Jocko Podcast 144 w/ Echo Charles - We Lie To Ourselves. Interview w/ Col. David Hackworth

2018-09-26T15:22:18Z

Join the conversation on Twitter/Instagram: @jockowillink @echocharles 0:00:00 - Opening 0:02:23 - PBS Interview with Col. David Hackworth. 1:31:01 - Final thoughts and take-aways. 1:36:24 - How to Stay on the Path / Support. 2:20:12 - Closing Gratitude.

AI summary of episode

And even to me, it kind of seems like even if it wasn't stuff to use like, I mean, man, it's a spectrum, like some, you know, hot like when, you know, on the movie where the criminal, they're chasing the criminal with the dogs and the criminal left part of his shirt or something and the dog sort of smells it. But isn't that like, like I said, like, isn't that like because of intelligence that they had and stuff like there was more to it than just, hey, let's just, yeah, When it was, my experience just like, you know, obviously, it's surprised enough to tell you about it, you know, and just like me, where's like dang bro? Like, especially at first, when you use two of these different, like you're like, what if you came across the results of a bomb and it's like dang So when I tell you like out loud stuff and some of the stuff is like, I just start telling you and just the work of your face and like, I know the answer already. So so offensive is kind of when you think about it, it's just like a mindset, kind of mainly to begin with because it's like a, it's like a forward leaning mindset. Like, all like, I don't know, like, oh, no. It's like that feeling like your enemy has like something in yours, right? So if you're a company, you're like, hey, I think dordidour is the way to go because back in, you know, 75, we were killing, you know, kind of thing. You know what's, you know, so fun is like me, I'm all like surprised. And then just the fact that, for example, like what if in Iraq, you capture somebody or whatever, any has like a pair of like some old army boots or something. It's like, I'm on this, it's on, I'm on this like psychological pat-like. Because this is like, it feels like it could be like this could be funny. Yeah, because you know, when people make a change in their whatever, you know, they make, it's like, what do you actually, your, the first of my heard this over-corrected. You know, so it kind of exposes this element of like, like just immense of individuality of a person. Actually on this particular training exercise, when we were going into the field, it was raining when we got in the field that started sleeping, you know, like ice and that turned to snow. You know, when I do all this work to shift it around, but if I were to just shift it around and be like, that's the new schedule, like I could do it. Yeah, because they seem kind of sensitive too when you think about it, you know, like they're going to sensitive. I was just using that coffee can, you know, like two days ago or something like that. You know, it's just like, yes, yes, like constant. That says that like, you know, she was like overweight Like, because it's like, you just had the whole bill, you know? Because like if you're like, hey, you already got the pull-up bar. I mean, the way I imagined it is like, you know, I don't know, you're in the pool or the bath. You know, so it's kind of like, I don't know. So I had like, and they suggested like the main thing you'd get from a GG tournament and a little cheesy metal and a T-shirt. That's what it's kind of like, when my wife will be like, hey, can you, can you just go later? It's like, man, you know what that, you know what that says? Yeah, so like in your situation that you're like, so if I punch you, I was on offense. And we were rolling for, like, pretty long as far as two guys rolling, and then you're like, isn't it just so awesome when you have your own gym? The like came earlier, which was like, I should really get this done right now. Anyway, I'll text Andy and like, I'm like, hey, I'm heading to the gym in 15 minutes. I mean, yes, but not like you like pull ups. Like, like, a, hey, I went and ran stairs this morning. If they're like, hey, is Gigi to the best martial arm like not even the other options don't even enter. They talk about the generals like West Moreland would say, oh, you know, there's this many people and they wouldn't count the local populace or these local guerrillas as insurgents. Wasn't the fighting from 72 to 75 more like a more like conventional warfare. Well, I'm going to blow up regarding, and of course, I'm not going to be saying, hey, you know, you're showing up late and I'm kind of tired.

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Episode transcript

[00:00:00] This is Jockel Podcast number 144.
[00:00:03] With echo Charles and me, Jockel Willink.
[00:00:06] Good evening, echo.
[00:00:07] Good evening.
[00:00:08] And a few episodes back, I referenced an interview that I had read with Colonel David
[00:00:16] Hackworth.
[00:00:17] The author of about face, my favorite book of all time, check.
[00:00:22] And it was actually on podcast number 142.
[00:00:25] And I referenced this interview and I said I would cover it in the future on a podcast.
[00:00:30] So here we are.
[00:00:31] 144.
[00:00:32] The interview is from PBS.org.
[00:00:36] They had a show called People's Century.
[00:00:40] And inside that show, inside that series, there was one part of it.
[00:00:45] I guess it maybe was an episode.
[00:00:47] It was called Gorilla War.
[00:00:49] So we're going to take a look at that also on top of that to expand on some of the
[00:00:54] topics.
[00:00:55] I'm also going to take a look at a book called Vietnam Primer.
[00:01:01] And it's a pretty cool book.
[00:01:03] It's very tactical.
[00:01:04] And when I say tactical, I'm not talking about, I'm talking actual tactical.
[00:01:09] Like it shows where you should put your security elements while you're in Vietnam.
[00:01:14] What's the best way to maneuver through the jungle in Vietnam?
[00:01:18] It's very, very specific to that kind of jungle fighting.
[00:01:21] But there are definitely some topics in it that I wanted to pull out.
[00:01:24] That is the book in about face when Hackworth is talking about working with SLA Marshall,
[00:01:31] which we covered his book on 142.
[00:01:35] He's talking about how he worked with him.
[00:01:37] And they wrote when they got done with going and interviewing all these people, they wrote
[00:01:42] the book Vietnam Primer.
[00:01:44] And so I wanted to at least take a look at that.
[00:01:47] I probably won't cover it any great depth on the podcast because it's so tactical.
[00:01:53] And it's very specific to that time.
[00:01:56] And maybe I'll cover it someday.
[00:01:58] But because you never know.
[00:02:00] Well, anyways, there's definitely some things to get out of it that I want to look at.
[00:02:05] And we'll pull some of those up today.
[00:02:07] But the basis is to look at this interview with Hackworth.
[00:02:12] And I think you're going to see it.
[00:02:15] It takes a lot of stuff from about face and just really puts it in the clear.
[00:02:21] So here we go, people's century, guerrilla wars.
[00:02:28] And this is the interview with David Hackworth from PBS.
[00:02:34] What do you think the Viet Kong learned from Mount Saitong?
[00:02:39] And Hackworth says, I think the major thing was how a poor man fights a rich man.
[00:02:44] How a war can be fought employing ancient rules first developed by Sunsu, the need for
[00:02:51] patience, the need for political motivation, the need to fight a war of economy and how to
[00:02:58] employ all the rules of warfare.
[00:03:02] So there you go.
[00:03:03] That's a little way to start this thing off, the need for patience, the need for political
[00:03:08] motivation, he gets into this.
[00:03:10] And he talks a lot about talks a lot about the economy.
[00:03:13] Because that's something that you can lose track of as a front line person.
[00:03:17] But you need to think about it.
[00:03:19] Next, this is very interesting.
[00:03:23] One lesson should the Americans have learned from the French defeat.
[00:03:27] So the French got beaten Vietnam and here's what Hackworth says.
[00:03:29] Well, I think the major lesson they should have learned was that that war didn't involve
[00:03:36] the security of France.
[00:03:38] And the security of the United States, it wasn't at issue either.
[00:03:41] On a tactical level, they didn't have an objective.
[00:03:45] They didn't have an objective on a tactical level.
[00:03:47] So clearly the point is you have to have an objective.
[00:03:52] He goes on.
[00:03:54] The Americans should have studied the lessons of the French very closely and taken something
[00:03:58] from them.
[00:03:59] A correspondent once asked the General Westmourlin, the American Commanding General and
[00:04:03] architect of the war, what he thought of how the French fought the war and was he studying
[00:04:09] the lessons of the French.
[00:04:12] He said, why should I study the lessons of the French?
[00:04:16] They haven't won a war since Napoleon.
[00:04:19] This was the attitude of American total arrogance.
[00:04:26] We didn't learn from the past.
[00:04:28] We didn't learn from our own experience by going back to when we beat Britain in 1776.
[00:04:34] At that time, the British had argued that we didn't fight in formations such as theirs,
[00:04:39] a big block formation.
[00:04:41] We didn't meet them in the open and fought, and we fought like the Indians, behind trees
[00:04:45] using concealment and cover and so on.
[00:04:48] And a couple hundred years later, we had the British mentality towards fighting.
[00:04:54] And we had forgotten the lessons that we had taught the British.
[00:05:01] That's things, doesn't it?
[00:05:03] And that ego gets out of control.
[00:05:05] Can you think about that?
[00:05:07] That quote from Westmourlin is awful.
[00:05:11] Why should I study the lessons of French?
[00:05:14] They hadn't won a war since Napoleon.
[00:05:17] That's awful to read.
[00:05:21] That is why the seals that when I was running training, the seals that would get fired,
[00:05:30] the seals that would get fired for leadership problems or from leadership positions,
[00:05:36] they would be getting fired.
[00:05:37] Because of that attitude right there, they don't listen to anybody.
[00:05:42] And what's interesting about this hackworth is actually saying, the lose, you should
[00:05:46] actually even listen to the loser.
[00:05:52] Put that ego in check.
[00:05:55] Next question.
[00:05:57] Don't you think that the United States tremendous firepower could have won the war?
[00:06:03] Hackworth.
[00:06:04] The war could never have been won in terms of the employment of firepower.
[00:06:08] The solution to winning the war was to cause reform in the government to win the hearts
[00:06:13] and minds of the people to make the cause justifiable so that the people of the country
[00:06:19] were willing to give up their lives.
[00:06:21] This was not done.
[00:06:23] You could have used all the firepower in the world, all the technical ability that the
[00:06:28] US had to fight the enemy, and you'd have maybe won a temporary tactical respite.
[00:06:35] That's important because sometimes you think yourself, well if we put enough bombs on
[00:06:40] them, we can shut them down.
[00:06:42] I mean, short of nooking them.
[00:06:45] But I think that's important.
[00:06:46] He's saying you could maybe possibly win.
[00:06:49] Because I think that's enough.
[00:06:50] Yeah, I mean, if you drop enough bombs on people, you know, you can shut them down.
[00:06:53] But he's saying you can win a tactical, a temporary tactical respite.
[00:07:00] Back to the interview, but we'd never won a war strategically unless we had people had the
[00:07:06] people join our side.
[00:07:08] I'm going to read that again.
[00:07:10] But we'd never have won the war strategically unless we had the people on our side.
[00:07:15] The war was about the people in winning over their hearts and their minds and their allegiance
[00:07:20] to the host country.
[00:07:21] The host country in Vietnam was made up of gangsters.
[00:07:27] Next question.
[00:07:29] But you weren't there as a soldier to win hearts and minds.
[00:07:32] You were there strictly for military purposes.
[00:07:36] Hackworth.
[00:07:38] If you were a student of warfare, if you were a student of warfare as I was, you quickly realized
[00:07:43] that tactically, we were not going to win the war and we had to win the people.
[00:07:48] And this is basically the same conclusion.
[00:07:53] When I got to Iraq the second time and I saw the intel reports and saw that what we were
[00:07:55] doing was the capture kill missions.
[00:07:59] And I saw that they had as many targets.
[00:08:02] You know, I was in Iraq, 2003, 2004, and they had as many targets up on the wall in 2006
[00:08:09] when I got back as they had when I left.
[00:08:12] So that to me said, this is just, when is this ever going to stop?
[00:08:18] It didn't look like it to me.
[00:08:20] We had to do something different.
[00:08:21] And that's when I read the counter-insertancy manual.
[00:08:24] My second day on the poemeters, something like that, and figured out what he was saying
[00:08:30] right there.
[00:08:31] You had to take care of the people.
[00:08:35] Next question.
[00:08:37] So were the efforts to resettle whole villages of Vietnamese a good way to fight this war?
[00:08:43] Hackworth.
[00:08:44] So, because the Americans again tried to impose their values on the country of Vietnam without
[00:08:50] understanding the culture and the religion of Vietnam.
[00:08:53] It was a country made up of Buddhists who worshipped ancestors.
[00:08:58] Frequently, listen this, frequently people who had been moved from their homes would go through
[00:09:02] mine fields to get back to worship at the graves of their ancestors.
[00:09:06] We didn't understand that we didn't understand what the Vietnamese culture was all about.
[00:09:12] So imagine that you're thinking you can just move people around.
[00:09:16] No, actually you can't do that.
[00:09:18] That ground is holy to them.
[00:09:20] That ground is where their family is.
[00:09:22] They have deep rooted ties.
[00:09:25] And we didn't recognize that.
[00:09:26] Next question.
[00:09:28] What do you think was so particularly good about the Vietnam scurrilla fighters?
[00:09:32] What did you as a military man respect about them most?
[00:09:36] Hackworth.
[00:09:37] We respected their dedication, the fire in their belly, their great strong belief in freedom.
[00:09:44] So, that's interesting.
[00:09:46] Because of course, we're looking at them, we're looking at the Vietnamese thinking they're
[00:09:51] communist and they're, we think we're fighting for freedom, right?
[00:09:58] And this is, this is a fairly common opinion about Vietnam is that they just didn't want
[00:10:09] outsiders.
[00:10:10] Like they saw any outsiders were, were imposing on their freedom.
[00:10:15] So even if we were going to bring glorious democracy, it wasn't their glorious democracy
[00:10:20] since anyone at home.
[00:10:24] Back to the interview, there's was a mission, a complete dedication to winning independence
[00:10:28] for their country.
[00:10:29] So there you have it.
[00:10:30] So I respected them for where they were coming from.
[00:10:34] Maybe it was empathy.
[00:10:35] My ancestors, two or three hundred years ago, had fought for the British.
[00:10:39] Oh, sorry, had fought the British.
[00:10:42] What about their strategy in tactics?
[00:10:45] Hackworth.
[00:10:47] As fighters, they were very fanatical and very dedicated.
[00:10:51] They were like my paratroopers who were extraordinarily fine soldiers.
[00:10:56] A soldier tends to respect the counterpart that's a heavyweight.
[00:11:00] And they were indeed heavyweights because of their devotion to the cause.
[00:11:07] Next question.
[00:11:08] A female gorilla leader said that sometimes when they shot an American soldier, his comrades
[00:11:14] would come up to get the body and then they'd all burst into tears, which she said was
[00:11:18] a wonderful opportunity to shoot them or to grab their weapons.
[00:11:24] Is that a fair comment?
[00:11:26] Hackworth.
[00:11:28] It's right on the mark.
[00:11:30] The problem with Americans fighting that war was that as the war went on, they lost leadership.
[00:11:38] They lost their hardcore professional leaders.
[00:11:42] A professional soldier does not go after wounded.
[00:11:45] He leaves that to the medics.
[00:11:47] The soldiers that are not well trained and not well disciplined by their leaders tend to
[00:11:52] become more of a group of fraternity buddies who care very much for their fallen comrades
[00:11:58] and who want to get him out of the line of fire.
[00:12:01] In Vietnam, it was known that the standard technique to use was to hit the first guy,
[00:12:07] then take out anybody going after him.
[00:12:10] That was how they'd add to their casualty list.
[00:12:13] I've had my soldiers tell me that a guy might have been hit in the leg in a hot firefight
[00:12:18] and his opponent only 10 or 15 feet away would be pointing at him, giving him the finger,
[00:12:24] doing all these things to tease him while he's waiting for someone to come out and pull
[00:12:28] him away.
[00:12:30] Then they could blow that guy away too.
[00:12:36] Prioritized an execute.
[00:12:37] You've got to know what the most important problem you've got and it's not the wounded guy.
[00:12:41] It's the guy that's trying to kill you.
[00:12:45] You've got to be able to train your guys to be able to overcome that emotional situation
[00:12:50] that they're going through because that's going to be the instinct.
[00:12:52] That's the human instinct.
[00:12:56] Next question.
[00:12:57] The Vietcong hit in the jungle, but in the Maycong Delta there really isn't any jungle,
[00:13:02] so where did the Vietcong hide?
[00:13:04] I like this answer.
[00:13:07] Hackworth.
[00:13:08] Well, they were hidden in the jungle that was always alongside the waterways which tended
[00:13:12] to be very thick and well-buby trapped out in front.
[00:13:17] They were hidden by the people.
[00:13:19] They hid in the waterways.
[00:13:20] They would get underwater and take a read and put it above the water and breathe through
[00:13:24] that.
[00:13:25] Then surround themselves with a bit of floating neepa grass.
[00:13:28] They would dig caves under the waterways and then put a bit of read up to the top and
[00:13:33] breathe through that. They were very, very cunning fighters.
[00:13:39] Yeah, that's like what you hear about in the movies, right?
[00:13:45] The little read.
[00:13:47] Breathing through a read.
[00:13:48] They're actually doing that.
[00:13:49] He goes into that more here.
[00:13:52] Next question.
[00:13:53] Did you have any personal experience of finding Vietcong lurking under the water surface?
[00:13:58] Hackworth.
[00:13:59] Oh, commonly.
[00:14:00] If we saw a bit of neepa floating down a waterway, a bit of jungle debris, we
[00:14:03] fired out it in invariably, it would turn red.
[00:14:07] That meant that below was a Vietcong hanging onto the roots of the debris with a read
[00:14:12] going up to get air and we'd killed one enemy.
[00:14:15] Once we located them, I always took concertino wire and put it on both sides of the
[00:14:20] creeks so they couldn't float down.
[00:14:22] They'd run into the wire.
[00:14:23] I instructed my soldiers to fire at any foliage and in most cases there would be a
[00:14:27] Vietcong hanging on trying to get out.
[00:14:31] They were simply the most skillful, the most dedicated, the best opponent of struck in almost
[00:14:36] 50 years of being around soldiers.
[00:14:39] They're the best.
[00:14:43] Question.
[00:14:44] What other problems were unique in the Maycon Delta?
[00:14:47] The problem in the Delta was not only the terrible conditions that prevailed there, but
[00:14:51] it was the impact it had on your soldiers.
[00:14:53] I'm speaking now as an American.
[00:14:55] We had terrible casualties from what we called immersion foot.
[00:14:59] immersion foot was the problem in World War I called trench foot.
[00:15:04] After being in the water for a long time, the feet would become very soft and the boot
[00:15:08] rubbing against the foot would become very abrasive.
[00:15:11] Suddenly you'd have a hole in your foot, the size of a bullet hole, and suddenly you're
[00:15:15] a lost soldier.
[00:15:19] We had to be very wary and take care of the feet.
[00:15:22] There was no place to sleep so you were in the water at night.
[00:15:27] The soldiers were in the water and you stayed miserable and wet.
[00:15:30] My rule was that a unit could only stay in the field for five days.
[00:15:33] After five days immersion foot said in so badly that a whole battalion of 800 men could
[00:15:39] be laid up for weeks.
[00:15:43] I got immersion foot one time.
[00:15:45] I got legit immersion foot.
[00:15:48] So I was doing a training exercise in.
[00:15:55] It was we were doing a training exercise doing a reconnaissance of an air field that was
[00:16:01] located around the swamp.
[00:16:03] So I spent five or six days in this swamp.
[00:16:09] Not the whole five or six days, but a good amount of days and plus the days I wasn't
[00:16:13] in the swamp there was heavy rain.
[00:16:15] Just my feet were wet for an extended period of time.
[00:16:17] Actually on this particular training exercise, when we were going into the field, it was
[00:16:23] raining when we got in the field that started sleeping, you know, like ice and that turned
[00:16:29] to snow.
[00:16:31] So it was right around, and then in the daytime it warmed up and it turned back to rain.
[00:16:36] But it was a pretty miserable six days.
[00:16:39] When I got out of the field and quite frankly I didn't really understand the threat
[00:16:44] of immersion foot.
[00:16:45] So I just kept my boots on probably almost the whole time.
[00:16:49] When I got out my feet were really jacked up, really jacked up.
[00:16:52] I was metafact.
[00:16:53] I was looking at some pictures just to see how bad I had it compared to how bad it
[00:16:56] can get.
[00:16:57] I just looked at some pictures on the interwebs and my feet were jacked up legit.
[00:17:04] Well, I mean obviously this is, I mean I've never heard immersion foot, but that's a common
[00:17:10] for the trench foot, right?
[00:17:11] Yeah, yeah.
[00:17:12] So that's common knowledge, right?
[00:17:13] Yeah.
[00:17:14] Because remember a forced gump when he said that when he's like, Lieutenant Dan, when he made
[00:17:19] a motorcycle, I'm going to tell you two things or whatever.
[00:17:22] And one of them was keep your socks.
[00:17:23] Keep your socks dry.
[00:17:24] Yeah, yeah.
[00:17:25] Yeah.
[00:17:26] So that's definitely a common thing.
[00:17:28] Then he talks about it a lot.
[00:17:30] You got to get in spec, guys feet, make sure the feet are good to go.
[00:17:34] When guys feet aren't good to go, they're done.
[00:17:37] You can't walk, you're done.
[00:17:39] But my feet from that immersion foot, they were numb.
[00:17:42] They were numb like dead.
[00:17:44] Why does it got cold or it was just the wetness?
[00:17:48] Yeah.
[00:17:49] It was cold, it only snowed and red.
[00:17:52] It only was below freezing that first night and then it was warmer, but they were wet for
[00:17:56] a long time.
[00:17:57] Yeah.
[00:17:58] That was a lot of young.
[00:17:59] And then when you take it, they don't take off your shoes.
[00:18:02] Does it like does the pain set in then?
[00:18:04] Or no, they were actually they went, they didn't hurt at, no, they did.
[00:18:09] But they didn't hurt, they hurt more when I got out of the field.
[00:18:11] Yeah.
[00:18:12] That's when they started to hurt.
[00:18:13] Yeah.
[00:18:14] Because they were actually numb.
[00:18:16] Yeah.
[00:18:17] I mean, the way I imagined it is like, you know, I don't know, you're in the pool or
[00:18:22] the bath.
[00:18:23] When you're a kid you're in the bath for like super super long.
[00:18:25] I get all the water.
[00:18:26] Yeah, you get the wrinkle.
[00:18:27] Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[00:18:28] Like prunes or whatever.
[00:18:29] And it's pruned up feet.
[00:18:31] But it's like that.
[00:18:32] But it's like five days.
[00:18:33] Yeah, it's going like too far, kind of.
[00:18:35] Yeah, because they seem kind of sensitive too when you think about it, you know, like
[00:18:38] they're going to sensitive.
[00:18:39] That's what it's like, oh man.
[00:18:42] So next.
[00:18:45] Next question, why were you men in the water?
[00:18:47] Why didn't they walk along the banks or along pathways between patty fields?
[00:18:51] Hackworth.
[00:18:52] You could expect any dry surface was mined in booby trapped.
[00:18:55] And 60% of all casualties we hadn't Vietnam came from mines and booby traps laid.
[00:19:01] I might add by those local guerrillas who the generals at the top West Moreland and
[00:19:07] assistance didn't count.
[00:19:10] So he's saying the local guerrillas.
[00:19:12] They talk about the generals like West Moreland would say, oh, you know, there's this
[00:19:18] many people and they wouldn't count the local populace or these local guerrillas as
[00:19:23] insurgents.
[00:19:24] I.
[00:19:25] Continuing, they didn't believe that they were the enemy because their mentality was a
[00:19:30] World War two mentality.
[00:19:32] They didn't understand the nature of the war.
[00:19:35] They were refighting World War two and they thought they could win the war by applying
[00:19:39] heavy firepower the outpouring of Detroit and great technological ability.
[00:19:46] They thought they would steam roll the opponent into defeat.
[00:19:49] They found that a war could not be won with bulldozers against somebody fighting with
[00:19:55] great cause.
[00:19:59] Next question.
[00:20:00] But after the Ted offensive, didn't the heavy bombing raids actually take a very heavy
[00:20:05] toll on the Vietcong.
[00:20:08] Well, general Lame said, if I had enough bombs, I could win this war because I'd blast
[00:20:15] the Vietcong to the Stone Age.
[00:20:18] What he didn't understand was that the Vietcong to me, we're already living in the Stone
[00:20:23] Age and that firepower wouldn't work under those circumstances.
[00:20:28] I do think you're correct that at the end of Ted 1968 February 1968, we increased the
[00:20:35] amount of bomb tonage out of frustration.
[00:20:38] Vietnoms, a country about the size of California in terms of area.
[00:20:42] We used three times the amount of bombs in the Vietnom war as we did in all of World War
[00:20:47] two, both the allies and the Axis.
[00:20:52] How's that for just completely insane?
[00:20:55] We put enough steel on that California size target to sink it and it did not cause the
[00:21:00] opponent to give in.
[00:21:01] Firepower was not the answer, the answer was to win the hearts and minds of the people.
[00:21:07] Question why didn't firepower work?
[00:21:09] Hackworth, well, what firepower did using pursuit aircraft fighter aircraft fighter bombers
[00:21:15] artillery mortar and so on, what it did was it galvanized the opponent, it put steel in
[00:21:22] their back.
[00:21:23] They could see themselves being struck by a giant and they had no way, no recourse
[00:21:27] to strike back.
[00:21:29] But as it did historically with the British and World War two, it put fire in their
[00:21:34] belly.
[00:21:35] It was absolutely the worst thing we could do in Vietnam.
[00:21:38] It gave them a tonic to fight harder.
[00:21:41] So we've covered that on the podcast about how the brits, when the brits got bombed,
[00:21:48] psychologically it made them tougher.
[00:21:51] Because there's something happening.
[00:21:54] Look, this massive attack comes.
[00:21:56] Well, it seems like a massive attack and something you can't control something you can't
[00:21:59] fight back.
[00:22:01] But when you bomb a city of a million people, there's actually a small number that actually
[00:22:06] get impacted by it.
[00:22:08] So everyone else goes, hey, we can survive this.
[00:22:11] And so that's what happened with the Vietnamese.
[00:22:13] They owe you drop these giant bombs.
[00:22:14] Let's guess what I'm still here.
[00:22:15] You can't do anything to me.
[00:22:16] America, big America with your big bombs.
[00:22:19] I'm still right here.
[00:22:21] What do you got?
[00:22:22] Now, I'll tell you what, if the recent fighting in Iraq against ISIS, there's been a
[00:22:36] lot of bombing in the bombing has been, let's just say it was a very, very productive,
[00:22:41] very, very productive and they killed a lot, a lot, thousands and tens of thousands
[00:22:48] of ISIS fighters.
[00:22:50] And even what that being said, there was ground forces that had to move in, but man, they
[00:22:54] did a lot of devastating, devastating destruction of the enemy without stuff.
[00:22:59] So I think in certain situations, you can have a massive impact with firepower.
[00:23:05] But isn't that like, like I said, like, isn't that like because of intelligence that they
[00:23:10] had and stuff like there was more to it than just, hey, let's just, yeah, yeah, it was
[00:23:15] a bunch of people.
[00:23:16] And the ISIS were easier targets.
[00:23:19] Not only easier targets, but better weaponry.
[00:23:23] Because man, if you look at the number, like, I remember reading something about a bridge
[00:23:27] that they were trying to take out in Vietnam and they launched mission after mission after
[00:23:32] mission after mission and drop bomb after bomb after bomb after it's hard.
[00:23:36] It was hard back then to actually hit something like a bridge with a bomb.
[00:23:41] God, yeah, okay.
[00:23:42] You know what I'm saying?
[00:23:43] Well, I have to get Dave Burke on here.
[00:23:45] Good deal, Dave.
[00:23:46] Yeah, good deal, Dave.
[00:23:47] Good, him on here and talk about how hard that is to with dumb bombs.
[00:23:52] Because you know, everyone says smart bombs now.
[00:23:54] Yeah.
[00:23:55] Those were dumb bombs.
[00:23:56] You had to basically, you got to eyeball it.
[00:23:57] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[00:23:58] You're like, I've all missed a few.
[00:23:59] Imagine how hard that is.
[00:24:00] Like, okay, we get that if you just want to bomb this general, this city, right?
[00:24:05] You can just drop bombs on the city.
[00:24:06] Okay, I get you can hit that.
[00:24:08] But you're trying to hit a bridge.
[00:24:09] Yeah.
[00:24:10] Can you imagine how hard that's got to be?
[00:24:12] Yeah, I do because I used to play this game called Mario Kart.
[00:24:14] Right.
[00:24:15] Like a split screen and it's the tracking to get these weapons.
[00:24:18] Right.
[00:24:19] And you're playing your friend who's sitting right next to you because it's a split screen.
[00:24:22] And you can pick up these weapons.
[00:24:24] So two of the weapons were the turtle shell.
[00:24:26] Is it red one and a green one?
[00:24:28] The red one was a smart turtle shell.
[00:24:30] It like seek the other guy out.
[00:24:32] But the green one just went in the exact direction that you shot it.
[00:24:35] So imagine you're on a track.
[00:24:37] You're taking turns.
[00:24:38] It's way harder with a green shell.
[00:24:39] Yeah.
[00:24:40] So back in Vietnam was a green shell.
[00:24:42] Yeah.
[00:24:43] Not as we got the red shell.
[00:24:44] I fully understand this.
[00:24:46] It's the same thing.
[00:24:48] Check.
[00:24:49] All right.
[00:24:51] With that, we'll go back to the interview.
[00:24:53] Next question.
[00:24:55] When you were active in the May Kong Delta, it was difficult to tell who was the
[00:24:58] one who was the one who was civilian.
[00:25:00] Hackworth.
[00:25:01] I was in the ninth division and our commander was General Julian Eul who was called the
[00:25:08] butcher of the Delta.
[00:25:10] The policy of the division was that it didn't matter.
[00:25:13] If it moved, shoot it and then count it.
[00:25:16] Theoretically civilians were supposed to be away from the battle area.
[00:25:20] They would say this as a free fire zone.
[00:25:25] But without realizing the tradition of the people to go back to their homestead.
[00:25:29] So regardless of the danger, they would go back to where their ancestors were and then
[00:25:33] they were considered via Kong and Fair game.
[00:25:37] There were an enormous number of casualties who were civilians, but all the civilians,
[00:25:41] you have to understand, we're sympathetic, certainly in my part of the Delta to the
[00:25:46] Viet Kong effort.
[00:25:48] Most of the people in the rural areas of Vietnam were sympathetic to the Viet Kong
[00:25:51] cause.
[00:25:52] They had won the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people.
[00:25:56] They felt that their cause was more just.
[00:25:58] It had a more nationalistic purpose.
[00:26:03] Question.
[00:26:04] You will once flying in a helicopter over the Delta and you saw some people running along
[00:26:08] and you fought their civilians, their children.
[00:26:10] Hackworth.
[00:26:11] They were doing what's called Eagle Flies, which is a platoon of infantry helicopters.
[00:26:15] Five, six soldiers per helicopter and I was controlling everything in a command.
[00:26:19] A control helicopter, the pilot in the front seat of my helicopter said, there are four
[00:26:25] enemies streaking across the field, request permission to fire.
[00:26:28] As commander, I would grant that permission.
[00:26:32] I looked down and I saw four little kids.
[00:26:34] So I said negative, those are little kids.
[00:26:36] They're just playing hokey from school or something.
[00:26:38] Leave them alone.
[00:26:40] I went ahead and inserted my platoon and let them maneuver through the area.
[00:26:44] Suddenly they took fire from those poor little kids who were probably no more than 12
[00:26:49] or 13 years old and it stashed their AK 47s.
[00:26:52] So I was wrong.
[00:26:55] My previous experience had been up in the highlands.
[00:26:59] That was one of my first days in the Delta and I was learning that just about anybody
[00:27:03] in that battlefield sadly enough was a hostel.
[00:27:11] Question were they ever helpful to you?
[00:27:13] Hackworth.
[00:27:14] Again, he hits it here.
[00:27:15] 60% of all casualties, 60% of all US casualties during that war were from mines and booby
[00:27:23] traps that were set out by these local people who had built them and installed them.
[00:27:29] Ironically enough, the top generals never counted those people as part of the enemies
[00:27:33] order of battle, even though they accounted for about 300,000 people.
[00:27:38] They were conveniently dropped from the walls.
[00:27:41] They were only counted when they were found dead.
[00:27:45] Going into any battle area, if we picked up a civilian, he became our point man against
[00:27:50] the Geneva Convention.
[00:27:52] The assumption was that if this cat lived here, he knew how to get through this area
[00:27:57] without losing a leg or a life he could lead our forces through.
[00:28:02] So that's again, we've covered this a bunch, but the local populace, they're walking through
[00:28:09] these trail every single day and they're not hitting any booby traps and then you lose
[00:28:12] a guide today, you lose a guide of moral.
[00:28:14] Eventually you realize that they add a minimum, they know where these booby traps are.
[00:28:18] And Hackworth's saying they're the ones that set them up, made them and set them up.
[00:28:23] Oh yeah, so it mentioned against the Geneva Convention.
[00:28:26] Yeah, to grab a civilian.
[00:28:28] So they're sort of grabbing them and what forcing them to do it.
[00:28:31] Hey, you're gonna walk, you're gonna walk out in front of you.
[00:28:33] You're gonna take us through this trail.
[00:28:36] Like a host of some sort of stuff.
[00:28:37] Yeah, I almost like a host of source.
[00:28:38] Yeah.
[00:28:38] Next question, what was a simple booby trap?
[00:28:45] Well the Pungi steak was a no-brainer.
[00:28:48] Normally they were setting a position where they would strike your ankle.
[00:28:51] It would scratch you, you were in filthy water, you'd get an infection.
[00:28:54] I had a Pungi wound and I didn't know it.
[00:28:56] I must have gotten the morning and it bled a lot.
[00:28:58] I didn't know until I got out of the water and looked at my boot and it was soaking
[00:29:01] red from blood.
[00:29:03] There was a wound that looked very much like as if someone had taken a razor and made
[00:29:07] about a three inch long slash in my leg.
[00:29:10] It became infected.
[00:29:11] That was the problem.
[00:29:13] It wasn't a long term wound.
[00:29:15] There was something that put you down for a few days.
[00:29:17] It had to be cleaned out, debridled, then it would be stitched up and you were fine.
[00:29:22] The real killer was the coffee can filled with explosives from a dud American round.
[00:29:28] Everything they used, we gave them.
[00:29:31] We threw away our sea ration cans.
[00:29:34] We threw away our used batteries.
[00:29:36] We threw away our coffee cans.
[00:29:38] If a 500-bound bomb didn't explode, that provided them with a raw materials for their
[00:29:43] booby traps.
[00:29:44] So they set up their booby trap factory.
[00:29:47] They opened up the mine.
[00:29:48] They took out the explosives, packed it in a can.
[00:29:51] Rapped barbed wire and nails and other things around it got a primer device from a grenade
[00:29:56] that was left behind, put a trip wire on it and set it on the side of the road.
[00:30:00] When the first soldier hit it, he would lose his life and maybe three or four people
[00:30:05] behind him would be down.
[00:30:07] I've seen what we call number 10 cans, the large cans packed full of sea for and so filled
[00:30:13] with nails to have a fragment effect that it could take down 10 or 12 people.
[00:30:19] The impact on the soldier was a psychological impact.
[00:30:24] But every time you put your foot down, you didn't know whether you're going to have a leg,
[00:30:29] a limb or a life.
[00:30:31] And this played over and over for 365 days of going down trails, going down waterways.
[00:30:40] It took the fight out of you.
[00:30:42] I took over the battalion down at the delta.
[00:30:45] It was called the hard luck battalion in six months before I took it over and had 600 casualties
[00:30:51] killed in a wounded, all from mines and booby traps, it had never met the enemy.
[00:30:58] It was all from these incidious little devices put down by these people that the generals
[00:31:03] didn't count because they didn't understand the nature of the war.
[00:31:09] Yeah.
[00:31:10] And I think the numbers for Iraq was 75% of the casualties were from IEDs, 75% off
[00:31:21] to confirm that.
[00:31:22] But whatever it was, it's a huge number.
[00:31:25] It's a huge number.
[00:31:27] It must be an odd feeling to find that, you know, like dang they made that bomb out of
[00:31:32] our stuff.
[00:31:33] Like, especially at first, when you use two of these different, like you're like, what
[00:31:38] if you came across the results of a bomb and it's like dang I was just using that coffee
[00:31:43] can, you know, like two days ago or something like that.
[00:31:45] Well, yeah, that's why discipline soldiers wouldn't leave anything behind ever.
[00:31:49] Yeah.
[00:31:50] But lack of discipline soldiers would leave all this stuff.
[00:31:53] Now, sometimes you drop bombs and they don't detonate.
[00:31:56] That's, so they can't really fall for anyone for that.
[00:31:59] But yeah, coffee cans.
[00:32:00] And they, they, they, they taught us when I, when I was going through training, they taught
[00:32:06] us like we weren't allowed to leave anything behind.
[00:32:08] Yeah.
[00:32:09] Couldn't leave anything behind because we didn't want the enemy to use it.
[00:32:12] Yeah.
[00:32:13] It's the way it was.
[00:32:14] And you know what, you know what, the Iraqis, the Iraqis did the same thing.
[00:32:17] The insurgents, the insurgents, the Iraq they used old ordinance.
[00:32:21] Now, some of the old ordinance that they used was actually from the old Iraqi army.
[00:32:27] A lot of it, but a lot of it was from unexplored ordinance, just like what the Vietnamese
[00:32:31] would be a calling used.
[00:32:32] Yeah.
[00:32:33] And even to me, it kind of seems like even if it wasn't stuff to use like, I mean, man,
[00:32:39] it's a spectrum, like some, you know, hot like when, you know, on the movie where the
[00:32:43] criminal, they're chasing the criminal with the dogs and the criminal left part of his
[00:32:46] shirt or something and the dog sort of smells it.
[00:32:49] It's like that feeling like your enemy has like something in yours, right?
[00:32:52] So he from one side of the spectrum is like, okay, they use it to make bombs, right?
[00:32:56] Which is kind of just maybe psychologically just kind of odd.
[00:33:00] And then just the fact that, for example, like what if in Iraq, you capture somebody or
[00:33:05] whatever, any has like a pair of like some old army boots or something.
[00:33:09] Oh, yeah, for sure.
[00:33:10] But there's the, well, I'd say, yeah, that's, that's a, I see it hitting you.
[00:33:15] And I'm trying to figure out why this is kind of shocking to you.
[00:33:17] And it must be the first time you've ever thought about this.
[00:33:20] Yeah.
[00:33:21] Yeah.
[00:33:22] So for me, like for instance, this was horrible.
[00:33:25] So just think about this.
[00:33:28] There was an element of snipers that got overrun and Romadi.
[00:33:33] And so think about what the enemy got.
[00:33:37] Sniper weapons, night vision.
[00:33:39] That's always like your horrified night vision goggles and sniper weapons.
[00:33:43] So that takes what you were just talking about and multiplies it times a lot.
[00:33:48] Yeah.
[00:33:49] But he's now the enemy has legitimate equipment that puts them a little bit higher on the
[00:33:55] tactical level.
[00:33:57] So that's definitely scary.
[00:33:59] And that's why we're so careful about never leaving anything behind.
[00:34:06] Next question.
[00:34:09] What did these sorts of casualties do to the morale of American soldiers?
[00:34:13] Just blew it away.
[00:34:16] Just like a mind blew away a leg.
[00:34:18] It just played with your mind.
[00:34:19] Months after I left Vietnam, I found myself walking across an open field and I suddenly
[00:34:24] said where am I and froze.
[00:34:26] In my mind, I was in a mind field.
[00:34:29] It took a few minutes for me to work out that I was not in a mind field.
[00:34:32] I believe that a lot of this so-called Vietnam stress syndrome that has created so many
[00:34:37] walking wounded across America today is due to the damage caused long ago by what they saw
[00:34:43] of their mates going down by minds and booby traps.
[00:34:47] Remember of the 60,000 dead and 300,000 Americans wound in that war, 60% were from minds
[00:34:53] and booby traps.
[00:34:54] He driving that point home.
[00:34:56] The great irony was that the infantry soldiers who went to Vietnam received a total
[00:35:02] of five hours of training in minds and booby traps.
[00:35:06] That was the curriculum used in World War II.
[00:35:09] We simply didn't learn.
[00:35:16] I can tell you, they turned up.
[00:35:17] I mean, when I was running training, we went crazy with IEDs.
[00:35:21] Our fake IEDs, but yeah, we would get nuts with them.
[00:35:24] We'd put them all over the place.
[00:35:26] And just you had to figure it out.
[00:35:29] Yeah, to be careful.
[00:35:30] But I'll tell you, man, it is hard when someone's good at making those IEDs and camouflaging
[00:35:36] them.
[00:35:37] Boo.
[00:35:38] Scary.
[00:35:39] Yeah.
[00:35:40] We'd have to like, brief the training cadre over and over again to make sure that
[00:35:44] training cadre didn't set off the IEDs.
[00:35:46] Yeah.
[00:35:47] We would be building.
[00:35:49] Next, what was the purpose of the Vietcong tunnels in the sort of Kuchi area north of
[00:35:54] Saigon, hackworth?
[00:35:56] The purpose of the tunnels is to provide safe areas for supplies, for their headquarters
[00:36:00] and for their soldiers.
[00:36:02] A great casualty producer for them was artillery.
[00:36:06] Their bombing and machine gun strikes from aircraft and helicopters.
[00:36:09] Most of the tunnels were located in areas that had great limestone formations.
[00:36:14] It was easy to dig in, but still quite strong and easy to shore up.
[00:36:17] They could go down two, three, four, actual floors.
[00:36:22] With pumped in air and brought in water, it gave them a secure area that was really behind
[00:36:27] the American lines.
[00:36:29] And the Americans never really worked out that they were there.
[00:36:32] For example, there was a place called the Iron Triangle.
[00:36:35] There was a great number of such tunnels and a general named Williamson took a brigade in
[00:36:39] there and said the Iron Triangle is no more.
[00:36:42] That was in 1965 at the beginning of the American involvement in the war.
[00:36:46] When the North seized the country and they went, when they won the war in 1975, their
[00:36:51] headquarters was in the Iron Triangle in those very caves.
[00:36:57] That's like another situation.
[00:37:00] You call this area secure and the enemy has actually has their headquarters there.
[00:37:06] Crazy.
[00:37:07] Next question, wasn't it possible to block up the tunnels or gas them or blow them up?
[00:37:12] Hackworth, we tried everything possible to destroy the tunnels, including having small
[00:37:16] soldiers called tunnel rats go down and try and clear them.
[00:37:20] But they were so cleverly done, you could never find where the actual end was.
[00:37:24] There would be a dead end with a hidden door going down to the next level.
[00:37:28] And I'm sure that if enough creativity and effort had gone into it, then yes, they could
[00:37:32] have been closed up.
[00:37:33] But the top generals were not concerned.
[00:37:36] An anecdote, a cave expert came to me between my tours in Vietnam and my office in the
[00:37:41] Pentagon.
[00:37:42] He said, look, I can help you in the war.
[00:37:44] I can tell you where the caves are because this is something I've studied my whole life.
[00:37:48] I took him to my boss and Vietnam veteran who was very excited about it.
[00:37:52] We took him to our general and he didn't want to know about it.
[00:37:56] He wants to waste money sending this guy over there and having examined tunnels and caves.
[00:38:01] What's he going to tell us?
[00:38:03] Again, it was the mentality that firepower will win the war.
[00:38:07] These great outpourings of American industrial strength will win this war.
[00:38:11] This arrogance didn't allow us to get beyond a blinkered military mindset.
[00:38:20] Good advice for life.
[00:38:22] This is something that with actual unfraining working with a lot of businesses.
[00:38:28] Sometimes your strategy is wrong.
[00:38:30] It was the sort of happening Iraq with us.
[00:38:32] Your strategy was not working and it took us some time to figure that out and start
[00:38:37] doing a counter insurgency campaign.
[00:38:39] But I see this with businesses a lot too.
[00:38:41] They're using some strategy and it's not working.
[00:38:45] But maybe they used it 12 years ago.
[00:38:47] Maybe they used it two years ago.
[00:38:49] It worked and they were celebrated and now they're just going to do it harder.
[00:38:53] Do the same strategy more.
[00:38:56] Seems like that's the case with marketing.
[00:38:58] Marketing just changes so much.
[00:39:00] Like when you're marketed to the new strategies, it's not obvious.
[00:39:05] The old strategy is like dordidour salesmen.
[00:39:08] Dordidour salesmen comes to your house now.
[00:39:11] Bro, you don't want to hear it.
[00:39:13] Why did you come to my house?
[00:39:14] That's like when that begins to just a complete waste because you've got to pay some
[00:39:18] kid for whatever, 12 bucks an hour to go dordidour.
[00:39:21] Whereas you can pay 12 bucks and send out of, I don't know, email or something.
[00:39:25] Yeah, but even emails.
[00:39:26] Well, yeah, that's the point.
[00:39:28] What's the new deal?
[00:39:29] I don't know Facebook ads.
[00:39:31] I don't know.
[00:39:32] Even that's kind of old now.
[00:39:33] But the, um, no, dordidour.
[00:39:35] There was a time where dordidour was dope.
[00:39:37] You know, as funny as I still talk to people that will go out and make stuff happen dordidour.
[00:39:40] Well, so now it's old school again.
[00:39:42] Right?
[00:39:43] Old schools coming back.
[00:39:44] Here's the thing usually dordidour seems like a heart cell.
[00:39:47] So sure, they'll make things happen, but it's not as efficient as other ways like
[00:39:51] newer ways of marketing.
[00:39:52] Yeah, these people come to my house dordidour people.
[00:39:55] They want us to own these stuff.
[00:39:56] Yeah, how many times have you bought?
[00:39:58] Zero.
[00:39:59] Yeah, so that's the point.
[00:40:00] But let me come see you.
[00:40:01] I'm trying to keep running through my mind to see if that was a solid answer.
[00:40:05] I'm actually, I'm actually pretty sure that in the last 20 years, I bought zero from
[00:40:09] dordidour salesman.
[00:40:10] Right.
[00:40:11] And that's probably common.
[00:40:12] Yeah.
[00:40:13] I mean, consider the feeling you have when someone comes to your make.
[00:40:16] But there's some people that make money.
[00:40:17] Obviously.
[00:40:18] Yeah, yeah.
[00:40:19] Yeah, and I'm not saying no, I work with some companies where they do dordidour
[00:40:24] sales.
[00:40:25] They got some good sales kids.
[00:40:27] They're selling a good product.
[00:40:28] Yeah.
[00:40:29] They're like, OK, we're going to get this out there.
[00:40:31] Right.
[00:40:32] So, I'm not going to get it.
[00:40:33] I dig it.
[00:40:34] But there was a time back in the day when dordidour was kind of the dope thing.
[00:40:39] It's OK.
[00:40:40] And when you think about it, it would make sense because dordidour, like back long time,
[00:40:44] where a man would be able to come over, they just knock on the door.
[00:40:47] There wasn't cell phone or nothing like that.
[00:40:49] If they were super courteous, they'd call before they came.
[00:40:51] But if that's your neighbor, your friend or whatever, people would not go into the
[00:40:54] other time.
[00:40:55] Now, people don't just show up at your door.
[00:40:57] Yeah, that's true.
[00:40:58] Go out there because they're lazy also.
[00:40:59] Yeah.
[00:41:00] I'm sorry.
[00:41:01] Tax, yeah.
[00:41:02] Yeah, I call you home.
[00:41:03] Yeah, that's what I'm saying.
[00:41:04] So, but back in the day, dordidour salesman, they were put it this way.
[00:41:08] They weren't as unwelcome as they are now.
[00:41:11] Right.
[00:41:12] So, as a work, there was more random people showing up at your house.
[00:41:13] Yeah, for there's a bunch of reasons.
[00:41:15] This one's same, but the point is back in the day, that marketing technique or that sales
[00:41:21] technique or whatever was more effective than it is now.
[00:41:25] I'm not saying it's a zero effective.
[00:41:26] Not saying it's way more, you know, it's the things change.
[00:41:29] So if you're a company, you're like, hey, I think dordidour is the way to go because back
[00:41:34] in, you know, 75, we were killing, you know, kind of thing.
[00:41:38] Well, that was what's interesting.
[00:41:39] So, going back to Iraq and going away from dordidour sales here for a moment.
[00:41:43] Yeah.
[00:41:44] The, that was interesting about the surge.
[00:41:48] What was the surge was not just more people.
[00:41:51] It was new strategy.
[00:41:53] It was more counter-insurgency focused strategy.
[00:41:57] And luckily, that we shifted that strategy because it wasn't going well up until that point.
[00:42:06] Next question.
[00:42:07] But these tunnels were militarily significant orn't they?
[00:42:11] Backworth, they were running sore from the beginning to the end and they were a very powerful
[00:42:19] ally of the vehicle.
[00:42:21] Question, you were in the state at the time it happened, but do you remember hearing about
[00:42:24] the Ted offense of in 1968?
[00:42:26] Hackworth, when the Ted offense have occurred in 1968, I was in the Pentagon.
[00:42:31] A dear friend of mine was an aide to a very senior general, so he was privy to a lot
[00:42:35] of information that we Indians didn't have.
[00:42:38] The low ranking guys, as opposed to the chiefs Indians.
[00:42:44] He came and whispered in my ear and he told me about the attack long before hours before
[00:42:48] anyone in the press or public knew anything about it.
[00:42:51] I was quite frankly shocked and heartbroken.
[00:42:54] I had been convinced for two years that the vehicle we're going to win the war.
[00:42:58] That the Americans simply didn't understand the nature of the war.
[00:43:01] It was very much epitomized when Walter Cronkite asked the American people what the hell
[00:43:06] is going on here, I thought we were winning the war.
[00:43:10] That was the kind of shock it was to the American people.
[00:43:13] Everyone had been fed these glowing afteraction reports by the president, Lyndon Johnson,
[00:43:20] by General West Morland that there was light at the end of the tunnel that we were prevailing,
[00:43:27] that it would only be a matter of months.
[00:43:29] The American public was still oriented towards World War II.
[00:43:33] They were believing that as long as we grabbed this real estate, we would eventually
[00:43:37] find the light at the end of the tunnel.
[00:43:39] But the light at the end of the tunnel was a vehicle on freight train coming on full
[00:43:43] bore.
[00:43:44] That's what we discovered in TET of 1968 and that was the turning point of the war.
[00:43:50] Question why was it the turning point?
[00:43:52] Hackworth.
[00:43:53] TET was a turning point because it destroyed the will of the American people to support
[00:43:57] the war.
[00:44:00] Those soldiers who were in the no realized that this was just the beginning of the end.
[00:44:05] We saw that the American people switched off.
[00:44:08] If the support of the people is not there, you are going to be cut off of the legs and
[00:44:13] that's exactly what happened in Vietnam.
[00:44:18] And this is when I was on that show on the history channel, the warriors show and I talked
[00:44:25] about how you have to have the will to kill and the will to die and to show about markedly.
[00:44:30] And that's where that quote, that statement that I made is rooted in what I learned from
[00:44:37] Macworth.
[00:44:38] That is you have to have this will.
[00:44:40] You have to have the will and the people, the nation has to have the will.
[00:44:43] It's not just the military has to have the will.
[00:44:45] It's the people.
[00:44:46] Because what is the military, the military is the people.
[00:44:52] Back to the interview, there had been a fair amount of support for the war until
[00:44:57] 10th of 1968.
[00:44:58] People thought it would be unpatriotic not to hang in there and wait until we grab a noi.
[00:45:04] When the people saw a veetcon climbing on the top of the American embassy, they knew that
[00:45:09] they'd been lied to.
[00:45:11] Then they knew that this war was not winnable.
[00:45:14] All they had to do is ask their sons by that time, probably a million Americans had
[00:45:18] served in Vietnam and it come back home and told their parents and loved ones the truth about
[00:45:22] the war.
[00:45:23] The government couldn't just provide it with a Madison Avenue Snow job anymore.
[00:45:30] Question, could the war have been won?
[00:45:33] Could the veetcon have been beaten?
[00:45:35] Hackworth.
[00:45:36] The war could not have been won, unless the host country, the Sagan government, the
[00:45:41] South Vietnamese changed their very repressive form of government and won the hearts and minds
[00:45:46] of the people.
[00:45:48] After the northern government had employed this technique and they had created the promise
[00:45:52] of this utopian dream as soon as they kicked out the invader, this repressive South
[00:45:56] Vietnamese government.
[00:45:58] The South Vietnamese government never understood what never understood that they had to make
[00:46:04] those changes.
[00:46:06] They were led by greedy people who were into making money.
[00:46:09] They had no contact with the people in the main.
[00:46:12] They were mainly Catholics and they were in to, and they were trying to rule a country that
[00:46:17] was 90% Buddhist.
[00:46:21] Question, why was body count so important?
[00:46:24] Or was it?
[00:46:26] Hackworth.
[00:46:27] McNamara was a number cruncher and he wanted to have something to crunch a number.
[00:46:32] The overall strategy was attrition to wear out the enemy by counting bodies we would
[00:46:37] know the impact of the war its success or failure.
[00:46:41] That became the standard measurement of success.
[00:46:43] It was the score and everyone wanted to know the score.
[00:46:47] What really happened was the body count counting completely eroded the honor code of the
[00:46:52] military specifically among the officer corps.
[00:46:55] It taught people to lie.
[00:46:58] The young fresh lieutenant out of the military academies were taught to lie.
[00:47:02] The generals who were pretty proficient lieers anyway pushed the body count.
[00:47:06] A high body count meant great success.
[00:47:09] So in every battle enemy bodies were counted several times.
[00:47:13] If there were 200 bodies, suddenly the figure became 650 and it became to quote Westmoreland
[00:47:18] another great American victory.
[00:47:21] It corrupted the officer corps and appalled the soldiers who by that time were mostly
[00:47:26] drafted.
[00:47:27] They were scurrying around the jungle counting bodies which was a pretty awesome and terrible
[00:47:32] thing to do.
[00:47:33] It had a real boomerang effect on the military because it was like a cancer.
[00:47:37] It destroyed its soul.
[00:47:38] What was the military strategy of the war?
[00:47:51] Hackworth.
[00:47:52] Westmoreland's idea was to destroy the enemy's large battle formations as in World War II.
[00:47:58] When you've worn the enemy down, you've won on the field of battle.
[00:48:02] That tells you that we simply didn't understand the nature of the war because the guerrilla
[00:48:06] was not going to fight in that way.
[00:48:08] The guerrilla's manner of fighting was to hit and run so he could be alive to fight another
[00:48:12] day.
[00:48:13] He was an into these huge stand-up battles.
[00:48:16] Big operations required a great number of resources, a great amount of logistics, a great
[00:48:20] amount of aircraft and a great amount of artillery fire.
[00:48:25] Most Diane, who is the chief staff of the Israeli army, came to Vietnam and I interviewed
[00:48:31] him right after he had spent two weeks with an American rifle company of about 100 men.
[00:48:36] He said that in one battle, with a North Vietnamese force of a couple hundred men, they fired
[00:48:41] more artillery over 25,000 rounds than he had fired in a whole campaign.
[00:48:48] That was the American way of fighting a war.
[00:48:51] It was also terribly expensive.
[00:48:53] Each round was a hundred dollars.
[00:48:55] If you fired 10,000 rounds, you've probably gone through a million dollars in one 15 minute
[00:48:59] fight and you've killed seven enemy.
[00:49:04] When you look at it from a cost basis, we were paying an enormous amount to kill the enemy
[00:49:09] and we couldn't sustain that kind of momentum and that kind of expenditure for a long time.
[00:49:15] It was a failed tactic that never should have been used.
[00:49:17] We should have used the same rules that Mao was teaching, that Sun Su taught before, to break
[00:49:23] up in small elements and fight fire with fire.
[00:49:27] You know, you think about that economic you pay a million dollars to kill seven enemy soldiers.
[00:49:35] That's your...
[00:49:37] It's not going to work out well, I'm a long run.
[00:49:43] Question, had you been in charge?
[00:49:45] How would you have done things differently?
[00:49:47] Hackworth, during my second year in Vietnam, I commanded a battalion made up of conscripts
[00:49:51] down in the Delta.
[00:49:52] It was a battalion with very bad leadership.
[00:49:54] It sustained 600 casualties in the six months before I took over.
[00:49:58] Morales low, they called themselves the Hark Brick Battalion.
[00:50:03] Within 30 days they turned around and of course we've covered this on steel.
[00:50:06] My soldier charged her in by hackworth about this experience and we also covered it in
[00:50:09] about face, which he covers that as well about this experience.
[00:50:13] So I'm moving a little bit quicker here.
[00:50:15] We fought like gorillas.
[00:50:17] We didn't fight in these huge formations.
[00:50:19] We broke up and fought in small units of five or seven people.
[00:50:22] We fought at night, we stole the night from the enemy, we ambushed, we didn't march
[00:50:26] in large formations and expect to meet an opponent marching in large formations.
[00:50:32] We fought him using his very tactics, his very skills.
[00:50:35] We tore a page out of Mao's book.
[00:50:38] The proof of the pudding was six months later that the battalion had only lost 25 American
[00:50:43] soldiers.
[00:50:44] It had killed over 2600 enemy soldiers and there were no via Kong in the area of operation.
[00:50:52] Those soldiers proudly called themselves the hardcore battalion and they were hardcore,
[00:50:57] but they were simply simple drafties who didn't want to be there.
[00:51:02] Question, are you sure that was an accurate body count?
[00:51:05] Harkworth.
[00:51:06] Yeah, I think that was an accurate body count considering the inflated body count techniques
[00:51:10] employed by the US military at the time.
[00:51:14] Question, wasn't the fight because it's a little ironic that he talks about how bad the body
[00:51:17] count is and then he uses it.
[00:51:19] So he's kind of getting called out on that a little bit.
[00:51:23] He should have just stuck to the fact that there was no more via Kong operations in that
[00:51:26] area.
[00:51:27] There used to be X amount of enemy attacks today and now there was zero.
[00:51:32] Sorry, Hark, come on.
[00:51:33] Don't worry, I got you.
[00:51:37] Wasn't the fighting from 72 to 75 more like a more like conventional warfare.
[00:51:44] Harkworth.
[00:51:45] It was conventional warfare.
[00:51:46] A gorilla campaign starts with a few people who are dissatisfied.
[00:51:50] They throw rocks at the enemy.
[00:51:51] They finally kill an enemy soldier and get a rifle.
[00:51:54] They get more rifles and they raid an armory and they get more weapons and they build and
[00:51:57] build up.
[00:51:59] Phase one of a gorilla campaign is individual sniping, laying booby traps and low-scale conflict
[00:52:04] type fighting.
[00:52:05] The final goal, phase, the final goal in phase four or five is to move in brigades and divisions
[00:52:13] and cause an conventional formation and that's the culmination of the war.
[00:52:19] Which is interesting to think about when it's like one of those situations where what
[00:52:24] made you strong you leave behind.
[00:52:27] It happens with companies all the time.
[00:52:28] This company starts off there small, but nimble they can adapt to the market and then
[00:52:31] over time they get so big.
[00:52:33] They can't change anymore.
[00:52:34] And then some other company that was a start up is now a small nimble and can take advantage
[00:52:38] of the changes in the market.
[00:52:40] Same thing happens.
[00:52:41] Unless you pay attention, unless you keep yourself, unless you enact decentralized command
[00:52:49] and you can provide it, you can keep if you start decentralized everything.
[00:52:53] What you have to get somewhat more centralized when you grow like that.
[00:52:56] One thing is in the military you say, well we've got decentralized command.
[00:53:01] Well part of that, part of the reason we have that we can let people have decentralized
[00:53:05] command is because we have the discipline training up front.
[00:53:09] So once a company as a company grows, if you put discipline on them, you can allow them
[00:53:14] to still have decentralized command and act very quickly.
[00:53:16] You've got to have trust in your subordinate leadership.
[00:53:19] For sure, to be able to employ that.
[00:53:25] Next question, but the actual defeat of the Southern government was by the North Vietnamese
[00:53:29] regular army.
[00:53:30] That was hardly a viet con victory.
[00:53:32] Was it hack worth?
[00:53:34] Oh, I think that the architect of that general tray was a viet con, a southerner.
[00:53:41] He was the one that planned it.
[00:53:42] There were a number of viet con divisions.
[00:53:44] For example, the ninth viet con division in the Delta fought in the final battles as a regular
[00:53:48] unit.
[00:53:49] Sure, the majority were regular forces from the North, but they fought in hit and run
[00:53:53] type operations.
[00:53:55] They always fought on the offensive.
[00:53:57] That is interesting to note.
[00:54:00] Is that of 100% of all contacts when one guy attacks another 85% were enemy initiated.
[00:54:09] That means that throughout the war, the Americans were on the defensive 85% of the time.
[00:54:15] And the enemy, the viet con, and the North Vietnamese was on the offensive.
[00:54:19] You can't win a war by being on the defense.
[00:54:22] You have to have the offensive power.
[00:54:24] We didn't have the initiative throughout the war from beginning to end the initiative
[00:54:28] rested in the hands of the opponent, the viet con, and the North Vietnamese.
[00:54:33] That's like in jujitsu when someone is just attacking and attacking and attacking.
[00:54:38] You're defending the whole time.
[00:54:39] You're going down immediately.
[00:54:40] Yeah.
[00:54:41] You're going down eventually.
[00:54:43] And that was something that we definitely changed up for my last point when we were
[00:54:50] in Ramadi with tasking a bruiser.
[00:54:54] Whenever you're on patrol, you're on defensive.
[00:54:56] You're on the defensive.
[00:54:57] You set up a little overwatch position and you're waiting for the enemy patrol.
[00:55:01] Now you're ambushing them.
[00:55:02] So now you're on the offense.
[00:55:03] So I mean, we weren't on offense 85% of the time.
[00:55:08] But we were on offense a lot of the time.
[00:55:10] The boys were getting out on offense and surprising the enemy on a regular basis.
[00:55:16] I mean, probably more than half the time.
[00:55:19] Because we were also doing things where we were on the defensive.
[00:55:22] I mean, it's offensive and defensive at the same time when you're pushing through a,
[00:55:26] when you're doing a clearance operation, you're on offense, but you're on defense.
[00:55:29] Because the enemy's waiting for you.
[00:55:31] Yeah.
[00:55:32] So there's a little dichotomy in doing that type of mission.
[00:55:35] But like doing a direct action mission where you're going to go and take down a building
[00:55:39] where you think there's a bad guy, you're offensive when you get to that target.
[00:55:44] But while you're going to the target, you're waiting to get ambushed.
[00:55:48] You're waiting to get ambushed.
[00:55:49] That's what you're doing.
[00:55:50] Even though you're scanning, even though you're looking for threats, you're still
[00:55:52] waiting to get ambushed, you're waiting to roll over an ID.
[00:55:54] Even though you feel like you're on offense and we train our guys to be an offense,
[00:55:58] the reality is the first shot in those situations is absolutely going to be fired by the enemy.
[00:56:04] The ID is going to be initiated by the enemy.
[00:56:06] And once you do the raid, the raid itself, that's us being on offense, right?
[00:56:11] They're in their sleep being or they're not expecting you to come and boom,
[00:56:14] you blow their door off and you enter their house, you're on offense.
[00:56:17] But that's like four minutes.
[00:56:19] So you're saying before that before that while you're going to the target.
[00:56:22] Because they like protected themselves with whatever.
[00:56:24] No, you're still unrelated.
[00:56:26] Like let's say you're going for a bad guy.
[00:56:28] Bad guy X and he lives in the house.
[00:56:31] You know you're going to get him.
[00:56:33] And when you get there, you're going to surprise him and he's not going to be expecting you.
[00:56:36] But on the way there, that guy Z, bad guy M and bad guy F have all set up ambushes on this road.
[00:56:44] Not maybe completely disconnected with bad guy X.
[00:56:47] But you are going to have to go through the ambushes that they've set.
[00:56:51] And they don't care, they'll set up that ambush tonight.
[00:56:54] No one comes, okay, cool.
[00:56:55] We'll set up tomorrow night.
[00:56:56] No one comes, we'll set up tomorrow night.
[00:56:57] You only got to go down that one road one time to get ambushed.
[00:57:00] So you're on.
[00:57:02] So when you're going, when you're when you're moving through enemy territory,
[00:57:05] you are on defense.
[00:57:07] Again, that's not the mindset we teach.
[00:57:10] The mindset is like, we're on offense, we're going to go get some.
[00:57:13] The reality is the first shot is going to be most likely, most likely,
[00:57:18] fired by the enemy, most likely.
[00:57:21] That's the way it is.
[00:57:26] And we did, I mean, these big clearance, these big sector clearance that we were doing,
[00:57:32] the army was doing the ringgroom.
[00:57:33] And like I said, you're on offense, if it's an offensive push, you're making the initiative.
[00:57:37] You're taking the initiative and getting in there on an operational level on a tactical level.
[00:57:43] Most likely, the enemy is going to see you first.
[00:57:46] They're hitting, they're hiding, they're two rooms deep in a building.
[00:57:49] They're they're waiting and they've got an ID buried in the road.
[00:57:52] So so offensive is kind of when you think about it, it's just like a mindset,
[00:57:57] kind of mainly to begin with because it's like a, it's like a forward leaning mindset.
[00:58:03] I think an offense means you often says you strike first.
[00:58:07] It's, you have the initiative.
[00:58:09] That's often, when you have the initiative, that's often.
[00:58:11] When you're reacting, that's defense.
[00:58:14] Yeah, so like in your situation that you're like, so if I punch you, I was on offense.
[00:58:20] Right? Yeah.
[00:58:21] If you don't punch me, I just, I was on defense.
[00:58:25] So yours was like, a pump, but you weren't punching.
[00:58:29] Yeah, it's interesting.
[00:58:30] Yeah, it's, it's harder, I guess, really get the capture, the actual, how you would explain that.
[00:58:36] I think the best I could do is when I just said, operationally you're on offense.
[00:58:39] Right.
[00:58:40] Meaning we're pushing into your neighborhood.
[00:58:41] Yeah, so that's essentially what's like this.
[00:58:43] Like this, if you had a bar, you were the bounce right at a bar, and I had a beef with you, I showed up at your bar.
[00:58:51] Right? Right.
[00:58:52] But once I get there and get in your face, boom, you crack me.
[00:58:55] You just went on offense.
[00:58:56] Right.
[00:58:57] Or even better, while I'm going to your bar, one of your boys steps out of the alleyway because he was waiting for me.
[00:59:02] Yeah.
[00:59:03] Cracks me with the ball on the back of the head.
[00:59:05] Right.
[00:59:06] So it'll be ready for people like you could.
[00:59:08] Yeah.
[00:59:09] So now we got another thing you got to come to the way.
[00:59:10] So there's different orders.
[00:59:11] They better kill me.
[00:59:13] They better stay better kill me.
[00:59:15] You and deep into the urinary of them.
[00:59:17] I'm just saying.
[00:59:18] I'm cool.
[00:59:19] There it is.
[00:59:23] Try and be on offense.
[00:59:25] Yeah.
[00:59:26] If you at least, the lesson to be learned there for me, if you're at least think about it, at least think about that you want to be on offense.
[00:59:34] Right.
[00:59:35] And that was always nice about these, you know, a lot of the missions that we did in Iraq
[00:59:39] is like we were surprising the enemy.
[00:59:41] Yeah.
[00:59:42] And if you can surprise the enemy, you're on offense.
[00:59:44] Yeah.
[00:59:45] So yeah.
[00:59:46] So like even like you're back to your, um, example, your your missions.
[00:59:51] Just the fact that you initiated that capture kill mission, that's your offensive.
[00:59:56] That's offensive movement.
[00:59:57] Yeah.
[00:59:57] But just like when I'm coming to the bar, I got to get to the bar.
[01:00:00] Right.
[01:00:01] One defense from the get in their center, and one will get hit.
[01:00:03] Right.
[01:00:04] So it's like throwing a punch with that with that other hand up.
[01:00:06] It's important to note that we would teach our guys to have an offensive mindset, meaning when we,
[01:00:11] would you saw one of our patrols, or one of our vehicle patrols, or a foot patrol, you see every guy ready to engage the enemy.
[01:00:19] Yeah.
[01:00:20] Most likely the first shot's going to come from.
[01:00:23] Yeah.
[01:00:24] Did that happen all the time?
[01:00:25] No.
[01:00:26] There's sometimes we, you know, on a patrol, guys would engage first or that could happen, but most likely that that's luck.
[01:00:32] Because most likely the enemy is a little bit smarter, they're hiding in a, you know, when you're walking,
[01:00:36] think about when you walk down the street, think of how many windows there are, how many doors there are.
[01:00:40] So now you just walk down a street, and how many windows can you see 200, 300, right?
[01:00:46] I mean, if you're walking down a city street, you can see a hundred windows.
[01:00:51] Let's say one of those windows could have a bad guy in it, and you can't, you're not going to see him.
[01:00:56] Yeah.
[01:00:57] He's going to see you first.
[01:00:58] Yeah.
[01:00:59] So.
[01:01:00] Check.
[01:01:02] Next question in April of 1975, during the fall of Saigon, there were some memorable images of American
[01:01:10] helicopters taking off from the roof of the American embassy in dozens of South Vietnamese trying to escape.
[01:01:14] What were your feelings when you saw those pictures?
[01:01:17] Hackworth.
[01:01:18] I was heartbroken when I saw the end come and the helicopters airlifting people off the embassy.
[01:01:23] But at the same time in 1971 when I left Vietnam, I said four years from now, the North Vietnamese were fly up to
[01:01:30] Flag over this capital.
[01:01:32] The reason I said that, and I was dead on to the month, was that I had been like a doctor
[01:01:38] feeling the pulse of a dying patient, and it was obvious to me that this patient, the South Vietnamese
[01:01:43] government, was on its way down.
[01:01:46] Question was the April 1975 victory of victory for the people's style of war.
[01:01:53] Hackworth.
[01:01:54] I think that the victory in Vietnam introduced a new phase of warfare where low intensity
[01:01:58] conflict can eventually win.
[01:02:01] Question.
[01:02:02] What was what does the concept of a people's war mean to you?
[01:02:06] Hackworth.
[01:02:07] It's the same thing that my forefathers employed in 1776.
[01:02:10] We wanted independence, and we were willing to pay with our lives.
[01:02:15] All people want to be free, and if they have that anger inside them and the ability to arm themselves,
[01:02:21] and somebody comes along and says, hey, I'm your leader, and I'm going to show you how to do this.
[01:02:26] Then the one guy who's trying to suppress them is in trouble.
[01:02:33] Question.
[01:02:34] What are the key lessons to be learned from the V.I.C. success?
[01:02:39] And actually before we go into that question, if you think about this from a leadership perspective,
[01:02:44] we all wanted independence.
[01:02:46] We all want to be free, and if somebody comes along and tries to dictate to you how things are going to be,
[01:02:52] that person's in trouble.
[01:02:54] Right? So as a leader, if you try and impose your will on people, look, can you get away with it? Yes.
[01:03:00] Yes. Does it work if you're in the, you know, if you can fire someone or yes, but to be actually lead someone, you can't just try and impose your will on top of them.
[01:03:10] You can get them in the game too.
[01:03:12] Next question.
[01:03:13] How important was mass mobilization to the success of the V.I.C.
[01:03:18] Hackworth.
[01:03:20] If you're going to fight a war today, you're going to need your whole nation behind you.
[01:03:24] Either as fighters or supporters or carriers, it's no longer the act of a few soldiers fighting on a sunny hill, waving swords at one another.
[01:03:33] Warfare is now the employment of the complete population. The V.I.C. took on two superpowers, France and the United States,
[01:03:41] and they couldn't have done it on a shoestring.
[01:03:44] They needed to mobilize everything within their nation, and they needed to get as much outside support as possible.
[01:03:50] At the end, the war became almost a conventional war. One of the things that bothers me is that the Americans who are now trying to rewrite history of what actually happened,
[01:03:58] say we won all the battles, but we lost the war.
[01:04:02] But we didn't win all the battles. We lost most of the battles.
[01:04:05] This is really, this is really critical, and this is a very important thing to think about.
[01:04:09] The reason they've come up with this very bad rationale is because of the American way of keeping score.
[01:04:15] In the old American way of conventional warfare, if you're king of the mountain at the end of the day, you've won the battle.
[01:04:22] But to the V.I.C.
[01:04:24] It wasn't who held the ground. It was what kind of punishment you inflicted on your enemy.
[01:04:29] The V.I.C. and North Vietnamese were willing to pay an easy, easy ratio of 10 to 1.
[01:04:35] If you fought him and you lost one soldier and he lost 10, he walked away saying, I was the winner.
[01:04:42] There's the mentality that you have to understand, and that's why you have to be willing to kill, and you have to be willing to die if you're going to go to war.
[01:04:50] That's why right there.
[01:04:53] Question. Can parallels be drawn between Afghanistan and Vietnam, between the V.I.C. and the Americans and the Mujahideen War success?
[01:05:04] Against the Soviets?
[01:05:06] Hackworth? Absolutely.
[01:05:08] There's no question that there are sharp parallels between the Afghan war and the war in Vietnam.
[01:05:13] The fighters, there were freedom fighters.
[01:05:17] They were trying to rid themselves of communism.
[01:05:20] They were supported by an outside country.
[01:05:22] This time the USA who poured billions of dollars into that war.
[01:05:25] They tried to win by using an enormous amount of firepower.
[01:05:29] Conventional tactics against the search and destroy operation.
[01:05:33] A high degree of technology. All the mistakes that the Soviets made in Afghanistan.
[01:05:37] The Americans made in Vietnam and the French made in Indochina.
[01:05:42] No one looked back on the lessons learned.
[01:05:46] Did the Soviets learn anything from America's experience?
[01:05:49] No one looked back on the lessons learned.
[01:05:52] Did the Soviets learn anything from America's experience?
[01:05:55] Did the Soviets learn anything from America's experience in Vietnam?
[01:05:59] Hackworth? From my analysis of the war, I'd say very little.
[01:06:03] They tried to win the war by using firepower by bombing them back the stone age
[01:06:07] through the use of American provided stinger missiles.
[01:06:09] And by mounting machine guns in high mountains and firing down on aircraft,
[01:06:13] they made the price so heavy for the Soviets in terms of cost that they blinked first and got out.
[01:06:20] Again, they used an incredible number of mines and booby traps,
[01:06:25] creating a great number of Soviet casualties.
[01:06:28] The Soviet units did that did well there, where special units led by people
[01:06:33] who understood that form of wealth warfare.
[01:06:36] But their conventional infantry was exactly the same as the American conventionally
[01:06:41] of the Korean Vietnam or the French conventionally in the Indochina.
[01:06:45] Question, why did the Soviets fail to learn from the American and French mistakes?
[01:06:51] Hackworth? I think it is a military mindset.
[01:06:55] We don't want to go back and look at the past.
[01:06:58] We're in such a hurry to get where we're going.
[01:07:01] There's a certain amount of military arrogance.
[01:07:05] The older I get, the more I realize how we never study the past and try to learn from it,
[01:07:10] we just stumble along and make the same mistakes.
[01:07:14] We're doomed to do that until people wake up.
[01:07:18] And with the military mind, I'm not sure it will ever wake up.
[01:07:24] Gotta keep your ego in check.
[01:07:28] Gotta learn from the past.
[01:07:31] 100% erect.
[01:07:33] Question, is there anything about guerrilla warfare which is new to this century?
[01:07:39] Hackworth, well a number of things are new.
[01:07:41] The amount of firepower that the insurgent employees and uses, the use of booby traps and mines,
[01:07:45] the ability to communicate via electronic communications.
[01:07:49] One of the problems that's always hampered the grill is getting the word out.
[01:07:53] In the days of older was done by messengers which today is an hours.
[01:07:57] Today a general has very sharp communications.
[01:08:00] Out in Somalia, General Adi had little portable radios to talk to his soldiers,
[01:08:05] very low frequency.
[01:08:07] The American CIA's intercept devices are all high frequency.
[01:08:11] They couldn't listen to what the man was saying.
[01:08:13] They didn't learn a thing.
[01:08:18] Question, how frightened was the average American conscript faced with all these obstacles and the skill of the enemy?
[01:08:26] Hackworth, the average American soldier going into battle in Vietnam,
[01:08:31] carried a whole pack full of fear, mainly because he wasn't trained properly back in the state.
[01:08:36] The training base was just off.
[01:08:39] They were preparing for World War II, not for insurgency warfare,
[01:08:43] so the lad received 16 weeks of training was flung in a Vietnam,
[01:08:47] generally in a unit that was never kept together.
[01:08:51] But it was always filled up by the individual replacement system.
[01:08:55] As a result, there was no real strong cohesion, no teamwork in the unit.
[01:09:00] And this is something that SLA Marshall talked about in Men Against Fire.
[01:09:05] The soldier was like an orphan thrown into a family,
[01:09:08] but a family that was not solidly put together.
[01:09:11] As a result, his fear level would be high because of the uncertainty of what he was going into.
[01:09:16] The typical kid who went to Vietnam was black.
[01:09:20] 21% of all soldiers were black,
[01:09:23] and the Hispanics and the whites were from the other side of the railroad tracks.
[01:09:28] If you went to a good university, like Brown University or something,
[01:09:32] you didn't find yourself carrying an M16 rifle in Vietnam.
[01:09:36] You did a Clinton. You got out of the war.
[01:09:39] It was very unfair. The poor, working classes were the ones that carried out the war effort.
[01:09:44] But they were made of tough stuff because their whole life required tough stuff.
[01:09:49] Once they were provided with the leadership,
[01:09:52] the proper leadership, that raw material did a hell of a job.
[01:09:57] But it didn't make the fear go away.
[01:10:02] When you're playing in that kind of a lethal super bowl,
[01:10:06] the possibility of dying and coming home in a rubber bag is always lingering in the back of your head.
[01:10:11] Regardless of how courageous you are,
[01:10:14] you will still have fear.
[01:10:16] But if you have competent leadership that you have confidence in,
[01:10:20] and if you're well trained, you can get the job done.
[01:10:23] It's my theory that the better trained you are, the more natural courage you have,
[01:10:28] because you have a belief in yourself.
[01:10:36] That's all important stuff.
[01:10:39] The better trained you are, the more natural courage you have.
[01:10:43] Keep that in mind.
[01:10:46] Also, the raw material just give me some good leadership
[01:10:51] and it will make something happen.
[01:10:55] Continuing, our soldiers weren't well trained,
[01:10:59] and in the main they weren't well led.
[01:11:02] But the longer the soldiers stayed there,
[01:11:04] the more experienced he became, and the more confident he became.
[01:11:07] The uncertainty was dispelled.
[01:11:09] He knew what to expect.
[01:11:11] But the fear would never go away.
[01:11:14] You know, you can never go near a battlefield without having those butterflies in your stomach.
[01:11:19] Question, what frightened your soldiers most?
[01:11:22] Hackworth, I think it was the uncertainty.
[01:11:25] Once they got into a unit and knew they were well led,
[01:11:29] knew that their commander loved them and cared for them,
[01:11:32] and would not throw them into harm's way unless absolutely necessary.
[01:11:36] Their main fear was just that uncertainty that came from the minds and booby traps.
[01:11:42] And it's a psychological thing.
[01:11:44] I've walked down trails, and I've said to myself,
[01:11:47] my self-asniper has me in his sights.
[01:11:49] You play those mind games with yourself.
[01:11:52] I've had that kind of experience where I saw a guy,
[01:11:54] where I saw a guy looking through his rifle,
[01:11:56] looking at me perfectly at what we call a six o'clock sight picture,
[01:12:00] and he's going to squeeze and you spot yourself going down.
[01:12:04] Good leadership dispells all those kinds of mind games.
[01:12:09] Question, there are all these images of American soldiers walking around,
[01:12:16] smoking pot, beads around their neck, singing rock songs,
[01:12:19] clearly the morale of the American troops broke down.
[01:12:22] Hackworth, the morale of the American army disintegrated
[01:12:26] the longer the war went on.
[01:12:29] We went there with a professional army that was well led
[01:12:32] by very fine combat leaders, most of whom were World War II
[01:12:36] or Korea experienced.
[01:12:38] I'm talking about senior NCOs and officers.
[01:12:41] They had a lot of battle experience or high quality people,
[01:12:44] and they were badly used from the beginning.
[01:12:47] They were traded out.
[01:12:49] So we lost the non-commissioned officer corps almost straight away
[01:12:53] within the first 18 months of the war.
[01:12:56] After that, there was no unit cohesion.
[01:12:59] Every 365 days you had a new unit.
[01:13:02] You had no institutional memory.
[01:13:05] I know this is my team of obvious, but you got to keep people together.
[01:13:09] When you get a good team, you got to keep them together.
[01:13:12] No one remembered what happened last month.
[01:13:15] And they kept repeating the same mistakes again and again and again.
[01:13:19] The Americans were in Vietnam for eight years,
[01:13:21] and there were no leaders at the top willing to raise Hell
[01:13:24] and demand that the training be hard,
[01:13:26] and demand that the standards be high.
[01:13:28] No one wanted to shake things up in a very, very unpopular war.
[01:13:32] Now the finest thing you can do for any young soldier is being
[01:13:36] mean as hell with him, and whack him in the head when he doesn't do something
[01:13:43] correctly.
[01:13:45] Make certain that he knows his job and knows how to do it right,
[01:13:49] because if he does it right, he'll do it right on the battlefield.
[01:13:52] But the whole training and leading leadership system,
[01:13:56] we're asking, how can we resolve this disintegrating morale problem?
[01:14:00] We can resolve it by getting them to the right.
[01:14:03] We're all problem. We can resolve it by getting them
[01:14:06] or an R delivering cold beer and coke and ice cream at night and hot food.
[01:14:12] This is what the general's mentality was,
[01:14:15] instead of kicking them in the ass and making them do things right,
[01:14:19] screw on their steel pot, carry their weapon and clean up their ammo,
[01:14:23] get rid of their love beads and not smoke dope.
[01:14:26] When I took over my battalion in a Delta,
[01:14:29] I was grass all over the place. Before I'd go out with my battalion,
[01:14:33] I'd shake everybody down. I'd boot people in the butt who even smoked cigarettes
[01:14:37] because you could smell tobacco in my all-away.
[01:14:39] You could see the light from a cigarette a couple miles away.
[01:14:42] In my unit, you didn't smoke anything and you certainly didn't smoke grass.
[01:14:46] It was just a question of discipline.
[01:14:49] If you had good leadership and provided discipline,
[01:14:53] you could design not to harass but to keep people alive, the soldiers would react.
[01:14:59] So, critical distinction there.
[01:15:02] Not talking about discipline, just design to harass people
[01:15:06] and do things for no good reason,
[01:15:08] but discipline that's actually there to keep people alive.
[01:15:11] Continuing.
[01:15:14] If they didn't have that, they would react the other way.
[01:15:18] This saw between 1965 and 1973 when the last US forces went out
[01:15:22] was a total disintegration.
[01:15:24] It was an organization that didn't have proper boundaries
[01:15:27] and didn't have people insisting on those boundaries.
[01:15:31] They were an army of hippies and they didn't have discipline.
[01:15:35] Had the war continued for a few more years,
[01:15:37] we were seeing at the end by 1973 units refusing to fight.
[01:15:43] Well, we'd have seen a whole army that refused to fight
[01:15:46] because it was a most unpopular war and soldiers were saying,
[01:15:50] what am I doing here?
[01:15:52] My politicians want me out, my family wants me out,
[01:15:55] and there's no purpose in being here.
[01:15:57] This does not affect my country's security.
[01:16:00] All I am is upon is stupid war.
[01:16:03] They were an army of hippies and didn't have discipline.
[01:16:08] Had the war continued for a few more years,
[01:16:11] we were seeing at the end of 1973 units refusing to fight.
[01:16:17] Well, we'd seen a whole army that refused to fight
[01:16:22] because it was a most unpopular war
[01:16:24] and the soldiers were saying, what am I doing here?
[01:16:27] My politicians want me out, my family wants me out
[01:16:30] and there's no purpose in being here.
[01:16:32] This does not affect my country's security.
[01:16:34] All I am is upon in a stupid war.
[01:16:41] First of all, obviously we're not talking about every soldier,
[01:16:45] every military, every service member, and Vietnam.
[01:16:47] That was acting that way.
[01:16:50] Clearly, there was people still doing heroic things
[01:16:53] and serving to the best of their ability.
[01:16:55] But he's making a broad general statement.
[01:16:58] That if we saw in 1973 some units that were saying,
[01:17:03] hey, we don't want to fight, then if you would have continued down that trajectory,
[01:17:07] you eventually have been saying, hey, wait a second.
[01:17:09] There'd be a lot more units that would be saying that.
[01:17:12] Next, how did your soldiers, particularly your fresh recruits,
[01:17:20] cope with not knowing who the enemy was?
[01:17:23] Hackworth.
[01:17:25] When a soldier would arrive in Vietnam,
[01:17:27] badly trained from the USA, not prepared for the war.
[01:17:30] My procedure was that each unit from their own training program
[01:17:34] at division level.
[01:17:36] The young recruit would go through this training up to two weeks
[01:17:39] in his particular area of operations.
[01:17:42] For example, looking after your feet in the may-con delta,
[01:17:45] keeping your ammo dry, and things of this nature.
[01:17:48] After they finished that division level training,
[01:17:51] they would come to a unit.
[01:17:53] Normally, I would talk to my soldiers,
[01:17:55] welcome them to the unit, assign them to a rifle company.
[01:17:58] My standard operating procedure was to assign a young recruit to an old soldier
[01:18:02] in the same foxhole.
[01:18:04] That soldier would be his buddy.
[01:18:06] A veteran would get a green recruit or a fresh meat as they called them,
[01:18:10] and he would take that new guy and pass his knowledge to him.
[01:18:15] Question, were your soldiers ever reluctant to fight?
[01:18:19] Hackworth, I had the ability to motivate people.
[01:18:22] Even though a guy might be a pacifist,
[01:18:25] in a few days, he was hunting for Charlie.
[01:18:28] I never had a problem in terms of getting soldiers to fight.
[01:18:33] Question, were you ever frightened?
[01:18:36] Can you remember a moment when you were frightened?
[01:18:40] Hackworth, I spent eight years on battlefields as a soldier,
[01:18:45] and I'm sure that there aren't very many minutes of those eight years that I wasn't frightened.
[01:18:51] It's something that lives in your stomach.
[01:18:54] It's just churning all the time.
[01:18:56] As the bullets start snapping in the intensity of combat increases,
[01:18:59] that churning increases.
[01:19:01] But it's always there.
[01:19:03] As long as you're in a dangerous situation,
[01:19:06] you've got it, and you're carrying it with you on your back.
[01:19:11] Question, did your soldiers have any compunction about shooting civilians on the chance that they were via Kong?
[01:19:18] Hackworth, I think the average American soldier perceived the enemy as,
[01:19:22] but for the grace of God, there go I,
[01:19:25] and they were reluctant to shoot somebody unless they knew they were of the enemy.
[01:19:30] But if the guy were coming at him at night,
[01:19:33] if the guy were walking in an area he shouldn't be in and had weapons or something like that,
[01:19:38] the way I trained my soldiers was to react automatically.
[01:19:42] Don't get the thinking process going.
[01:19:46] When you see a right cross-combat you,
[01:19:48] block it with your left hand and go with the right hook.
[01:19:52] I never had problems with soldiers being reluctant to fight.
[01:19:56] Of course, this is different than the SLA martial report of people not wanting to fight.
[01:20:03] And it's also, you know,
[01:20:07] I say this sometimes people freak out about it.
[01:20:10] When I say don't think, right, it's not thinking.
[01:20:13] Hey, your alarm clock goes off the morning.
[01:20:15] Don't think you just get up and you do what you're supposed to do.
[01:20:17] Oh, you're supposed to work out.
[01:20:19] Don't think about it.
[01:20:20] Just go do it.
[01:20:21] And that's what he's saying for a more important situation.
[01:20:25] Oh, there's an enemy threat.
[01:20:26] Don't think about it.
[01:20:28] Do what you're supposed to do.
[01:20:35] Would it surprise you to know that the chief concierge
[01:20:38] at the continental hotel, side-gons, top hotel,
[01:20:41] was in fact working for the Vietcong.
[01:20:44] Hackworth, it wouldn't surprise me.
[01:20:46] At TET of 68, the Secretary of the to the commanding general of the US forces in Vietnam,
[01:20:51] General Westmoreland was found holding an AK47.
[01:20:55] With the whole Vietnames apparatus,
[01:20:58] I never once trusted a Vietnames.
[01:21:00] I never trusted a Vietnames general.
[01:21:02] I never allowed a Vietnames inside my camp, my firebase.
[01:21:05] If I were going to meet a Vietnames kernel,
[01:21:07] I would meet him outside my firebase because I didn't trust him.
[01:21:11] I assumed everybody was Vietcong.
[01:21:14] Question, and the use of the people you were meant to be fighting for.
[01:21:18] Hackworth, that's right, and that was my attitude.
[01:21:21] The soldiers from the 9th Division hated the South Vietnamese soldiers more than they did the Vietcong.
[01:21:27] So what he's saying right there is, I'm going to read that again.
[01:21:32] My soldiers from the 9th Division hated the South Vietnamese soldiers more than they did the Vietcong.
[01:21:37] That's a horrible situation.
[01:21:40] They saw them coming and going out.
[01:21:44] They saw them going out on operations and not beating the enemy, but avoiding the enemy.
[01:21:48] They called it search and avoid were supposed to be search and destroy.
[01:21:51] My Bataen could go all the way through the same area and come back bloodied and battered.
[01:21:56] That really got to my guys.
[01:21:58] I was walking the perimeter one night.
[01:22:00] I used the British system of stand two in the evening,
[01:22:03] where everybody was at their post with a weapon ready to go,
[01:22:07] just as the sun was going down.
[01:22:09] One of my sniper said, sir, how's the body count today?
[01:22:13] And I said, not so good.
[01:22:15] We only had a 8 or 9 for the day for the Bataen.
[01:22:18] And he said, well, I'll get you two more before I could stop him.
[01:22:22] He took out a sniper rifle.
[01:22:24] I looked down at the end of the weapon to see where it was pointed.
[01:22:27] And it was pointed at two South Vietnamese soldiers guarding a bridge about 40 meters from my perimeter.
[01:22:33] I knocked the weapon up before he had a chance to scream, squeeze off around.
[01:22:38] This was the attitude of a lot of soldiers.
[01:22:41] They didn't like the South Vietnamese because they didn't pull their weight.
[01:22:46] Question, why did massacre as a current Vietnam hack worth?
[01:22:52] Well, the big massacre was me lie.
[01:22:56] Lieutenant William Carley and Captain Medina were the principal characters involved in that act.
[01:23:01] Why did they have that occur?
[01:23:03] It occurred for a number of reasons.
[01:23:05] The soldiers were frustrated.
[01:23:07] They were mainly frustrated because of mines and booby traps,
[01:23:11] and because they could never find the enemy.
[01:23:13] They were just tripping through mine fields and seeing their mates blown away,
[01:23:18] never grabbing hold of the enemy and getting into a real fight.
[01:23:22] Then there's a lot of people in a village,
[01:23:24] and then insanity takes over, and they just start blowing human beings away.
[01:23:30] It's also about bad leadership.
[01:23:34] Lieutenant Carley had gone through Officer Canada School.
[01:23:37] He had gone through three separate courses,
[01:23:39] was found wanting and leadership in two of them,
[01:23:42] and had been recycled instead of being booted out.
[01:23:46] The military was into a numbers game and didn't want to have a high-attrition rate for their officers.
[01:23:52] They kept recycling someone until they graduated.
[01:23:56] So here's a guy who never should have been trusted more than an Army PFC ends up a lieutenant.
[01:24:02] He's with a platoon of soldiers who are extremely frustrated because of mines and booby traps,
[01:24:08] and he doesn't have the leadership ability to control them to stop that fire.
[01:24:15] I think massacres occur when you don't have strong leadership,
[01:24:19] when you don't have soldiers who are extremely well trained and well disciplined and well controlled by their leaders.
[01:24:25] That's what happened.
[01:24:27] All those components fell apart.
[01:24:31] And I think the book that we covered on the Meal Eye Massacre actually gave even better details.
[01:24:39] I mean, obviously it gave better details because it's a full book,
[01:24:42] but I really was one of the key things I remember.
[01:24:46] I remember how the intelligence escalated.
[01:24:49] It escalated.
[01:24:50] And I'll tell you something else.
[01:24:52] He's saying that, you know, that Lieutenant Carley couldn't stop them.
[01:24:58] Lieutenant Carley led that massacre.
[01:25:00] He led the massacre.
[01:25:01] Wasn't him saying, oh, I can't control the guy.
[01:25:04] He was actually doing the massacre.
[01:25:06] And they were, they were actually following.
[01:25:09] And that wraps up that wraps up the interview.
[01:25:13] It was kind of a abrupt ending.
[01:25:14] I don't know why it's so abrupt.
[01:25:16] I looked around and see if there was anything else missing.
[01:25:18] But that's how the interview ends.
[01:25:21] But I wanted to go to it from there.
[01:25:23] I wanted to just grab a couple sections out of the Vietnam primer.
[01:25:26] Again, this is the book that that hack worth wrote.
[01:25:29] Hack worth wrote with SLA Marshall when they got back.
[01:25:33] For when they got back from this torn Vietnam,
[01:25:36] there was a few months long.
[01:25:37] And they went and talked debriefed all kinds of people.
[01:25:39] And again, there's all kinds of tactical level lessons in here.
[01:25:43] I mean, like real tactical doubling security,
[01:25:47] contending with a jungle security on the trail.
[01:25:50] The company in movement field and intelligence.
[01:25:52] I mean, there's the defensive perimeter.
[01:25:54] It's just very, it's also a very short book.
[01:25:57] And I mean, a hundred pages long.
[01:25:59] And like I said, if you want to get this,
[01:26:01] if you're in the military, you might be able to use this.
[01:26:05] If you're leading up, if you're a platoon leader,
[01:26:07] you probably get some decent lesson thrown down to this.
[01:26:10] But this isn't one of those books that translates directly to business.
[01:26:15] Because it's actually not, it's not about leadership.
[01:26:18] It's about the tactics of an infantry platoon and infantry company.
[01:26:25] So, but that being said, of course, there are some lessons.
[01:26:32] And what's interesting to me is also, as I found these leadership lessons.
[01:26:36] They're not just leadership lessons.
[01:26:38] Beyond being leadership lessons, there's a lot of lessons here for you as a person,
[01:26:47] for me as a person.
[01:26:49] And you start taking the leadership lessons from Vietnam,
[01:26:54] and applying them to yourself.
[01:26:56] I think you could see a lot of crossover.
[01:26:59] Starting from a leadership perspective, though, here we go.
[01:27:02] Vietnam, primer.
[01:27:04] Back to the book.
[01:27:06] Armistakes in Vietnam are neither new nor startling.
[01:27:10] They are not something we can blame on the mysteries of warfare.
[01:27:13] They are the same problems that have been haunting small unit commander since before Gideon.
[01:27:18] In peace or war, these errors spell the difference between professionalism
[01:27:23] and mediocrity.
[01:27:26] Many young leaders, enchanted by the Hollywood image of war,
[01:27:30] approach combat with the good guy versus the bad guy attitude.
[01:27:34] But there is no similarity between what John Wayne gets away with on the screen
[01:27:39] and the hot hard facts of a firefight.
[01:27:43] A small unit leader in combat cannot afford to have a film heroes
[01:27:48] and a devil-make-air attitude toward training, discipline and basic soldiering.
[01:27:53] In the recipe for battle victory, well-led and disciplined soldiers are the main ingredient.
[01:28:01] Soldiers who have been conditioned through training to react by habit when confronted
[01:28:07] with the searing realities of engagement.
[01:28:10] The habits learned in training, good or bad are the same habits
[01:28:15] that move the soldier in combat.
[01:28:18] A leader then must ensure that each of his soldiers is well trained
[01:28:22] and has developed good habits, habits so deeply ingrained through correct teaching
[01:28:27] and intensive practice that even under the pressure of fear and sudden danger,
[01:28:32] each soldier automatically will do the right thing.
[01:28:37] Check.
[01:28:39] Continuing, there is no magic formula or sweatless solution by which one can achieve this goal.
[01:28:54] There's no hack.
[01:28:56] Leaders may approach training for combat only with intense dedication,
[01:29:01] accepting as gospel the timeless truth that better trained men live longer on the battlefield.
[01:29:08] No military unit is ever completely trained.
[01:29:14] There will always be a weak area that requires additional time and effort.
[01:29:19] The wise commander uses all available time to train his unit.
[01:29:24] He never says good enough.
[01:29:27] Leaders must accept the old but absolute maximum,
[01:29:31] the more sweat on the training field, the less blood on the battlefield.
[01:29:36] Combat is too serious a business to permit easy excuse of even one mistake.
[01:29:43] Never quit checking.
[01:29:49] Check everything all the time.
[01:29:52] Weapons for cleanliness, aid men for supplies, centuries for alertness
[01:29:57] and the camp for field sanitation.
[01:30:03] Another weakness among junior leaders is the inaccurate report of the estimate of the situation.
[01:30:13] Estimates are many times either so greatly exaggerated or so watered down that they are not meaningful to the next higher commander
[01:30:21] who must make critical decisions as to troop employment and allocation of combat power.
[01:30:28] The confusion and noise of the battlefield are two reasons why faulty estimates are made.
[01:30:35] Over emotionalism and the sense of the drama are others.
[01:30:40] These factors coupled with the judgment of an impulsive commander who feels that he must say something on the radio even if it is wrong, are the crux of the problem.
[01:30:51] Commanders must report the facts as they see them on the battlefield if they don't know the situation, they must just say that.
[01:31:04] And again those are just a couple little lessons learned out of Vietnam primer.
[01:31:12] And I think one of the things like I said, there's a lot of things that you can take from what Hackworth talks about and we talk about leadership.
[01:31:25] And you can actually apply it to yourself.
[01:31:28] You can apply it to your personal life and some of the things that you just said, think about some of these.
[01:31:32] Armestakes are nothing new or startling.
[01:31:37] Think about that.
[01:31:40] Most of the time most of the time think about this most of the time when you make a mistake.
[01:31:47] It's something that you already knew you actually know you're making the mistake when you're making it.
[01:31:54] Here's another thing he says.
[01:31:56] Errors spell the difference between professionalism and mediocrity.
[01:32:01] It's the little things.
[01:32:03] It's the little mistakes that you make.
[01:32:06] Next thing he says, discipline soldiers are the main ingredient in victory.
[01:32:14] We'll guess what the main ingredient in victory in your life is.
[01:32:19] Discipline.
[01:32:20] Yeah.
[01:32:21] All day.
[01:32:24] He says there's no magic formula or sweatless solution by which one can achieve their goals.
[01:32:33] I think he just said there's no there is no shortcut. There is no hack.
[01:32:37] There's no sweatless solution.
[01:32:39] You're gonna have to work.
[01:32:44] Then he says this no military unit is ever completely trained.
[01:32:47] Guess what neither are you neither am I.
[01:32:52] There is always weakness to work on always.
[01:32:55] A lot of them.
[01:33:00] He says this in Vietnam primer.
[01:33:03] Combat is two series of business to permit easy excuse of even one mistake.
[01:33:10] Now think about this.
[01:33:12] Okay.
[01:33:13] Combat's two series of business.
[01:33:15] Why is that?
[01:33:16] It's because you can die.
[01:33:17] But guess what?
[01:33:18] We're all gonna die.
[01:33:21] We're all gonna die.
[01:33:22] So why would we allow ourselves to make easy, easy excuses?
[01:33:28] Why would you allow that?
[01:33:31] Combat's life and death.
[01:33:33] So is life.
[01:33:38] So you shouldn't allow yourself these easy excuses.
[01:33:41] And then the last section that he talks about that I read, it can absolutely be applied.
[01:33:49] It can absolutely be applied.
[01:33:51] He says another weakness common among junior leaders is the inaccurate reporting.
[01:33:57] The inaccurate reporting of the estimate of the situation.
[01:34:00] They are either so exaggerated or will so water down that they are not meaningful.
[01:34:10] Now again if you apply this to yourself what you realize is that you have these junior leaders that they're lying to the chain of command.
[01:34:20] I mean they're exaggerating or they're watering things down but they're basically lying to the chain of command.
[01:34:25] Well how does that translate to us?
[01:34:26] We lie to ourselves.
[01:34:29] That's how it translates to us.
[01:34:31] We lie to ourselves.
[01:34:33] We don't tell ourselves the way things really are.
[01:34:35] And when we do that then we can't fix our problems.
[01:34:39] If we can't fix our problems we're not gonna improve.
[01:34:41] So we have to be truthful to ourselves.
[01:34:46] I have to be truthful to myself.
[01:34:48] You have to be truthful to yourself.
[01:34:50] You have to stop rationalizing, stop making excuses, stop telling yourself.
[01:34:54] Little water down the assessments of where you're really at.
[01:34:58] Tell yourself the truth.
[01:35:04] So that you can get where you want to go.
[01:35:08] You can be who you want to be.
[01:35:09] You could be who you should be.
[01:35:13] Who you should be when you do what you know you should do when you pay attention to the little things.
[01:35:20] When you implement discipline.
[01:35:24] True and unfrenching and unmitigated discipline in your life.
[01:35:28] When you stop trying to find a sweatless solution.
[01:35:34] When you look for weaknesses to work on.
[01:35:36] When you allow no easy excuses.
[01:35:40] And all that starts when you stop lying to yourself.
[01:35:46] That's when you can become who you know you should be.
[01:35:51] When you tell yourself the truth about where you are.
[01:35:55] So you can make sure you are in the right place.
[01:35:58] And if you're not in the right place then you can get yourself on the path to get there.
[01:36:04] The path of discipline, the path of hard work and the path of truth.
[01:36:15] And I think that's all I've got for tonight.
[01:36:27] So echo Charles speaking of the path of truth.
[01:36:33] What's open to any suggestions you may or may not have on how we can get on that path.
[01:36:43] And then go ahead and stay on a path.
[01:36:46] Yeah.
[01:36:47] I feel like more and more of us are on the path.
[01:36:52] That's what I feel like.
[01:36:53] You know at the roll call.
[01:36:55] At the roll call that we just got done.
[01:36:57] Which was an event if you don't know for military first responders, law enforcement,
[01:37:03] paramedics, firefighters.
[01:37:05] There was a lot of people there that are straight up on the path.
[01:37:09] Yeah.
[01:37:13] And it's one of those deals where you know how like when you hear a certain story.
[01:37:17] And then you're about someone and you're like, like, dang that's impressive.
[01:37:21] And then you hear it again.
[01:37:22] And again and then again and then you're like, okay, you know, I'm kind of used to it.
[01:37:25] I don't feel like I've gotten used to this at all because everyone's story is kind of different.
[01:37:30] You know, so it kind of exposes this element of like,
[01:37:34] like just immense of individuality of a person.
[01:37:38] You know, so it's kind of like, I don't know.
[01:37:40] It's like, I don't know.
[01:37:41] Maybe like your kids birthday or something that happens over and over again,
[01:37:44] but never gets old.
[01:37:45] You know, kind of that kind of situation.
[01:37:47] There was a guy he was like, and he just told me this while we were listening to you guys.
[01:37:52] Dude, dude, just to.
[01:37:53] And he was just right in the middle of it, just kind of in my ear.
[01:37:56] And he's like, dude, I lost 70 pounds.
[01:37:59] Yeah.
[01:38:00] I'm on the path.
[01:38:02] Geez.
[01:38:03] Guys were just guys and girls females.
[01:38:07] Boys and girls men and women.
[01:38:10] We're walking up to me and like showing me pictures.
[01:38:13] Hey, this is what I looked like 13 months ago.
[01:38:16] Me.
[01:38:17] I've lost 38 pounds or whatever.
[01:38:20] Awesome.
[01:38:21] I got promoted.
[01:38:23] Yeah.
[01:38:24] It's awesome.
[01:38:26] So yes, you are correct.
[01:38:28] There's a lot of people on the path.
[01:38:30] Kids, everything.
[01:38:31] Kids, oh yeah.
[01:38:32] Oh yeah.
[01:38:33] People, I made little videos for kids.
[01:38:35] I was looking at videos, kids, kids doing pull ups.
[01:38:38] Kids doing jiu-jitsu.
[01:38:39] The warrior kids.
[01:38:41] Straight up on the path.
[01:38:43] No one, the, no one, the getty's burger dress.
[01:38:47] Hey, look at this kid.
[01:38:49] Look at my son.
[01:38:50] He knows he got his burger dress.
[01:38:51] He's six.
[01:38:52] No, look at my daughter.
[01:38:55] That's six pull ups right there.
[01:38:57] You know, you know how many should you could do last year?
[01:39:00] Zero.
[01:39:01] Yeah.
[01:39:02] You see what I'm saying?
[01:39:03] I'm just gonna go and grab a pat.
[01:39:06] You think it's gonna get crowded around the path?
[01:39:08] No.
[01:39:09] It'll get wider.
[01:39:10] Maybe the path gets wider.
[01:39:11] It's wide.
[01:39:12] Everyone's kind of on their own path.
[01:39:13] But there's just a unified, yeah.
[01:39:15] Oh, there's, there's common ground on the path.
[01:39:18] Yeah, there's definitely a general.
[01:39:19] You know, I mean, on a fundamental level, actually, there's, there's immense
[01:39:22] commonality.
[01:39:23] You know, but the path is big enough to maintain.
[01:39:27] There's not gonna be a traffic jam on the path.
[01:39:30] No.
[01:39:31] It's very, it's just a opposite.
[01:39:32] Yeah.
[01:39:33] The more people have a path, the faster it goes.
[01:39:35] Yeah, more momentum.
[01:39:36] Yeah.
[01:39:37] Yeah.
[01:39:38] So, all right.
[01:39:39] Well, we're now, we're now, we're now, you could take leadership principles and
[01:39:41] apply them to yourself.
[01:39:43] Yeah.
[01:39:44] Yeah.
[01:39:44] So it's almost like don't lie to yourself.
[01:39:46] Think about that.
[01:39:47] Right.
[01:39:48] Because you think about the little lies you tell yourself.
[01:39:49] Oh, yeah.
[01:39:50] They had a lie.
[01:39:51] I was like this myself.
[01:39:52] So long time ago, my mom was like overweight.
[01:39:55] I didn't know.
[01:39:56] I mean, I guess I knew that.
[01:39:58] No, no, no, no, no.
[01:39:59] When you're a little kid, you know, no.
[01:40:00] You just need to know about that.
[01:40:01] Yeah.
[01:40:02] And then, so she got on the path back in the day and she lost a bunch of weight.
[01:40:08] And my dad said, hey, you know, what am I going to get your mom for her birthday?
[01:40:12] I was like, what?
[01:40:13] He's like a mirror, a full size mirror.
[01:40:15] Because she lost a bunch of weight.
[01:40:16] Yeah.
[01:40:17] It's good.
[01:40:18] You know, whatever.
[01:40:19] And I was like, cool, you know, that's something I don't stuff.
[01:40:22] Whatever furniture was a furniture.
[01:40:24] Good.
[01:40:25] You know, whatever.
[01:40:26] Good job that that whatever.
[01:40:27] You know, kind of.
[01:40:28] And then I kind of thought about it.
[01:40:29] And I'm thinking about it more now.
[01:40:30] It's like, man, you know what that, you know what that says?
[01:40:33] That says that like, you know, she was like overweight and she was a sit from my dad to know that.
[01:40:38] You know, and to take action like that means that he knew that she was in a way.
[01:40:43] And when we're in another avoiding the mirror.
[01:40:45] Yeah.
[01:40:46] And well, I would say straight up avoiding it, but she just didn't want to see herself in the mirror.
[01:40:51] Yeah.
[01:40:52] You said the same thing I said.
[01:40:53] I guess I said it in a little bit of different way, but she didn't want to see herself in the mirror.
[01:40:57] Right.
[01:40:58] If you have a, and you kind of think about it, sure you have a mirror in the bathroom and it's sort of it.
[01:41:02] But like, I don't know where to where to do we have mirrors, right?
[01:41:04] Like, I don't know in the bedroom or something.
[01:41:06] You don't want girls to get ready.
[01:41:07] I don't know.
[01:41:08] I'm comparing it to my car.
[01:41:09] I don't know.
[01:41:10] I don't know.
[01:41:10] I have like the mirror in the bathroom medicine cabinet.
[01:41:13] Yeah.
[01:41:14] Yeah.
[01:41:14] I guess I guess my, you know what, you're right, because both my daughters, my older daughters had mirrors in their room.
[01:41:20] Yeah.
[01:41:21] I'll have to think.
[01:41:22] Get ready.
[01:41:23] Yeah.
[01:41:24] Right.
[01:41:24] Get ready.
[01:41:25] Get that outfit.
[01:41:26] I'm assuming.
[01:41:27] You're looking over there.
[01:41:29] But for a girl, I don't know.
[01:41:30] Again, I'm just totally like thinking of my situation.
[01:41:33] So, and yeah, so I kind of thinking back on like dang, we only had the mirror in the bathroom.
[01:41:37] Anyway, so for that to be the case, for a mirror to be a good gift where your dad's going to tell you like,
[01:41:42] How this has a good gift.
[01:41:45] It kind of indicates that.
[01:41:46] You don't like it.
[01:41:47] It's like, oh yeah.
[01:41:48] So anyway, the point is like, yeah, we do kind of like to ourselves.
[01:41:51] Even if we don't think we're necessarily lying or something,
[01:41:53] She's like, you don't want to admit certain things.
[01:41:56] You see a mission.
[01:41:57] Yeah.
[01:41:58] Oh, yeah.
[01:41:58] Oh, yeah.
[01:41:59] I'm not even going to look at myself before.
[01:42:00] Yeah.
[01:42:01] I don't know what you just told subject to.
[01:42:02] Yeah.
[01:42:03] Yeah, yeah.
[01:42:04] They're for us.
[01:42:05] I like it.
[01:42:06] Yeah.
[01:42:07] Yeah.
[01:42:08] Like if you don't do Jesus.
[01:42:10] Yeah.
[01:42:11] Like you don't do Jesus.
[01:42:12] You don't want to.
[01:42:13] If you don't do Jesus, you don't want to.
[01:42:14] If you don't do Jesus, you want to.
[01:42:15] If you don't do Jesus, you want to.
[01:42:16] Let's say there's an a month or four days that you didn't do Jesus.
[01:42:20] Three of those could have been legitimate days.
[01:42:23] Yeah.
[01:42:24] for whatever reason couldn't do G2.
[01:42:26] One of those days might have been predicated on a lie
[01:42:29] that you told yourself.
[01:42:30] Right?
[01:42:31] Right?
[01:42:31] Like, I just don't have time today.
[01:42:33] Yeah.
[01:42:34] When what you really did was you extended some work.
[01:42:36] Yeah.
[01:42:37] An extra.
[01:42:38] Because that's a weird time.
[01:42:39] There's a weird time thing that happens with G2.
[01:42:41] Like, hey, class starts at 4.30.
[01:42:45] Or class starts at, like, hey, I'm going to roll at 5.30.
[01:42:49] The guys are everyone's training at 6.
[01:42:52] Right?
[01:42:53] You know, no get 6.
[01:42:54] Well, if I get caught up in something mysteriously and all of a sudden it's 6.04 at my house,
[01:43:02] you know what?
[01:43:03] I won't even get there until 6.20 or 6.15 by the time it gets changed.
[01:43:09] You know, the guy's a probably done.
[01:43:11] Yeah.
[01:43:12] You just told yourself a bunch of lies.
[01:43:13] Well, there are, I would say, because there's not, that's not nothing.
[01:43:18] This is, and my house is called the G2 window.
[01:43:20] So, okay. Like, because there is not like the gym.
[01:43:23] Well, the like it, then I should have said this then.
[01:43:25] The like came earlier.
[01:43:26] The like came earlier, which was like, I should really get this done right now.
[01:43:29] Yeah.
[01:43:30] No, you could get that done when you get home later.
[01:43:32] But you just, you just extended that window because you wanted to shut the G2 window
[01:43:35] on yourself.
[01:43:36] Right?
[01:43:37] Yeah.
[01:43:37] That's what happens.
[01:43:38] And that window is like, that's a weird psychological area to be.
[01:43:41] Because it's going to, I call it at home.
[01:43:43] I call it the G2 window.
[01:43:44] That's what it's kind of like, when my wife will be like, hey, can you, can you just go later?
[01:43:48] I was like, no.
[01:43:49] There's a window and it's super, super narrow.
[01:43:52] Just like I said, when it's 604 and you're supposed to be there at six is that
[01:43:56] because here's the factors.
[01:43:57] One, everyone will be either finishing up or late in the rounds.
[01:44:01] Yeah.
[01:44:01] You'll get one roll.
[01:44:03] So kind of the, the later you show up, the less training you're going to get.
[01:44:07] So the less training you get, the less worth it.
[01:44:09] It is to get dressed and get all your stuff to get in and go.
[01:44:12] I'm not saying it's going to be not worth it.
[01:44:15] But it becomes less and less worth it.
[01:44:17] So there's that. And then there's like the social things.
[01:44:20] Like, oh, you're the guy that shows up on the last round.
[01:44:22] Yeah.
[01:44:22] When it was tired, what are you doing?
[01:44:23] You know, there's kind of like a stigma with that.
[01:44:25] When somebody says that to me, I'm like, I just got done working.
[01:44:29] I came here as quickly as I could.
[01:44:31] Yeah.
[01:44:31] And I'll tell you what.
[01:44:32] I'll do 35 burpees right now.
[01:44:35] Yeah.
[01:44:35] And then we can train you.
[01:44:37] Yeah.
[01:44:38] And that's, of course, that's not because because that's not always the case.
[01:44:41] I mean, with you, I can't really remember actually done that before.
[01:44:43] But yeah.
[01:44:44] That's just what I always,
[01:44:45] that in just your answer there, kind of indicated like,
[01:44:48] that's never happened to you.
[01:44:49] How does it kind of think?
[01:44:50] No, there's there's one, you know, big Eric.
[01:44:53] Yeah.
[01:44:53] Yeah.
[01:44:53] Big Eric will be like, oh, you're showing up.
[01:44:55] I'm like, bro.
[01:44:56] He always did like one round.
[01:44:59] Oh, no.
[01:45:00] Come on.
[01:45:02] Come on.
[01:45:03] No, don't care.
[01:45:05] I, another thing you'll say is if he's done anything else that day,
[01:45:10] he'll tell you about it.
[01:45:12] Like, like, a, hey, I went and ran stairs this morning.
[01:45:14] I'm like, that's cool.
[01:45:15] I squatted, did sprints went surfing and now I'm here to train.
[01:45:19] What?
[01:45:20] Even that's how it's.
[01:45:23] Yeah.
[01:45:24] Yeah.
[01:45:25] But none of the last, did you swim into a thrill?
[01:45:27] You know, because you'll, you know, let me just miss this.
[01:45:30] And I don't mean this, you know, in a hostel way.
[01:45:32] How come sometimes when the jiu-jitsu class starts,
[01:45:35] let's say it, let's say we're going to train at 11.
[01:45:37] How come sometimes you show up at like 11, 48?
[01:45:41] That's, that's, that's a bit.
[01:45:44] Maybe that went, sometimes it seems like your window is way just off alignment sometimes.
[01:45:49] Seriously, I don't know.
[01:45:50] Let's call it a Sunday, right?
[01:45:52] We all know what time we start training, right?
[01:45:55] And then sometimes you come rolling in and you want to talk about, you,
[01:45:58] you like, hey, we know you're 15 minutes.
[01:46:00] Say these guys, can we don't?
[01:46:01] I'm, I'm an hour and a half.
[01:46:03] Yeah, brown.
[01:46:04] Walk it.
[01:46:05] And you're rolling in like, bowing up to me.
[01:46:08] Well, I'm going to blow up regarding, and of course, I'm not going to be saying, hey,
[01:46:11] you know, you're showing up late and I'm kind of tired.
[01:46:13] No, I'm going to say, okay, we're, you showing up. We'll do what we got to do.
[01:46:16] Yeah, you know what it is, okay?
[01:46:17] Because you know, I have no idea.
[01:46:19] I have no idea how someone could be knowing that all of his training
[01:46:23] partners that want to train with them are there at 10 o'clock or at 11 o'clock.
[01:46:28] And that individual decides, hey, I'll just show up at 11, 48.
[01:46:32] And call it good.
[01:46:34] This is what happened.
[01:46:36] On Sunday, the normal routine has always been I come at noon for Greg
[01:46:40] Trains.
[01:46:41] No, Guy.
[01:46:42] Okay.
[01:46:43] And they've been for two, three, four years.
[01:46:46] You've shown up at that time.
[01:46:47] See me in a ball of sweat.
[01:46:49] 12 rounds deep.
[01:46:51] Yeah.
[01:46:52] If you remember correctly, there are times that all come.
[01:46:57] It'll be me and Andy just going around Robin.
[01:46:59] There will be those times.
[01:47:01] But you're looking at the amount of times that Andy and I have done that.
[01:47:04] Very large number.
[01:47:06] Yeah, I know, but here this is why though.
[01:47:08] So it has to do with like my whole overall life scheduling.
[01:47:12] So noon is the best time.
[01:47:14] And I get trained with Greg and you're all this stuff.
[01:47:17] And then you'll text me like the day before.
[01:47:19] So you're in here.
[01:47:20] We're going to freaking tent.
[01:47:21] And I'm like, okay.
[01:47:22] You got a hard, hard, crazy schedule.
[01:47:25] I need to call your assistant.
[01:47:27] You're going to put in your calendar.
[01:47:29] Anyway, the day before.
[01:47:31] Anyway, I'll text Andy and like,
[01:47:33] I'm like, hey, I'm heading to the gym in 15 minutes.
[01:47:35] He's like, I'm on my way.
[01:47:36] Look, hey, look.
[01:47:37] What Tuesday night, Thursday, Sunday morning.
[01:47:40] Whatever, what if, okay, what if you and Andy had
[01:47:43] planned to train at 10 and I text you, hey, let's train at 130.
[01:47:48] Yeah, I'd say no, be here at 10.
[01:47:50] Why not 130?
[01:47:51] Because we're not training then we're training at 10.
[01:47:54] We have a still to understand.
[01:47:55] Okay, I want 30.
[01:47:56] Hey, you can train.
[01:47:57] Because that's what time we train.
[01:47:58] What about 130?
[01:47:59] What's the difference?
[01:48:00] 15 minutes.
[01:48:01] We got to do things too.
[01:48:02] There you go.
[01:48:03] We have other things to do.
[01:48:04] So I had like obligations.
[01:48:06] Okay, this is not like a random thing that happens.
[01:48:10] This is the steady state for years.
[01:48:12] Yeah.
[01:48:13] 1148.
[01:48:15] You probably count yourself as being early for me.
[01:48:18] Yeah, I do.
[01:48:19] I do.
[01:48:20] 1148 is when you come in and you see sweat.
[01:48:23] Yeah.
[01:48:24] Are you a little bit bummed out?
[01:48:25] Yes.
[01:48:26] Why, why do you not adjust your schedule?
[01:48:27] Why don't you calendar yourself?
[01:48:29] Well, because I don't know.
[01:48:30] It's weird.
[01:48:31] It's like, I'm on this, it's on, I'm on this like psychological pat-like.
[01:48:34] You're lying to yourself.
[01:48:35] No, no, no, no, no.
[01:48:36] I'm not.
[01:48:37] You're lying to yourself.
[01:48:38] Hackworth says no.
[01:48:39] I'm going to lie into yourself.
[01:48:40] I'm going to go hit in the soon that I am lying to myself.
[01:48:43] I have to do this.
[01:48:44] I'm going to find it and admit it to myself.
[01:48:48] But this is what it feels like.
[01:48:50] Your comes the lie.
[01:48:51] No, no, no.
[01:48:52] Because this is like, it feels like it could be like this could be funny.
[01:48:55] Like all week I do whatever whatever whatever.
[01:48:58] Right.
[01:48:59] That's just sort of in place.
[01:49:02] It doesn't take much mental work.
[01:49:03] But then if you're like, taxi me the night before saying, hey, 10.
[01:49:06] I'm like, oh man, kind of in my mind.
[01:49:08] I'm already kind of committed to the new to myself though.
[01:49:11] You're all heavy, truly.
[01:49:13] That seems the same thing.
[01:49:16] I'm like, oh man, kind of in my mind.
[01:49:17] I'm already kind of committed to the new to myself though.
[01:49:20] You're all heavy, truly.
[01:49:21] That seems the same thing.
[01:49:23] This isn't just the lie.
[01:49:32] It means like a whole conspiracy front against yourself.
[01:49:38] Did you hear me?
[01:49:41] Yeah.
[01:49:42] That's ridiculous.
[01:49:43] No, it's not ridiculous.
[01:49:45] It's not ridiculous because I do have other news to do with any problem.
[01:49:49] No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
[01:49:51] I don't know.
[01:49:52] I don't know.
[01:49:53] I don't know.
[01:49:55] But they all dare.
[01:49:57] They are time sensitive in this sense that I do have to do them.
[01:50:00] So if I plan to do them before training, now I got to shift all that.
[01:50:05] Other stuff for like, you know, and there's other people involved.
[01:50:08] That's not what I mean.
[01:50:10] Anyway.
[01:50:11] So it's usually the case.
[01:50:12] But look if we're all known.
[01:50:13] It's going to fall you down the path and it's kind of be a good.
[01:50:18] You're right.
[01:50:21] That's the thing.
[01:50:22] And now they're, I know it's so funny.
[01:50:23] Yeah, this is the truth.
[01:50:24] This is this bad.
[01:50:25] This is this good actually at the end of this.
[01:50:27] So I'll have a lot of see this situation.
[01:50:30] Yeah, I'm telling you and you're like laughing at me and telling me how I'm lying to myself.
[01:50:34] That this situation goes on in a lot of ways with me with everyone.
[01:50:38] But yeah, but you're going to confess right now.
[01:50:41] I'm confessing this.
[01:50:42] So when I tell you like out loud stuff and some of the stuff is like,
[01:50:47] I just start telling you and just the work of your face and like,
[01:50:50] I know the answer already.
[01:50:51] And I know already.
[01:50:52] And this is one of those things we're before I got into it.
[01:50:55] I was like, for real committed to it.
[01:50:56] Like, this is like true.
[01:50:57] That's how it is.
[01:50:58] And this is the reason.
[01:50:59] And sometimes I'll come train with you guys.
[01:51:01] You know, when I do all this work to shift it around,
[01:51:03] but if I were to just shift it around and be like,
[01:51:05] that's the new schedule, like I could do it.
[01:51:08] It's a mirror.
[01:51:09] I'm asking.
[01:51:12] Alright, Brad.
[01:51:13] See.
[01:51:14] You know what I just realized is very good, a very,
[01:51:18] a very solid quality.
[01:51:19] And I've talked about, I always talk about people like everyone's allergic to criticism.
[01:51:24] Like everyone hates getting criticized.
[01:51:25] Like you tell me to do something different.
[01:51:27] What are you talking about?
[01:51:28] Yeah, yeah.
[01:51:29] You're actually very open to criticism.
[01:51:31] And I think part of it is because,
[01:51:33] well, maybe it's because when I criticize you,
[01:51:35] I'm not telling you like, I do what I do.
[01:51:37] I'm just saying, like, hey, you tell me what your reason is.
[01:51:40] And we'll figure out if you're, I just think you just figured out if you're alive yourself or not.
[01:51:43] You're over on my side of the table over here.
[01:51:46] We think we suspect,
[01:51:48] we're suspect of the statement.
[01:51:51] Yeah.
[01:51:52] It's very suspect.
[01:51:53] Alright, so.
[01:51:54] So there it is.
[01:51:55] Anyways, what the thing is,
[01:51:58] maybe we can adjust that, maybe we can,
[01:52:00] we can snuff out that lie, we can find all the truth isn't the truth is you should be training with your training.
[01:52:04] Your normal training partners.
[01:52:06] Yeah.
[01:52:07] On the Sunday.
[01:52:08] Whenever that, whenever that,
[01:52:10] that agreed upon time is out there.
[01:52:15] Ten of hearts nice.
[01:52:16] Love in a car accident.
[01:52:17] Ten of hearts nice.
[01:52:18] You know what's nice?
[01:52:20] It holds him.
[01:52:21] When he means the whole gym,
[01:52:23] I just empty.
[01:52:24] Oh yeah, I just just kidding.
[01:52:26] Just kidding after it.
[01:52:27] Yeah.
[01:52:28] Yeah, that is remember.
[01:52:30] Remember when we first opened this gym up and you were like,
[01:52:33] hey, we got new before the mats were all even in.
[01:52:35] And you were like, there's new mats downstairs.
[01:52:37] Remember that?
[01:52:38] Yeah.
[01:52:38] And then there was still some slippery.
[01:52:40] I wanted to test them out.
[01:52:42] Test the new mats.
[01:52:43] Yeah.
[01:52:44] And we were rolling for, like,
[01:52:45] pretty long as far as two guys rolling,
[01:52:47] and then you're like,
[01:52:49] isn't it just so awesome when you have your own gym?
[01:52:52] That's what you're doing.
[01:52:53] But in sure I was like,
[01:52:55] dang, man, that must be.
[01:52:56] Like, because it's like,
[01:52:57] you just had the whole bill, you know?
[01:52:59] Yeah.
[01:53:00] It is very nice.
[01:53:01] Just sure that is a nice thing now.
[01:53:03] Speaking of the juice.
[01:53:05] Okay, everyone, we're going to do juice too.
[01:53:06] That's what we're doing.
[01:53:07] If you're on the path or looking or interested,
[01:53:09] if the path is right for you,
[01:53:11] kind of situation.
[01:53:12] If someone's geek, curious.
[01:53:14] And it is, yeah.
[01:53:15] Yes.
[01:53:16] And you're doing just so you're going to need a geek.
[01:53:17] Because you can't just just do no geek as tempting as that might be.
[01:53:21] It is tempting.
[01:53:22] Do some geek.
[01:53:23] It's tempting until you say,
[01:53:25] what do you want to be so good in one thing,
[01:53:27] and it's being lost with something that's so close.
[01:53:30] Yeah.
[01:53:31] And they both complement each other.
[01:53:33] Yes.
[01:53:34] They really do.
[01:53:35] Yeah.
[01:53:36] They're around of geek in that peak.
[01:53:41] Yeah.
[01:53:42] Yeah.
[01:53:43] It was good.
[01:53:44] It did some good rounds.
[01:53:45] Good.
[01:53:46] Did two players out there.
[01:53:47] Yeah.
[01:53:48] It's some good times.
[01:53:49] But it was all geek.
[01:53:50] Sure.
[01:53:51] It was all geek.
[01:53:52] I told JPM like, hey, I'm not bringing a geek.
[01:53:54] And he's like, hey, just bring your belt.
[01:53:58] And I'll get you a geek if you need it just for the class.
[01:54:01] And you can roll a geek, no geek afterwards.
[01:54:03] So I'm like, okay, cool.
[01:54:04] And then I put the geek on how to geek.
[01:54:06] If he's one of his geek's pants,
[01:54:08] for two tight couldn't move my legs.
[01:54:11] Mm-hmm.
[01:54:12] Was it super ugly?
[01:54:14] No, it was an origin geek.
[01:54:17] Oh, well.
[01:54:18] Because one of the warrior geek, the lightweight ones.
[01:54:20] Yeah.
[01:54:21] Anyway, yeah.
[01:54:22] Yeah.
[01:54:22] You got a bunch of good rounds.
[01:54:23] Good.
[01:54:24] Always fun.
[01:54:25] Nikki, so yeah, you're going to need a geek.
[01:54:26] If you're on the path, and you start your jitsu,
[01:54:27] or you've already started your jitsu, you're going to need a geek.
[01:54:29] What kind of geek do you need?
[01:54:30] That's the question.
[01:54:31] That's always the question.
[01:54:32] You get an origin geek.
[01:54:33] Not a question.
[01:54:34] Not anymore.
[01:54:35] No.
[01:54:36] There it is.
[01:54:37] Boom question.
[01:54:38] Answered.
[01:54:39] OriginGeek.
[01:54:40] Go to originmain.com.
[01:54:41] That's where you get your geek.
[01:54:42] All made in America.
[01:54:43] All made in America.
[01:54:46] From beginning to end.
[01:54:47] Mm-hmm.
[01:54:48] There's some rash guards too for no geek.
[01:54:49] So boom, get them both, and get your jitsu established.
[01:54:54] Did you say rash guards?
[01:54:56] Yes.
[01:54:57] Okay.
[01:54:58] You got rash guards.
[01:54:59] And other, what do you call this normal clothes?
[01:55:01] Normal clothes.
[01:55:02] And I say a pairl one day, you like, that's, oh, that's not, not, not the thing to say.
[01:55:07] No, no, no, I said, I, I said a pairl to clear it with you.
[01:55:11] You said cool.
[01:55:12] No fashion.
[01:55:13] Yeah.
[01:55:14] Even though he, he has one pink in the fashion.
[01:55:17] Oh, no, he's got one.
[01:55:18] You got more than thing.
[01:55:20] He's got a whole art thing going on.
[01:55:22] Yeah.
[01:55:23] Respect.
[01:55:24] You know, his father and Lord Joe.
[01:55:25] What were you doing?
[01:55:26] Oh, yeah.
[01:55:27] We were taking the picture at the immersion camp.
[01:55:29] Yeah.
[01:55:30] And he started like, Pete started getting all, hey, you
[01:55:31] come over here a little bit.
[01:55:32] Hey, we need to.
[01:55:33] And it was really taking some artistic control in the situation.
[01:55:36] I said, Joe, I said, here comes the big artist guy coming out.
[01:55:39] Yeah.
[01:55:40] You know, laughing.
[01:55:41] Yeah, but yeah.
[01:55:42] So he's got more than just a pinky in there.
[01:55:45] Yeah.
[01:55:45] Both pink.
[01:55:46] He's at a minimum.
[01:55:47] Well, good.
[01:55:47] Because not everybody's like you and some people.
[01:55:48] They like that fashion element.
[01:55:50] Actually, I was going to talk to Pete about this.
[01:55:53] So Pete, he's listening right now.
[01:55:55] Sure.
[01:55:56] I was actually a very accurate statement when I said, when we had this conversation before,
[01:56:01] my ultimate goal of fashion is to make no impression.
[01:56:09] Yeah.
[01:56:10] And I guess that's completely the wrong thing to do.
[01:56:13] Yes, sir.
[01:56:14] But that's my thing.
[01:56:16] If you, I want my clothing to look in such a way that when you look at me, you just see,
[01:56:22] you know what you see?
[01:56:24] What?
[01:56:25] Normally normal.
[01:56:26] Okay.
[01:56:27] Just a film normal.
[01:56:28] Like just normal clothes.
[01:56:29] Like you wouldn't be able to say, I bet that guy.
[01:56:31] Now the exception that I have to ask, I got the victory of a T-shirt.
[01:56:34] That's your thing.
[01:56:35] Yeah.
[01:56:36] And the reason I have that is because I have a bunch of them.
[01:56:39] And I just wear the same thing every day.
[01:56:41] Yeah.
[01:56:42] So I have that little thing.
[01:56:43] But if you see me traveling when I'm not wearing T-shirt, I'm going to be wearing something
[01:56:47] where you just think, oh, this is just a normal person.
[01:56:50] Yeah.
[01:56:51] This person has no nothing.
[01:56:53] Right?
[01:56:54] No thing.
[01:56:55] Yeah.
[01:56:56] Well, so if you, I don't want to call this a mistake.
[01:57:01] But here's the thing that makes that it almost like an antiquated kind of scenario.
[01:57:06] Okay.
[01:57:07] Because you're like, my goal is, you said, my goal is to be normal, whatever.
[01:57:12] If that's your goal, your, your is not to make a statement, right?
[01:57:15] You know, you're, that's your fashion.
[01:57:18] Oh, that's your statement.
[01:57:20] So by just by way of your whole discourse, you're doing what you're trying to do.
[01:57:25] It's kind of like, um, well, I guess I, I guess what I, I guess I should have phrased it differently.
[01:57:30] What I normally would wear is just stuff that works.
[01:57:35] No one leaves.
[01:57:36] Although I guess, yeah, no, I guess there is, I guess in this day and age, you have to make some kind of an effort.
[01:57:44] So I guess in, you know, in a horrible way, I'm making some kind of a fashion effort.
[01:57:49] Yeah, no, you know what, you know who you are, though?
[01:57:51] This is what it feels like anyway.
[01:57:53] A day, however you want to explain this, what if you remember Bruce Lee when he was like on the boat.
[01:57:57] He was going to, I don't know which one it was.
[01:57:59] Another dragon made me, he's on the boat, right?
[01:58:01] Going over to wherever.
[01:58:03] Yeah.
[01:58:04] And the guy's like, what's your style?
[01:58:06] And he's like, my style is fighting without fighting.
[01:58:10] That's your style right there.
[01:58:12] It's fashion without fashion.
[01:58:14] Browse looking at old pictures of us.
[01:58:16] Yeah.
[01:58:17] Like, all like, I don't know, like, oh, no.
[01:58:19] Yeah.
[01:58:20] 10 or something.
[01:58:21] 10 years ago.
[01:58:22] Yeah.
[01:58:23] And work is like me, you, J, and I think, Tim was there.
[01:58:26] And then, you know, it's like whatever you being you.
[01:58:28] Same you by the way, same exact, like, joke, quote, normal face.
[01:58:31] And guess what you're wearing.
[01:58:33] Victory, T sure.
[01:58:34] Yeah.
[01:58:35] That's your whole uniform, right?
[01:58:36] I got a lot of women.
[01:58:38] It's, you know, you're straight forward.
[01:58:40] I dig it anyways.
[01:58:41] Fashion without fashion.
[01:58:42] That's a joke.
[01:58:43] Luckily Pete's got your back.
[01:58:44] Yeah.
[01:58:45] Well, this is cool because Pete also has a sense of that who else is making a black-on-black sweatshirt, right?
[01:58:52] There's no, you can't see the origin.
[01:58:54] I mean, you can see it, but you got it, you know?
[01:58:56] Yeah.
[01:58:57] You're not drawing attention to yourself.
[01:58:59] Yeah.
[01:59:00] I guess that's the thing, right?
[01:59:01] Trying to try attention to yourself.
[01:59:03] Yeah.
[01:59:04] Just be a little bit more laid back with that stuff.
[01:59:06] I feel like, yeah.
[01:59:07] Because cool for guys used to make fun of me at Seal Team 2.
[01:59:10] Because I had, that was when I was competing all the time.
[01:59:13] So I had like, and they suggested like the main thing you'd get from a GG tournament
[01:59:17] and a little cheesy metal and a T-shirt.
[01:59:19] I had all these, I had different T-shirt.
[01:59:22] I had different GG T-shirt.
[01:59:23] So there, guess what I was doing.
[01:59:25] Just wearing what I was given, but guess what?
[01:59:27] It kind of stood out.
[01:59:28] Yes.
[01:59:29] Yeah.
[01:59:30] Even though these all just free T-shirts.
[01:59:32] Yeah.
[01:59:33] Well, although I paid for the Hicks and Grayson,
[01:59:34] I had to have some Graystit T-shirt and paid some money for that one.
[01:59:37] That's cool.
[01:59:38] The old Peaco street academy.
[01:59:40] Some old school people remember that right now.
[01:59:42] Yeah.
[01:59:43] We were best in the West, best of the West.
[01:59:46] There was a judiciary.
[01:59:47] Yeah, I remember that, but that was little later.
[01:59:50] I'm talking old school grappling games.
[01:59:52] I'm talking Joe Morera.
[01:59:54] No.
[01:59:55] I'm talking about Graysee.
[01:59:57] The Graysee was a Graysee-invitational.
[02:00:00] Graysee Nationals.
[02:00:01] Graysee Nationals.
[02:00:02] I think it's, it's, it's, it's called the Graysee Nationals.
[02:00:04] Newtual grounds.
[02:00:05] The court is going old school.
[02:00:07] It's cool.
[02:00:08] It's cool.
[02:00:09] The limit to the charter.
[02:00:10] Oh, yeah.
[02:00:11] The hangman.
[02:00:12] I could go down memory lane with you.
[02:00:14] You know, it's not do it.
[02:00:15] But anyway, yeah, judiciary get, get origin, get all origin stuff for judiciary.
[02:00:20] That's, that's the spot to go.
[02:00:21] Even like the, the joggers and the sweats sweat stuff.
[02:00:25] Mm-hmm.
[02:00:26] Most comfortable in the world.
[02:00:27] Boom.
[02:00:28] Also supplements.
[02:00:29] You can get some supplements.
[02:00:31] Joint warfare.
[02:00:32] Getting some rave, the lake babbin.
[02:00:34] He said he went off joint warfare.
[02:00:36] Mm-hmm.
[02:00:37] I think he said four or five days.
[02:00:38] Whatever he's on the trip.
[02:00:40] Yeah.
[02:00:41] And he said his knees started hurting again.
[02:00:43] Hey, back.
[02:00:44] Went back on the joint warfare.
[02:00:46] Guess what?
[02:00:47] Knee healed up.
[02:00:48] I mean, he, I don't know.
[02:00:49] Healed, but it's no longer sore.
[02:00:51] Better.
[02:00:52] Yeah.
[02:00:53] Yeah, man.
[02:00:54] That's all.
[02:00:55] You know what's, you know, so fun is like me, I'm all like surprised.
[02:00:57] When it was, my experience just like, you know,
[02:00:59] obviously, it's surprised enough to tell you about it, you know, and just like me,
[02:01:03] where's like dang bro?
[02:01:04] I told him, I told him we put illegal stuff and joy.
[02:01:07] I told him I was like, hey man, don't tell anyone, but we put some little, we put some little,
[02:01:11] stick right on.
[02:01:12] Yeah.
[02:01:13] Yeah.
[02:01:14] And he was all lucky.
[02:01:15] He didn't eat it, probably, me for point three seconds, because he didn't really
[02:01:18] believe me that much, but then I was like, no, I'm just kidding man.
[02:01:20] But.
[02:01:21] Yeah.
[02:01:21] Anyway.
[02:01:22] Yeah.
[02:01:23] But nonetheless, isn't that supposed, isn't that odd though that we're all surprised,
[02:01:26] surprised?
[02:01:27] It's supposed to do that, you know?
[02:01:29] Like it's supposed to do these things.
[02:01:31] Yeah, but I think the level that it does it do is a little more,
[02:01:34] the what people expect.
[02:01:36] Yeah.
[02:01:37] There you go.
[02:01:38] Get on the crilloile too.
[02:01:40] Now, discipline.
[02:01:45] We've got some debates going on on whether Dave, you know, Dave Burke, could do,
[02:01:51] yeah.
[02:01:52] Whether he should be the actual representative, clearly he's a representative of discipline.
[02:01:58] Yes.
[02:01:59] But for milk and the full milk train, he's a little lean.
[02:02:04] Yeah, he's lean.
[02:02:05] He is the lean representative of milk.
[02:02:07] He's the before pick.
[02:02:09] That's cold blood.
[02:02:10] Well, I, you know, maybe if there's less than like weight, I don't want to get all big.
[02:02:17] Hey, Dave Burke, he's on the milk train fully on the milk train.
[02:02:21] Yeah.
[02:02:22] And he's not huge.
[02:02:23] Yeah.
[02:02:24] Well, well, let's break it down.
[02:02:26] So to me personally, I don't think Dave Burke should be the poster child for milk.
[02:02:32] Shouldn't be.
[02:02:36] Wait, is he trapped on your territory?
[02:02:38] That's not the class of the year anyway.
[02:02:40] I should have, I should have, I should have read into this more.
[02:02:43] So the idea, you know, you're the representative of the board.
[02:02:46] But technically, he could be technically, he could be.
[02:02:48] So what protein, right?
[02:02:49] Protein additional protein because, look, you work out, you lift, you work out, you do, you know, all this,
[02:02:55] actually hard exercise, boom protein is part of the recovery process.
[02:02:59] A big part of the recovery, home building blocks for lack of a better term, whatever.
[02:03:03] And boom, the milk comes in, boom, right?
[02:03:07] But the milk tastes good, right?
[02:03:09] So here, and here's this side note, this is why it's important for it to taste good.
[02:03:13] This may or may not go against your whole state.
[02:03:15] Actually, well, not a one, it won't, it won't.
[02:03:17] Seems like wood, but it tastes good.
[02:03:19] So let's say I'm like, I'm on the fence about working out.
[02:03:23] I don't know, you can't relate to that part, but let's say you are.
[02:03:25] I get it right.
[02:03:26] But then, you're like, wait, but when I work out,
[02:03:28] I can take the milk.
[02:03:30] So it like fits in, you know,
[02:03:32] it won. There's one with the other.
[02:03:34] That's the best thing.
[02:03:35] Yeah, no, there's guys that just thought just the supplements alone would get him to.
[02:03:38] Yeah, exactly, right? Yes.
[02:03:39] And that's part of the point.
[02:03:40] Because you don't, just, just so everyone knows, you don't have to work out to have milk.
[02:03:44] You can have milk without working, but it will taste better if you work out.
[02:03:47] Well, if you take milk or any, like, additional protein for the reason you take protein,
[02:03:52] I'm saying, and you don't work out, there's no reason to take it.
[02:03:56] True.
[02:03:57] So you'm saying, like any excess calories that are.
[02:03:59] Except for the fact that milk tastes good.
[02:04:02] Yeah, you can actually just take milk.
[02:04:04] Just like there's no reason to eat ice cream and then chocolate,
[02:04:07] you buy ice cream, except for a taste real good.
[02:04:08] Yeah, but that's the slippery slope, though, that's not the path.
[02:04:11] So officially, by the way, and we established this,
[02:04:13] this was, I think I was talking to Lief, but we'd,
[02:04:16] the opposite of the path is the slippery slope.
[02:04:18] Yeah.
[02:04:19] Okay, you can step off the path for 10 minutes for one day for one week,
[02:04:22] but keep in mind the more you're, the more time you spend off the path.
[02:04:25] You're going to slip a slippery slope.
[02:04:27] So boom, unless if your home mindset is to drink milk just because it tastes good,
[02:04:32] no exercise, no this, but you're, that's the wrong path.
[02:04:37] You're going in the wrong direction.
[02:04:39] Yeah, we'll speed by the way, but it's got a foot on the slippery slope at that point.
[02:04:43] Yeah, and you're kind of, you're facing the wrong way.
[02:04:46] Yeah, that tastes good.
[02:04:48] Boom, same reason.
[02:04:49] But you're not, you're, you're, you're,
[02:04:50] pizza you're two feet off.
[02:04:52] That's true.
[02:04:53] Milk, one foot on the path.
[02:04:55] Milk and working out, you're on the path.
[02:04:57] Okay, real quick, because we're getting crazy here.
[02:05:00] We got mentholca chip, we got peanut butter, chocolate,
[02:05:03] Dave works favorite, mentholca because it's my favorite.
[02:05:05] What's your favorite?
[02:05:06] Mint, mint, mint, mint.
[02:05:07] But you make some because you're psycho.
[02:05:09] Well, and then now new two new flavors are out, vanilla gorilla.
[02:05:14] And we got a chocolate, which is called The Darkness.
[02:05:20] We're not going to beat vanilla gorilla.
[02:05:23] I was like, hey, no, we need to make it vanilla gorilla.
[02:05:26] And then he, he like paused, we were texting.
[02:05:29] And he's like, wait, seriously.
[02:05:31] And I was like, yes, and he made a little crazy looking vanilla gorilla,
[02:05:34] a little white gorilla.
[02:05:36] So anyways, vanilla gorilla is the name.
[02:05:39] And the chocolate, of course, is called Darkness.
[02:05:41] And if you don't know, there are layers to both those comments.
[02:05:45] If you know about the darkness, then know that one.
[02:05:48] If you know, if you know life, when you can figure out the vanilla gorilla.
[02:05:52] Yeah, yes, these are all impeccable things.
[02:05:59] Kind of, yeah, impeccable, that might not be the correct word, but they are impeccable things to stand,
[02:06:04] keep you on the path.
[02:06:05] 100% indeed.
[02:06:06] 100% indeed.
[02:06:07] Also, chocolate's door is called Jocco Store.
[02:06:12] This is where you can get shirts and hoodies and hats.
[02:06:16] More rash cards, different feel, different, not physical feel, but different different.
[02:06:21] There was kind of this is pretty cool.
[02:06:23] At the roll call when we did Gigi to, there was people in the I've never done Gigi to before,
[02:06:30] area, they had rash cards.
[02:06:33] They had Jocco Store rash cards.
[02:06:35] They had Defcore rash cards.
[02:06:37] Yeah.
[02:06:38] And they had origin rash cards.
[02:06:40] Yeah.
[02:06:41] A lot of stuff, a lot of stuff.
[02:06:43] And you can just look at that one room, it was filled with a lot of stuff that's made in America,
[02:06:47] which is a big deal.
[02:06:48] There was.
[02:06:49] And that says a lot for someone who's never done Gigi to get, they have the rash cards.
[02:06:52] So that's kind of like, in a way, I don't want to say commitment necessarily because
[02:06:55] This means good stuff.
[02:06:56] I could admit, what if I bet you there was people there that said,
[02:06:59] I'm going to try the Gigi to and I'm going to continue down the path.
[02:07:03] Yeah.
[02:07:04] As people know, you got to get on the Gigi to path.
[02:07:06] Yeah.
[02:07:07] That's just part of the deal.
[02:07:08] Yeah.
[02:07:09] I think we'll have a guy question me.
[02:07:11] Yeah.
[02:07:12] Yeah.
[02:07:13] At the roll call.
[02:07:14] After we got done teaching, he's like, so is Gigi to the best thing to start with.
[02:07:20] As opposed to.
[02:07:21] Bop.
[02:07:22] Anything.
[02:07:23] I was like, yeah, man.
[02:07:26] We did you hear everything I just said.
[02:07:28] Come on, man.
[02:07:29] Yeah.
[02:07:30] Do it.
[02:07:31] Yeah.
[02:07:32] I said, what about, what about like striking though?
[02:07:35] And I said, well, you know, start with boxing, get to, get to, get to Mojitai when you get good at boxing.
[02:07:39] You can start opening it up a little bit.
[02:07:41] He's like, oh, should I start with that?
[02:07:42] I was like, no, because if I grab you, that's not going to work anymore.
[02:07:45] Right.
[02:07:46] And if some bad guy grabbed you, that's not going to work anymore.
[02:07:49] So anyways.
[02:07:50] Yeah.
[02:07:51] Yeah.
[02:07:52] I always try to put myself in like outside of my own brain.
[02:07:55] Because you know, when like, if someone asks me to touch them.
[02:07:58] Yeah.
[02:07:59] If they're like, hey, is Gigi to the best martial arm like not even the other options don't even
[02:08:04] enter.
[02:08:05] You know, it's just like, yes, yes, like constant.
[02:08:06] Yes, thing.
[02:08:07] But I'm like, wait, you know, let me.
[02:08:09] Let me consider this.
[02:08:10] You know, I'm like, try it.
[02:08:12] Let go of some of my bias.
[02:08:13] Anyway, back to Jockel store.
[02:08:15] We got some good stuff on there.
[02:08:16] If you want to represent the path, discipline equals freedom straight up.
[02:08:21] Because it does.
[02:08:22] It's the uniform for the path.
[02:08:23] It is.
[02:08:24] Yes.
[02:08:25] Yeah.
[02:08:25] That's a good way of putting it.
[02:08:26] Oh, it's a.
[02:08:27] There's the new discipline equals freedom shirt.
[02:08:30] Yeah.
[02:08:30] Sure.
[02:08:31] Is it different?
[02:08:31] No.
[02:08:32] Is it standing out?
[02:08:33] No.
[02:08:34] These things are all kind of, you know, it's just how.
[02:08:36] These are fashion items.
[02:08:37] Well, but they do make a stand.
[02:08:39] They do make a stand.
[02:08:40] They do make a stand.
[02:08:41] Yeah.
[02:08:42] Is that called to me to everything my friend?
[02:08:44] Yes, sir.
[02:08:45] There is.
[02:08:46] You know, yeah, if you want to represent, you want to represent in the wild.
[02:08:48] But they're, they're guys with the shirt that you design with my head on it.
[02:08:52] Yep.
[02:08:53] But I don't think I've ever felt more honored in my life.
[02:08:55] That was pretty good.
[02:08:57] It was pretty solid.
[02:08:58] Multiple people wearing the dang shirt.
[02:09:00] You decide not to.
[02:09:02] Design.
[02:09:03] For I guess you called the nag shirt.
[02:09:05] Yeah.
[02:09:06] Well, you know, now you're going to keep it.
[02:09:08] Anyway, if you want to represent jockelstore.com, also, if you want to support.
[02:09:15] A message, the word.
[02:09:16] What do you guys call it?
[02:09:17] Spreading the word?
[02:09:18] Or passing the word spread the word past the word.
[02:09:20] Pass the word.
[02:09:21] You want to pass the word.
[02:09:22] Subscribe to the podcast.
[02:09:23] On iTunes and Stitcher and wherever.
[02:09:25] You, I mean, seems obvious.
[02:09:26] But, you know, if you haven't subscribed, subscribe.
[02:09:28] And don't forget, don't forget about that war your kid podcast.
[02:09:31] Yes.
[02:09:32] Which is your, you're going to get learning lessons from it.
[02:09:36] For sure, your kids are going to dig it.
[02:09:38] And it's going to get your kids.
[02:09:39] Are we just going to talk about the path?
[02:09:41] Or it's going to get your kids on the path.
[02:09:42] Yes, as well.
[02:09:43] Which is awesome.
[02:09:44] I'll get the war your kids.
[02:09:46] So from Iris Oaks Ranch dot com.
[02:09:49] That's Aiden.
[02:09:50] He's a war your kid.
[02:09:52] He's got his own business.
[02:09:53] He's making soap.
[02:09:54] And that's awesome.
[02:09:56] From goat milk of goats that he raised himself.
[02:09:59] And then he, he, the whole process.
[02:10:01] He sent me all these pictures of it.
[02:10:02] What he actually does.
[02:10:03] He's got a man.
[02:10:04] He's got a man.
[02:10:06] You factoring thing going on.
[02:10:08] In America.
[02:10:09] Yeah, in America.
[02:10:10] By the way, goats.
[02:10:11] The goats are American goats.
[02:10:13] Yeah.
[02:10:15] Yeah.
[02:10:16] Also YouTube.
[02:10:17] We got the YouTube channel.
[02:10:18] And that is where that is where echoes legit videos are.
[02:10:23] And he's putting them up on a pretty regular basis.
[02:10:27] And he's got a plan in place to increase that even more.
[02:10:31] Sure.
[02:10:32] And as long as that fits his schedule.
[02:10:35] And then we got psychological warfare.
[02:10:40] That's an album with tracks of me talking and telling you why you should do something instead
[02:10:45] of not do something or why you should not do something instead of do something.
[02:10:48] How to stand the bad reason.
[02:10:50] Sleepy slope calls.
[02:10:51] There you go.
[02:10:52] So get on that.
[02:10:53] Yeah.
[02:10:54] That's available through all the places you can MP3s.
[02:10:57] Yeah.
[02:10:58] What about psychological warfare too?
[02:11:00] It's common.
[02:11:01] We're working on it.
[02:11:02] Yes sir.
[02:11:03] Also on it.
[02:11:05] .com slash jockel by the way.
[02:11:07] This is where you can get your other fitness gear.
[02:11:11] So remember back in the day we had the there's actually back.
[02:11:16] When you're explain the essentials of home home gym.
[02:11:19] Yes.
[02:11:20] Number one.
[02:11:21] So look when you're growing.
[02:11:22] Number one is rings.
[02:11:23] Which I got from on it by the way.
[02:11:24] Which actually the kids enjoy those two.
[02:11:26] Yeah.
[02:11:27] They're fun.
[02:11:28] Nice quality quality.
[02:11:29] And then the last one you're expanding your home gym in the event of you having a home gym.
[02:11:33] Or even if you don't have a home gym.
[02:11:35] This is where you can get the stuff to sort of begin that.
[02:11:38] Really good stuff on there.
[02:11:40] Cattle bells is my I would say that's my number one.
[02:11:43] Number one thing to have.
[02:11:45] That would be my recommendation.
[02:11:46] You say everything.
[02:11:47] You say rings.
[02:11:48] Can you pull up on kettle bells bro?
[02:11:49] No.
[02:11:50] No.
[02:11:51] I know.
[02:11:51] Wait.
[02:11:52] Do you like pull ups?
[02:11:53] I like pull up.
[02:11:54] Why can't really do now.
[02:11:55] You know what?
[02:11:56] In your game when you're when you're when you're 100%.
[02:11:58] Yeah.
[02:11:59] I mean, yes, but not like you like pull ups.
[02:12:00] Like it's in.
[02:12:01] How you have your.
[02:12:02] The ones you like.
[02:12:03] Like when I started kettle bells, I really like that.
[02:12:06] My thought is super fun.
[02:12:07] Because there's a lot.
[02:12:08] Anyway, they're fun.
[02:12:09] I get them from on it.
[02:12:10] And there's a lot of cool.
[02:12:11] Other cool stuff on there.
[02:12:12] So yeah, go on it dot com slash jaco.
[02:12:15] Also jaco white tea.
[02:12:17] You can get the tea bags or get the can.
[02:12:19] And when you get the tea bags or you get the can either one.
[02:12:22] It doesn't matter because what you get with that.
[02:12:24] You get a 8,000 pound deadlift 100% guaranteed.
[02:12:26] Although I did have one guy complain at roll call.
[02:12:29] His deadlifts only 7,400.
[02:12:32] So, I mean, yeah, he's probably, I told him to get after the harder.
[02:12:38] And then you got some books.
[02:12:39] Also the the tea is available on Amazon.
[02:12:42] And the store and jaco store.
[02:12:44] And jaco store.
[02:12:45] There you go.
[02:12:46] I figure ultimately you.
[02:12:47] We will unify.
[02:12:49] Yeah.
[02:12:50] Well, I guess the kind of the goal.
[02:12:52] The short term goes kind of make it just available.
[02:12:55] Yeah, like if you're going to grab a shirt, rash guard, whatever.
[02:12:58] And you're like, hey, let me grab tea too.
[02:12:59] Good point.
[02:13:00] Also I saw an Amazon store when we were in Dallas or not.
[02:13:03] Not Amazon store.
[02:13:04] And Amazon, like obvious shipping facility.
[02:13:07] Mm-hmm.
[02:13:08] This thing was.
[02:13:09] Huge.
[02:13:11] I was surrounded by trucks that were backed up to it.
[02:13:16] You know, loading docks.
[02:13:17] Mm-hmm.
[02:13:18] It was crazy.
[02:13:19] There's totally nuts.
[02:13:20] And I was like in there somewhere.
[02:13:22] There's a little bit of jaco white tea.
[02:13:24] Getting ready to roll out and increase somebody's deadlift.
[02:13:27] And maybe I'll do it.
[02:13:28] Yeah.
[02:13:29] That's what it looks like.
[02:13:30] They all said books in there.
[02:13:32] Yeah.
[02:13:33] Jaco books.
[02:13:34] Jaco books.
[02:13:35] Yes.
[02:13:36] They had way to work.
[02:13:37] Mm-hmm.
[02:13:38] You think they had that one?
[02:13:39] I know.
[02:13:40] They absolutely do.
[02:13:41] They had the field manual.
[02:13:43] So the way to work it and Mark's mission.
[02:13:45] I signed so many of those books at roll call.
[02:13:49] And of like, personal messages to the kids and everything.
[02:13:53] The kids are getting on the path.
[02:13:55] This is factual.
[02:13:57] Mm-hmm.
[02:13:58] Awesome.
[02:13:59] So get the books for your kids and get them a pull-up bar and get them a jajitsu class.
[02:14:06] Because that's what they're going to want to do.
[02:14:08] And those two things are going to help them through their entire life.
[02:14:11] Yeah.
[02:14:12] They're in entire life.
[02:14:13] Yeah.
[02:14:14] And that's actually a good head's up.
[02:14:15] Because like if you're like, hey, you already got the pull-up bar.
[02:14:18] And like they just took classes scouted out, you know, and then so you're just ready.
[02:14:21] You're ready for the request.
[02:14:22] Because your kids are going to be, they're going to want to get on the path.
[02:14:26] Yeah.
[02:14:27] And I think it was you who's telling this to where I was reading the part where you have to fix up his bike.
[02:14:33] They ought to want to spoil or spoil anything.
[02:14:35] But anyway, he needed money.
[02:14:38] Okay.
[02:14:39] He needed money.
[02:14:40] So he's like, hey, to get money, you got to get a job.
[02:14:43] And you know, it lays out the whole thing.
[02:14:45] All the layers of things is pretty good.
[02:14:47] So right after I was done with that chapter, my five-year-old daughter by the way.
[02:14:51] Oh, because she kind of sits back almost disappointed looking.
[02:14:55] She goes, she goes, I always shy had a job.
[02:14:58] I was like, oh, hey, I don't think I was feeling a work ethic into a kid that's five years old.
[02:15:03] About wanting to work and wanting to have a job and wanting to, that's just like legit.
[02:15:09] Yeah.
[02:15:10] So get those books.
[02:15:11] Where the work, get marks mentioned.
[02:15:14] You can also get the discipline equals freedom field manual.
[02:15:17] I was under tone of those.
[02:15:19] Yeah.
[02:15:20] Again, there's some people that that book hit them hard.
[02:15:26] Yeah.
[02:15:27] Hard.
[02:15:27] And they made some significant changes in their lives.
[02:15:30] So everyone that came up to me and told me that, thank you.
[02:15:32] And I appreciate that feedback.
[02:15:34] And it's awesome to see that book hitting people the way that it hit me when I wrote it.
[02:15:42] Yeah.
[02:15:43] And it's awesome to see.
[02:15:45] In fact, that beginning part is what you're reading today, there is no hack.
[02:15:51] Yep.
[02:15:52] There's no sweatless, uh, pursue, this sweatless pursuit, sweatless direction.
[02:15:59] Yeah.
[02:16:00] Definitely.
[02:16:01] And then, of course, there's extreme ownership, which is written by me and my brother, Leipabin.
[02:16:08] Combat leadership for using your business and life.
[02:16:13] And we also have this week just released.
[02:16:16] So this, this is live now at this time, order it immediately.
[02:16:22] The dichotomy leadership.
[02:16:23] A couple reviews already up there because some people got some advanced copies.
[02:16:27] Awesome reviews.
[02:16:28] Everyone is stoked, including me and life.
[02:16:31] You know, we wrote it and, you know, we'd added each other.
[02:16:34] And it'd be like, bro, nice chapter.
[02:16:36] Like, bro, nice chapter.
[02:16:37] I'm like, hey, you know, so yeah.
[02:16:40] Yeah, we, we critique each other and edit each other.
[02:16:45] So, uh, the book is, it just takes it to another granular level.
[02:16:49] That's what it does.
[02:16:50] Takes it down to another granular level.
[02:16:53] I think, and some people are saying that there are more people going to get more out of that economy.
[02:16:59] Leadership than they did in our extreme ownership.
[02:17:01] Hmm.
[02:17:02] They definitely compliment each other.
[02:17:04] But there's a lot to be learned.
[02:17:08] A lot of the mistakes that people make are going to be corrected through the dichotomy of leadership.
[02:17:13] Yeah.
[02:17:14] Yeah, because you know, when people make a change in their whatever, you know, they make,
[02:17:18] it's like, what do you actually, your, the first of my heard this over-corrected.
[02:17:22] Over-corrected.
[02:17:23] Yes, yes.
[02:17:24] People will over-correct all the time and they throw off the balance of the dichotomy of leadership.
[02:17:29] Yeah.
[02:17:30] And so when you read the dichotomy of leadership, you'll become aware of that.
[02:17:33] You'll see what the signs are and you'll be able to correct them.
[02:17:35] And this is going to, this is going to really help out leaders in the world.
[02:17:39] So dichotomy of leadership available now.
[02:17:41] I mean, I think of that.
[02:17:43] This book's been in the work for a long time.
[02:17:46] And now it's out.
[02:17:47] It's released.
[02:17:48] It's in the wild.
[02:17:49] Hmm.
[02:17:49] So get some, get some for your people you work with.
[02:17:53] We appreciate that support.
[02:17:56] And then, of course, we've got a leadership company.
[02:17:59] Leadership consulting company, Esslant Front, a We-Solve leader.
[02:18:03] We solve problems through leadership.
[02:18:05] That's what we do.
[02:18:06] It's me.
[02:18:07] It's Lave Babin, JPDNL, Dave Burke, Flynn Cochran, Mike Surelli.
[02:18:10] We also got Mike Bahamon.
[02:18:12] Did you do you were there for Mike Bahamus part of Rolkall?
[02:18:15] Meingun Mike?
[02:18:16] Meingun Mike.
[02:18:17] I'm going to play that.
[02:18:19] That's like a new Marty.
[02:18:21] Yeah.
[02:18:22] So we got another member, Army retired tenant Colonel, who is with us in the battle or
[02:18:27] Marty, a company commander, then tanker and badass.
[02:18:34] If you want, if you need help, leadership at your company with your team, whatever it may be,
[02:18:39] go to Esslantfront.com.
[02:18:41] We've also got the Master coming up.
[02:18:42] Rolkall's done.
[02:18:43] Sorry you missed it.
[02:18:44] It was awesome.
[02:18:45] Come next time.
[02:18:47] In the meantime, Master 006 San Francisco October 17, 19th.
[02:18:53] We're danger close right now.
[02:18:55] If you hear this podcast and you listen to it on, you know, in September, hopefully, maybe,
[02:19:01] I don't know, check the website, extremlororship.com, all of them sold out or danger
[02:19:06] close on this one.
[02:19:07] But check it out.
[02:19:08] We can just sometimes squeeze in a few more seats.
[02:19:10] And of course, we also have EF Overwatch. EF Overwatch.com.
[02:19:14] This is for businesses, for businesses that want leaders, tested, battle-tested, special
[02:19:23] operations, leaders from the special operations community or from a combat aviation community.
[02:19:29] You want those people, those leaders at your business.
[02:19:34] Go to EF Overwatch.com.
[02:19:36] That we are.
[02:19:37] We have our friends, our colleagues, people we know, our connections inside the special
[02:19:43] operations and inside the combat aviation community.
[02:19:46] They're trained, they're ready, and they will come and help your business through
[02:19:52] solid leadership.
[02:19:54] Again, that's EF Overwatch.com.
[02:19:58] And if you want to keep communicating with us, then you can do it through the
[02:20:04] in-webs, through Twitter, perhaps through Instagram or on the FACC.
[02:20:13] Bwah.
[02:20:16] Echo is at Echo Charles and I am at Jocca Whilling and thanks.
[02:20:20] It's all of you that make this podcast possible.
[02:20:25] And that's not some big corporate sponsor.
[02:20:27] No, it's the military personnel around the world that keep our country free.
[02:20:33] It's all the first responders out there.
[02:20:35] Police law enforcement, correction officers, firefighters, border patrol,
[02:20:39] paramedics, all of you that keep us safe on the home front.
[02:20:43] Thanks to all of you for what you do.
[02:20:45] And everyone else, it's out there.
[02:20:48] Thank you for listening.
[02:20:50] Thank you for spreading the word.
[02:20:52] Thank you for supporting what we do.
[02:20:54] But most of all, thanks for telling yourself the truth.
[02:20:59] Thanks for not looking for that sweatless solution or that easy road.
[02:21:05] Because the sweatless solution and the easy road don't exist.
[02:21:12] To get on the path and to stay on the path that gets you to where you want to be.
[02:21:17] There is going to be sweat and there's going to be hard work and there's going to be discipline.
[02:21:23] And you are going to have to look at yourself and tell yourself the truth.
[02:21:31] And then, of course, you're going to have to get after it.
[02:21:39] And until next time, this is Echo and Jocco out.
[02:21:46] Thank you.