:22:52] I've made you feel insecure or untrusted but I got my way in the end.
[00:22:59] I gained a little bit of authority over you.
[00:23:04] You got your 10 yards of authority.
[00:23:05] Got my 10 yards of authority.
[00:23:07] It's a type of engagement that I see people do and they don't understand how negative it is.
[00:23:17] All they're doing is they win and this is the sad thing.
[00:23:20] When you charge that German line and you take 4,000 casualties and you move 50 yards forward and you raise your hands and you say, I won.
[00:23:31] And you're actually standing up and saying, I won. You're standing on the backs of 4,000 dead men.
[00:23:39] And you're holding up your arm saying, I won.
[00:23:42] So when you get an argument with one of your subordinates or with one of your bosses or with one of your peers,
[00:23:48] and you inflict damage and you expend ammunition and you expend leadership capital and then you stand up and you come through with a victory and you stand up and you raise your arm.
[00:23:58] You say, I won. Look underneath your feet and see what you're standing on because you're standing upon your reputation.
[00:24:05] You're standing on your dead, you're dying reputation.
[00:24:08] You're standing on your, you're expended leadership capital.
[00:24:11] You're standing on top of a, of a wounded relationship.
[00:24:16] So don't do that.
[00:24:21] Back to the book. Traditionally, maneuver is meant moving in a way that gains positional advantage.
[00:24:27] For example, we may maneuver by enveloping and exposed enemy flank or by denying enemy terrain critical to his goals.
[00:24:34] We may maneuver by threatening the enemy's lines of communication, enforcing him to withdraw.
[00:24:38] We may maneuver by seizing a position which allows us to bring effective fire to bear against the enemy,
[00:24:43] but which protests protects us against enemy fires.
[00:24:46] We may maneuver in other dimensions as well.
[00:24:49] For instance, we may also maneuver in time by increasing relative speed and operating in a faster tempo than the enemy.
[00:24:55] Normally, we maneuver both in time and space to gain advantage and ultimately victory at the least possible cost.
[00:25:02] There are so many other ways to move forward towards your strategic goal.
[00:25:10] And people are just absolutely blind to these ways.
[00:25:15] And the only way that they feel, it's like they can't recognize anything other than I'm going to be.
[00:25:24] I'm going to attack you.
[00:25:27] If I'm not attacking you, then how can I win?
[00:25:31] They don't understand that there's so many other different ways to win.
[00:25:35] And again, I'm talking about a leadership, leadership up or down the chain of command, peer, relationship, whatever.
[00:25:40] The only way I feel like I can be Dave is by imposing my will upon him and that's how I'm going to win.
[00:25:48] When the reality is, that's actually the worst way to win.
[00:25:53] If there is a tactic that is disconnected from the strategy, it's virtually guaranteed to lose.
[00:26:00] And that's why there's a difference between being tactical and what the tactic is.
[00:26:06] The tactic might be in you come in from the north and I bring my forces up the middle and I use that might be the tactic to do that.
[00:26:12] But if there's not a connection to what the strategic outcome is, it's guaranteed to not have the impact that you want.
[00:26:18] And what we see is all too often is there's no understanding of why we're doing the thing that we're doing other than for the reason to do it.
[00:26:26] I was with the company a couple weeks ago and I was, we were looking at personnel.
[00:26:30] The number of people had and I got some feedback in a survey.
[00:26:33] There's a couple of folks at the company.
[00:26:35] We're really happy.
[00:26:36] They didn't really feel that they were well used and that they, that a contribution was marginal and they didn't feel like they were a big part of the team.
[00:26:42] And one of those feedbacks was to figure out what that is.
[00:26:47] And I asked the, it was a COO and I asked him, hey, there's a guy on this department and this is some of the feedback and his answer was to go, well, he was actually a defensive hire.
[00:26:55] We hired this guy because I was afraid of our competence. He's competent guy but I was afraid my competition would get him first so we brought him in.
[00:27:02] Like, okay, there's there's a reason to do that.
[00:27:05] And so what are you doing with him? Like not much.
[00:27:07] We really just didn't want our competition to get him.
[00:27:10] I'm thinking, this person has met the threshold by which if he goes to your competition he could be damaging, that's how competent and capable this person is.
[00:27:19] So you've made the mind mindset like, I need to bring this guy to my team because he's too good if the other person gets him.
[00:27:24] And then your answer was to do nothing with him.
[00:27:27] And just that idea of, and he was so stoked that they had gotten this guy before their competitor got him.
[00:27:36] And so you know what?
[00:27:37] Tactical big deal.
[00:27:38] One, they won. I got this guy. I got Jack on my team before my competition does. What do you do with them now?
[00:27:43] Nothing. That was the move. That was the plan.
[00:27:46] And just kind of that missing of just, you've done nothing for the big picture.
[00:27:49] And Ashley's person is going to be more motivated over time when he leaves your company to bulldoze you because of what you did to him and doing that.
[00:27:58] And you see that man. This is, and it's not a hard problem to solve.
[00:28:01] When you see it from the outside, but from the inside it was, we won. We got the win. We pulled this guy over.
[00:28:09] The reason I, I, I took a note while you were talking.
[00:28:12] And it's a little, it's a disconnected subject, but I'm going to bring it up anyway.
[00:28:15] It's just to make sure it doesn't slip away.
[00:28:18] One of the things of dealing with another company.
[00:28:21] Uh.
[00:28:24] We pay people money, right?
[00:28:27] And people talk about, well, how do you, how do you make someone happy, right?
[00:28:32] And what, what levers can you pull, right? You can pay him more.
[00:28:36] You can give him less work. You can give him more rewarding.
[00:28:39] You can give him ownership of things, right? Like that's who, so there's, there's like the money and then there's everything else, right?
[00:28:45] Everything else, give people ownership of things.
[00:28:48] But, and I wrote down the word, fate.
[00:28:51] Because one of the best possible ways you can compensate a human being is by giving them more control over their own fate.
[00:29:00] And so often this is not used as a lever.
[00:29:03] And it's a powerful lever. It's not like, it's not like, okay, you know what?
[00:29:06] I'm going to manipulate Dave into wanting to do good work by giving him this false sense that I'm going to give them some control over his own fate.
[00:29:15] And that's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about actually giving the person control over their own fate. And all of a sudden Dave looks up and goes, well, you know, I don't have to do this today.
[00:29:23] Or I can. And if I do, I'll be rewarded. And things will go better for me. I control my destiny. I control my future.
[00:29:29] Just a good way to, again, I guess the reason I found this is it's a maneuver that you can use as a leader.
[00:29:37] It's instead of me barking and crippling my relationship and wounding my subordinate. Why not lift them up and prove the relationship and get them to do what I want them to do by giving them more control over their own fate?
[00:29:56] What is really helpful as a leader to be able to understand to do those things is not not just the strategically.
[00:30:04] It's to what we talked about in the last podcast, which is actually care about them. Actually believe and care about them is one of the things that guided it to recognize that that will be so critical for them.
[00:30:17] And the return on that would be that the loyalty and all the things that you really want is from to do it anyway.
[00:30:24] And it's not a trick. It's actually believing in that person's livelihood and happiness. The things that make that person's life better is to believe it. That's what how you allow them to have that thing, which is, I know you want more control over your fate.
[00:30:37] We all do. And I'm not doing it as a play. I'm doing it because I care about you that much and the irony is that return to that is I get what I want.
[00:30:45] That's the incredibly loyal person that will do anything for me. It's one of the hardest things to explain about all this stuff is that it works when you make a maneuver like that.
[00:30:57] When I say, Dave, you know, you take more control of your own fate. It works and the person will do step up and do better.
[00:31:05] But the, and it will be much, much, much better for Dave. What the, the complete bonuses is that it'll be much, much better for me. And I'm going to win because Dave is happy.
[00:31:18] And when Dave's happy, Dave does better work and when Dave does better work, we do better as a team and we do better as team, I win.
[00:31:25] Meanwhile, the control, converse of that is me thinking, nope, this is me. I'm going to take care of me and Dave, Dave, therefore, needs to do what I say. And now, guess what, Dave doesn't do as good work. He doesn't put out as much effort and Dave and the team doesn't do as well. And now I look bad.
[00:31:41] Next section, exploiting the environment. The use of the efficient, the use of the environment offers tremendous opportunities to gain advantage over the enemy.
[00:31:52] You must understand the characteristics of any environment where we may have to operate jungle desert mountain or the riverine urban.
[00:32:01] More importantly, we must understand how the effects of terrain, weather and periods of darkness or reduced visibility impact our own.
[00:32:09] And our adversaries ability to fight. So this is another one of those statements like we heard in the last podcast where.
[00:32:17] If somebody needs to tell you, you must understand the characteristics of the environment we're going to operate.
[00:32:22] Seems like that's super real obvious. And yet, there it is, in planning which broke down for all of us idiots.
[00:32:31] Because so often, we overlook the fact that we're in a different environment or a new environment or an environment that's shifting or an environment that we never even took a look at in the first place.
[00:32:44] Next terrain.
[00:32:47] Our objective is to employ tactics that make terrain and advantage to us and a disadvantage to our opponent terrain impacts on our maneuver and influences our tactical dispositions.
[00:32:58] We must understand terrain and comprehend its effects as it may limit our movement, reduce our visibility or restrict our fires.
[00:33:05] We must understand what effects it has on the enemy and on his abilities to detect or engage us.
[00:33:13] We must be aware that the enemy also seeks advantage from terrain.
[00:33:18] We must understand that terrain shapes the enemies maneuver and dispositions as well as our own.
[00:33:26] This is for, you know how I'm always saying, hey, for the business world. This is not for the business world.
[00:33:34] If you're going to say when you're a young leader and you're going to be on the ground fighting army special operations Marine Corps, whatever unit you're with.
[00:33:46] The terrain is like the thing that brings you from sort of.
[00:33:54] It brings you to the next level.
[00:33:56] If you don't understand terrain and how to use it and how the enemy's going to use it, you are a baby.
[00:34:05] This brings you into your teenage years.
[00:34:09] But without, and I believe me, I met, I've met commanders or leaders at every level that do war babies when it came to terrain.
[00:34:19] They didn't understand these incredible.
[00:34:23] It's like teenage, but at the same time, it's also like masters. If you are good at terrain, if you're good at understanding terrain, it's night and day.
[00:34:31] Yeah, and it's, it actually helps solve so many other problems. If you're deficient in resources and all the in combat or anywhere.
[00:34:39] If you don't have all the things that you think you need enough guns and enough people, whatever.
[00:34:43] If you occupy the most critical terrain, it actually is a huge hedge against not having all the things you wish you had.
[00:34:51] More guns and bombs and okay, we don't have those.
[00:34:54] But you can have all the resources in the world. And if you're not in the right place to utilize them, it isn't going to work.
[00:35:00] That's true in combat. That's true anywhere.
[00:35:02] And it isn't just, the high ground, the biggest hill is not always.
[00:35:06] It's actually being able to just see what the terrain looks like and recognizing that is the best place to be to recognize where the commanding event is going to occur to bring my forces to bear.
[00:35:17] It's here and I see that and I've got to get control of that terrain.
[00:35:21] And now when it comes now, when we do translate it back to the business side, there's a couple big key points here.
[00:35:27] Okay, and it's like what they say about counter insurgency, right? The decisive terrain and counter insurgency is not an airfield and it's not a mountain and it's not a beachhead.
[00:35:37] It's the people.
[00:35:38] Well, guess what the terrain, decisive terrain is in an organization, in a business.
[00:35:43] It's the people all day long. That's the decisive terrain. So what you have to do is you have to get those people on board with the program.
[00:35:49] So when a counter insurgency, what you have to do is you have to get the local populist to support what you're doing.
[00:35:53] What you have to do in a business, you have to get the local populist to people that work for you on board with what you're doing.
[00:35:59] That's the decisive terrain. So you've got to know what that terrain consists of.
[00:36:03] And it is equally important as the terrain, the high ground that you might see on the battlefield.
[00:36:08] The other part of this is the moral terrain.
[00:36:11] Where are you at morally? And I had this conversation with the CEO that was complaining to me that there was bad.
[00:36:18] That actually this was two CEOs in a row. They were both complaining about competitors that were very good at lying about them in their products.
[00:36:30] So there's, there's, you know, this other company which is slightly bigger than ours and every time we do something,
[00:36:36] they're putting now bad propaganda to their line about us and it, but it gets traction.
[00:36:41] And then I saw the same, another company's same thing.
[00:36:45] And you know, it gets brutal. It gets brutal.
[00:36:48] And you know, you can watch the news and you can watch politicians on the news.
[00:36:51] And you listen to what the two sides of the two different parties are saying.
[00:36:58] And they're completely like, there's no possible way that they,
[00:37:04] that there's, that they're even close to any middle ground. Right? They're saying completely opposite things.
[00:37:10] And so that's what these companies deal with companies do the same things.
[00:37:15] They will straight up lie about what another company is doing.
[00:37:19] And what's the defense against that? Well, the defense is that you have the truth.
[00:37:24] And if you have the truth and you don't weaponize it, you need to weaponize it just right in and up telling both of these CEOs.
[00:37:30] You need to weaponize the truth. You need to get the truth out there. You need to go on the offense with the truth.
[00:37:35] You have the high ground, but you're sitting there, wait, let in someone drop, drop lie bombs on you.
[00:37:41] You're going to sit there and you're going to be in the combined arms dilemma because you're going to come out looking,
[00:37:45] looking bad because you're now back peddling trying to explain things that shouldn't need to be explained in the first place.
[00:37:52] And if you actually occupy that moral, if you actually do occupy the high ground there and you actually do have the truth,
[00:37:59] you can be transparent and honest about it. You don't have anything to hide because those things are being, those aren't, those are lies.
[00:38:04] And if you actually have that, then you actually have the weapon and you occupy that high ground because you're doing it the right way.
[00:38:11] You're not lying, you're not, you're not doing those things.
[00:38:14] And if you're actually covering some of those things up, if you actually are hiding some of that and you've abicated that moral piece of this, then you're going to lose again.
[00:38:23] You're going to lose. So you're not only have to have a way to second.
[00:38:27] You might not lose. You might not lose immediately. You might win the big, you might win the tactical battle.
[00:38:33] You might win that with some lies and some cover up for sure. You can win that way.
[00:38:37] That long term, long game. That strategy, you're going to lose strategically.
[00:38:41] For sure.
[00:38:42] Give us a little example here. Lieutenant Harold Kaiser of First Battalion 7th Marine Regiment, new how to use terrain to gain an advantage in November 1950.
[00:38:51] His company was ordered to seize a key piece of terrain at talk, talk, talk pass during the march out of the chosen reservoir area.
[00:39:00] Lieutenant Kaiser had only 20 Marines left in his battalion.
[00:39:05] And the pass was heavily defended by the Chinese.
[00:39:08] Using a flanking ridge line to conceal as a approach, Lieutenant Kaiser skillfully enveloped the enemy from the rear and quickly routed the Chinese out of their well-intrenched position.
[00:39:18] Today, as in Korea, the intelligent use of terrain has become a standard practice for Marines.
[00:39:26] Whether adverse weather, heat, cold rain, in-peeds combat operations.
[00:39:34] Actually, I'll say this.
[00:39:37] We used to say when it was raining, we'd say good operating weather.
[00:39:41] Because it is, because guess what? When it's cold and it's raining, guess what your centuries are doing?
[00:39:46] The centuries that you're trying to sneak by, they're inside their little guard hut, they got their hood pulled over their head.
[00:39:53] So, impedes combat operation. Sometimes you can use it to, well, you can often use it to your advantage.
[00:39:58] The military unit that is best prepared to operate in these conditions will gain advantage over its opponent.
[00:40:03] During the breakout from Trojan Reservoir in November 1950, Marines demonstrated time and time again, the ability to use harsh weather to their advantage over a determined enemy.
[00:40:14] The assault of Able Company, first Italian, first Marine Regiment on Hill 1-0-8-1 in a blinding snowstorm.
[00:40:23] It's such an example. Despite visibility, only 25 yards the company was able to coordinate a combined arms attack and envelop this key piece of terrain that blocked the breakout of the first Marine Regiment.
[00:40:34] Using a snowstorm to mask its movement, Able Company surprised and annihilated the Chinese defenders there by opening a route for the rest of the division.
[00:40:43] If we are to use weather to our advantage, we must train and prepare rigorously to operate in all climatic conditions.
[00:40:51] We must be able to operate our equipment and employ our weapons effectively in hot cold and wet environments, literally in every climb and place.
[00:41:03] Whether it comes to comparing these leadership principles is unpredictable and unpredictable.
[00:41:12] You can't control it and it's this random thing which hits every company, every business, every leadership situation, there's things you can control.
[00:41:21] So what do you do? You figure out how to mitigate. You plan. You have contingencies for these situations and as you can see here, you train to be prepared for them.
[00:41:34] This idea of control you talked about. I've heard you talk about weather in the past. I use it as an example a lot because in aviation weather makes a massive impact in what you do in an airplane.
[00:41:46] The reality is that when it comes to something like weather is idea of a snowstorm, we are in 100% of control of how we react to it.
[00:41:55] We are 100% of control of what we choose to do based on this blinding snowstorm.
[00:42:00] The reality is most people do in a blinding snowstorm.
[00:42:04] That's what most people do and I think it was the point you were making at the very beginning is the best you think. I'm praying for a snowstorm.
[00:42:16] I want the worst possible environment because I know more than likely that other guy, that other company, they're going to win it in that and we're going to go on the attack.
[00:42:26] I know what it feels like to be called. I don't like being cold. It sucks. But to use it to your advantage and welcome this inclement weather, this giant blinding snowstorm.
[00:42:40] That's what good leaders do is they get people around them to do those things.
[00:42:45] The guy who puts on an orange vest in a snowstorm.
[00:42:51] That's an amazing situation to think about. Given the environment, we're going to hold up and I can't deal with this. It's too cold. It's too biting. It's too hard.
[00:43:04] That's the vehicle used to actually when I want the weather to be bad.
[00:43:09] To be able to recognize that you are 100% control of how you react to that is a huge differentiator that most people just completely overlook.
[00:43:16] I can't do anything about this. Actually, you can.
[00:43:23] Periods of darkness or reduced visibility. Units that can operate effectively during hours of darkness or periods of reduced visibility.
[00:43:30] Often gain significant advantage over their opponent.
[00:43:32] Reduce visibility can make the simplest of tasks difficult to accomplish.
[00:43:35] This obvious disadvantage can be turned on its head and used to our advantage by a commander whose forces are trained to equip, able and willing to operate at night.
[00:43:43] Night operations can produce great gains against a force that cannot or will not operate at night.
[00:43:48] Operating during periods of reduced visibility creates tempo by adding another 10 to 12 hours to the day for fighting.
[00:43:56] Psychologically, impact of night fighting is also great and can produce significant rewards.
[00:44:03] So what is that translate to? That translate to look at what is hard for your competitor and what's hard for you and your competitor.
[00:44:12] And then get good at it. Just get good at it.
[00:44:16] Suck it up and get good at it.
[00:44:19] A good example of tactical impact of night attacks was found in the battle for Okinawa during World War II.
[00:44:24] Marine forces were essentially stalemated by the presence of a strong Japanese defensive line in the coral ridges of Southern Okinawa.
[00:44:31] After days of ineffective attacks by the 7th Marine Regiment, the regimental commander elected to attack under cover of darkness at 0 330 on 12 June 1945.
[00:44:41] The first and second battines of the 7th Marines advanced using a road that intersected the ridge as a guide.
[00:44:48] Colonel Edward W. Snedekker commanding officer of the 7th Marines at the time noted two companies, one from each of the first and second battines got across the valley during the night into position on the ridge.
[00:45:03] During the early morning when the Japanese came out to cook breakfast, they found themselves a little bit of a surprise.
[00:45:10] The Japanese defenders were not used to US forces attacking at night. The use of darkness allowed the Marines to occupy positions along the crest of Kanishi Ridge, literally without firing a shot.
[00:45:24] From these positions, the Marines dislodge the enemy from their entrenched positions and moved onward until the Japanese defenders were annihilated.
[00:45:36] So you train to get good at something that the competitors not good at and then you execute on it.
[00:45:43] Or you just sack up and execute on something that you live. They're not going to expect this one. So let's bring it.
[00:45:51] Yeah, and the feeling of the discomfort and the pain and all the negative things that you might associate with operating in those type of environments, which is the reason people aren't doing it.
[00:46:05] The feeling of winning, the satisfaction that comes from all that work and all that pain going into that when you are annihilating the enemy and they're not even aware of it.
[00:46:19] Lastly, outweigh is whatever discomfort you might be feeling when they hate we're going to suck it up and operate in bad weather or we're going to do things our competition doesn't want to do because it's sort of sucks. It does suck. It's extra time, it's actually whatever it is.
[00:46:32] Winning makes all that go away. All those all that it just goes away.
[00:46:37] And you're that feeling of being victorious in that environment makes all that worth it and just the willingness to just do like you said, we're just going to do the work that they're not willing to do.
[00:46:47] And that's going to be the difference.
[00:46:49] True.
[00:46:51] Complementary forces complementary forces. The idea of fix and flank aren't important way of gaining an advantage.
[00:46:58] The idea behind complementary forces is to use our forces as a nut cracker.
[00:47:03] We seek to crush the enemy between two or more actions. Consider the case of an enemy rifleman firing from behind a tree.
[00:47:09] If one marine fires from the front, the enemy rifleman is protected by the tree.
[00:47:14] If the marine maneuvers in attempts to fire from behind the enemy rifleman merrily moves to the other side of the tree to maintain his protection.
[00:47:21] However, two Marines can place our opponent in a dilemma. One can fire from the front while the other snakes around him fire from the enemy fire.
[00:47:28] Fire is at the enemy from the flank of the rear.
[00:47:31] The opponent is now vulnerable to one or the other of the two Marines. He cannot use the tree for protection against both.
[00:47:39] flank flank flank flank cover move. Cover and flank.
[00:47:46] The idea, the same idea applies to air to air tactics.
[00:47:50] Did you just get like a little chill up in your spine?
[00:47:53] The same idea applies to air to air tactics upon detecting enemy aircraft, a flight of fighter, a flight of fighters splits into two or more elements beyond air to air missile range.
[00:48:03] They approach the enemy aircraft from multiple directions and varying altitudes.
[00:48:07] No matter how the enemy aircraft moves, dives, climbs, turns, or twists, it is exposed.
[00:48:14] How often I always, whenever I think of you and top gun, I always think of you, one on one against one other person.
[00:48:23] That's not the way the game is played.
[00:48:25] Occasionally, is it played that way?
[00:48:27] It is. It's a small part of it. It's definitely a part of it, and those skills are important.
[00:48:31] But the preponderance of the time is multiple forces. Large forces against large forces.
[00:48:36] Okay. Large being how many aircraft on one side.
[00:48:39] The smallest would be four, the biggest would be maybe 25.
[00:48:42] Jeez. Would you guys do drills with 25?
[00:48:45] The culminating events of it, Fallen, you know, the final exercise is at both top gun and the air wing training, which is carrier training for a war would be 225 airplanes.
[00:48:53] Would you guys be sitting up there?
[00:48:55] So you guys every time the carrier air wing came through to dual deployment, they come through and flagged into you guys.
[00:49:01] Every time they come up through Fallen for three weeks.
[00:49:04] And how? What's cycle way? Are we getting one a quarter?
[00:49:08] One air wing a quarter?
[00:49:10] Yeah. That's about right. Every three to four months.
[00:49:12] Sometimes a little more a little less, but about every three months and air wing, every two to three months and air wing would come through.
[00:49:17] The entire air wing.
[00:49:18] Did you guys psychologically let them start to do better at the end or which you just destroyed in the whole time?
[00:49:23] They would get better.
[00:49:25] They absolutely would, and not the game of them, they would get better.
[00:49:30] Now, we would also, we would try to represent traditional enemy tactics.
[00:49:34] And so they were working through problem sets.
[00:49:37] But it got to the point that on air wing against air wing, they would get to a point that they executed the tactics correctly.
[00:49:44] They would be successful on the air wing side for sure.
[00:49:47] Were you say air wing against air wing?
[00:49:50] Yeah. So would they go against themselves?
[00:49:52] No, they would go against the trainers that would be representing an enemy air force.
[00:49:57] So that's you guys. That's the top gun instructors.
[00:50:00] It's the top gun and the, I'm conflint, it's actually called air wing training.
[00:50:05] That's the game up at foul and so there's top gun and air wing training two separate entities.
[00:50:09] We would fly together to, to, to, in the same airplanes at the same sort of the same squadron against the actual American air wing that would come in from whatever carrier coming through.
[00:50:18] And they'd bring their jets from their squadrons getting what they'd deploy against, and that was called air wing training.
[00:50:23] So we would represent an enemy air wing.
[00:50:25] Got it. And so this is, this is like the exact same thing that I read. Right. It's hey, I've got some seals.
[00:50:33] And we have some other role players that aren't quite in trade-up, but they're just whatever. They're going to come and help out.
[00:50:38] And it's, it's our, and we simulate enemy tactics.
[00:50:41] And the, and exactly as you just said, if the seals that were going through the training, if they did what they were supposed to do in the executed the tactics, they would win.
[00:50:51] They'd be successful.
[00:50:52] They would, they would take house, because it would be hard, but they would win.
[00:50:56] And, and, and, in fact, if they were really good, they would dominate.
[00:50:59] Yeah. If you guys at decentralized command and prioritize next,
[00:51:02] Cuten, simple plans, and people covering a movement, they would actually, they would actually dominate.
[00:51:07] For sure. And, and, and we wouldn't just roll over to let them win, because we wanted them to go home with a victory.
[00:51:13] That's not how it worked.
[00:51:14] It actually, what would happen by the end of their training, they understood the fundamental principles they needed to,
[00:51:20] and, and, and if they ever came through and at the end, they weren't doing those things.
[00:51:25] Not only would they not win.
[00:51:27] They sometimes wouldn't be qualified to go out to deploy.
[00:51:31] And I was, that's, now, that's a rare event, but there are times you said it like, you did not actually,
[00:51:36] Complete, you did, did you guys reload them?
[00:51:39] Yeah, they would, they would, they would, they would, they would, they would, they would, they would reload them.
[00:51:42] You got to do it.
[00:51:43] You got to do it.
[00:51:43] You got to do it.
[00:51:44] Yeah.
[00:51:44] Yeah.
[00:51:45] They're actually getting ready to go to war.
[00:51:46] Yeah.
[00:51:47] How do you feel, and this is, you actually have to demonstrate the things, but if they did, which usually they did, these are smart guys.
[00:51:54] They started applying the tactics and understand what they're doing correctly and implement the principles we taught.
[00:52:00] They would be successful.
[00:52:01] It would work.
[00:52:02] And it worked most of the time.
[00:52:04] And, and, you know, you know, which units, which airwings came through that didn't do that.
[00:52:08] Those are heavy commanders that said, I've got this figured out.
[00:52:12] Yeah.
[00:52:13] I don't need those are the ones that would, that would struggle the most.
[00:52:15] What a shocker.
[00:52:17] What a surprise.
[00:52:18] So, most of the air to air combat that you trained in was you at least with the wingman, right?
[00:52:27] Yeah.
[00:52:28] And it's interesting to say that because we would do these big culminating exercises with this whole bunch of airplanes.
[00:52:33] But actually being able to maneuver 20 airplanes, that actually led to flexibility, where I could break off you and I could just break away from the entire air wing.
[00:52:44] If, if required, and you and I, being solo was a bad idea, it's almost never a good idea to be by yourself.
[00:52:51] But if you had just one other airplane, just like that story with the guy with the tree, if you had just one other machine out there with you,
[00:52:59] you could maneuver in relations up to each other to put the enemy in a position that if they are active one, they get killed by the other and vice versa.
[00:53:06] So, this is, I'm, I'm actually a little bit disappointed.
[00:53:10] And this is the first time I've been hearing from this review because this is like full on the covered move.
[00:53:15] As I, like, as I say, when I talk about cover move and I say, well, once the enemy is killed my partner, what are they going to do to me?
[00:53:22] Like it's bad for me. Like if you do and me, I want to kill you. Like it, that really sucks for you. But guess what?
[00:53:27] It's going to be just bad for me because they're coming for me.
[00:53:30] Yes.
[00:53:31] And so that's cover move in the air is 100% how you have to roll.
[00:53:37] 100% if you were out there, you know, we called it a raging single.
[00:53:41] There's Dave fun. We'd have these giant screens and you could watch and all these computer screens, a little icon.
[00:53:47] And there's Dave by himself down and you'd see it.
[00:53:50] And what you could watch from the TV screen is all the enemy forces maneuvering on Dave and there's Dave down there running by himself.
[00:53:57] And you just set your watch because Dave's, but if you had one other guy.
[00:54:01] And it's not always just one. Sometimes it's more than one.
[00:54:04] But if you had just one other guy, you actually could maneuver with that other person and create real problems for the enemy.
[00:54:09] And as soon as you were alone, as soon as you were raging single, people were set their stopwatches because you're just, you're just, you're just going to die.
[00:54:15] You're not going to survive.
[00:54:16] Are you voluntarily?
[00:54:17] Is that a guy that goes, oh, you know what I can take this guy over here?
[00:54:20] Is that what creates the raging single?
[00:54:22] No, typically what it is is a guy who's lost awareness.
[00:54:25] It's pretty uncommon, especially at that stage and you're clear to think to voluntarily say I got this.
[00:54:31] I've got this. It's actually not really realizing what's happening.
[00:54:35] And what that person would do, he'd have his face buried in the radar screen.
[00:54:39] He'd get locked into this one guy. He thinks he's fighting against thinking it's one against one.
[00:54:44] And he loses sight of the big picture. He goes down there on path.
[00:54:47] And he doesn't recognize that he's actually getting maneuvered on.
[00:54:50] And that one guy that he's looking to target is actually baiting him in the moving into this place.
[00:54:55] It wasn't always another airplane. Sometimes it was a sandwich. We called it where pull himself over train, where their surface air missiles.
[00:55:01] There's a whole bunch of things going on there.
[00:55:03] But it was typically someone who lost situational awareness.
[00:55:06] Did you hear Jim Kunkl talking about being his P38?
[00:55:10] And he calls break break, which means, hey, we got a break off and go attack.
[00:55:15] And there was loss of columns or whatever, so he just breaks by himself.
[00:55:19] Yeah. And sure enough, I mean, he took out some bad guys, but then he got taken out because he was, you know, got maneuvered on.
[00:55:24] Yep. For sure.
[00:55:28] Whole new whole new like category I can talk about now.
[00:55:31] Back to the book.
[00:55:32] Sunsu described this concept as Chiang and Chi.
[00:55:36] Chiang is the more direct obvious action.
[00:55:39] It fixes the enemy.
[00:55:41] The Chi is the unexpected or extraordinary action.
[00:55:44] It is the bid for a decision or as we call it today, the main effort.
[00:55:48] These two actions work together against the enemy.
[00:55:51] The two actions are inseparable and can be interchangeable in battle.
[00:55:55] The Chiang may become the Chi.
[00:55:57] The concept is basic, but it can, but it can be implemented in a variety of combinations.
[00:56:03] Limited only by our imagination.
[00:56:08] Creatively. Yeah. Totally.
[00:56:10] You know, it's like limited only by our doctrine.
[00:56:13] Limited only by our standard operating procedures.
[00:56:15] Limited only by what you were taught in school.
[00:56:18] No, limited by your actual imagination.
[00:56:20] Yep.
[00:56:22] Surprise.
[00:56:24] Achieving surprise can greatly increase leverage.
[00:56:27] In fact, surprise can often prove decisive.
[00:56:30] We try to achieve surprise through deception, stealth, and ambiguity.
[00:56:34] How like that one?
[00:56:35] Never really thought too much about that.
[00:56:37] The fact that ambiguity can create surprise.
[00:56:40] You're not really sure what I'm going to do.
[00:56:42] Kind of ambiguous.
[00:56:43] War is based on deception.
[00:56:45] Stated Sunsue. We use deception to mislead our opponents with regard to our real intentions capabilities.
[00:56:51] By employing deception, we try to cause our opponents to act in ways that will eventually prove prejudicial for them.
[00:56:58] We may use, you know, it's, you know, it's awesome about these books.
[00:57:03] And this is very interesting.
[00:57:05] This is like the ultimate, the ultimate in lack of ego.
[00:57:10] So, you know who wrote this book?
[00:57:12] The United States Marine Corps. Some are a Marine.
[00:57:15] But you know what?
[00:57:16] There was probably four, seven.
[00:57:18] I don't know. There was something like that.
[00:57:20] There was a guy. There was one of those guys that was really on it.
[00:57:22] There was one of those guys that he was the old dog.
[00:57:25] And he was like, hey, listen, let me, you know, you can write the chapter.
[00:57:28] But let me tell you what you need to hit.
[00:57:29] There was a guy that was like that for sure.
[00:57:31] For sure.
[00:57:32] And you don't will never know who he is.
[00:57:35] Because of Marine Corps, he was a Marine.
[00:57:37] We know that.
[00:57:38] And that's all we need to know.
[00:57:40] So, he wrote that line right there.
[00:57:44] This eminently qualified Marine.
[00:57:46] Bro, that's right.
[00:57:48] Eventually, that by employing deception,
[00:57:50] we try to cause our opponents to act in ways
[00:57:53] that will eventually prove prejudicial for them.
[00:57:56] We may use deception to mislead the enemy
[00:58:00] as to the time and location of our pending attack.
[00:58:03] We may use deception to create the impression
[00:58:05] that our forces are larger than they really are.
[00:58:08] We may, we hope the enemy will realize this deception only
[00:58:11] would as to relate for them to react.
[00:58:13] Marines have often relied on deception to mislead
[00:58:16] and enemy in regard to the location of amphibious landings.
[00:58:19] Marine used this deception to create the illusion of force
[00:58:22] where there was none in Operation Desert Storm.
[00:58:24] Lieutenant General Boomer stated that.
[00:58:27] Said the situation which incest is stated in an extensive
[00:58:30] deception operation.
[00:58:32] We're taking on 11 Iraqi divisions with two marine divisions.
[00:58:36] Our force to ratio, our force to ratios, our force ratios are horrible.
[00:58:42] We don't want him to know that.
[00:58:44] The Marines created task force Troy.
[00:58:48] 460 Marines imitated the activities of a 16,000 man division
[00:58:53] using loudspeakers dummy tanks and artillery and helicopters
[00:58:56] conducting simulated resupply.
[00:58:59] Surprise can be generated through stealth stealth
[00:59:01] as used to the advantage when maneuvering against the enemy.
[00:59:04] It provides less chance of detection by the enemy,
[00:59:07] leaving him vulnerable to surprise action for which he may be unprepared.
[00:59:11] Marines may also employ stealth by lying in weight
[00:59:15] for an approaching enemy in ambush.
[00:59:17] The ambush is perhaps the most effective means of surprising opponents,
[00:59:20] especially at the lower tactical level where surprise
[00:59:23] through stealth is easiest to achieve.
[00:59:26] We also, we can also achieve surprise through ambiguity.
[00:59:32] It is usually difficult to conceal all our movements from the enemy.
[00:59:36] But we can sometimes confuse him as to the meaning of what he sees.
[00:59:40] Sun Su said,
[00:59:42] the enemy must not know where I intend to give battle.
[00:59:45] For if he does not know where I intend to give battle,
[00:59:48] he must prepare in a great many places.
[00:59:51] When he prepares in a great many places,
[00:59:53] those I have to fight in any one place will be few.
[00:59:57] ambiguity was central to the tactics of World War II,
[01:00:02] German Blitzkrieg.
[01:00:04] And attack in Blitzkrieg involved multiple thrusts
[01:00:08] with reinforcements following whichever thrust were most successful.
[01:00:14] The multitude of thrust created paralyzing uncertainty
[01:00:18] because the opponent could not determine which constitute the real attack.
[01:00:21] There was nothing secret about the German attack,
[01:00:24] but it was ambiguous on a massive scale.
[01:00:28] That's like it starts off with the opposite of the concentration of effort,
[01:00:33] which is sort of one of the fundamental principles of war.
[01:00:36] Constituent concentration effort.
[01:00:38] We're going to mass our efforts.
[01:00:40] We're going to concentrate our efforts.
[01:00:42] Well, what we're doing with Blitzkrieg is we're actually going to spread that out
[01:00:45] initially and then once we see a gap.
[01:00:47] To see where the gap is.
[01:00:48] And then you're absolutely.
[01:00:50] Then we're coming in hot.
[01:00:52] The idea you were talking about stealth.
[01:00:54] You're talking about ambiguity.
[01:00:56] I got to live this in an airplane where I went from a regular airplane,
[01:00:59] like an F-18 and an F-16, a fluke for years.
[01:01:02] And then I got to fly a stealth airplane.
[01:01:04] I started flying the F-22 and has always attributes that the other planes
[01:01:08] didn't have.
[01:01:09] But you know what we never did in the F-22,
[01:01:11] no matter how powerful and invisible all those things.
[01:01:14] We still didn't do the frontal assault.
[01:01:16] We still created maneuvers that could even more ambiguity and leverage this thing.
[01:01:20] People think, if you get the advantage, that means you go straight out
[01:01:24] and run them over.
[01:01:25] That's not what it means.
[01:01:27] It just allows you to create even more confusion, more ambiguity.
[01:01:31] And what that means is the place and the opportunity to recognize where the
[01:01:35] weakness is, there's more of that.
[01:01:37] It gives you more opportunity to see where there's gaps up here.
[01:01:40] But then you still look for those gaps.
[01:01:42] And you've taken even more advantage of what you're doing.
[01:01:46] And that's how it's an incredibly small number of stealth airplanes.
[01:01:49] And the difference between the planes can wipe out a much bigger,
[01:01:52] so the force ratios are even less in an airplane in a stealth airplane.
[01:01:55] So I only need four rappers who I might need 16 Hornets.
[01:01:58] Because I can create even more ambiguity and the opportunity for those maybe used to be one or two gaps.
[01:02:04] And now there's going to be four, five or six, and I create base on that exact same principle.
[01:02:08] And once that happens, we all go into that hole.
[01:02:10] And we fill that and we exploit them and wipe them out with a force ratio and a
[01:02:14] little bit of a force ratio that's even less than it was in an older machine.
[01:02:19] And when you see the reaction of an enemy who simply doesn't understand what's happening,
[01:02:26] man, that's a good feeling.
[01:02:28] Because in a Hornet, in a legacy machine, it was still you against me.
[01:02:33] I always saw you, you always saw me if I outmaneuvered you, I would still win,
[01:02:37] but it rarely were you surprised by it.
[01:02:39] You might have had a hard time reacting to it.
[01:02:41] There were things I had that you couldn't do.
[01:02:43] But you were aware that when you are having to react to something, you don't understand.
[01:02:48] And you don't knight attacks and bushes thing.
[01:02:51] When you just simply don't know what's happening, the force multiplier of that is
[01:02:56] significantly higher than when they see you and you're just, you just outmaneuvered them.
[01:03:01] Which is actually fairly rare in combat when they see what's going on.
[01:03:04] It's usually kind of a stalemate.
[01:03:07] A delta-platoon task in a bruiser, Seth Stone, JP, the crew.
[01:03:13] It was like one of the early times that they did a deception and then an Overwatch
[01:03:21] and then a flanking Overwatch.
[01:03:23] It was literally called the flank Overwatch.
[01:03:26] So they had a main Overwatch and they had like a little flanker position.
[01:03:30] But I remember Seth calling me up and he was so happy.
[01:03:34] Because what happened was as they started killing bad guys,
[01:03:41] the other bad guys didn't know what was happening.
[01:03:45] They didn't understand and they literally like put down their weapons and like just walk
[01:03:50] away and they just left.
[01:03:52] Because normally as you know, when the guys would set up an Overwatch position and start killing
[01:03:57] people then the bad guys would bring it.
[01:03:59] And eventually you'd get up, not really a clandestine Overwatch position.
[01:04:03] And a reinforced fighting position is what most of the Overwatch is in the battle
[01:04:08] over money turned into.
[01:04:10] But this one, I remember the first time that they did this and it was Seth was all excited.
[01:04:17] He was like, they gave up.
[01:04:18] They didn't know what was happening.
[01:04:19] They didn't know when they were getting shot out from it was just they just left
[01:04:23] the dead and let them bleed out and just got away because they were totally overwhelmed.
[01:04:28] As you just described, they did not know what was happening.
[01:04:32] And same thing with Charlie did it too.
[01:04:35] The first time, well, it was, I don't know if it's the first time, but when they started using boats
[01:04:40] where we're all of a sudden in areas, you know,
[01:04:43] Charlie, the two and showing up in areas where the enemy had no freaking idea
[01:04:49] that Americans would be in these spots and be able to engage them.
[01:04:54] Yeah, when they ruled out this location as a possible enemy advanced meaning for us,
[01:05:00] when that was ruled out and then it happened, that psychological impact of that is this cannot be happening.
[01:05:07] I simply do not understand what's happening.
[01:05:09] What can be happening?
[01:05:10] Why are my friends getting killed right now?
[01:05:13] Yes.
[01:05:14] How is this possible?
[01:05:15] It's possible through the creative minds of to you, loser.
[01:05:20] That's right. Come and have your life. Come and have those boats, man.
[01:05:24] I remember that.
[01:05:25] Yeah.
[01:05:26] That first one we did was awesome.
[01:05:28] Trapping the enemy.
[01:05:32] Modern tactics is based not on pushing the enemy, but on trapping him.
[01:05:36] Another excellent way of gaining advantage,
[01:05:38] trapping is the desired result of the application of combined arms fire maneuver or complimentary force tactics.
[01:05:45] Why do we want to trap the enemy instead of just pushing?
[01:05:48] A pushing contest is seldom decisive.
[01:05:52] The side that is pushed out comes back the next day, still full in the fight.
[01:05:56] We have to fight him again and again.
[01:05:58] And unfortunately in Vietnam, many of our battles were pushing battles.
[01:06:01] We were always able to push the enemy off the ground.
[01:06:05] He held and to inflict casualties on him.
[01:06:08] He just withdrew, regrouped, placed his losses,
[01:06:12] replaced his losses, and came back to fight us again.
[01:06:15] The result was a series of indecisive actions and a seemingly endless war.
[01:06:24] However, if we can trap our enemy, we have a better opportunity to win decisively.
[01:06:29] You know, this is from a leadership perspective.
[01:06:32] What we're doing here is we're winning the tactical battle.
[01:06:37] Like I made Dave do it.
[01:06:39] Like your damn right Dave, you better do it. I told you do it.
[01:06:41] And you're like fine.
[01:06:42] Tactical win.
[01:06:43] You go back, but you haven't, you don't still understand why you're doing what you're doing.
[01:06:48] And then I don't do it very well.
[01:06:50] And you don't do it very well.
[01:06:53] Many of history's decisive battles have been trapping actions.
[01:06:57] Recall how Roman legions were trapped at Canai or the German divisions at Stalingrad.
[01:07:03] Trapping gains advantage by disrupting the enemy's mental process
[01:07:08] while he attempts to think through the dilemma we have placed him in.
[01:07:12] The way he's rapping allows us to gain and maintain our initiative as the enemy is forced to react to our actions.
[01:07:18] It can also temporarily undermine the enemy's will to resist when he is at his weakened weakest while we continue to press the attack and our initiative.
[01:07:33] So I would say this when it comes to it because obviously trapping and destroying it from a leadership perspective has a bad connotation.
[01:07:41] So what am I trying to do by by trapping someone in a conversation?
[01:07:48] This is a very simple, very simple tactic that I use all the time.
[01:07:55] By trapping someone, if you and I have an conversation about something and I trap you,
[01:08:01] when I trap you, my purpose isn't to prove that I'm right.
[01:08:04] The way I trap you and the way that I win in a leadership situation is when I trap you,
[01:08:09] what happens is I force you to come to the conclusion yourself and you see it.
[01:08:15] And that's when I win.
[01:08:17] So you end up walking away from me saying, you don't talk on this is the way we should do it.
[01:08:23] And what you're telling me is what I wanted you to say.
[01:08:26] I got you to come up with the idea that I wanted you to come up with.
[01:08:30] And if it's done correctly, I figured that out.
[01:08:35] Okay, I had this wrong. I recognize that. Yes.
[01:08:38] And where that actually comes from is you not wanting to win.
[01:08:43] It's you wanting me to win.
[01:08:45] They come from, you're not wanting to beat me.
[01:08:47] It's like, because you could beat me and I won.
[01:08:49] But actually what you want is you want me to figure that out.
[01:08:53] Not that I walked away and go, juggle beat me.
[01:08:55] I think like, oh, I see this differently.
[01:08:57] So next time I do it the right way.
[01:08:59] And it comes from you actually wanting to be successful.
[01:09:02] And we're going at our folks and we if we have these conversations and really what we're trying to get them to do is recognize it themselves.
[01:09:08] It's not for the satisfaction of being right.
[01:09:11] It's for them to get better and learn and evolve and feel like they can go do it better.
[01:09:16] Which is what I really want.
[01:09:17] Yes.
[01:09:18] And by the way, the way that you approach that most effectively is to go in with that attitude yourself.
[01:09:26] I don't go in thinking, well, Dave's got a bad plan.
[01:09:28] So I'm going to get him to believe in my plan.
[01:09:31] Actually, I go in there thinking, maybe I have a bad plan.
[01:09:33] Maybe Dave's plan is better.
[01:09:35] Let's find out.
[01:09:36] Yeah.
[01:09:36] And as we explore that, guess what?
[01:09:39] If we can have a civilized ego removed conversation, that plan will percle the good plan.
[01:09:46] The correct plan will percleate to the surface.
[01:09:49] Yeah.
[01:09:50] And that is what we're looking for.
[01:09:53] And think of the power of the times where if you were in the leadership position where you actually have that conversation and then wreck, you know what?
[01:10:00] Their plan is actually better than mine.
[01:10:03] Because what you don't want to have is, now the conversation with Jaco, I don't know what's going to happen, but eventually he's going to win and I'm going to be proved that he's smart of me and sooner or later.
[01:10:13] It's actually not effective anymore either because I've just come to realize this guy.
[01:10:18] He's always got some answer.
[01:10:19] He's always got some final thing that makes him right.
[01:10:21] And I almost kind of resign myself to that.
[01:10:23] But if every not not by design, but because it actually you actually are humble enough to see and go, you know what I did?
[01:10:29] I didn't see that.
[01:10:31] That's a really interesting.
[01:10:32] Let's do that.
[01:10:33] Go, go down that road, go down that road and I'll back you up.
[01:10:36] And if that happens often enough that I feel like these conversations aren't a contest over right.
[01:10:41] The conversation is actually how we both get to the right place.
[01:10:44] And look, if you're more experienced, you've done it more.
[01:10:46] You probably are going to be right more often.
[01:10:48] But not all the time.
[01:10:50] And you're not trying to break that or will of, here comes another kind of guess what's going to happen if I do.
[01:10:55] I'm going to lose again.
[01:10:56] And all that, that idea of breaking someone's will.
[01:11:00] When I try and break your will, the that my, my, I'm being driven by my own insecurities.
[01:11:10] I want to prove to you that I'm right that you're wrong, that my plan is better than your plan.
[01:11:15] I am completely being driven by my own insecurities.
[01:11:20] The person that is secure and is actually confident.
[01:11:25] And and understands that they're in a good spot and understands that it's okay.
[01:11:30] Like if, if, if I make a mistake that I'm not, it's not the end of the world.
[01:11:35] And I'm a human and I'm not trying to portray the fact that I'm not a human.
[01:11:39] It's like, oh, okay, if we can get there, if I can get there, then guess what?
[01:11:44] If you come up with a better plan, I'm sorry.
[01:11:45] That's awesome.
[01:11:46] I think their plan is better.
[01:11:47] Let's go with it.
[01:11:48] Yeah, the, the, for the leaders out there listening to this,
[01:11:51] the humility that it requires to do that is actually your, your,
[01:11:56] that's your biggest tool.
[01:11:58] Because more often than not, the situations are a superior in a subordinate.
[01:12:02] And you know who knows who's the superior?
[01:12:04] Everybody in the conversation.
[01:12:06] I write your performance review.
[01:12:08] I write your paycheck.
[01:12:10] I do all, I have all this organizational influence that I can exert over you.
[01:12:14] And I know that and the subordinate knows that.
[01:12:16] And if I'm leveraging that to be right in the conversation,
[01:12:18] eventually unless the subordinate just wants to get fired,
[01:12:21] he's going to, he's going to give in.
[01:12:23] But if I have all those positional advantages,
[01:12:26] and I still come in with the humility and wreck,
[01:12:28] oh, that's a really good idea.
[01:12:29] I didn't see that.
[01:12:30] And I push that down to you and we go wrong with your plan.
[01:12:33] The leadership capital, you, the deposit into the bank of leadership.
[01:12:37] You have, it's, yeah.
[01:12:40] Yeah.
[01:12:41] And if you think, if you think,
[01:12:45] the back of your head, that you can effectively cover up your insecurities
[01:12:52] to your subordinates through punitive measures and through exulting your authority over other human beings,
[01:13:02] if that's a fantasy in your head, you're so wrong.
[01:13:07] Your insecurities stand out in, in, in fluorescent colors.
[01:13:14] They stand out like Kurt Lee's vest in the chosen reservoir battle, fluorescent orange.
[01:13:20] And you might as well put a label on your forehead that says,
[01:13:24] I'm super insecure.
[01:13:27] That's why I'm trying to force my will upon you because I'm scared.
[01:13:33] And I'm insecure.
[01:13:35] Yeah.
[01:13:36] If you think that you can cover that up, you are so wrong.
[01:13:41] So don't.
[01:13:42] A good example of trapping from the Vietnam conflict occurred during Operation Do We Canyon,
[01:13:49] North Vietnamese activity along the low-ation South Vietnamese border increased dramatically
[01:13:57] in early January 1969.
[01:14:00] Large enemy convoys, including armored vehicles regularly traveled from Louss
[01:14:05] into South Vietnam, threatening friendly units.
[01:14:09] And the songboys were up there tracking it.
[01:14:12] Colonel Robert H. Barrow and his ninth Marines responded with Operation Do We Canyon,
[01:14:17] three battains of ninth regiment crossed the Dead Dog Cron River on February 11th and 12th,
[01:14:23] the third and first battains moved South Southeast through the mountainous terrain towards Louss.
[01:14:28] Second battalion to the west, Swung South Southwest, turning east,
[01:14:32] a stride, the Vietnam Louss border, the North Vietnamese forces moving along Route 9,
[01:14:40] 22 from Louss into the A-Shaw Valley we've heard that before.
[01:14:44] We're trapped between the three battalions, the North Vietnamese, were mauled as a result.
[01:14:50] Their equipment losses were staggering.
[01:14:52] More importantly, Operation Do We Canyon destroyed a North Vietnamese base area,
[01:14:56] and so disrupted their logistics that it forced them to abandon their planned spring offensive.
[01:15:01] In I-Core area.
[01:15:05] Developing an ambush mentality, perhaps the most common tactical tool for gaining advantages
[01:15:10] of the ambush. All Marines are familiar with an ambush as the type of combat patrol.
[01:15:14] In maneuver warfare, ambush takes on a much broader meaning and the development of ambush mentality
[01:15:19] is integral to maneuver warfare tactics.
[01:15:22] The ambush mentality is not new to most of us.
[01:15:25] We may have employed the ambush mentality in sports and football, the trap block is an ambush.
[01:15:30] A player pulls an offensive line, an offline leaving a hole,
[01:15:34] when a defender comes through the hole, another line then suddenly blocks him from the side,
[01:15:38] usually knocking him down, the players have blind sighted him, that is the ambush mentality.
[01:15:43] In basketball setting, a pick is an ambush.
[01:15:45] As one team member drives to the basket, another steps into the defenders path from behind,
[01:15:49] blocks the path, stops the defense, and momentarily clears the lane to the basket for the other team member.
[01:15:54] Again, that is the ambush mentality.
[01:15:56] In combat, we move our reinforced squad in the position along a well-traveled trail.
[01:16:01] We position flank security to protect ourselves and give identification and warning of the enemy movements down the trail.
[01:16:07] We position our weapons so as to concentrate our fires into a kill zone and to seal off exits,
[01:16:12] forcing the enemy to remain subject to our fires.
[01:16:15] The squad waits in position until signaled when they immediately respond with concentrated, sustained fires on enemy forces trapped in the kill zone.
[01:16:24] The enemy surprised into inaction, unsure of what to do or where to move is annihilated.
[01:16:30] Fires are maintained until all the enemy are killed, or until signal to stop.
[01:16:35] That is the ambush mentality.
[01:16:37] Pretty straightforward.
[01:16:39] Unless you're a sod guy and then you set your claimors up in such a method and you put a block of C4 that will snun the person right in the ambush.
[01:16:47] Because was it Lynn Black? I think it was Lynn Black that blew himself up over and over again until he found out how to see F4.
[01:16:57] It took the knock it out.
[01:16:59] Do you get any more logic than that?
[01:17:02] No, you don't.
[01:17:03] The ambush mentality tries to turn every situation into an ambush.
[01:17:07] I like that.
[01:17:08] The ambush mentality tries to turn every situation into an ambush.
[01:17:12] In this broader context, an ambush has several distinct features. First, in an ambush, we try to surprise the enemy.
[01:17:19] Think of a patrol that we ambush.
[01:17:21] Our enemies are walking through the woods and suddenly I don't know where they are under fire for multiple directions.
[01:17:26] They are taking heavy casualties.
[01:17:27] The psychological impact of a surprise may paralyze their thoughts and actions, leaving them incapable of reacting effectively.
[01:17:33] To have an ambush mentality means we always try to surprise the enemy to do the unexpected surprises. The rule rather than exception.
[01:17:40] Second, we want to draw our enemy unknowingly into a trap.
[01:17:45] This will often involve deceiving him.
[01:17:48] We make one course of action appear inviting when he takes that course of action.
[01:17:53] We are waiting for him.
[01:17:55] Third, an ambush is invisible. If the ambush is not invisible, it ceases to be an ambush.
[01:18:01] Instead, it becomes a target for the enemy.
[01:18:03] Whether we are defending or attacking, the enemy must not detect us until it is too late for him to react.
[01:18:09] Surprise often depends upon invisibility.
[01:18:13] That invisibility may be provided through stealth.
[01:18:15] The movement we are focusing the enemy's attention, L-square to allow our forces to maneuver without detection.
[01:18:20] The big common hope for Murmari, when I broke this down,
[01:18:28] it often is a defensive mentality.
[01:18:31] We want to be an offensive. I would ask these young juniors officers that would be coming through the officer training course that lay for us on another time.
[01:18:37] I would say, hey, is a direct action mission on offensive mission?
[01:18:41] Of course they would also say, yeah.
[01:18:43] I would say, okay, it takes us, and this was a direct action mission.
[01:18:47] It takes us an hour to get to the target.
[01:18:50] Then we spend 20 minutes on the target. We blast the door open. We clear the target.
[01:18:54] Then it takes an hour to get back.
[01:18:56] Patrol and then home-vees, and then we're back.
[01:18:58] How much of that time was offensive?
[01:19:00] Then the guys would think about it.
[01:19:01] The sharp ones would say, three minutes.
[01:19:04] Maybe right, because on your patrol and guess what, you're waiting to get ambushed.
[01:19:08] Believe me, this is when we got to her body, I did not like the idea of us waiting to get ambushed.
[01:19:16] Of course you can't avoid it. You have to go and patrol. You have to get her.
[01:19:20] Sure. You have to move through the city.
[01:19:22] But I couldn't, what I didn't like was the ratio of, hey, you know, two hours of patroling three minutes of offense.
[01:19:32] I didn't like that ratio. I like the ratio of an hour patroling 24 hours on offense.
[01:19:38] And then another hour of patroling. That's what I liked.
[01:19:41] And that's kind of what we shift to do.
[01:19:43] Yeah, because the hour of patroling is, you have to get there.
[01:19:46] So you have to do that.
[01:19:48] That amount of time to get where you're going.
[01:19:51] Whatever that amount of time is, you have to do that.
[01:19:53] And you are undeniably, especially in your body, you're exposed.
[01:19:56] No matter how much firepower you're bringing, or how much you're bringing to that.
[01:20:00] And it requires very little of the enemy to disrupt and do very little.
[01:20:04] It was easiest for them when we were doing that.
[01:20:06] And if you're going to make that investment in that time and that commitment to doing that,
[01:20:10] spend as much time as you possibly can, taking advantage of whatever it is you've created by going through that work and doing that.
[01:20:18] And all this stuff I'm hearing, you know, stealth is all these things that I'm hearing.
[01:20:23] That's like, the ambush should be the goal every time.
[01:20:27] Your goal should be to keep the enemy from not understanding what's happening all the time.
[01:20:32] It would just get, why would you ever do the frontal assault?
[01:20:36] They see it's coming.
[01:20:38] Now you still may win on the frontal assault, but it gives the enemy every possible thing.
[01:20:44] It could have to defend itself against it.
[01:20:46] They see it's coming.
[01:20:47] They know it's coming.
[01:20:48] They're massing their firepower.
[01:20:49] The frontal assault, nine times out of ten, is a loser, even if you actually win the engagement.
[01:20:56] It's just a loser.
[01:20:57] And the mindset should always be out maneuver them.
[01:21:01] Yes.
[01:21:02] And when you hear it, it sounds so simple.
[01:21:07] And when you hear it in a business context and the leadership context, it sounds, it sounds,
[01:21:14] and people echo brings up this example of, well, that's just the way I am.
[01:21:20] And what I hear from leaders of, you know, you know, I got to have a direct conversation with this person and tell him what's going on.
[01:21:29] Look, I get it that sometimes there's an occasional pull.
[01:21:32] But most of the time, there's a way to maneuver that's going to make that whole situation infinitely better than your direct assault on their brain.
[01:21:41] Totally.
[01:21:42] And probably the biggest thing that I talk about, and I try to explain and dispell the myth,
[01:21:49] looking when we're talking about flanking your enemies in combat, you are actually talking about maneuvering to destroy them,
[01:21:55] to get into position to wipe them out.
[01:21:58] And if you're taking the analogy of, I have someone I work with.
[01:22:02] This is a peer.
[01:22:03] This is my boss.
[01:22:04] This is a carrot.
[01:22:05] This is someone on my team.
[01:22:06] The flanking and the outmaneuvering isn't to destroy them.
[01:22:10] It's to get to a place for them to recognize there's a better way for me to do it,
[01:22:16] that actually helps him, helps me, helps a team, and so my life gets better.
[01:22:20] And that frontal assault, even if it's well intended, prevents that from happening,
[01:22:26] because the recipient can't actually hear what you're trying to get across,
[01:22:29] which was the better way, because he's defensive and you're putting him.
[01:22:34] So even if the frontal assault makes sense in your mind, because you have this totally outside.
[01:22:39] All your information is right, and it seems so clear.
[01:22:43] You're still dealing with another human being, who most of the time simply doesn't want to hear it.
[01:22:48] And it's going to get defensive and it's going to attack you back.
[01:22:51] Yes.
[01:22:52] And they get harder and they expend ammunition, and we get a worse relationship.
[01:22:56] There's two things I kind of have to say, because I just said this before,
[01:23:01] but because I just got asked this.
[01:23:03] I was kind of talking through the exact scenario that we're talking through with a company.
[01:23:06] And you know, isn't the hand went up in the back of the room, isn't that just manipulation?
[01:23:12] And it's like, well, let me tell you what I think the difference between leadership and manipulation is,
[01:23:18] because they both use the same tools.
[01:23:20] Manipulation is when I'm doing what I'm doing to benefit me.
[01:23:26] Leadership is when I'm doing what I'm doing, I'm trying to get you to do what you're doing.
[01:23:31] I'm trying to get you to do what I want you to do, because it's going to benefit you,
[01:23:35] and it's going to benefit the team.
[01:23:36] And you threw this out there, you said, it's going to be, it's going to make my life better.
[01:23:43] But what you really mean is it's going to make our life better, the team's life better.
[01:23:48] And most important, so I actually want, when I manipulate you, Dave Burke, I'm manipulating you,
[01:23:54] and everything that I'm doing, every maneuver that I'm making happen to you, I'm doing it,
[01:23:58] and it's going to benefit your life.
[01:24:00] You're way over me, for sure.
[01:24:02] And when you look up, in my best manipulation that I can do, you don't even realize that it happened.
[01:24:11] And you're looking up going like, did a good job on that last project that I had to do.
[01:24:15] I did a super job, and oh, and I got a fat paycheck and a bonus, and oh, that's great.
[01:24:21] I did great.
[01:24:22] And that's exactly what I want you to be saying.
[01:24:24] I want you to be saying, I did great.
[01:24:26] And you know what, subconsciously, in the back of that little, thick nugget of a brain you got there, you're going to learn.
[01:24:33] That kind of kind of helped me out that, that boss man, 100%.
[01:24:37] And that's what we want, because then they realize our team realizes that we care about the team,
[01:24:44] or do we care about ourselves, and then when we have that, that's the trust and the relationship,
[01:24:48] and that's what makes that team strong.
[01:24:50] That is the glue that makes the team strong.
[01:24:53] If you don't trust me, and I don't trust you, we don't have a team period.
[01:24:56] There's no glue soon.
[01:24:57] As soon as that thing, as soon as that pressure comes along, we're going to fracture going to fall apart.
[01:25:01] When we have a strong bond, we know what that pressure does to us.
[01:25:04] It makes it even stronger.
[01:25:06] Get some.
[01:25:09] Back to the book.
[01:25:10] The reverse slope defenses an example of using invisibility to spring an ambush.
[01:25:14] The enemy does not know where you are until he comes over the crest of a hill and is hit by our fires.
[01:25:20] His vehicles are hit on their soft underbellies.
[01:25:23] His troops are exposed to our weapons, because he could not see us into the last moment.
[01:25:27] He could not call in artillery fire on our position.
[01:25:30] The reverse slope, not only protects us from his direct fire, it protects us from his observation and thus his indirect fire.
[01:25:38] That is part of the ambush mentality.
[01:25:41] Do not let yourself be seen.
[01:25:44] Fourth, in an ambush, we want to shock the enemy.
[01:25:47] Instead of taking them under fire, gradually with a few weapons at long range, we wait until he is within easy range of us with every weapon.
[01:25:55] We then open up suddenly all at once with everything we have.
[01:25:59] He is paralyzed by the shock he cannot react.
[01:26:02] Everything was going fine and suddenly he is in a firestorm with people falling all around him.
[01:26:06] Often he will panic, making his problem worse as he reacts rather than acts.
[01:26:12] Combine norms may be used to ambush the enemy artillery raids that reach deeper into his vital areas that expected to produce.
[01:26:20] The same desired shock effect as ground-based ambush.
[01:26:23] We place them into dilemma as he attempts to move from the effects of artillery and goes right into attack by the air.
[01:26:29] Finally, in the ambush mentality, we always focus on the enemy.
[01:26:35] The purpose of an ambush is not to hold a piece of terrain just to destroy the enemy.
[01:26:44] We use terrain to affect the ambush, but the terrain itself is not what we are fighting for.
[01:26:47] Next section, asymmetry.
[01:26:50] Fighting asymmetrically means gaining advantage through imbalance applying strength against enemy weakness.
[01:26:56] Fighting asymmetrically means using dissimilar techniques and capabilities to maximize our own strengths while exploiting enemy enemies.
[01:27:04] Fighting asymmetrically means fighting the enemy on your own terms rather than on his.
[01:27:14] By fighting asymmetrically, we do not have to be numerically superior to defeat the enemy.
[01:27:21] We only have to be able to exploit his vulnerabilities.
[01:27:25] For example, using tanks to fight enemy tanks, infantry to fight enemy infantry, and air to fight enemy air is symmetrical.
[01:27:32] Using attack helicopters to fight tanks and closer support against enemy infantry, are examples of fighting asymmetrically.
[01:27:38] In these examples, we gain advantage of the greater speed and mobility of the aircraft relative to the enemy.
[01:27:46] Ambushing tanks with attack helicopters and terrain which hampers tank maneuvers provides an even more effective.
[01:27:52] Even more effective generates even more advantage.
[01:27:56] This is the so important for people to think about.
[01:28:02] Okay, due to it's.
[01:28:04] If we're going against a fighting, I should say, if you're going against a boxer, do you box him?
[01:28:09] No, you take him down. If you're going against a wrestler, what do you do? You strike with him.
[01:28:14] They're not used to striking.
[01:28:15] If you're going against a GJ2 person, what do you do? You punch him. You stay standing.
[01:28:20] You don't go into persons. What the person is good at? You don't want to fight them in their own grip.
[01:28:24] If you watch the early UFC's, that's why everyone lost a GJ2.
[01:28:28] Because you take down. You didn't see Horace Gracie standing in there and trading blows. No. He went asymmetrical.
[01:28:35] That's what you do.
[01:28:38] Obviously, it's what you do on the battlefield.
[01:28:41] When we get into leadership and we get into relationships, if I've got someone that's got a strong, passionate idea about something,
[01:28:52] I am not going to attack that idea with my passion and my strong feeling.
[01:28:58] Because now we're all we're doing is creating conflict between us.
[01:29:04] This is not improving my position. It's actually strengthening their position because they're digging in deeper.
[01:29:13] So what do I do? I look for another thing that I can start to maneuver on.
[01:29:19] Get them thinking so often, so often, so many of my solutions for leadership is all I'm trying to do initially is create like something.
[01:29:28] And you've heard me say this, David, say, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, and now you've started a conversation.
[01:29:33] Because that's what I want.
[01:29:35] Because if I'm not in a conversation with someone, then there's no possible way I can convince of anything.
[01:29:41] If all I'm doing is attacking them, they're not convinced of anything.
[01:29:44] So I do this that the other thing, and I make a couple maneuvers and now I'm in a conversation.
[01:29:49] And the conversation probably has nothing to do with the subject that I'm eventually going to change their mind on.
[01:29:59] You've just tried to build trust.
[01:30:01] Just try to build a relationship and build some trust.
[01:30:04] And you could be 100% right.
[01:30:07] And they could be 100% wrong.
[01:30:09] And if you attack them to prove that point, you get nothing.
[01:30:14] You get no trust.
[01:30:15] And if I, if I do actually do get something, you go backwards in your relationship.
[01:30:19] You go backwards, that's what's happening.
[01:30:22] But if you completely out-moved maneuver in a different direction, and I just come to find that I can talk to you.
[01:30:28] I can have a relationship with you.
[01:30:30] I can communicate with you.
[01:30:31] When you do eventually circle back to the thing that was sort of the initiation of the conflict,
[01:30:37] I'm actually going to listen to you.
[01:30:39] And that's what you're, I'm going to, okay, I'll hear you out.
[01:30:42] And you're going to have to say.
[01:30:44] And you know, people like conflict avoidance, like the idea of conflict avoidance is what you're really trying to do is,
[01:30:51] are you actually going to be able to convince the person of what's the best thing in their world and the best outcome that you're trying to get to?
[01:30:59] It's the idea of conflict avoidance.
[01:31:01] It's more the idea of, is this person going to listen to me?
[01:31:05] And if the person who wants to listen to me and I move backwards, not only do I lose, they lose too.
[01:31:12] They lose.
[01:31:13] And we talked about what a really, what a leader really wants is they care about their people.
[01:31:17] They want their people to just what we'd said.
[01:31:19] They want their lives to be better.
[01:31:21] So do I need it to take, maybe it's going to take longer than I'd like it to take.
[01:31:24] I'm not going to solve this today because I have nothing, no foundation to build.
[01:31:28] I have to start with a conversation and go from there.
[01:31:31] Yeah, where do we end up tactically when we engage in conflict?
[01:31:35] Sure, we're beating this dead horse.
[01:31:38] Sure, we might win that conflict.
[01:31:41] But where do we end up strategically?
[01:31:43] Because we dove into that conflict head on.
[01:31:46] We've heard a trust-review of our relationship.
[01:31:49] Don't do it.
[01:31:50] Part of the reason we're beating the dead horse, though, is it happens all the time, indeed?
[01:31:56] Indeed.
[01:31:57] Here's the conclusion to that chapter.
[01:32:00] Combat is a test of wills where the object is to win.
[01:32:03] One way to win is to gain and exploit every possible advantage.
[01:32:07] This means using maneuver and surprise whenever possible.
[01:32:10] It means employing complementary forces and combined arms.
[01:32:13] It means exploiting the terrain, weather, and times of darkness to our advantage.
[01:32:17] It means trapping our enemy by ambush or by some other means.
[01:32:20] It means fighting asymmetrically to gain added advantage.
[01:32:24] This is what Sun Su-Met when he wrote.
[01:32:27] Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates.
[01:32:40] Yes.
[01:32:43] I know you've heard me talk about dictating the situation.
[01:32:46] I suppose it's to letting the situation dictate.
[01:32:49] But what kind of ownership are you taking as a leader if you say, you know what?
[01:32:55] I'm going to set this situation up in such a way that victory will come, not from my troops and what they do.
[01:33:06] But just by the situation I put them in, they are going to win.
[01:33:10] That's how much ownership I'm taking of this situation.
[01:33:14] We are going to win because of the situation I put you in will be guaranteed victory.
[01:33:20] That's a skilled commander.
[01:33:24] Yes.
[01:33:28] Chapter 4, we're moving right along almost two hours deep.
[01:33:33] Chapter 4 is called being faster.
[01:33:37] Hit quickly, hit hard and keep right on hitting.
[01:33:41] Give the enemy no rest, no opportunity to consolidate his forces, and hit back at you.
[01:33:46] That's Holland M Smith.
[01:33:50] Howl in mad?
[01:33:52] Four star general.
[01:33:54] He's the guy that's called the father of amphibious warfare.
[01:34:00] Fontworld war one.
[01:34:02] And lead task force 56 in the battle of little battle called the Uojima.
[01:34:09] And again, what's scary about reading quotes like this.
[01:34:13] Hit quickly, hit hard and keep right on hitting.
[01:34:16] Give the enemy no rest, no opportunity to consolidate his forces and hit back at you.
[01:34:19] What does that say to someone that's predisposed to go on the attack?
[01:34:24] This is the quote they've been waiting to hear.
[01:34:28] You were just talking about conflict avoidance and the person that thinks,
[01:34:32] Hey, you know what?
[01:34:33] You're just trying to avoid conflict Dave.
[01:34:35] I'm going to roll with Holland Smith general Smith's outlook,
[01:34:39] which is I'm going to hit hard and hit quickly.
[01:34:41] And I'm going to keep right on hitting.
[01:34:46] You've got to not be predisposed for that.
[01:34:50] Yeah, it doesn't say the front.
[01:34:53] It's not the frontal assault that's not what he's saying.
[01:34:56] Yeah.
[01:34:58] For the infantrymen to be truly effective,
[01:35:00] he will have to be as light of foot as he is quick of thought.
[01:35:05] Mobility is needed most in all classroom arms.
[01:35:08] So there you go.
[01:35:09] There's the counter.
[01:35:10] There's the dichotomy to Holland Smith's.
[01:35:12] Mobility is needed most of all in the classroom arms.
[01:35:15] Swift and agile movement plus rapidity and intelligent
[01:35:19] tactical flexibility are its true essentials.
[01:35:24] Coming from John A. English, who is a Canadian.
[01:35:29] Actually a Canadian.
[01:35:31] Or be that known for his military writings studies.
[01:35:38] So here we go.
[01:35:40] Under the chapter usually to think of weapons means to think of a personal
[01:35:43] rifle or pistol the units machine guns and mortars or the aircraft's missiles
[01:35:47] bombs or guns.
[01:35:48] A load of station may realize that weapons include trucks,
[01:35:51] bulldozers and excavators.
[01:35:54] Some Marines overlook one of their most powerful weapons.
[01:35:58] One that creates advantage for infantrymen,
[01:36:00] aviators and load of stations equally.
[01:36:04] That weapon is speed.
[01:36:07] Speed in combat.
[01:36:09] How is speed a weapon?
[01:36:11] Think of sports again.
[01:36:12] The breakaway in hockey uses speed as a weapon.
[01:36:15] By rapidly passing the puck down the ice one team denies the other
[01:36:18] to the chest to get set up on defense.
[01:36:20] Speed circumvents their opponents ability to respond in an organized manner.
[01:36:24] The fast break in basketball seeks the same result in two or three passes
[01:36:27] the ball is down the court and the basket is scored all before the
[01:36:31] opposition can react.
[01:36:32] The results of speed often reach beyond the immediate goal.
[01:36:36] How many times have we seen a score a team score on a fast break?
[01:36:40] A big steel ball comes in bounds immediately score again and even a third time
[01:36:44] unable to regain their composure.
[01:36:46] The victims of the fast break become the victims of a rally.
[01:36:50] The victims lose confidence passes go astray.
[01:36:53] Signals become crossed.
[01:36:55] Tempers flare arguments ensue.
[01:36:57] The rally becomes a route.
[01:36:59] The beleaguered players see certain defeat.
[01:37:01] They virtually give up while still on the court.
[01:37:04] As I was thinking about that section,
[01:37:06] when you watch basketball and like a fast break and then another fast break,
[01:37:11] what does the coach do?
[01:37:12] It goes to time out.
[01:37:14] We can't, yeah.
[01:37:15] We're slow this thing down.
[01:37:17] We're slow this thing down.
[01:37:18] The same thing can happen in combat.
[01:37:21] The battalion or fighter aircraft or load the logistics train can consistently move
[01:37:26] and act faster than its enemy has a powerful advantage.
[01:37:30] The in June of 1943 during the Battle of Saipan, the aggressive hardening tactics of general Holland Smith proved to be
[01:37:38] singularly successful in defeating the Japanese defenders.
[01:37:41] General Smith's tactical plan for Saipan called for applying unremitting pressure on the enemy
[01:37:46] and bypassing strong points of resistance by mopping up by reserve elements in order to press the attack to better ground.
[01:37:53] So there we have it.
[01:37:55] There we have it.
[01:37:56] General Smith, who we just quoted,
[01:37:59] and what's he doing with those hard points of resistance?
[01:38:03] He's bypassing it.
[01:38:05] He's bypassing it.
[01:38:06] Long indoctrinated with the value of speed in an amphibious operation general Smith's bypassing tactics,
[01:38:14] placed the Japanese remaining.
[01:38:16] The Japanese remaining in their fixed defenses at an extreme tactical disadvantage.
[01:38:22] These tactics prove very effective in isolating and reducing the Japanese defense.
[01:38:26] General Smith's use of speed served as a force multiplier and also reduced marine casualties.
[01:38:32] The British Royal Air Force bested the Germans during the Battle of Britain in World War II,
[01:38:38] and part because they were able to speedily recover their downpilets,
[01:38:42] return them to base, place them in a new aircraft, and have them fighting again in the afternoon.
[01:38:48] Down German pilots were less easily recovered,
[01:38:51] and the Luftwaffe had fewer of the long range aircraft required for replacement.
[01:38:56] Eventually pilot and aircraft losses forced the Germans to end daylight bombing and resort strictly to relatively ineffective night attacks.
[01:39:05] Yeah, the brits were getting shot down over Britain, right, or at least close to Britain.
[01:39:12] Yeah, and speed doesn't just mean my plane is faster than yours.
[01:39:15] In this case, it's that operational tempo speed of how quickly can I get my guys back into an airplane?
[01:39:20] And that was a huge advantage of that because every time a airplane got shot down,
[01:39:25] they literally just got in a truck and drove back to base.
[01:39:29] That's kind of crazy, right?
[01:39:31] Like you get shot down, and then they're just bringing you back to base for another aircraft,
[01:39:35] and you're going to go get some more.
[01:39:36] Yep.
[01:39:37] The brits are hard, grace of people.
[01:39:40] Resilient man.
[01:39:42] Yeah, being out there on an island, you had attacked by the Nazi war machine.
[01:39:47] Whatever, bring it, bring it.
[01:39:50] Great leaders have repeatedly stated the value of speeding combat.
[01:39:54] Napoleon said, I'm, no.
[01:39:56] Napoleon said, I may lose in battle, but I shall never lose a minute.
[01:40:03] I may lose in battle, but I shall never lose a minute.
[01:40:08] Nathan Bedford for us told us secret of many victories.
[01:40:11] Get their first with the most men.
[01:40:14] General Patton said in 1943, when the great day of battle comes, remember your training
[01:40:19] and remember above all else that speed and violence of attack are the sure road to success.
[01:40:25] History's great commander commanders differed in many ways, but one thing they shared
[01:40:30] was the sense of the importance of speed.
[01:40:33] An Operation Urgent Fury 1983, the Marines of Battalion, the landing team, two eight, moved fast
[01:40:39] as their commander lieutenant Colonel Ray Smith had trained them to do.
[01:40:43] And they captured the operations officer of the Grenadean Army.
[01:40:47] He said to them, you appeared so swiftly in so many places where we didn't expect you that it was clear that resistance was hopeless.
[01:40:53] So I recommended to my superiors that we lay down our arms and go into hiding.
[01:40:58] That is what speed used as a weapon can do for you.
[01:41:02] What is speed?
[01:41:05] What is speed would seem to have a simple answer.
[01:41:07] Speed is going fast.
[01:41:09] This is speed we think of when driving a car, more miles per hour.
[01:41:13] That's part of the answer.
[01:41:15] That is part of the answer in tactics as well.
[01:41:17] We used speed to gain initiative and advantage over the enemy.
[01:41:20] Like you just talked about, play in this faster.
[01:41:22] For example, when a tank batained attacks, it goes over ground as fast as it can.
[01:41:26] General Ballcast, whether the Russian tanks ever used terrain in their attacks against him during World War II.
[01:41:32] He replied that they had used terrain on occasion, but more often they used speed.
[01:41:38] The question followed up, which was harder to defend against, Ball answered, speed.
[01:41:43] Physical speed, moving more miles per hour is a powerful weapon in itself.
[01:41:47] On approach to the enemy speed and movement reduces a reaction time.
[01:41:51] When we are going through them around them, it changes the situation faster than he can react.
[01:41:56] Once we are passed him, it makes his reaction irrelevant.
[01:41:59] In all three cases, speed impacts on the enemy, especially his mind causing fear, indecision and helplessness.
[01:42:06] Remember attacking the enemy's mind is a central tenet of maneuver warfare.
[01:42:11] I might even call it the primary tenet.
[01:42:14] Yeah.
[01:42:17] Speed in time.
[01:42:18] In a military sense, there is more to speed than simply going fast.
[01:42:22] And there is a vital difference between acting rapidly and acting recklessly.
[01:42:27] There is your dichotomy coming at you live from Marine Corps 1-TAC-3.
[01:42:33] With time we must always consider the closely related factor of timing.
[01:42:39] Speed in time are closely related.
[01:42:42] In fact, speed is defined in terms of time, miles are kilometers per hour.
[01:42:47] In tactics, what this means is always of the utmost importance.
[01:42:52] Time cannot be spent in action.
[01:42:56] Must be spent thinking about how to act effectively.
[01:43:00] Time that cannot be spent in action.
[01:43:03] So if you can't go, what you need to do is spend that time thinking about how you're going to act effectively.
[01:43:08] I wonder how much modern life has chewed up that idea.
[01:43:14] Because when we're not thinking, when we can't do something, I see people all the time.
[01:43:19] They're not being proactive.
[01:43:21] They're not doing anything productive.
[01:43:23] They're definitely not thinking about how to act.
[01:43:25] When they can't act, they're not thinking about how to act effectively.
[01:43:28] So for sure, I see that all the time.
[01:43:32] I was on a flight coming home.
[01:43:34] If I had six hour flight from a client in Jersey back to San Diego.
[01:43:37] Yeah.
[01:43:38] And look, six hours in a plane for me is a God send.
[01:43:42] Because I got basically no distraction.
[01:43:44] I got my laptop and I'm hammer.
[01:43:47] I'm working.
[01:43:48] I'm cranking out.
[01:43:49] I don't know who it was because I didn't see him, but the seat over and up one.
[01:43:53] Got to watch the movie on the plane.
[01:43:59] And I saw him.
[01:44:01] I don't know what the movie was.
[01:44:02] When the movie ended, he replayed the same movie again.
[01:44:05] Yeah.
[01:44:06] And I'm thinking, man, I don't know what he's doing.
[01:44:10] And look, he can take an app or something kind of refresh and then get to get back in the game.
[01:44:14] But I see it and my kids.
[01:44:15] I mean, their natural state is to do nothing productive.
[01:44:17] And you actually have to write like, if you're not doing, if you're not physically doing something,
[01:44:21] what am I going to do after this?
[01:44:23] Yeah. And like you just said, um, because I'm sure that we push back on that comment,
[01:44:28] sometimes you do have to, and I've talked about this before.
[01:44:31] I've gone on a plane and been like, I'm done.
[01:44:33] I'm done.
[01:44:34] My brain is fried.
[01:44:35] I need to watch the dumbest movie I can watch and rack out.
[01:44:39] And in fact, I sleep on planes beautifully.
[01:44:42] I can sleep on planes beautifully.
[01:44:44] If you see me on a plane, guess what?
[01:44:46] I probably got up at two o'clock in the morning.
[01:44:48] Yeah.
[01:44:49] I got out in before I got on that plane and I'm going to go to sleep.
[01:44:53] I'd come talk to me when we land.
[01:44:56] But yes, how much time, so yeah, you might need a little break here in there.
[01:45:01] For sure.
[01:45:02] And by the way, how long does it take to mentally recover?
[01:45:05] Is this a five hour evolution?
[01:45:07] No, it's not.
[01:45:08] It's like reset and take to, you know, intentionally take a little bit of a breather and then get back in the game.
[01:45:17] Back to the book.
[01:45:19] Even when we are engaged with the enemy, we are not always moving fast.
[01:45:22] To some of the time, we are not moving at all.
[01:45:24] Nonetheless, every moment, none the last every moment is still of the utmost importance, even when we're sitting still.
[01:45:33] A battalion staff that takes a day to plan an action is obviously slower than one that takes an hour.
[01:45:37] A tank battalion that takes three hours to refuel is slower than one that takes two hours.
[01:45:41] Just as one that must refuel, every hundred miles is slower than one that must refuel.
[01:45:46] A company that sits down to eat once it is taken the objective is slower than the company that presses on deeper into the enemy.
[01:45:55] A fighter squadron that can fly only three sorties per aircraft per day is slower in terms of effect on the enemy.
[01:46:00] The one that five six, a maintenance repair team that can take two days to fix the damage vehicle and get it back in action is slower in terms of fact on the enemy than one that can do it overnight.
[01:46:11] Every moment is still of utmost importance, making maximum use of every hour and every minute is important to speed and combat as simply going fast when we are moving.
[01:46:24] It is important to remember every important to every member of a military force, whether serving on staffs in units, aviation combat, service support ground, everyone.
[01:46:34] A good tactician has a constant sense of urgency.
[01:46:39] We feel guilty if we are idle.
[01:46:42] We never waste time and we are never content with the pace at which things are happening.
[01:46:48] We are always saying to ourselves and others faster, faster.
[01:46:53] We know that if speed is a weapon, so is time.
[01:46:58] That is so legit.
[01:47:03] Think about a leader who can cultivate that mindset in all of his people.
[01:47:08] Think about how productive your people are.
[01:47:11] If they all feel like every single thing they do, whether they are the most person that seems like, okay, what are sales based business?
[01:47:21] I'm in sale.
[01:47:22] The people that are on the back end that get no publicity that are working the logistics of the administration think about it.
[01:47:28] The leader that gets everybody in his organization to feel that same thing.
[01:47:32] If I am wasting time, the guilt of hurting the team, if you can cultivate that from everyone, not just your point of attack people, but everybody.
[01:47:40] Think about what those organizations are able to do.
[01:47:45] You and I were with a client and we were talking about this and one of the problems that this particular client had was they felt like they couldn't create a sense of urgency in their organization.
[01:48:01] So like you're saying, some people had it at the point, they said, how do we create a sense of urgency?
[01:48:06] So for those of you that are wondering how to create a sense of urgency with your people, the way that you do it is by making sure they understand why they're doing what they're doing and why it's important.
[01:48:14] And the example that I gave was if you have a seal platoon and I would see this situation unfold in training exercise, you've got a seal platoon and they've got a perimeter set up meaning they're stagnant.
[01:48:29] Maybe they're doing a reorganization of ammunition, maybe they're getting a head count, maybe they are working on a wounded guy or something like that.
[01:48:37] So they're in a stagnant position, they've got their 360 degree security set up and all of a sudden someone sees enemy maneuvering on them.
[01:48:45] And now the leader wants to create a sense of her, he wants to leave.
[01:48:49] So he says, all right, everyone, hey, we're moving, we're leaving in one minute.
[01:48:52] Pack up your stuff, we'll leave in one minute.
[01:48:54] And guys, you know, so one guy's like, hey man, we just got here, I'm tired, I'm trying to sort out my ammunition. Someone's out saying, hey, we got this wounded guy, he's unstable.
[01:49:00] I need to get him stabilized and someone else is saying, well, hey, we're trying to still get a full head count over here.
[01:49:05] You know, let me, let me just get it, get a handle my fire team.
[01:49:08] So that's what they're all thinking.
[01:49:10] And maybe some of those priorities are actually really, really important.
[01:49:14] Certainly, we have a wounded guy, certainly, we want to know where our people are.
[01:49:17] But, and those people, so they don't really do anything. They don't react. His one minute call gets blown off and you don't think this happens in the military.
[01:49:24] Oh, it happens. I see it happen over and over and over and over again.
[01:49:27] That's the opituent commander can understand why no one will move.
[01:49:30] As it always says, it can't have everyone, we're leaving in 30 seconds.
[01:49:34] And what happens? Say, everyone thinks the same thing. They just thought 30 seconds ago, which is, I'm not going anywhere.
[01:49:39] I got my gear out, I'm sort of an ammunition to calm down.
[01:49:43] The lieutenant's freaking out again.
[01:49:46] Why can't he create a sense of urgency?
[01:49:49] The reason he's not effectively creating a sense of urgency is because he's not explaining to his people why they need to move.
[01:49:55] So when he says, when a good leader says, hey, everyone, guess what?
[01:49:59] I know we're jumbled up right now. We have enemy maneuvering to the high ground on our flank.
[01:50:05] There are 200 meters away. We need to move right now.
[01:50:09] Or we're going to get slaughtered. And you'll see people move.
[01:50:13] So when you want to create that sense of urgency, when you want to get people to understand the importance of time,
[01:50:21] and that we never waste time and that we feel guilty for that word if we're idle.
[01:50:25] And then we have a constant sense of urgency.
[01:50:27] If you want to make that happen, explain to your people why they're doing what they're doing and why urgency and speed is important in that particular situation.
[01:50:42] Timing.
[01:50:43] We employ speed and use time to create tempo.
[01:50:46] tempo is not merely a matter of acting fastest or acting at the earliest opportunity.
[01:50:51] It is also a matter of timing acting at the right time.
[01:50:54] Timing requires an appreciation for the rhythm of combat so we can exploit that rhythm to our advantage.
[01:51:00] It is physically impossible to always operate at peak tempo, like we just talked about.
[01:51:05] Sometimes you got to take a breather.
[01:51:07] Sometimes you got to watch the big labowski for the 174th time.
[01:51:13] Even though we can extend operating cycles through the economical use of resources, we cannot operate at top speed indefinitely.
[01:51:22] We must rest our people and replenish our supplies.
[01:51:26] The test of skill is to be able to generate and maintain a fast pace when the situation calls for it and to recover when it will not hurt us.
[01:51:36] Timing means knowing when to act and equally important when not to act.
[01:51:44] You gotta know when you can take a little breather.
[01:51:49] Although speed is important, tactical weapon for our situations in which it is better to buy at our time.
[01:51:54] So here we go, here's the dichotomy.
[01:51:57] Here's the dichotomy.
[01:51:58] Speed is an important tactical weapon.
[01:52:00] There are situations in which it is better to buy at our time.
[01:52:03] If our concept of operation involves a diversion, we need to allow time for the diversion to take effect.
[01:52:10] If we have laid an ambush for the enemy, we need to give the enemy time to fall fully into the trap.
[01:52:16] If the situation is still forming, we may not want to develop it further before we commit to a course of action.
[01:52:22] So this is a big one.
[01:52:23] And this happens with young seals, where they would immediately make a decision before.
[01:52:31] And we would actually say to him, say hey, you've got to let the situation develop.
[01:52:34] Those are the words that we would use. Let the situation develop.
[01:52:39] And sometimes you have to do that.
[01:52:41] And there's dichotomy that you go to, for an one direction you're ready to get overrun.
[01:52:46] For example, an error commonly made by defenders is counter attacking two soon so that the enemy is merely pushed back rather than cut off and circled and destroyed.
[01:52:54] Decisive action is our goal and must be time to occur at the proper moment.
[01:52:57] There are times to act and there are times to set the stage and wait.
[01:53:02] So strategic vision.
[01:53:06] We talked about that.
[01:53:07] Yeah, we talked about all the time.
[01:53:08] And that strategic patience of hey, you have to let the situation develop.
[01:53:11] You actually get more understanding of what's happening.
[01:53:14] So the move that you do make is the right move.
[01:53:17] And when you're talking about your folks, not being able to run at the highest up tempo all the time.
[01:53:25] You know, especially if we work with these younger companies start up that are growing and your folks aren't always going to tell you either.
[01:53:33] They're not going to say hey, I think we need to take a knee or I think we need to re-evaluate.
[01:53:37] Sometimes they're going to put their heads down and go and go and go and go.
[01:53:42] And actually your job as a leader is to recognize when that is, when they're not telling you that we need to.
[01:53:48] Yeah, I mean, I always said that problem.
[01:53:50] But I personally always had that problem because no one wanted to tell me hey, we need to break.
[01:53:54] Yeah, like, you know, how many times the late babbin came up to me and said hey man, I could really use it, really either or jpe, he didn't even know.
[01:54:01] Okay, I'm up to me and said hey, hey boss, I kind of get some downtime zero.
[01:54:06] But not my times jpe said that to me is zero.
[01:54:09] Yeah, it's zero.
[01:54:10] So, and other times when he absolutely needs downtime, oh yeah, because he would burn the candle at both end, he would he will do it now.
[01:54:17] Yes, it isn't care.
[01:54:19] He's going to go get some.
[01:54:21] So, yes, as a leader, you need to be able to recognize those things because they're not always going to say it to you.
[01:54:29] A benefit from a decision not to act is that it saves precious resources and energy for later commitment.
[01:54:35] Some leaders dissipate their units energy on constant, unprioritized activity.
[01:54:42] Not all, not all activity support the mission.
[01:54:45] This energy is not easily repelation should be treated as a precious resource to be expended only toward decisive goals.
[01:54:55] Relative speed.
[01:54:56] Going fast and making efficient use of time are both parts of the answer to the question, what is speed?
[01:55:01] However, something else must be considered.
[01:55:04] The enemy, as with all things in war speed is relative, speed is meaningful.
[01:55:11] Clearly, only if we are acting faster than the enemy, we can do that either by slowing the enemy or by increasing our own speed.
[01:55:20] In the battle for the Faulklin Islands in 1982, the British Army moved slowly.
[01:55:24] The terrain was difficult to weather, it was abominable.
[01:55:27] And much of the material had to be moved on the men's backs, all of which slowed down the British.
[01:55:32] Nevertheless, the British still had the advantage and speed because they moved faster than the Argentines who once they had made their initial dispositions.
[01:55:40] Essentially, did not move.
[01:55:43] That superior-oriented relative speed allowed the British to maintain the initiative throughout the campaign.
[01:55:49] Covered that one on the podcast, brutal.
[01:55:52] Continuing speed, to be consistent superiority in relative speed, must continue over time.
[01:56:01] It is not enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then, because when we are not moving faster, the advantage, the initiative, pass it to it.
[01:56:09] Most forces can manage an intermittent burst of speed, but must then halt for a considerable period to recover between bursts.
[01:56:17] During that halt, they are likely to lose their advantage.
[01:56:20] We realize that we cannot operate at full speed indefinitely, and the challenges to be consistently faster than the enemy.
[01:56:27] One way to sustain speed is to use the effects of combined arms when the infantry are mounted troops must break contact temporarily to maneuver, reply or recover.
[01:56:38] Air and artillery can keep the pressure on.
[01:56:42] Manuver cannot be sustained indefinitely, but the momentum can be maintained through skillful planning, combined arms effects, keeping the enemy always at a disadvantage.
[01:56:52] Here, the speed of logistics become critical, though physical exhaustion is a factor, halt's often are driven by logistics.
[01:56:59] Ground or aviation units must stop for equipment repair, maintenance and resupply supporting forces can minimize loss of speed if they deliver the supplies and perform maintenance quickly.
[01:57:07] Thus, they enable combat units to move before the enemy gains the initiative.
[01:57:13] I get paranoid about the enemy.
[01:57:16] I'm always thinking that from not moving, they are maneuvering.
[01:57:21] Don't push her.
[01:57:24] Every company should think like that.
[01:57:28] We're talking about the differences between combat and the differences between private sector and business.
[01:57:37] We work with companies that are one of the challenges they are facing is they have competitors.
[01:57:42] If strong competitors and they're trying to carve out more market share or they're trying to enter a geographic region that maybe they don't have a foothold and they want to move into their to expand their business.
[01:57:52] We talk about what they want and regardless of the competition and the things that they say are things like we want to annihilate them.
[01:58:02] They're working the competition in the private sector is fierce.
[01:58:08] When they're talking about they want to run you out of business.
[01:58:12] You need to do legitimate competition that are talking about here.
[01:58:15] They want to find a natural way to share. They want to run you down.
[01:58:23] If you're not maneuvering into that space, your competition is and their goal is to bury you.
[01:58:28] That's really what their goal is.
[01:58:30] When we see companies that are slow on that and they want to wait and see how this and their enemies maneuvering into that space.
[01:58:39] Even if they're first maneuvering into that space isn't ideal.
[01:58:42] They're in there and they have the foothold and you're able to get that back as almost zero if they get out in front of you there.
[01:58:47] And make no mistake.
[01:58:49] It combat their trying to kill you to run you over.
[01:58:52] And that is hardcore to recognize that if you're not doing it, they are.
[01:58:56] Yeah, and we work with companies.
[01:58:59] It's what's interesting and what's cool is you know, as American military people.
[01:59:05] We always were the biggest and the strongest and the most powerful right.
[01:59:10] But what's cool about Eshelon front is that we work with like, I'll be working with one company that's the the insurgent.
[01:59:17] Yeah.
[01:59:18] And then we'll the next day I'll be working with a company that is the absolute powerhouse.
[01:59:23] Yes.
[01:59:23] And guess what? There's advantages and disadvantages.
[01:59:25] That insurgent can maneuver quickly and make changes and disrupt the big person can overpower and destroy.
[01:59:34] So you get we get to see that all the time.
[01:59:37] Yeah, both sides.
[01:59:38] But on both those sides, the one that is paranoid, the one that is thinking, you know what?
[01:59:46] I'm an insurgent. If I don't get, if I don't attack that big company, they're going to put me under.
[01:59:52] I'm not going to let it happen.
[01:59:54] Those are the ones that step up.
[01:59:56] The big companies that say, oh, you know what those insurgents right there?
[01:59:59] They could take a part of our business and that could turn into a total route for us.
[02:00:04] And I will not allow that to happen. We will destroy them.
[02:00:08] We get to work with both those sides. And the ones that have that attitude are the ones that end up winning.
[02:00:13] A really big, really historically successful company that has done great work and had year after year of good work.
[02:00:22] That is paranoid of that.
[02:00:25] Those companies are hard to take down because they've got all those tangible things.
[02:00:30] And they had that mindset of what got us here doesn't guarantee that we get it tomorrow.
[02:00:34] And when you see a good company that wants to get better and they are paranoid of the insurgency that they used to be five year.
[02:00:41] Those are, and the ones that fight off the complacency that fight off the ego of hey, we've arrived.
[02:00:47] We've accomplished our objective in what, when you got a big company that doesn't, that is,
[02:00:51] Parado de Losing.
[02:00:52] No, yeah, man.
[02:00:53] It's, it's awesome to see it.
[02:00:55] It requires humble leadership. They say, hey, there are no guarantees tomorrow.
[02:01:00] These guys are out to get us.
[02:01:02] Yeah, that's legit.
[02:01:04] Yeah, that's a tough feeling.
[02:01:07] It's a tough feeling to live with.
[02:01:09] And I say that speaking from personal experience.
[02:01:12] Like, you know, and I've no, I've told you and the team is like, hey, you guys want to know why I don't sleep because I'm paranoid of what's going to happen.
[02:01:20] We need to bring our aid in everyday.
[02:01:22] The day that we take a step back, the day that we're not putting, putting forth absolute best is the day someone else out there is going to get a little footage.
[02:01:32] I will not allow that to happen.
[02:01:34] It will not happen because we're on the war path over here.
[02:01:39] Amen.
[02:01:40] And forever, for every leader that has that feeling about their team, those leaders, you want that, for something like me to come into echelon front.
[02:01:49] How about Dave Burks, the reason this company failed?
[02:01:52] How about we brought in this guy?
[02:01:53] He didn't, he didn't stay on the path the whole, how about Dave got complacent?
[02:01:57] And I start that feeling of paranoia.
[02:02:00] There is no way I'm going to contribute to this company, not being successful.
[02:02:06] And if you get those leaders head of created something and built something, and they have that same feeling of ownership all the way down to the bottom,
[02:02:13] where the most junior person, the most, the newest hires is paranoid.
[02:02:18] And they are in the game.
[02:02:20] That's that force is so powerful.
[02:02:23] And it's the way to do that if you're, is to give them that same amount of, that same ownership you have of this is yours.
[02:02:30] And, by the way, that means we're, we can all lose here.
[02:02:35] You have to feel that same feeling of, I, I could be the reason we fail, and I am not going to let that happen.
[02:02:43] And that's a burden, that, that, that, that, that's a burden.
[02:02:48] That's a feeling that stays with you and it stays, and if you don't have that feeling,
[02:02:52] there's something wrong.
[02:02:53] You're in the wrong, you're doing something wrong.
[02:02:56] If you don't have that feeling, you know.
[02:02:59] Speed and change.
[02:03:01] In order to act consistently faster than the, consistently out faster than the enemy, it is necessary to do more than move quickly.
[02:03:08] It is also necessary to make rapid transitions from one action to another.
[02:03:12] While there are many types of transitions and combatants important to remember that the transition transitions produce friction,
[02:03:18] reduction of friction minimizes the loss of tempo that the friction generates at the point of transition.
[02:03:25] A unit that can make transitions faster and more smoothly than another can be said to have greater relative speed.
[02:03:35] In due to, I know that I learned one of the really powerful lessons that I learned.
[02:03:42] I learned from watching my old coach Fabio Santos.
[02:03:44] I was watching him train.
[02:03:46] This is when I was probably a white belt or a blue belt, but I was watching him train with one of the,
[02:03:50] you know, one of his purple belts, one of our purple belts that we had at the time.
[02:03:53] And I was watching him and, like, for instance, as the guy mounted him, as the guy mounted him, he was escaping.
[02:04:04] As the guy put him in the guard, he was passing the guard.
[02:04:07] So he did not allow, he was just ahead on tempo. He was just slightly ahead, like, I'm not waiting for you to settle in position.
[02:04:15] No, it's not happening. I'm actually going right now.
[02:04:18] So that is a good attitude to have in everything.
[02:04:25] In the 18th century, the importance of fast transitions, sometimes called agility, was displayed when shifting from column,
[02:04:33] formation into line. If an army could not rapidly deploy into line, and consequently, consequently, was engaged while still in column, it was often beaten.
[02:04:45] Much drill is devoted to practicing this difficult transition, so it could be accomplished rapidly in combat.
[02:04:51] Today, we develop proficiencies in battle drills and immediate action drills that allow units to rapidly transition from one formation to another without pausing.
[02:05:00] It is important to be able to affect rapid changes in organization as well.
[02:05:06] Being quick to affect required changes in task organization based on a rapidly changing battle situation, increases agility and decreases reaction times.
[02:05:14] Battle drills and rehearsals can be conducted to smooth out procedures for changing organization rapidly.
[02:05:20] The faster these transitions can be made, the more effective the force becomes.
[02:05:28] The place in time and space where transitions occur can be called a friction point. Friction points commonly encountered in tactics include movement from an assembly area to attack from patrol movement formation to ambush posture from defensive posture to attack from one maneuver to another and so forth.
[02:05:47] The transition involves simply positional changes and drills, but also changes of attitude in the minds of Marines.
[02:05:55] The last shift on mental focus from one movement to another.
[02:06:00] So, here's one of the things that I did with my platoons with my task units that was super effective.
[02:06:09] When it came time to do an assault, and some guys would really set up a specialized assault formation.
[02:06:18] Okay, since we're doing assault, okay, we're going to put them, they would make these changes to their formation and I would minimize really minimize if not completely eliminate.
[02:06:31] This whole change in the way we're going to form. So we're going to do an assault, okay cool, Charlie Patoon, you're on assault and you got one squad from Delta.
[02:06:38] Everyone's in the same same patrol formation, everything's the same, but you, but you're going to do the assault.
[02:06:43] Okay cool, I'm not saying, okay, we're going to take these breaches and we're going to put these with us, we're going to set up these special overall, no, no, no, everything's the same.
[02:06:50] And by the way, what happens when we get hit and you know things start falling apart, everyone's with the unit, the little element that they're used to working with.
[02:06:58] And we're, we got unit integrity all the time.
[02:07:01] That being said, because you can't guarantee that I would always rehearse and train like we would go out on the beach and do.
[02:07:11] Rattle battle drills where I'd call all these different maneuvers, rapidly in succession on top of one another.
[02:07:16] Everyone be all confused and all jumbled up and you had to just figure it out and make it happen.
[02:07:20] So we got on the battlefield. We would never get as jumbled up on the battlefield as we would when I was running blender drills.
[02:07:27] What we call them blender drills on a on my cartoons.
[02:07:30] Like we'd run blender drills, no one it'd be just every, it'd be every person would be in a different position.
[02:07:35] So everyone got used to, okay, what do you do? What's the protocol that you do when you're all jumbled up?
[02:07:39] Here's the protocol you look around. If you look around and there's no one making a call, grab four guys you're a fire team leader, make something happen. Go.
[02:07:46] Yeah.
[02:07:47] So between those two things, between being ready for the chaos and the disorganization, because we train that way.
[02:07:54] And always to the best of the best that I could possibly pull it off, hey, we're going to keep our normal formations.
[02:08:04] Like when this talks about patrol formation, ambush posture, defensive posture, all those posters for me in my task unit in my cell pattern, they were the same.
[02:08:15] There's no confusion.
[02:08:17] Like this is what's happening. Occasionally what you have to, would you have to take a little sniper element and pull out or you'd have to do something occasionally?
[02:08:22] Yes.
[02:08:23] Yeah.
[02:08:23] But I would do that as little as possible.
[02:08:27] And I would train to the point that they could handle it if it happened. But the thing is it just wouldn't happen. When you're that, when you're that used to being in that position.
[02:08:37] So the weird thing about this is you might, is this gave us total freedom, because we could assault from a totally different direction.
[02:08:45] I could say, oh yeah, by the way, that looks like it's a secure, looks like there's a guard up there. So we're going to go in from the other, we're going to go in from the south.
[02:08:52] And nothing changes. Everyone's, everyone's fine. We're still in Pilton Integrity. This is just no changes. So that's a little trick that I used.
[02:09:01] It was, and I'm trying to think, imagine in my mind right now, what the driving force that makes people want to specialize for a particular part of an operation.
[02:09:15] The reason that I think we want to do it is because it seems from a broad perspective. No, no, from the opposite of a broad from a granular perspective, if we set up like this, that part of the operation will go smoother.
[02:09:31] And there's a chance that they're right in that particular smooth operation where nothing goes wrong.
[02:09:37] But in any other thing, when anything goes sideways, it's not the right answer.
[02:09:41] And if you actually take the mindset that nothing is ever going to happen the way that you plan it to happen. If you just accept that, which I think was verbatim out of the beginning of this is your plan is not going to go the way that you think.
[02:09:53] You immediately recognize it. That's that's not a good plan. And it doesn't mean everybody needs to be an expert in every single thing. That's not what it means.
[02:10:00] But it means everybody and you talked about the transitions. Everybody has to have the flexibility and then recognize you talked about a protocol. Okay, I can't answer what we're going to do and all it.
[02:10:11] But I know there's a protocol. This is what we're going to do. The four of us, we're going to go and we're going to go and attack that problem.
[02:10:16] And we're going to reveal itself as we move down it. But the, hey, I'm, I don't, I don't do that mission. I'm, I'm at this guy mission. I'm really sorry that we haven't chosen to do this mission because the enemy is now doing something totally different.
[02:10:31] So the alternative is to sit here and do nothing or that we can get up and actually transition out of this mindset, you know, the defense to offensive things.
[02:10:38] That's all mindset people actually can get good at that.
[02:10:41] But through, through doing it over and over again, they can actually get good at that. You remember what you're saying earlier about the stealth fighter, but how you used even though you had this stealth fighter, you had all this advantage, you still like did the fundamental things correctly.
[02:10:54] And that's exactly what I did. So I would have my guys trained up where it didn't matter what person from to you take four guys from to you, bruiser five guys from to you bruiser, one of them was going to step up as a fire team leader and start making something happen. That's the way it was going to be.
[02:11:09] So I had the capability really to mix and match people and set up on a target assault, however I wanted to.
[02:11:15] But even though I had that step, you know, that capability, that, that advanced capability that I could scramble everyone up and it could be effective.
[02:11:24] It didn't matter. I still used the fundamental principle to be as simple as possible because simplicity is is paramount.
[02:11:33] Back to the book, a modern example of the importance of fast transitions comes from aerial combat.
[02:11:43] Good deal, Dave Burke is in the house. In the Korean War, American aviators achieved, this is the part of the book where you just am waiting to get here.
[02:11:52] The first glance, this is somewhat surprising. The main enemy fighter, the Meg-15, was superior to the American F-86 and a number of key respects.
[02:12:08] It could climb and accelerate faster and it had better sustained turn rate.
[02:12:13] The F-86, however, was superior to the Meg in two critical, though less obvious respects first, because it had high powered hydraulic controls. The F-86 could shift from one maneuver to another faster than the Meg.
[02:12:27] Second, because of its bubble canopy, the F-86 had better visibility.
[02:12:33] The F-86 better field of view provided better situational awareness and also contributed to the fast transitions because it allowed its pilot to understand changing situations more quickly.
[02:12:47] So the beauty of this example is it's a literal example of those transitions we were just talking about.
[02:12:54] I'd brief this, and I actually use this Korean War example of the F-86 and the Meg-15. I had totally forgotten it was in this book. Completely forgotten this example was used in the one three.
[02:13:06] It says almost the exact same thing.
[02:13:09] The connection I've made from this story of my machine and your machine, what your machine does well and what my machine, my advantages and disadvantages.
[02:13:17] All too often we see what people want to do with their disadvantages is hey, we need another machine. This machine doesn't do this as well. So I want more resources and I want more equipment and the answers hey, we can't do that.
[02:13:29] If we could, it's going to take us years to develop this and they spend all this time thinking about, well if I only had a machine that turned better.
[02:13:36] And if I only had a thing that climbed and they spent all this time thinking about what it is that they can't do instead of recognizing hey, all right, what are our strengths, what are our advantages here and what do we need to do to build a plan that leverages those strengths.
[02:13:50] You can actually outperform people in a way that doesn't seem to be evident to them if they aren't the what I got a better machine, why do I need to worry about my transitions. I do this better than you.
[02:14:00] That's a huge disadvantage for them that they don't even realize and if you spent less time worrying about hey, what's wrong with the things that haven't and think of where are my advantages, what small companies but don't have the revenue.
[02:14:12] We don't have the market, but you know what you have, you've got 25 people you know quickly you can communicate, you know, fast you can get back and they've got 1500 people they can't get their communication.
[02:14:25] And so, I think the story is a recognition of there were things that that airplane that you would not pay attention to that were vastly better than than the enemy.
[02:14:34] And the set of spending all this time thinking about what we don't do well is build a plan on around your strengths and then out maneuver them meaning maneuver more quickly.
[02:14:42] Maybe you're not doing it, maybe your turn is in as fast your climb and as fast and watch them react.
[02:14:47] And then you're talking to your first move when you're on move number three when they're reacting to your second move you're on move number seven and all of a sudden and tend to one by the way just tend to one is staggering.
[02:15:00] I mean, that is it's crazy to think about what for every hundred airplanes the enemy loss we lost ten think about that with an inferior machine.
[02:15:12] The story is my is my favorite story tell because we're used to having right now the American military are our stuff is a better.
[02:15:19] Our equipment is better that's why when that is not why we win as matter of fact if your plan is just leverage the better equipment.
[02:15:26] You're going to lose because you know what your enemy is doing right now.
[02:15:29] Figure out what you're weakness is all figuring out how you're going to maneuver on you.
[02:15:33] That's right that's exactly what they're doing.
[02:15:35] Another important part of this okay because of its bubble canopy the F86 pilot had better visibility.
[02:15:45] The better field of view provided better situational awareness and contributed to the fast transition because it allowed the pilot to understand changing situations more quickly.
[02:15:55] What the way that translates when you're not in a cockpit is it translates into detaching from the situation taking a look at what's going on and actually being able to see what's happening.
[02:16:04] What do you see what do you see what do you actually see and if you see what's happening.
[02:16:09] Then you can react faster you can make those transitions happen quicker that's this massive advantage that you can have.
[02:16:19] And the amount of people that I know that do a good job of detaching and taking a step back is a very small number.
[02:16:26] It's a very small number and everyone that I know that can do it and do it well they dominate.
[02:16:32] Yeah they dominate they dominate when you are not detached the only thing that is in focus is the one thing you're looking at and everything else is blurry.
[02:16:44] Literally is you don't see those other things and those are all the other things happening around you that you actually need to be reacting to.
[02:16:52] Another thing so the other thing that you had is these high powered hydraulic controls okay.
[02:16:58] Which allowed you to transition quicker you know what stops people from transitioning mentally from one thing to something else it's.
[02:17:07] What it is is it's there ego it's there ego thinking hey I actually know what's happening and I'm not looking at I'm not seeing anything else because I what I think is happening is what's happening.
[02:17:20] I have so much confidence in myself and I think I'm right so this is what hey I think the enemy is coming in from over there okay cool.
[02:17:30] And I'm not thinking that I could be wrong.
[02:17:32] I'm not assessing what anyone else is input is I'm not listening to what my subordinates are telling me what my peers are telling me what my boss is telling me I think I'm right so I'm not going to change anything that I'm doing right now.
[02:17:39] So those are the two kind of advantages that we can have in in the F86 in our you know you might not be as smart as your other someone else you might not you might not have the cognitive capacity you might not have the.
[02:17:54] The charisma that someone else has but if you can detach and you can actually be humble enough to assess honestly what's going on void of your own ego clouding your vision.
[02:18:07] You can do these two things you can you can see better and you can maneuver more quickly.
[02:18:13] That idea of seeing better and I I've spent a lot of my time thinking about what this means in the private sector now is.
[02:18:20] Even how you measure success you talked about being paranoid just a minute ago about what what a good leader in a good organization what they're paranoid about the way we measure success is.
[02:18:30] Revenue there's a whole bunch of ways we have this objective measurement we're making more money than we did we're growing.
[02:18:36] What a really good leaders actually doing is.
[02:18:39] What's happened what we're going to be in three years.
[02:18:42] My vision isn't just the next quarter my vision is is the things that I'm doing and you have to actually pay attention to what your competition now you don't spend all your hundred percent of your time in your competition.
[02:18:51] But you're paying attention to and your vision is actually.
[02:18:54] The farthest down range is it can possibly be because of we think quarter to quarter and sometimes we we even sometimes think year to year and these big companies we work with.
[02:19:03] This long game this long plan is recognizing what we're doing now this it isn't going to work forever we're going to have to change we have to see where we're where we're going and that is going to change all the time and that requires is a leader to be looking up and out all the time you asked that question the muster when should we be thinking strategically.
[02:19:25] People like well maybe.
[02:19:27] Actually I got asked that and the answer is. All the time all the time and that it's that vision of looking of if you don't have an idea of where you're going to be down the road you're never going to get to where you need to be and it's the same story of hey the the win was we took this hill.
[02:19:46] Okay what did take in this hill allow us to do and if you didn't have a vision of where we needed to go and why that hill is important you should have just bypass the hill all together because it's not getting where you need to be and a leader a good leader has to be able to do that and that's.
[02:20:00] That vision isn't isn't always just literal vision is it's actually where where is this organization going to go because when you're inside in your tactical guy like most of your employees are doing tactical things.
[02:20:10] They don't see that they don't see the vision and where you're and if you can't impart that on them and let them understand what the vision is.
[02:20:19] They're going to drive you in the wrong direction not not because they're careless and not because they don't because they simply don't see it.
[02:20:26] And for a leader to be able to see it and articulate that's really very few leaders are able to do that really well and God that organizations in that direction.
[02:20:39] Yes that's a tough combo to come up with the person that can has the vision and then that can can impart that division that vision.
[02:20:44] That means implicitly that you have to translate that vision to various types of people that are inside your organization and it's definitely a challenge and of course that I caught me to all of this is.
[02:20:57] If you know strategically in GJitsu we want to get the top position and we want to.
[02:21:04] If we don't defend the chain the choke we're getting choked if you don't make it through this quarter you're right you that's good you you had a good strategic vision and you can you lose tactically and lose strategically and doing so yes you absolutely can.
[02:21:21] You absolutely can you can not pay attention what's going on right in front of you and you can you can end up getting destroyed yes.
[02:21:29] There was the tender one ratio it wasn't a 10 to zero no she that's right.
[02:21:36] Back to the bulk American pilot developed new tactics based on these two advantages when they engage the mix they sought to put them through a series of maneuvers the F86 faster transitions between maneuvers gave it time advantage.
[02:21:50] The pilot transformed into a position advantage often when the make pilots realized what was happening they panicked and thereby made the Americans job even easier.
[02:21:59] These tactics illustrate the fast the way fast transitions contribute to overall speed and to a time advantage.
[02:22:05] The importance of the time and speed and a broader sense has been brought out in the work of John Boyd a formal farmer Colonel the US Air Force boyd studied a wide variety of historic battles campaigns and wars he noted.
[02:22:18] The fact that where numerically inferior forces had defeated their opponents they often did so by presenting the other side with a sudden unexpected change or series of changes.
[02:22:30] The superior forces fell victim because they could not adjust to the changes in a timely manner generally defeat came at a relatively small cost to the victor.
[02:22:39] The research led to the boyd theory which states that conflict may be viewed as a time as time competitive cycles of observation orientation decision action the U to loop.
[02:22:53] First each party to a conflict enters the fra by observing himself as surroundings and his enemy and tactics is equates the adaptation.
[02:23:01] So,我是onting instances stank searching actively looking hunting for the enemy and seeing what he is doing or about to do it also includes anticipating the enemies next move getting inside of his mind second based upon these observations.
[02:23:16] The combatant orient to the situation that is produces a mental image of the situation in gain situational awareness this awareness becomes the foundation of which to erect a plan generally better the orientation the better the plan.
[02:23:30] on this orientation, the combatant decides upon a course of action.
[02:23:34] The decision is developed into a plan that can be disseminated among subordinates for their
[02:23:38] planning and execution last.
[02:23:40] The combatant acts or puts the decision into effect.
[02:23:44] In tactics, this is the execution phase where the decision or plan is implemented.
[02:23:49] Since this action has changed the situation, the combatant, again, observes beginning
[02:23:54] the cycle of a new.
[02:23:57] This is called the Udrup.
[02:24:01] There it is.
[02:24:02] Udlup, get some.
[02:24:04] This thing came out of airplane against airplanes.
[02:24:06] It's that big F-86 story.
[02:24:10] The Marine Corps saw this and the entire maneuver warfare concept for the Marine Corps came
[02:24:15] from this guy, which is incredible to think about, but it's that, same, we're a numerically
[02:24:20] inferior force.
[02:24:23] With relatively limited loss can outperform an overwhelmed, a massively inferior enemy,
[02:24:30] a massively superior size enemy, which is an amazing just based on speed of maneuver.
[02:24:38] The buoyed theory helps to define the word maneuver.
[02:24:41] It means being consistently faster than our opponent.
[02:24:44] As our enemy observes and warrants on our initial action, we must be observing, orienting,
[02:24:50] deciding and acting upon our second action.
[02:24:53] As we enact our third fourth and fifth moon by the time, the time gap between our actions
[02:24:58] and our enemy actions increases increasingly wide.
[02:25:00] The enemy falls behind an a panic game of ketchup.
[02:25:03] He tries to respond to our penetration.
[02:25:05] We attack his reserves and his command and control.
[02:25:08] He counterattacks with his mobile reserve.
[02:25:10] We bypass with helicopter-borne forces.
[02:25:12] Everything he does is too late.
[02:25:14] That sounds like a lot like rolling with a good jiu-jitsu with someone that's better than
[02:25:19] you.
[02:25:20] That's exactly what it feels like.
[02:25:21] Same thing man.
[02:25:22] Thus the military answered to this question, what is speed?
[02:25:25] It's not simple.
[02:25:26] Nonetheless, it is central to every aspect of tactics.
[02:25:29] As General George Patton said, in small operations, as in large speed, is the essential
[02:25:34] element of success.
[02:25:36] We should also exercise caution so as to not confuse.
[02:25:40] Here comes the dichotomy.
[02:25:41] We should also exercise caution so as to not confuse speed with haste.
[02:25:48] General Patton made this observation haste and speed.
[02:25:51] There's a great difference between these two words.
[02:25:54] Haste exists when troops are committed without proper reconnaissance, without the arrangement
[02:25:59] for proper supporting fire, and before every available man has been brought up.
[02:26:04] The result of such an attack will be to get the troops into early action, but to complete
[02:26:10] the action very slowly.
[02:26:14] It is acquired by making the necessary reconnaissance, providing the proper artillery support,
[02:26:19] bringing up every available man, and then launching the attack with a predetermined
[02:26:24] plan so that the time under fire will be reduced to a minimum.
[02:26:31] There's a dichotomy.
[02:26:32] Always there's a dichotomy.
[02:26:33] Wow.
[02:26:34] With everything.
[02:26:36] Have to write a book about that.
[02:26:38] Check.
[02:26:39] Becoming faster.
[02:26:40] Before we see clearly the importance of speed, we want to be fast.
[02:26:45] How do we do it?
[02:26:46] We start by recognizing the importance of time.
[02:26:51] As leaders of Marines, we have a responsibility to make things happen fast our sense of
[02:26:58] the importance of time of urgency must direct our actions.
[02:27:04] We must work to create and build that sense within ourselves.
[02:27:09] This is the kind of thing you read to yourself before you go to bed night and when you wake
[02:27:13] up in the morning.
[02:27:15] We have a responsibility to make things happen fast.
[02:27:20] Once we have it, there are a number of things we can do to increase speed.
[02:27:25] First, we can keep everything simple.
[02:27:33] Simplicity promotes speed.
[02:27:35] Complexity slows things down.
[02:27:37] The ability should be central to our plans.
[02:27:42] Our staffs, large staffs, maybe one of the greatest consumers of time, are command and
[02:27:47] control and our own actions.
[02:27:50] This is why if you saw my task unit going to assault something, they were in the same
[02:27:54] formation.
[02:27:55] They were always in or damn close to it.
[02:28:00] Second, speed is increased through decentralization.
[02:28:05] Virtualization is important concept in the execution of the new warfare.
[02:28:09] How do we achieve decentralization while still maintaining control?
[02:28:15] We use two main tools to provide that required to provide the required control of the effort
[02:28:21] and the decentralization of its execution.
[02:28:24] These tools are mission tactics and commanders intent.
[02:28:29] Mission tactics is the assignment of a mission to a subordinate without specifying how the mission
[02:28:34] must be accomplished.
[02:28:35] It is a key tenant of maneuver warfare.
[02:28:37] In mission tactics, the higher commander describes the mission and explains its purpose.
[02:28:42] The subordinate commander determines the tactics needed to accomplish the task based on the
[02:28:47] way the mission, based on the mission and the higher commander's intent.
[02:28:53] In this way, each leader can act quickly as the situation changes without passing information
[02:28:57] up the chain of command and waiting for order to come back down.
[02:29:00] The speed is greatly increased by this decentralization process.
[02:29:04] According to John A. English and his work on infantry, decentralization has been one of the most
[02:29:09] significant features of modern war.
[02:29:13] English wrote in the Confused and often chaotic battlefield environment of today, only the
[02:29:18] smallest groups are likely to keep together, particularly during critical moments.
[02:29:22] In such circumstances, individuals rally around their leader, who, armed with the knowledge
[02:29:27] of the purpose or intent behind their task, can lead them toward success.
[02:29:35] And this is what we talk about all the time.
[02:29:40] Decentralized command.
[02:29:41] The fourth law of combat.
[02:29:42] And I often describe it even though it's last, it's certainly not least.
[02:29:46] You need to have the others in place to effectively execute decentralized command.
[02:29:50] There has to be a simple plan.
[02:29:51] You have to have a team that's going to cover and move for each other.
[02:29:53] You have to know what the priorities are.
[02:29:57] Then you have to have decentralized command.
[02:29:59] And the way you get decentralized command is not by explicitly giving em-
[02:30:04] There's a book and the Germans, as we were, as we were implementing decentralized command
[02:30:16] and maneuver warfare in America, what we started doing was we started adding the commanders
[02:30:21] intent to like the last slide of a brief.
[02:30:26] So commanders intent, going back to the book and then I'll wrap back to that.
[02:30:30] The commanders intent provides an overall purpose for accomplishing the task assigned through
[02:30:34] mission tactics.
[02:30:35] Although the situation may change, subordinates who clearly understand the purpose.
[02:30:39] That means why.
[02:30:40] And act to accomplish that purpose, can adapt to a changing circumstance on the room without
[02:30:45] risking diffusion or effort of effort or loss of tempo.
[02:30:49] Subordinate commanders will be able to carry on this mission on their own initiative
[02:30:53] and through lateral coordination with other subunits rather than running every decision
[02:30:59] through the higher command for approval.
[02:31:03] So in this, this German was looking at the way that we're planning and the Germans, you know,
[02:31:08] they're the ones that kind of pushed forward with this idea of mission tactics and commanders
[02:31:14] intent and really decentralized command.
[02:31:17] But he, he would see the commanders intent at the end of a brief.
[02:31:21] There'd be a hundred slides, a hundred power point slides in a brief and then the last
[02:31:26] slide would say, hey, the commander's intent of this operation is to blah, blah, blah.
[02:31:30] And this German said that last slide can actually replace this entire brief.
[02:31:37] What is it that you want me to do?
[02:31:39] You just spent a hundred, you just spent an hour telling me all the different ways you
[02:31:43] want me to do something.
[02:31:44] All I need to know is what is it you want me to do?
[02:31:47] Why do you want me to do it?
[02:31:48] And I'll go make it happen.
[02:31:52] When we're working, the idea of decentralized command comes up all the time as you might
[02:31:58] guess.
[02:31:59] And I know, you know, that because you've seen it over and over again.
[02:32:03] And initially, when we were talking about some of the frustration of junior leaders in the
[02:32:07] organization, mid-level managers, maybe supervisors, they get really frustrated that their
[02:32:11] senior leadership doesn't understand what's going on and they can't, they don't, they don't
[02:32:16] have what they need to solve the problems.
[02:32:18] And I say, hey, who here wants their leaders solving their problems for them?
[02:32:21] And they, and they'll put their hand up initially.
[02:32:22] They're like, and that's their initial reaction because you can do their frustrated.
[02:32:26] And they, I'm like, let's, let's think about that for a second.
[02:32:30] Do you want your boss is coming down here to your world and actually applying solutions
[02:32:37] to your problems?
[02:32:38] And they stop for the thing, and they're like, no, no, I don't, I don't want that.
[02:32:42] And like, well, why don't you want them doing that?
[02:32:45] And then I believe what they come down to is that because they don't understand what I'm
[02:32:48] dealing with day to day.
[02:32:49] I'm like, that's exactly right because if they did come down to your world, they don't
[02:32:55] have every single minute of every single day of all the context you have for the problem
[02:32:59] you're dealing with, and no matter what they do, it's going to be wrong because they don't
[02:33:02] understand it as well as you do.
[02:33:05] And what, and on both sides, what people are, are thriving for, and I think it's just
[02:33:09] just tell me what you want me to accomplish.
[02:33:12] And then leave me alone because I can actually do that better.
[02:33:15] And then if you reverse that with a senior leader, it's like, the same thing is they don't
[02:33:20] want to be down there because it takes them away from all these other things.
[02:33:22] And really all is required is for the leader to have the vision and the subordinate leader
[02:33:27] to understand what are we trying to get done there.
[02:33:31] You know, it's a good converse to that question when you ask the subordinates, hey, do
[02:33:36] you want your subordinate, do you want your boss to to fix your problems for you?
[02:33:41] And of course, they also yes.
[02:33:43] Another way you could broach that question with an equally, probably predictable answer
[02:33:49] is if you say to the leaders, hey, do you want your folks just to do what you tell them
[02:33:55] to do?
[02:33:56] And of course, they're all going to say, oh, yes, absolutely.
[02:33:58] And then it doesn't take very long into that conversation before you realize that they
[02:34:02] have no idea how to actually accomplish what it is that they envision.
[02:34:07] They have no idea how to operate that piece of equipment.
[02:34:10] They have no idea how to program that piece of software.
[02:34:12] They have no idea of any of those things.
[02:34:15] And so is same answer.
[02:34:17] It's like, yeah, that seems like good things like what I want, but that's not what you want.
[02:34:22] What you want is subordinates.
[02:34:24] You want decentralized command where everybody leads everyone's solves problems.
[02:34:27] Everyone's moving towards the unified vision that has been clearly stated by the boss
[02:34:30] of what the commanders intent is.
[02:34:32] That's what you want.
[02:34:33] That's how you run an organization.
[02:34:38] You would think that that would be what everyone would be striving for.
[02:34:43] And you would think that in striving for it, it would come to be clear how you actually
[02:34:51] do it and how you actually give people decentralized commanders by actually letting go.
[02:35:01] Letting go.
[02:35:03] Let people let life babb and go and run the operation.
[02:35:08] Let Seth Stone go and make it happen.
[02:35:14] And yes, do I train them to get ready for that?
[02:35:16] Absolutely.
[02:35:17] Do I build a relationship, sorry, trust them?
[02:35:19] Do they understand where I stand, what the parameters are?
[02:35:23] Do they know how much they're allowed to maneuver?
[02:35:25] Do they know what line they should never cross?
[02:35:28] Yes, they do.
[02:35:30] And that allows me to say, yeah, go get some.
[02:35:33] You know what you need to get cut done.
[02:35:36] Go make it happen.
[02:35:38] And by the way, it's not just life and Seth, there's other element.
[02:35:41] It's Andrew Paul.
[02:35:42] Andrew Paul, go run operations.
[02:35:43] The other assistant platoon commanders, Mike's really go make it happen.
[02:35:47] Can't run.
[02:35:48] How many run five operations at the same time I can?
[02:35:52] So that's what you do.
[02:35:53] That's decentralized command.
[02:35:55] Back to the book.
[02:35:56] A third way to become faster is through experience.
[02:35:58] Experience, breeds, speed.
[02:36:00] Experience, give units, gives units.
[02:36:01] Advantage is over less experienced units.
[02:36:04] This is why veteran units are usually much faster than green, untried units.
[02:36:10] If we are familiar with a situation or at least no generally what to expect, we can think,
[02:36:17] act and move faster, little overlay.
[02:36:21] In peacetime, our marines are not likely to be combat veterans.
[02:36:24] Still, we can give them experience through tactical decision games and sand table exercises
[02:36:28] or war games field exercises and rehearsals.
[02:36:30] These are other forms of training, help reduce the stress and confusion of combat.
[02:36:37] Another way in which experience helps us become faster is through the use of implicit
[02:36:44] communications.
[02:36:46] In implicit communications are mutual understandings that require little or no actual talking
[02:36:53] or writing.
[02:36:55] For example, two company commanders know each other well.
[02:36:59] They think alike because they're vatient commanders established standard operating procedures
[02:37:03] and has schooled subordinate commanders in approach to war.
[02:37:07] This is exactly what I was talking about.
[02:37:09] Seth and Lath.
[02:37:10] Well, guys, no.
[02:37:12] There's implicit communication.
[02:37:13] I need to ask me.
[02:37:15] They know.
[02:37:16] Thus, the company commander of company B, company bravado is not need to talk with the
[02:37:21] company commander of company Charlie very often in action because each knows from common past
[02:37:27] experiences and from daily observations how the others likely to react in many different
[02:37:32] situations.
[02:37:33] If bravado companies commander creates an opportunity, Charlie company commander will take
[02:37:36] advantage of it.
[02:37:37] That is implicit communication.
[02:37:39] It is faster and more reliable.
[02:37:41] It is more reliable than in explicit communication.
[02:37:45] Trying to pass words or messages back and forth over telephone.
[02:37:48] There are so many things that I had that my guys knew the implicit.
[02:37:57] They implicit.
[02:37:58] It was implied they understood exactly what I was coming from from the way that they behaved
[02:38:04] on the battlefield, the way they behaved on liberty everything.
[02:38:08] It was like, okay, well, there's a line that they knew what that line was.
[02:38:13] They knew what that line was.
[02:38:16] It also goes to show and prove why you can't do this thing, this fourth law of combat
[02:38:23] if you don't have the beginning.
[02:38:26] That implied communication.
[02:38:29] That's the strength of your relationship with these people.
[02:38:31] It's how well they know you, how much they trust you, how much you understand them.
[02:38:35] And it's how strong that first rule is.
[02:38:39] It allows you to do this thing that actually, if you kind of think about it in some
[02:38:43] terms, decentralized command, you could actually make an argument that it's the most important
[02:38:47] thing in combat in this particular case because it's so required because you as a leader
[02:38:50] can't be in 15 different places.
[02:38:53] But no matter what you do, if you don't have the beginning, if you don't have the foundation,
[02:38:57] if you don't have a good relationship, you can never do this.
[02:39:02] You can never have implied communication because I'll never really understand what it means
[02:39:08] if I haven't and you can't skip this.
[02:39:11] You can't accelerate this again.
[02:39:13] I'm decentralized command guys.
[02:39:14] Well, that's great.
[02:39:15] But you don't have a good relationship with your people.
[02:39:17] It won't work.
[02:39:21] We were at one of the monsters.
[02:39:23] We were done.
[02:39:25] I think it was the San Francisco monster.
[02:39:27] Maybe.
[02:39:28] Anyways, we were having our debrief.
[02:39:30] And people had to go.
[02:39:32] So it was a smaller debrief.
[02:39:33] Not everyone was there.
[02:39:36] Jamie, who is our director of operations, who is the logistition behind the monster, who
[02:39:43] handles everything that's happening.
[02:39:45] It's completely decentralized.
[02:39:46] But we get done with the monster.
[02:39:47] And of course, everything was just impeccably run from, if someone has to wait and
[02:39:55] line for 15 seconds to register, we get the, like that's a failure.
[02:40:01] So when we got done wearing this room, and I could see,
[02:40:06] and people were coming up to me, saying, this, I've never been an event that was run
[02:40:10] this smoothly.
[02:40:11] They're not even talking about what they learned.
[02:40:13] They're just saying, how is this thing run so smoothly?
[02:40:17] And how is everything so professional?
[02:40:19] And how is every little thing that occurs perfect?
[02:40:25] So we get in this debrief from.
[02:40:29] And what I said was I said to Jamie and Jen, who in Lynn, the powerhouse of
[02:40:36] the trio, who run all these logistics, I said, you know, I should have said this before
[02:40:45] any of these monsters.
[02:40:47] But everything that happens at the monster is a complete reflection of our company
[02:40:53] of echelon front.
[02:40:54] If we can't run a smooth check-in, then who are we to be advising people as to how to
[02:41:01] run an organization?
[02:41:03] And the fact of the matter is, so I never said that to them.
[02:41:07] And yet the team, the echelon front team, the volunteer as well, everyone that shows up,
[02:41:12] they go to the end degree to make sure that everything is smooth, to make sure that everyone.
[02:41:16] And that, this is clear, Jamie never had to ever hear those words come from my mouth,
[02:41:22] because Jamie knows me.
[02:41:24] And Jamie knows that what, how I roll is like, oh, this will be the best thing that everyone
[02:41:31] ever goes to, that is the standard.
[02:41:34] I never said that to her.
[02:41:35] She knew 100% in her soul, that's how we roll.
[02:41:38] If there was a question between, hey, you know what, we can save, we can make this a little
[02:41:43] easier on the volunteers or we are on the employees or we can adjust this a little bit
[02:41:50] and save a little bit of money here or hey, it doesn't matter if the people that are
[02:41:55] attending might not be able to see the whole.
[02:41:57] Like whatever, whatever the case may be, whatever it was, the thing that she knows that
[02:42:03] the team knows that the rest of her, which she implied that right down to her whole team.
[02:42:07] Because you know, she's got 20 people there that are working for.
[02:42:11] And they're all have the same mindset which is we will do everything to the end degree.
[02:42:16] Hey, we'll, we'll make mistakes.
[02:42:18] Absolutely.
[02:42:19] Will we drop the boss sometimes?
[02:42:20] Yes, we will.
[02:42:21] But when we drop that ball, we will pick it up, we will recover it and we will run that thing
[02:42:25] for a touchdown.
[02:42:27] And make it up to the person that whoever was affected.
[02:42:31] So that's like a classic example of implied communication.
[02:42:36] I don't need to tell you, hey, we're going to show up early for the people that we're
[02:42:42] working with tomorrow.
[02:42:43] Look, you don't need to hear that right?
[02:42:44] Like this is just a known thing.
[02:42:47] That's the way it is.
[02:42:48] Like you said earlier, you're not showing up saying, you know what, I don't really have
[02:42:52] time to prepare.
[02:42:53] So I'm just kind of kind of weighing it today.
[02:42:55] Right, that's not happening.
[02:42:57] That's not what we're doing.
[02:42:59] And so those kind of implied thing and Laf has great examples where he was making decisions
[02:43:04] and making calls.
[02:43:05] And I never said to him.
[02:43:07] But you know, you come back and say, hey, this was happening.
[02:43:09] This is what I did.
[02:43:10] But I'd be like, yeah, and he'd say, yeah, I need to call you and say, hey, what do you
[02:43:14] think we should do here?
[02:43:16] And this is because the trust, the relationship, then you're right, that does take time
[02:43:20] to build.
[02:43:21] And what's really scary is when people, when the trust isn't there, when the relationship
[02:43:28] isn't there, and people start trying to guess what the implied communication was, I thought
[02:43:33] you would have wanted me to do that.
[02:43:36] And that's something that I did.
[02:43:37] So I would have guys that would come, let's say, roll through when I was a student
[02:43:41] commander, I was a task commander, someone might roll through and go out on an operation
[02:43:45] here or there.
[02:43:46] And they thought they knew me or they thought they knew life.
[02:43:50] And all of a sudden they'd make a move out there on the battlefield and go, oh man, that
[02:43:56] was not a good move.
[02:43:58] And clearly, I did a failure to let them know that this was not what we're doing.
[02:44:03] And because my, because my guys knew me and they knew what the implied communication was,
[02:44:08] they didn't, they did it.
[02:44:11] And I didn't have to make it.
[02:44:13] I didn't have to be verbal with it.
[02:44:15] But someone that just shows up for a week and all of a sudden they're out on an operation,
[02:44:19] they do something that's dumb.
[02:44:21] My fault, our fault as leaders because we didn't make it explicitly clear, hey, here's
[02:44:26] what's going on here's how we, here's why we don't do that.
[02:44:31] Here's why we don't fire warning shots from a sniper Overwatch.
[02:44:37] This seems like a obvious thing, you know, and life sitting in a platoon brief wouldn't
[02:44:44] say, hey, guys, we're not taking warning shots.
[02:44:46] It's implied that it's a clandestine situation as long as we can keep it that way.
[02:44:50] And if we, when we have to go, we're going to start killing people, not firing warning
[02:44:54] shots.
[02:44:55] You're not, you're warning people that don't know where they are.
[02:44:57] This doesn't make sense.
[02:44:59] But you know what happens?
[02:45:00] And that particular thing happened.
[02:45:02] And again, we as leaders needed to understand, hey, we don't have that four relationship,
[02:45:07] we don't, people don't understand things as well.
[02:45:10] So you have to watch out when people start trying to guess what the implied communication
[02:45:15] is, I don't want you to guess.
[02:45:17] So I don't want you to guess at what I'm thinking.
[02:45:19] I want you, if you're not sure, I want you to actually raise your hand and say, hey,
[02:45:23] Jocco, my guess is that you're doing this, but I don't want to guess.
[02:45:27] I want to actually know.
[02:45:29] So if you're thinking something, that's my responsibility as a leader to say, hey,
[02:45:33] if you don't, if you're not sure, hit me up, hit me up.
[02:45:37] Yeah.
[02:45:38] Back to the book, another way, speed gains from experience is the development of lateral
[02:45:45] communications or coordination.
[02:45:48] If all communication is up and down the chain of command, action will move slowly.
[02:45:53] If commanders and leaders in every level communicate laterally, if we as leaders talk directly
[02:45:58] to other leaders, action moves much faster.
[02:46:02] Federal communication is not a natural consequence of mission orders.
[02:46:07] It must be practiced in training.
[02:46:11] It results from the confidence of the higher commander who has through past experiences,
[02:46:16] found that subordinates can exercise initiative based on the assigned mission and commanders
[02:46:20] staged in ten.
[02:46:22] As you just said, yeah.
[02:46:25] A good example of lateral communications comes from aviation.
[02:46:30] Dave Burke.
[02:46:32] In the air, the pilots of a flight of aircraft communicate laterally as a matter of course,
[02:46:38] a pilot who who needs to talk to another does so.
[02:46:43] A message need not go through the mission commander and then be relayed to the other pilot.
[02:46:48] Events would quickly outpace communication if pilots tried to talk that way.
[02:46:52] The same procedures may be employed by ground combat and logistics as units as well.
[02:47:00] But when what parameters are you given where it's like, okay, you do need to run it through
[02:47:05] the chain of command.
[02:47:06] Is that like, hey, I'm going out of the AO.
[02:47:08] Man, yeah.
[02:47:09] Like, I'm leaving.
[02:47:10] I've got a depart the area, something like that.
[02:47:13] It's such a small list.
[02:47:14] It would really, it would really boil down to a deviation of what our main practices are,
[02:47:23] our overarching SOPs that have these are just some big foundational things that we do.
[02:47:29] It would have to be something like, I'm leaving a location that everybody's probably thinks
[02:47:35] I shouldn't because I think something else is happening.
[02:47:39] And if I don't have the big picture, maybe I'm going to go, hey, look, this is what's
[02:47:42] happening.
[02:47:43] This is a critical decision, maybe then.
[02:47:45] But the reality is, is the question you're asking me, I'm thinking, I don't even know
[02:47:50] if I have a good example where I would have to defer to the chain of command given how
[02:47:55] limited my time.
[02:47:56] And how, you know, you're on minutes, you have, and so if I spend 10 minutes trying to work
[02:48:02] this answer out, that's probably all the time actually, he really had to go execute anyway.
[02:48:06] So the answer to the question is, I can barely think of an example that I would have
[02:48:11] to stop overdoing, ask the boss who somewhere else can I go do this.
[02:48:15] Yeah, and on the ground, it's really easy.
[02:48:17] Hey, we're going to go across this limited advance.
[02:48:22] Do we have, can we do that?
[02:48:23] Yeah, can we do that?
[02:48:24] There's something else going on that would create risk if I did.
[02:48:26] Can you tell someone else that I'm moving into their A.O.
[02:48:29] I want to hit a building that wasn't on the target list.
[02:48:32] Can I do it?
[02:48:33] Yeah.
[02:48:34] So, and you know what's interesting is, again, lay from Seth, they like, they just knew what?
[02:48:41] I don't think ever, life did something where I came back and said, you should ask or Seth,
[02:48:47] where I said, hey, you should have told me what was going on.
[02:48:49] You should have asked me what was going on.
[02:48:51] Those guys knew, again, implicit communications.
[02:48:55] Hey, I'm leaving.
[02:48:56] I'm going across this limited advance.
[02:48:57] I'm going to call them jockel and just let them know.
[02:48:59] Or hey, I'm going to hit this building.
[02:49:00] I'm going to go.
[02:49:01] Or hey, I'm doing this different for the first time on an operation.
[02:49:07] I'm going to check with jockel and see.
[02:49:08] That's never did I say to myself, you should have told me.
[02:49:12] And there was, and there was not a lot of times where they were telling me something
[02:49:15] where I was like, dude, come on, of course, go do it.
[02:49:18] Like, both of those guys had such a good feel for.
[02:49:22] They might air towards letting me know, of course, which I think is the good way to air.
[02:49:26] Hey, occasionally, maybe I'd be like, yeah, I'm in no problem, of course.
[02:49:29] But I would never say, dude, just do it, what's wrong with you?
[02:49:31] No, I'd rather you lean towards letting me know what's going on.
[02:49:35] And I think that's a huge distinction.
[02:49:38] The difference between asking for permission and informing your leadership, those are very
[02:49:41] different things.
[02:49:42] So in that same question, I would let them know, whoever they all the time.
[02:49:47] Hey, I'm moving here.
[02:49:48] I'm doing this.
[02:49:49] And it is an informative, I'm going to let my leadership know almost as much as I can.
[02:49:55] But in terms of like, I don't know if I should do this.
[02:49:58] I think I'm stopping the flow of this tempo to get permission because my leadership
[02:50:03] had created this level of friction that I couldn't make real-time decisions.
[02:50:07] The difference to the chain of command that up and down that you talked about.
[02:50:11] We even went so far to, if you were my squadron commander.
[02:50:14] And I was a captain in your kernel and on this particular mission, I was the flight lead
[02:50:21] and you were number to you were my wingman.
[02:50:24] Your rank did not go with you into the cockpit.
[02:50:26] It didn't matter that you were the squadron commander.
[02:50:28] I wouldn't treat you like a squadron commander in the airplane.
[02:50:31] I treat you like a wingman.
[02:50:33] And the expectation was that you would treat me like a flight lead.
[02:50:36] And whatever the natural leadership is there.
[02:50:37] And that's a good one because we often get asked, well, you know, your chain of command
[02:50:42] is so hierarchy in the military.
[02:50:45] And the example I always bring up is a breacher, a breach team.
[02:50:48] So you have a breach team leader that's running the breach.
[02:50:50] And when that breach team leader looks at me even though I'm nine ranks above him in the
[02:50:53] military, whenever four ranks above him, five ranks actually more than that.
[02:50:56] A lot of ranks above him.
[02:50:57] Yeah.
[02:50:58] If he looks at me and says, back up, you know what I do?
[02:50:59] I back up.
[02:51:00] He tells me to get down, you know what I get down.
[02:51:02] That's the way it works.
[02:51:03] Yeah.
[02:51:04] So he's got the tactical control over that situation and he's the guy in charge.
[02:51:09] And also I'd say this, when you talk about asking me, like asking, like how often did
[02:51:15] life or Seth or one of the other junior officers say, hey, what should I do?
[02:51:20] They almost never did that because I beat that one out of the early off.
[02:51:24] Like that one, we're not doing this.
[02:51:25] We're not doing this.
[02:51:26] You come up with a solution.
[02:51:27] You tell me what you're going to do.
[02:51:28] So it was almost always they were telling me for giving me the opportunity to negate.
[02:51:33] If they said, hey, I want to go to move across this amount of advance gives me the opportunity
[02:51:38] to say do it or negative, there's already friendly forces in that building hold which got whatever.
[02:51:43] Yeah.
[02:51:44] So yeah, there was not a lot of asking me what to do.
[02:51:49] And was there early on?
[02:51:50] Sure.
[02:51:51] The further on the long way down, the less and less those guys asked me anything.
[02:51:55] Yeah, I was just going to conclude with that same thing.
[02:51:57] Is that how I was as a squadron commander in day one?
[02:52:00] No.
[02:52:01] No.
[02:52:02] On day one, I wasn't like that.
[02:52:03] And it took a little bit of time to get to that evolution that ID of the centralized
[02:52:07] command is built on those relationships and on day one, you got to figure out those things.
[02:52:10] And it does take a little bit of time.
[02:52:11] So if you got a brand new team and you just got brought into an organization and run
[02:52:14] your team, that doesn't mean you just cut them loose on day one.
[02:52:17] It doesn't mean that you actually need to spend some time with a little more close control
[02:52:21] than you might like.
[02:52:22] The sooner you get to that, the better.
[02:52:24] But yeah, absolutely.
[02:52:25] You got to build those relationships out of the gate so you can get to that point.
[02:52:27] And if you cut them loose too soon, it's everybody's bad is micromanaging them when they
[02:52:31] don't need to be micromanaged.
[02:52:36] Back to the book, a fourth way to become faster is by the commander's positioning himself
[02:52:40] at the point of friction.
[02:52:42] This position may be with the main effort, a supporting effort or in the rear.
[02:52:46] A commander who is forward can instantly influence the battle as a situation develops for the
[02:52:51] same reason a commander may choose a position at a crucial crossroad during a night movement
[02:52:55] or where the unit is pushing supplies forward or where a counter-attack force is in
[02:52:59] the defense may be cited.
[02:53:01] The key is to be where we can best influence the actions of our units as Marines.
[02:53:08] We believe in leading from the front since that is where most friction points occur.
[02:53:13] But they may occur elsewhere.
[02:53:16] We must choose our positions accordingly throughout World War II and its career lieutenant
[02:53:21] general, Louis B. Chesty Polar.
[02:53:25] Believe that Marines had to lead from where the fighting was.
[02:53:29] This command, quote, post-business.
[02:53:32] This command, post-business will ruin the American army and Marines if it isn't watched.
[02:53:36] He said while he was the commanding officer of first battalion 7th Marines at Guadalcanal,
[02:53:41] as a battalion commander, Polar usually positioned himself directly behind the point element
[02:53:46] of his battalion and his head quarters element directly behind the lead company so that
[02:53:51] he could best influence the actions of his unit.
[02:53:55] In this location, he was able to impose his will and personally affect the outcome of the engagement.
[02:53:59] Depending on the situation, he could also be found at other points on the march or in his perimeter.
[02:54:05] His idea was to be where he could best influence the action.
[02:54:08] Notice even though it's leading from the front, he put himself behind the point element of his battalion.
[02:54:15] That's not in the point element because then he's the guy shooting his freaking rife, not making decisions.
[02:54:22] It's the same thing in aviation.
[02:54:24] There's a little bit of inherent inflexibility in aviation because you can't take your aircraft
[02:54:29] and go 75 miles.
[02:54:31] You can't just leave yourself as the mission commander.
[02:54:33] So actually, when you have a mission of 24 airplanes, you've got guys that are dedicated
[02:54:38] as fighters to shoot down enemy aircraft and you know what?
[02:54:41] That's the sexy mission.
[02:54:42] Everybody wants a mid kill.
[02:54:43] I want to shoot my missile and shoot down an airplane because that sounds cool and that sounds
[02:54:47] like the most fun.
[02:54:48] That's what people want.
[02:54:49] The real reason we're out there, the mission we're almost always doing, is to do,
[02:54:53] this is to blow something up in the ground to affect some underground influence to kill
[02:54:57] some target on the ground.
[02:54:58] So you know where the mission commander is, the guy in charge of the whole thing on every
[02:55:02] mission, he's with the strike element.
[02:55:04] He's with the element that's actually a full wave behind the leading element which is the
[02:55:08] fighter element which clears everything out and he's actually in the strike or element
[02:55:12] because he can see everything is out in front of him and he's actually with the element
[02:55:15] that will have the most of an amount of impact to the mission.
[02:55:18] At least that's the point.
[02:55:19] This is dropping bombs too.
[02:55:20] Oh he is.
[02:55:21] I mean every airplane, I mean, that's it.
[02:55:24] From resources in here up there.
[02:55:25] Yeah, we're up there.
[02:55:26] We're dropping bombs and he's going to be at some point.
[02:55:28] He's going to roll and go, he'll get tactical for a few minutes.
[02:55:31] He will go right through the soda straw in the pop.
[02:55:33] Yeah, that's exactly right.
[02:55:35] In the pop.
[02:55:36] But just like the amount of time that he's going to be doing that is 90 seconds on an hour
[02:55:45] and a half mission.
[02:55:46] And he will actually put himself behind that initial wave and be with what is most likely
[02:55:50] the point of friction.
[02:55:51] The bottom line is this tactical principle that could apply to a marine lands corporal, a
[02:55:56] platoon commander, a battalion.
[02:55:58] It's the same thing in aviation.
[02:56:00] It's the same.
[02:56:01] It's the same.
[02:56:02] The mission commander, or by the way, doesn't have to be this senior ranking guy.
[02:56:06] It doesn't have to be who is this squad.
[02:56:08] It's not always this squadron commander.
[02:56:09] He's not.
[02:56:10] It's you guys are going here.
[02:56:12] We're going here and this is and once I cut you loose and go to your thing.
[02:56:15] But I was first when we did OEF, you know, and we were in Afghanistan.
[02:56:20] This Operation Icona was his big mission.
[02:56:23] I was on Night Zero of Anaconda as a captain.
[02:56:25] I was leading information and the guy I was leading was my operations officer.
[02:56:28] He outranked me by two ranks.
[02:56:30] He was way more experienced than me.
[02:56:31] But on that mission, the squadron commander gave me the lead and he flew off my wing.
[02:56:37] Is that a workload?
[02:56:38] Is it a workload issue?
[02:56:40] Why do they do it that way?
[02:56:43] In other words, if I plan every single mission, eventually I just can't don't have the
[02:56:48] capacity to plan them all.
[02:56:49] So instead you plan the next one and that way I can get some rest or I can be ready.
[02:56:54] Yes, so he can actually go be an operations officer because what he was doing for most of
[02:56:58] that day rather than planning that mission, he was forecasting the next 96 hours of sustained
[02:57:03] combat operations.
[02:57:04] I can't they also can't afford a week.
[02:57:07] He's got a fight.
[02:57:08] We only have a certain number of pilots or number airplanes.
[02:57:10] But the rank it wasn't a matter is who's going to be able to get that job done in the
[02:57:14] upso in the squadron commander?
[02:57:15] We're doing long range strategic stuff.
[02:57:17] I spent the entire day planning and he jumped on my wing and never once had he take
[02:57:22] try to take control of that situation from me, you know, from beginning to end.
[02:57:26] Got to stay humble.
[02:57:31] Back to the book.
[02:57:32] Finally, it is important not only to be faster, but to maintain that speed through time.
[02:57:39] This endurance is made possible through physical and mental fitness.
[02:57:44] Physical fitness develops not only speed, energy and agility to move faster, but it also develops
[02:57:51] the endurance to maintain that speed for longer durations.
[02:57:54] With endurance, we not only outpace the enemy, but maintain a higher tempo longer than
[02:58:00] he can.
[02:58:02] Mental fitness builds the ability to concentrate for longer periods of time and to penetrate
[02:58:07] below the surface of a problem.
[02:58:10] For this reason, fitness plays an important part in the life of every marine.
[02:58:17] Pat and once said, high physical condition is vital to victory.
[02:58:24] And here's the conclusion of this chapter.
[02:58:26] We must be faster than our opponent.
[02:58:29] This means we must move fast, but more importantly, we must act faster than our enemy.
[02:58:36] The aim is to tailor our tactics so that we can act faster than the enemy force can
[02:58:42] react.
[02:58:43] Our ability to plan, decide and execute faster than our enemy creates advantage that we can
[02:58:49] exploit.
[02:58:52] We have just discussed ways to improve our speed.
[02:58:55] Readers of this publication may think of additional ways to be fast.
[02:58:58] When you find one that works, tell your fellow Marines about it so they can use it too.
[02:59:05] Anything that works to make you faster is good even if it is not yet in the books.
[02:59:15] Well, speed wise, we're not doing real good on this podcast right now because we are now,
[02:59:23] I don't know, something like three hours deep.
[02:59:28] And we only made it through another two chapters.
[02:59:30] So probably not exactly the fastest thing, but we are going deep and we're getting into
[02:59:38] it.
[02:59:40] The fact that we were just talking about the fact that we need to keep our mental and physical
[02:59:47] fitness up in the game, there's ways that we can do that.
[02:59:57] One of the ways that we can do that is a little thing that we like to call GJ2.
[03:00:02] How many times did we talk about GJ2 today?
[03:00:05] I don't think it's an overwhelming number of times, but it's definitely there.
[03:00:09] Ask me how many times I thought about it.
[03:00:13] So GJ2, Brazilian GJ2, if you're not training in it, there's no real good reason not
[03:00:20] to train in it.
[03:00:21] I did ask a lot of, well, like, you know, I'm 52 years old.
[03:00:24] Should I start GJ2?
[03:00:25] Yes.
[03:00:26] I'm a 130 pound female.
[03:00:30] That's 48 years old.
[03:00:31] Should I start GJ2?
[03:00:32] Yes.
[03:00:33] I'm my son is only nine years old.
[03:00:37] Should I start GJ2?
[03:00:38] Yes.
[03:00:39] Well, it's my daughter and she gets uncomfortable around people.
[03:00:45] Should she GJ2?
[03:00:46] Yes.
[03:00:47] You get where I'm going here.
[03:00:48] Yes.
[03:00:49] So you're going to change GJ2.
[03:00:51] If you're going to change GJ2, you're going to want to get a G.
[03:00:54] If you're going to want to do G and no GJ2, origin main.com, this is RJ2 company.
[03:01:04] And we're not just making G's.
[03:01:06] We're also making rash guards.
[03:01:08] We're making t-shirts.
[03:01:09] We're making, do you wear joggers?
[03:01:12] We have no one here to talk about joggers since Ecos on vacation.
[03:01:17] Apparently Eko likes the joggers.
[03:01:19] I tried them on one time.
[03:01:20] It was hilarious.
[03:01:21] They are not for me.
[03:01:23] So you know what are for me?
[03:01:24] Jeans, origin jeans, made in America.
[03:01:28] They have a little bit of stretch, a little bit of flexibility.
[03:01:33] When you see them, you have to kind of bring.
[03:01:35] Actually watch the watch the video that Pete made.
[03:01:40] He turns the jeans inside out and shows you what quality looks like.
[03:01:46] That's something that's important to see.
[03:01:48] Otherwise, you don't understand it.
[03:01:52] Then we got supplements to at originmain.com.
[03:01:56] Join warfare, krill oil, discipline, and discipline go of which Dave Partuk again, like clock
[03:02:05] work.
[03:02:06] I'm about to say good evening and he's taking a discipline go.
[03:02:10] Yep.
[03:02:11] Getting it in the gullet.
[03:02:13] Yeah, you're talking about some of them.
[03:02:15] It's two just real quick in the joint warfare.
[03:02:17] The best way to know if joint warfare is working.
[03:02:20] Stop taking it for a couple days.
[03:02:22] Go on the road and don't bring it with you.
[03:02:24] That's it.
[03:02:25] And then I don't think that was.
[03:02:26] Yeah, you won't make it more than once.
[03:02:28] But if you want to know if it's working, stop taking it for a couple days.
[03:02:30] That stuff is working.
[03:02:32] We talked about discipline last time, but the joint warfare.
[03:02:35] Knee, what ever it is, that stuff is working.
[03:02:38] If you get off that, you're going to feel it right away.
[03:02:40] You know, that's, we have, you can get subscriptions to our, to our gear at originmain.com.
[03:02:47] And that's one, that's, I think that's the highest subscription rate.
[03:02:51] The auto refill.
[03:02:52] The auto refill.
[03:02:53] Fresher.
[03:02:54] You're going to get that saying, why, you wonder, why do people want to auto refill that?
[03:02:56] That's why.
[03:02:57] Yeah, because people, they forget to reorder and all of a sudden they're off the joint
[03:03:02] warfare for a few days.
[03:03:03] They feel like crap.
[03:03:05] And so they're going to never making that mistake again.
[03:03:07] You should see this stock pile of joint warfare I have.
[03:03:11] It's ridiculous.
[03:03:12] I will never run out of joint warfare.
[03:03:14] Good.
[03:03:15] So joint warfare, krill oil.
[03:03:17] Killing is another like a universal, just universal goodness.
[03:03:23] And I haven't not taken krill oil and enjoyed more ferns so long.
[03:03:28] I can't even tell you, like what it feels like to not take them.
[03:03:31] We're not, I'm not going there.
[03:03:35] And milk, which apparently according to our last podcast, you're just, you're on the strawberry
[03:03:41] milk train.
[03:03:43] So the thing with strawberry is, it's the one.
[03:03:47] So, all, and look, I have a good to play of all of them.
[03:03:53] The, what strawberry did to me is the first one I'm taking.
[03:03:55] What, what, what, there's, there's no reason to have it.
[03:03:59] Like every other time was, hey, I want to replace a meal or any election protein or
[03:04:02] I'm on the go at, I'll take strawberry for no reason.
[03:04:08] It's that good.
[03:04:09] That's the one little difference between strawberry and the rest is I was like no reason
[03:04:13] for this other than I just love it.
[03:04:16] So I can blame, I guess I can blame strawberry, but that's what I'm my relationship with strawberries.
[03:04:19] I'll take it when I don't need to because it's just so good.
[03:04:22] The thing that I love about all the flavors of milk is when I get done eating.
[03:04:28] Even if I'm like happy, I had a good meal, I had a big giant, let's face it.
[03:04:33] I'm having a big ribeye.
[03:04:35] Maybe it's a bone in ribeye.
[03:04:36] Maybe it's a time of hawk ribeye, which I will not hesitate to order at all.
[03:04:41] And then I'll get home, I mean, I'll eat a, eat a 20-2 ounce time of hawk ribeye.
[03:04:47] Bless that thing, beautiful.
[03:04:49] I'll destroy that thing.
[03:04:52] I'll get home.
[03:04:54] And I'll be like, you know, I need just a little hitter.
[03:04:58] You need to get that mole here too.
[03:05:02] I mean, why would you, you know, they have dessert on the menu, right?
[03:05:04] There's a reason that they have dessert on the menu and a steakhouse, right?
[03:05:08] That's because people, even though they got to eat the steak, even though they put down
[03:05:12] the time of hawk ribeye.
[03:05:14] Even though they did that, they still want something like that little dichotomy.
[03:05:19] They want a little, little, little palette dichotomy is what's going on.
[03:05:25] And the, the, the, the mole hitter.
[03:05:28] The ovon style, the mole hitter can definitely get you that dichotomy of flavor that you
[03:05:35] need.
[03:05:36] I know we're not being this kind of time, but here's the thing with the mole too.
[03:05:40] Is it used to be that if you wanted to get that little sweetness to the thing, there wasn't
[03:05:45] any real substitute for what was on the dessert menu.
[03:05:48] Everything was going to be kind of not quite right in the little chocolate, but, and so
[03:05:53] you had to get the dessert and actually with the mole.
[03:05:57] You don't go, you know what, it was good, but it wasn't quite, it's now just as good.
[03:06:02] Oh, you don't, you don't need that dessert menu anymore, because that used to be the
[03:06:04] one way to get that hitter was the mole.
[03:06:08] You really get it, it's that good.
[03:06:10] That good, all right.
[03:06:13] And there's warrior kid mole too, because if, because most of us are not trying to literally
[03:06:20] give our children poison in the form of sugar, so get your kids, those strawberry or chocolate
[03:06:29] or your kid mole hitters, so they get stronger and faster and become better human beings.
[03:06:37] And don't forget about that white tea, because there's not too many people out there that
[03:06:41] just don't want an 8,000 pound deadlift, which is guaranteed 100% double.
[03:06:49] I'm trying to think of echo, you normally covers this park, see more, you've got the
[03:06:52] science down, triple plethora placebo, triple blind study has been done.
[03:07:00] And then we have a store, it's called Jocco store, where you can get t-shirts, rashguards,
[03:07:09] truckers, hats, beanies, you can get flex fits hats.
[03:07:14] I don't think, well you wear a baseball hat ever?
[03:07:17] Yeah, I got the, I got the trucker hat.
[03:07:19] Oh, okay.
[03:07:20] So here's the thing with the Jocco store is, so I actually have access to the Jocco store
[03:07:29] directly.
[03:07:30] I don't have to go to Jocco store.
[03:07:33] I'm one of the lucky ones that has access to this.
[03:07:35] But here's the thing, I don't get stuff from the Jocco store because it's accessible to
[03:07:41] me.
[03:07:42] I get it because those are the best t-shirts that I got.
[03:07:46] I'm serious.
[03:07:47] I get that stuff and when Eko has a, here's a rashguard, I don't wear it just because
[03:07:51] he gave it to me because I actually, if I, even if I go buy a rashguard, I would, I'd
[03:07:56] spend the money to get the rashguard that I wanted.
[03:07:59] I actually use this, where this stuff because it's the stuff that I like the most.
[03:08:03] And it isn't just because I can call Eko, like, hey, bro, hook me up, which I can't.
[03:08:07] And that, you know what, that's good to go.
[03:08:08] Is he hook you up?
[03:08:09] He, he hooks me up.
[03:08:10] Echo just went on report.
[03:08:12] And not only is he hooking up, cola has, his cousin, cola, he hooks me up.
[03:08:17] It's good stuff.
[03:08:18] And if you don't know this, if you support origin or you support the store, that's actually
[03:08:24] what supports this podcast.
[03:08:27] If you, if you ever listen to this podcast and you can say to yourself, that was pretty good.
[03:08:30] I got something out of that.
[03:08:32] Then, it's, we appreciate, because that's, that's how we make this podcast is through
[03:08:37] your support to this podcast.
[03:08:40] Which if you want to subscribe to it, you can do so.
[03:08:43] Because, well, if you listen to it, just subscribe to it.
[03:08:48] And Eko thinks that people don't subscribe to it.
[03:08:51] Is he paranoid?
[03:08:52] Should I be more paranoid?
[03:08:54] Should I be freaking out?
[03:08:56] People aren't subscribed.
[03:08:57] No, they're subscribing.
[03:08:59] If you haven't subscribed, subscribe.
[03:09:01] And also check out the Warrior Kid podcast.
[03:09:03] How often do you listen to Warrior Kid podcast with your children?
[03:09:07] Dave Burke, go.
[03:09:08] Maybe when they're with me in the car, which is every time I'm driving them somewhere.
[03:09:15] Right.
[03:09:16] And are they, you feel like the lessons are, are sinking in?
[03:09:24] They are two things.
[03:09:26] One, I learned from the podcast that my kids will learn things at the ages.
[03:09:31] They are, when I didn't think they could.
[03:09:33] I always, I had their two young, they're not going to get it.
[03:09:36] They do, because they reference that they will tell me things that they heard.
[03:09:40] They'll, jocco said this.
[03:09:43] And, and I see, they're, I mean, they actually say Uncle Jake said.
[03:09:46] For sure.
[03:09:47] They say that.
[03:09:48] And then the other piece, and if you're not, if you're a, if you're a jocco podcast listener
[03:09:51] that doesn't have kids and you're not listening to the Warrior Kid podcast, I have learned
[03:09:56] things on the Warrior Kid podcast as a parent, a ton of things.
[03:10:00] So it isn't just for them.
[03:10:03] As much as it is for them, I am the beneficiary of that as well and it is good for them
[03:10:07] and it is good for me too.
[03:10:09] Do you like my Warrior Kid podcast voice?
[03:10:12] So I'm not, I have been a guest on the Warrior Kid podcast.
[03:10:15] And I know how to change my voice just a little bit to make it more appropriate for the
[03:10:20] kids.
[03:10:21] No doubt.
[03:10:22] I didn't consciously do that.
[03:10:24] I didn't consciously say, you know what?
[03:10:25] I got a, that's just like, I was just like, okay, I'm talking to kids.
[03:10:29] Hey kids, this is the, it's like, that just where came out of me.
[03:10:32] I didn't say, okay, need to think of, need to get into the Warrior Kid podcast character.
[03:10:36] No, that's just where I'm talking to, trying to engage a bunch of kids.
[03:10:41] You've got to give it a little bit of that.
[03:10:43] A little bit of that thing.
[03:10:45] Absolutely.
[03:10:46] A little bit of that.
[03:10:47] A little bit of that.
[03:10:48] So yeah, Warrior Kid podcast, if you want to check that out and don't forget to check out
[03:10:52] IrishOxRanch.com for young Aiden that's making soap on his farm.
[03:10:58] Aiden's in the game.
[03:10:59] Yeah.
[03:11:00] So basically, YouTube channel, the YouTube channel is called the Jocco podcast.
[03:11:08] And there's videos on it of this podcast.
[03:11:10] If you want to see what Dave Burke looks like, you can see, if you want to see what
[03:11:14] anything, the guests, if you want to see what I look like, then you can go to there.
[03:11:17] And if you want to get small excerpts that echo Charles made that he thinks are legit,
[03:11:22] you can check out, you can subscribe to the YouTube channel.
[03:11:26] And you've got psychological warfare, a couple tracks so that you can overcome moments of
[03:11:32] weakness.
[03:11:33] And we also have flipside canvas dot com, that's Dakota Meyer.
[03:11:37] Listen to podcast 115.
[03:11:39] Yes.
[03:11:40] Listen to podcast 115.
[03:11:44] Just listen to podcast 115.
[03:11:46] Dakota Meyer, hear his story, hear what he has done, what he's been through his life.
[03:11:54] And I talked to Dakota on a fairly regular basis and just check out flipside canvas dot
[03:12:01] com.
[03:12:02] That's all you really need to say on it dot com slash jocco.
[03:12:06] If you need some workout gear, have the word fitness there.
[03:12:11] If you need some workout gear, so you can check some steel, check out on it dot com slash
[03:12:19] jocco and get some gear for yourself.
[03:12:22] And we got some books, Dave, what do you think of the books?
[03:12:25] Get some books, same thing with the podcast, you got the word your kid podcast, you have the
[03:12:29] word your kid books, way of the word your kid and Mark's mission.
[03:12:33] I've got the third book now, way of the word your kid, where there's a will.
[03:12:40] And we're talking a lot about Danny Ryanheart in my house right now.
[03:12:45] And how much mark can't stand Danny Ryanheart.
[03:12:51] That book, the stories in all three of those books, just like with the podcast, my kids
[03:12:55] are learning things that I didn't think they were able to learn at their age and they
[03:12:58] are and their lessons that are applying to their, my daughter's going in fifth grade.
[03:13:03] It's applying to her world and the people and the things that she's doing.
[03:13:06] And as a parent, I am stealing so much from those books to be able to better parent my
[03:13:11] kids because of what I know is working for them in these books.
[03:13:15] So the word your kid series, you got to get that series.
[03:13:16] And Mike in the dragons too, just because it's sort of geared towards a younger kid, same
[03:13:22] exactly the story in that my kids get it, they understand that in a solid jet.
[03:13:29] And then there's this political freedom field manual, which is a book that I wrote.
[03:13:35] And it's answers a lot of questions that I got asked a lot about my own personal kind of
[03:13:40] operating system, I guess, for lack of a better word.
[03:13:44] To eat how to rest, workouts.
[03:13:49] And I guess the more impactful part is what I'm thinking about.
[03:13:57] This one equals freedom field manual, how to get after the audio is on Amazon.
[03:14:02] It's on it's on MP3.
[03:14:03] It's not on it.
[03:14:04] It's not on audible.
[03:14:05] So you can check that out.
[03:14:06] And then there's extreme ownership and then I got a mail leadership, which were written by
[03:14:11] me and my brother, Dave Babin.
[03:14:14] And did you read extreme ownership for the first time, Dave?
[03:14:17] I was at the first book release, Dave gave it to me a metamine DC.
[03:14:21] And I didn't even know you guys were writing a book.
[03:14:23] He said, come out and join us.
[03:14:25] It was in DC for that release and that probably late 2015, I guess.
[03:14:27] And October of 15, something like that.
[03:14:30] Hand in me a copy of the book.
[03:14:31] Was that when we were all together in an event?
[03:14:33] No, it was just life.
[03:14:34] He was in DC on Amazon.
[03:14:37] Was it as a four of that?
[03:14:39] I'm trying to think when you.
[03:14:41] Okay.
[03:14:42] It was before you and I actually met again, which was probably the following month.
[03:14:48] It was probably a month before that.
[03:14:50] Check.
[03:14:51] And because I wasn't going to school in DC and he was out there and he's like, hey, jump
[03:14:55] and I didn't see him in a while.
[03:14:56] Hand me a copy of the book and it was all new to me.
[03:14:59] And for all the other books on that, you got to start with extreme ownership.
[03:15:04] Because that's really the thing that makes all of it make sense.
[03:15:06] Because you have to understand that of what that mindset really means and you have to read
[03:15:12] that everything we're talking about today was a dichotomy.
[03:15:14] This entire one tech three manual is a dichotomy and that's why you sort of have to have
[03:15:18] both those together and you need to read those for the rest of them.
[03:15:22] Even for the field manual to really make sense that mindset of really what extreme ownership
[03:15:27] means, it underpins and all of it.
[03:15:29] You have to have both those books you got to read them.
[03:15:33] And then we got echelon front where Dave Burke goes in with the rest of the team and what
[03:15:38] we do is we talk about things that we talked about today.
[03:15:42] But more important, we give the actual pragmatic hands on instruction and assessment to make
[03:15:51] sure that leadership inside of an organization is actually moving in the right direction
[03:15:58] from a strategic perspective and that everyone is on board and the line and got that
[03:16:03] thing.
[03:16:04] If you have a problem in your organization of any kind, it's a leadership problem and
[03:16:09] we can help you with your problems, all of them.
[03:16:12] echelon front.com for details on that.
[03:16:15] We have EF online which is a tool, it's an interactive leadership training tool where
[03:16:27] you will not just get some repetition on the information, but more important, you'll start
[03:16:33] to absorb it in a different way, in a more comprehensive way.
[03:16:37] You'll be putting the leadership scenarios that you have to unfold and unwind and make decisions.
[03:16:42] By the way, this is interactive online leadership training.
[03:16:45] You have to make decisions.
[03:16:46] And as for good as the face to face training is, as critical as that face to face training
[03:16:51] is with us, it's simply not an occupation.
[03:16:54] It is not a one time thing in this EF online resource because it's dynamic, even though
[03:17:00] it's pretty dynamic, that's what allows you to get the additional repetitions.
[03:17:04] That isn't just the same thing over and over again.
[03:17:06] It allows you to think about what it means to be a leader and how to actually problem
[03:17:09] solve in real time and the recognition that you got to think about that's up every single
[03:17:14] day.
[03:17:15] Yeah.
[03:17:16] And the way technology is now.
[03:17:17] I mean, there's so many advantages to it.
[03:17:20] For instance, you're in a classroom with 170 people at your event and you're taking notes
[03:17:27] on something that Dave Burke just said and then all of a sudden you look up and you
[03:17:29] missed his next little topic.
[03:17:31] That's not happening with EF online.
[03:17:33] Your press and pause.
[03:17:34] You're rewinding it.
[03:17:35] You're watching it again.
[03:17:36] You're submitting a question.
[03:17:38] You got that going on.
[03:17:40] You're going to the Q&A.
[03:17:41] You're watching.
[03:17:42] You're trying to make decisions based on what you just learned when you don't make the
[03:17:46] right decision. You're having it explained to you why that decision wasn't the best decision
[03:17:50] for you to make at that time.
[03:17:53] So yet it's it's it's a great training to it.
[03:17:58] It is and when one last thing, there's a lot of people that are on EF online right now.
[03:18:02] A lot of people and about once a month, Flynn, JP, Lave, we actually get on to a live Q&A session.
[03:18:09] So what what folks will do is they'll go through this training and they'll have I need
[03:18:12] a little more fidelity on a little more detail on this one and they'll write that down.
[03:18:15] So I'm on a live Skype session and I'm like hey, Jaka, what's your question?
[03:18:19] Hey, last minute, that question.
[03:18:20] There'll be a hundred people listening to that and we'll dig deep into that one question
[03:18:24] to really drive that home and that's for the folks that are on EF online.
[03:18:28] Not always a help the person asked the question.
[03:18:30] There's a hundred people listening and they're taking notes too because it's all the same
[03:18:33] stuff.
[03:18:34] So I love one of my favorite things about EF online is those live Skype sessions that we're
[03:18:38] doing with the people that are run through that training.
[03:18:40] Yeah, and one thing that's nice from my perspective is doing the live stuff.
[03:18:45] For me, on social media, for instance, it got I still do it.
[03:18:50] I need to do it a little bit more often, but it gets a little crazy because there's people
[03:18:54] that are what they might not want to talk about leadership, which is fine, which is great.
[03:19:00] You know, I get that.
[03:19:01] There's a broad audience out there.
[03:19:03] But if you are on EF online, you can ask me a question about your particular situation.
[03:19:10] And you know how many questions I get when I go online and do a Facebook Live or Instagram
[03:19:15] Live or Twitter, what's it called?
[03:19:17] Parascope Live.
[03:19:18] I mean, there's literally there be a thousand questions in 20 minutes.
[03:19:24] I did it with I was with Pete and Brian.
[03:19:28] We were new.
[03:19:29] You go to do an Instagram Live, Q&A.
[03:19:31] I said, OK, who's got questions?
[03:19:33] And they break it down.
[03:19:36] How old the question is?
[03:19:38] So this question came three minutes ago.
[03:19:42] This question came four minutes ago.
[03:19:44] My questions, it would say there would be between five and ten questions.
[03:19:49] No, I think it was between like three and six questions every second.
[03:19:55] So it'd say there'd be six questions that would be this question came four seconds ago.
[03:20:00] And so it just wasn't feasible.
[03:20:01] And then I got to sort through all those.
[03:20:03] So with EF online, you're getting that narrower.
[03:20:07] You're getting a group of people.
[03:20:08] What are they interested in?
[03:20:09] They're interested in learning about leadership.
[03:20:11] There's it's a closed group.
[03:20:13] So yeah, check out the EF online.
[03:20:14] That's a good point.
[03:20:16] The master Chicago's done.
[03:20:19] Next up is September 19th and 20th Denver.
[03:20:22] It's going to set out.
[03:20:23] They've also out.
[03:20:24] If you want to come register now, go to extremotorship.com for those details.
[03:20:29] And then of course we have EF Overwatch, which what do you think about EF Overwatch
[03:20:35] Dave?
[03:20:36] I just came back from a client last week where we had, I spent a day with their executive
[03:20:42] leadership team.
[03:20:43] And it's the first time I've been with a client where one of their executive leaders
[03:20:46] was placed from EF Overwatch, a guy who long-service in the military, an amazing career, looked
[03:20:52] at transition to continue to make big impact in a company.
[03:20:55] They get screened through our organization.
[03:20:58] What Mike Sirelli has done with Overwatch is make sure they understand these principles.
[03:21:00] He went off to this company and the dude is crushing it.
[03:21:04] He's crushing it.
[03:21:06] He's making massive impact in that organization and they're benefiting hugely.
[03:21:11] This idea of taking the lessons that they learn in the military and then sending around
[03:21:15] the extreme ownership concepts that we teach and putting them in an organization and how
[03:21:18] much reach they have.
[03:21:19] It's Overwatch's awesome.
[03:21:21] It gives a place for a better job to go.
[03:21:23] But it also gives for the private sector to get those lessons in there and man to see what
[03:21:27] that guy's doing.
[03:21:28] It's so legit.
[03:21:29] And the idea that we've talked about in the last podcast and we brought up a little bit
[03:21:34] today.
[03:21:35] But we're overlaying what you know.
[03:21:36] Right?
[03:21:37] We're not taking an imposing, hey, what is that?
[03:21:40] We didn't amelagery.
[03:21:41] No, no, no, no.
[03:21:42] And then this we talk about this with our candidates that we place.
[03:21:45] It's like, hey, you don't really impote.
[03:21:47] You take what you know and what you understand.
[03:21:49] You overlay it onto what this company is trying to do.
[03:21:52] The leadership principles are going to be the same.
[03:21:56] But we take your knowledge and your experience and you have so.
[03:22:00] Look, these guys that we're getting to fill these thoughts they have so much.
[03:22:04] They have so many overlays to place that they've seen this before.
[03:22:07] They've done this before.
[03:22:08] Maybe it's not the exact same thing.
[03:22:10] It wasn't an manufacturing plant.
[03:22:12] It was in a, it was in a squadron.
[03:22:15] It was as a troop commander.
[03:22:17] It was as a battalion commander.
[03:22:18] It was like one of these situations where they're going, okay.
[03:22:21] Oh, yeah.
[03:22:22] I've dealt with this situation before.
[03:22:23] Here's how we can fix it.
[03:22:25] Here's where I see a lack of decentralized command.
[03:22:27] Here's where I see priorities not being set.
[03:22:30] So that is efoverwatch.com.
[03:22:34] And if you are not sick of Dave and I yet talking, which you can see, we can talk, especially
[03:22:42] when it comes to these subjects.
[03:22:43] But if you want to talk to us a little bit more about it, you can find us on the in-a-webs
[03:22:47] on Twitter, Instagram.
[03:22:49] And on the face.
[03:22:52] BOOTK.
[03:22:53] Dave is at David or Burke BERKE and I am at Jockel Willick.
[03:23:01] Dave and he closing thoughts.
[03:23:05] Marine Corps manual one-tag three is about Marine Corps tactics.
[03:23:09] And what it is is actually about leadership and it applies everywhere.
[03:23:13] And this has been a blast.
[03:23:14] This is awesome.
[03:23:15] And we're only four chapters deep.
[03:23:19] And to all the service members out there in the army and the navy in the Air Force, in
[03:23:25] the Coast Guard and yes in the Marine Corps.
[03:23:28] And that includes reserveous and guard units.
[03:23:31] Everyone that is out there that have worn the cloth of this nation.
[03:23:35] Thank you for making the podcast possible by upholding freedom and democracy in the world.
[03:23:42] And of course, to our police and law enforcement and firefighters and paramedics and EMTs
[03:23:48] and dispatchers and correctional officers and board patrol and secret surfers and all the
[03:23:52] first responders out there, you also make this podcast possible.
[03:23:58] By providing the safety that we cherish in our great homeland and to everyone else.
[03:24:07] That is out there.
[03:24:08] Remember some of those things that we talked about today.
[03:24:11] Remember to make maximum use of every hour and every minute.
[03:24:19] Remember that a good tactician has a constant sense of urgency.
[03:24:23] We should feel guilty when we're idle.
[03:24:29] Guilty when we're idle never waste time and never be content.
[03:24:34] Never be content with the pace at which things are happening.
[03:24:39] You should always try and drive it faster.
[03:24:45] Time is important.
[03:24:47] And we have a absolute responsibility to make things happen.
[03:24:57] In order to do that, what you have to do is get up every day and go get after it.
[03:25:08] Until next time, this is Jockel and Dave out.